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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

A Religious and Sociological Quarterly

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
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THE PASSAGE FROM MIND TO MATTER. ✓

BY PROFESSOR JACOB COOPER, D.C.L., LL.D.

THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE passage from the world without to that within us is the problem which in some form has ever confronted philosophy. The impossibility of two apparently disparate powers acting on each other is disproven by the fact of their constant interaction, which is the basis and indispensable condition of all knowledge of material nature. The common-sense of mankind is in accord with that philosophic view, which has generally prevailed since men began to examine their own thoughts, that there are two sorts of being in the world,—Mind and Matter; for this Dualistic theory agrees with phenomena, and requires no effort to accept because it appeals both to sense-perceptions and the deductions we derive from them. Consciousness reveals to us an agent which we call ourselves. This receives impressions from something without which we know to be different from the Ego both in position and mode of action. The mind, acting on these sense-perceptions by a power which belongs to itself, discovers the modes by which this external something acts upon it, systematizes these modes of action, terms them laws of matter; and in

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turn employs these laws to gain insight, in order to control that part of the world with which we come in touch.

While the Dualistic view has been the prevailing one, there have been many profound thinkers who held to Monism, i.e., that all Reality is one. On this theory the apparent difference between what are called mind and matter does not at bottom indicate diverse essences, but the same under different manifestations. But this view as held hitherto requires a diversity in the mode of action so great that it involves virtually the same Dualism as the other, which recognizes two essentially different agents. For there is necessarily a passage from one factor to the other, a bridge to be crossed of equal width whether the factors which act on each other are disparate in their nature or only in phenomena. For one is active, the other passive; the one conscious subject, the other unconscious object; the one commands, the other obeys; and, in order to effect this, there must be a passage from one to the other, whatever be the space between them. In the strictest Monism of Sankhya philosophy, according to which the outward world is wholly illusory, the phenomena which the mind perceives are not the mind itself, but impressions conveyed to it by the "five gateways of knowledge." It is evident that such an explanation of Nature is a paralogism. For, if there be illusion, there must be something to cause, and something to receive, the illusion; if there be gateways of knowledge for even deception to enter, these must come from somewhere and be caused by something. For, if the mind deceived itself, the deception could not come through any gate. The senses would have no office in the bringing of illusion; the mind would have nothing to interpret but its own thoughts; and any other knowledge than of the mind itself would be impossible. It is therefore undeniable, that, according to the strictest Monism, the mind is the actor, and the phenomena, no matter how illusory,

are the materials acted upon; and the two must in some way be brought together.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY, DUALISTIC.

In the Greek philosophy, which is the highest exponent of human thought, however its speculations be modified, it was assumed that the mind is a factor which acts on something different from itself. This is alike true in the crass materialism of Democritus and the refined idealism of Plato. For, in the process of thought, the mind in some way acted and was acted upon, which implied two agents or factors. If they were both material, they occupied different spaces; if they were spiritual, one was in so gross a form that the other could never act properly until it got completely free from its trammels.¹ So, in every conceivable interpretation of sense-perception, consciousness reveals a distinction between that which makes the impression and that which receives it; and hence the problem still confronts us, how to explain the mode of this intercommunication. This is the stumbling-block standing at the threshold of all speculation, demanding some explanation, or compelling the admission of ignorance. None of the solutions from the dawn of speculation till the researches of Carpenter or Virchow, by their own confession, bring us any nearer to that which is essential in the process. The explanations are in every case talking round, rather than directly at, the question. We may enumerate the methods of treatment as follows:—

A. THEORY OF DUALISM.

Those made on the assumption that mind and matter are diametrically opposed; not differing in degree merely,

¹ Plato, *Phædo*, 80 E.; 81 A. St., ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μὴδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυμφέλκουσα, ὅτε οὐδὲν κοιωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φείγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροσμένη αὐτὴ εἰς αὐτήν—τοῦτο δεοῦδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα, κ.τ.λ.

but having nothing in common. This is distinctively Dualism; and gives us at least the satisfaction that we can see what is attempted; that is, to explain how things utterly opposed can have any commerce together. For it is known, by constant experience, that this does take place; and this fact is a perpetual challenge to explain how and where this is effected. Four different theories have been held, to explain this process: 1. Occasional causes, or the direct intervention of God in each act; 2. Preëstablished harmony between the actions of mind and matter; 3. Plastic medium; 4. Physical influence. But these all fail at the very point where an explanation is needed. They profess to tell what causes the interaction, but not how it is done. The difficulty, or rather impossibility, of a solution from this point of view has led to Monism; which, very often, has been expressed in the form of pure Materialism, where the process of sensation and its elaborated product, thought, are explained by mechanical means, without any potency or action existing anywhere apart from movement among the particles of matter composing the compound organism. While there are motions among the molecules of the brain, they are automatic; wholly spontaneous in receiving and acting upon sense-perception in the elaboration of thought. Consciousness seems to testify that sense-perception is the result of action by external nature upon our bodily organism. That there should be a consciousness is, however, surreptitiously assumed by the materialist, because it is contrary to our *a priori* conceptions and our whole experience, that matter can think or move itself. Another agent is imperatively demanded. It is only by doing violence to words in their common acceptation as the vehicles of thought, that we can conceive a machine to move itself. Pure material Monism is the folly of perpetual motion, the *bête noire* of science, called in for the explanation of mental action.

There is no analogy discernible from experience which permits a resolution of the thinking process into the independent action of matter to achieve a purpose. For all physical science deals with the application of force by an intelligence acting *ab extra*; and assumes matter to be merely the instrument through which it is transmitted or applied.

B. THEORY OF MONISM.

In the forms of Monism, whether we view it as denying the reality of an external world, as taught by the Indian and the Chinese philosophy, or the pure Idea of Hegel developing itself, a similar difficulty occurs. It denies our experience, and does violence to our common-sense. We are quite as sure of our material organism, as an instrument of action, as we are that we can think, will, and direct our energies to a definite result. For how could we influence our bodies to action, and achieve our purposes through that action, from the simplest bodily movement to the most complicated results of science, if these material organs did not exist? The result achieved demonstrates the certain existence of the factors employed. That there are two factors always necessary for action, i.e., the machinery and the power to propel it, is undeniable; save by such a subversion of our modes of thought and action as would prove the postulate of agnosticism to be absurd, by its efforts to establish its own doctrine. And that these two act in concert, so that the one is the agent of the other, is unquestionable. How nearly alike must be the material and the immaterial, if they are different, is seen in the close resemblance between the animal life and the power of thought. But still they must, in their present constitution, be different, even if they are not disparate; as may be seen in the case of the idiotic, who have the one factor in complete activity, while wholly destitute of the other. So, again, from disease or other sources of bodily weakness,

the physical may be reduced almost to zero, while the mind is active as ever. Certainly we must admit that this sensual power of action does not correspond, but is frequently in inverse ratio. But, as there is always some partnership, some interaction, as a condition of life, there is an apparent bridge on any system of perception which has ever been advocated. When the last word has been said by Tyndall, Dubois-Reymond, and Virchow, that the metaphysics of the mind is as far from explanation on any psychological movement of cells or automatic action of matter as when the subject was discussed by Democritus, we may be sure that the manner of this metaphysical and physical interaction is yet a Gordian knot.

WHERE IS THE POINT OF TRANSITION BETWEEN THE
MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL?

Strenuous efforts have been made by psychologists to locate the mysterious point where sensation passes over into perception. General consent fixes upon the brain as the ganglionic head-center which the information derived from the senses reaches, and where it is changed, by some new and different process, into immaterial thought. The particular part of the brain where this wedlock of mind and matter produces issue has been diligently sought. The Pineal gland has been fixed upon by some speculators, while others thought they had found its seat in different places. But it is scarcely necessary to say, that all their efforts have been absolutely fruitless, except to make the ignorance of psychology more manifest by renewed failures. The results are not a whit more satisfactory than the crude physiology of Homer in making the midriff the seat of the intellect, or the general consent of the classical world which made the viscera—bowels—the seat of the affections. They are but gropings in the dark, the efforts of inquiring minds to satisfy themselves by trying to local-

ize the action of the immaterial in the same way as we do the material instrument. If we proceed on the theory that mind and matter are entirely disparate, and yet that they do meet and act on each other, it is entirely natural to think that the mind must be confined somewhere within the extent of that body which it uses as its means of phenomenal action. This appears rational at first sight, on the principle that nothing can act where it is not; which statement must be clearly defined before we can pronounce on its validity. For, as the mind seems to be indissolubly connected with the body, and to direct its movements whenever they are rational and purposive, it would follow that the mind is somewhere, if not everywhere, within it. Few, perhaps none, will be found to question the substantial correctness of this view, whether they be materialists or idealists; whether they believe that the so-called activities of intellect be merely the movement of the molecules of the brain and nerves, acting without any power save what their uncaused and undirected action generates; or these molecular movements are excited by the action of an immaterial principle, and they are only the phenomena marking the presence and degree of power caused by a metaphysical energy,—in either case that which we call mind is localized within the bounds of the bodily structure.

THE TRUE THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

It is just here that we take our point of departure: modestly, as befits one who advocates a view at variance with the whole course of speculative thought, yet with a confidence, which results from conviction, that the new hypothesis will account for a greater number of facts, and encounter fewer obstacles, than any other theory. That there are obstacles in the way of any hypothesis when first broached follows from the nature of the case. For, if it encountered no obstacles, it would not be new, since it

would already have adapted itself to the accepted ideas of mankind, and to call it new would be a contradiction in terms. Besides, there could be no theory devised which would explain every fact connected with it, because, in a universe, every force or particle of matter influences all the rest; and to account for the mutual action of each factor in Nature would require omniscience. With these caveats, not as an excuse for venturing upon an entirely new path of speculation, but acknowledgment of its inevitable difficulties and the probability of objections which may be raised, we proceed to our new theses.

I. The mind cannot be localized. It is not confined in its action by the limits of time or space, nor bound by the chain of causality.

II. It is omnipotent and omnipresent in a relative sense; which, without involving any contradiction, is the condition of every finite thing—omnipotent within the sphere of its power, omnipresent within the extent of its action.

III. Mind and matter are one substance, differing only in the relative subtlety of their composition, and are transferable into their equivalents without loss or limitation.

IV. Therefore, they act on each other directly and immediately, and no bridge is required for them to cross.

I. THE MIND CANNOT BE LOCALIZED.

Those holding the theory that mind and matter are diametrically opposed in their essence, have made most strenuous efforts, as has been noted, to localize the former. But these attempts have arisen from a misapprehension of its real nature. For, according to the commonly accepted view, it is not subject to the conditions of matter. It cannot be apprehended by the senses. It submits to none of the standards of weight, measure, or physical power. Except as it knows itself intuitively, it can be apprehended only by the phenomena it causes; and in this fact shows

itself akin to all power in its essential nature. It is meta-physical—that is, above, beyond Nature, which is disclosed to us by mechanical means. If it had any of the attributes of matter, it would certainly submit to some of the tests by which the material world is made known to us. But it persistently eludes every effort to seize or retain it. Even physical force, which is so subtle that it can be known only by what it does, and not what it is in itself, can in no way interfere with the mind's action. For it laughs at bands, and rises superior to sufferings and death. Nor has a single one of the properties by which matter can be grasped any resemblance, as far as we can discern, to the essence of mind. And it will not do to argue from our ignorance and say, Because we do not know any other way of measuring its essence than by material standards, therefore it must be estimated by them.

But it may be said that the mind is somewhere in the body; else it could not employ this as an instrument of action. This is true, if we confine its action to those influences which it exerts through the material organ. Material phenomena must be produced through the agency of material organs, in order to be apprehended by any of our senses. But our senses do not measure force; only its results. We have not the least conception what force is *per se*—where or how it acts. We cannot tell how a blow is transmitted through a bar of iron from the place of impact to that where it acts upon another body. How does the electricity pass from the dynamo through the wire to the machinery it sets in motion? How does the current gathered by the battery move through the cable, bearing with it the energy which elaborates intelligence after passing under seas and over continents? Is this energy in part of the wire at one time, or in all of it simultaneously? So, when mind employs a material organ, as far as that organ is concerned—its action is localized and rendered phenom-

enal, for the apprehension of some other mind which, in a similar way, is rendered local. We see that one mind becomes confined in its action for the sake, not of another which is free from spatial and temporal conditions, but of one which is localized like itself. But this does not tell us where the force is in itself.

FORCE NOT CONDITIONED BY SPACE.

We gather up electricity by the dynamos and store it, in order to serve us by acting through material agents to supply our material wants. This energy as it exists free in nature does not show itself to our senses. When it is confined or localized by allying itself to material, whether in the raindrop or the evolution of heat by motion, then it may be so concentrated that it seeks to free itself in the lightning's flash, or by dissipation through the machinery which is effecting its appointed task, and so return to its normal condition of invisibility and intangibility. The electricity exists before it is gathered. It is not really generated, though in loose language we thus speak. It is imprisoned by a kindred subtle influence, the mind of man, when it makes its place and quantity manifest by its action through material instruments. What if the mind is connected by speculation with the nerve matter in the head? As a force it must have been somewhere before it became manifest through the vibration of the brain molecules. For, if the doctrine of the Conservation of Force be true,—and no law of science can be better established, either on *a posteriori* or *a priori* proof,—the mind, like any other force, for it is assuredly a force, whether viewed as mechanical by the materialist, or ideal by the metaphysician,—then the quantity of force exhibited as a mental power has never been increased or diminished. This force, then, existed free in the universe, and became to a certain extent localized when joined to its material companion. It is a

prime condition of a world of sensible phenomena, that force should act through a material medium, in order to be apprehended by material organs. In this sense we are justified in attaching mind to matter, and so localize it, in order to confine its work, and render it subject to the conditions of a material world. Hence the mind as a force antedates its union with a material body; and, according to an inborn belief in human nature, as well as the teachings of every form of that which purports to be a revelation from a higher wisdom, it will survive the dissolution of the compound, and be henceforth untrammelled by any conditions of locality. But whether we be materialists or idealists, it is equally necessary that what is known as mental action be through material organisms; and when these work, the power that propels and guides them must be where they work, provided their activities become phenomenal.

BUT FORCE MAY BECOME PHENOMENAL WHEN LOCALIZED.

But this is a condition of their union, and does not disclose the action of either *per se*. The body acts in a certain way while life lasts, and is directed by intelligence. When the severance we call death takes place, the materials of which the body is composed come at once under other forces, which begin disintegration. Hitherto the phenomenal action was integration through organic action. Now all is reversed. Some change has taken place which the materialist is bound to acknowledge. There is some kind of movement among the cells of the brain and all the rest of the body. There are forces at work of a very energetic kind, but wholly diverse from those manifested in life. Hence it is most emphatically clear that the power which previously controlled is no longer in any part of the body. For factors of an entirely different character are now in possession of the workshop, and acting

with such industry and efficiency that very soon there is no organ which the previous tenant could use, were it to return. Some power has departed which acted through this organism hitherto. Now if the doctrine of the Conservation of Force be regarded as a scientific truth, that force called Mind is, at all events, no longer localized. It is still a force, but set free from all material trammels so far as its previous habitation is concerned. It can doubtless exhibit its power in ways appropriate to its new order of existence, but it no longer submits to the testimony of our senses.

FORCE DIVERSE IN ESSENCE AND IN MANIFESTATION.

We must never forget that force is one thing in its essence and another in its manifestations. The latter are the result of material agents in action; and, in order to act in such a way as to be grasped by the senses, they must be employed by some material instrument. But they must exist *per se* before they can be made to manifest themselves through mechanical appliances. Electricity, heat, any of the mechanical forces, must exist before they are appropriated by the material agents through which they do their work under man's direction. The wire at one instant holds no electricity. Again it is charged by a battery. This power then is transferred, and there is a condition for phenomenal action. The force is stored somewhere in the wire for work, but cannot be localized further than this; for it will act from one part of the wire as well as another, provided this be of uniform material and make. And that part of the force which escapes—for it is a significant fact that all power which is collected and temporarily confined for use seeks to escape—reunites itself with that unlimited quantity which is free in the universe. This force in its essence, therefore, cannot be assigned to any part of the conductor or instrument through which it

is used; but in this limited sphere is omnipresent. The time required for its transmission depends upon the material through which it moves. Its own motion seems to be instantaneous, provided it is not impeded by the medium of transmission. We can see this hypothesis verified in the case of gravity. This acts in all directions alike; is instantaneous in its movements, or so nearly so that our senses can detect no interval. By analogy derived from such experiments as bear most directly on the case, we are assured that both heat and light act in every direction alike from their source, and that it is only the material through which they are transmitted that hinders them from acting at all distances, to which their power extends, at once. Like to the essence of material forces is the action of mind. It can be conceived as entirely free, or impeded by the obstruction of the medium through which it acts. By itself it requires no time.

PSYCHICAL FORCE NOT CONDITIONED BY TIME.

The experiments of physiology, which tell us that time is required for the transmission of intelligence through the sense organs to the brain, and then to be quickened into mental action, all go to prove that it is the material which requires time for the manifestation of the impression which is conveyed to the mind and changed into thought or action. The afferent or efferent nerves are parts of a material organism which acts in time and space; but experiments in psychology go to prove that the mind itself is subject to no such conditions. We can think at once of any event, how far soever it may be removed from the *now* and the *here*. The geologist tells us of an age in the world's history when its whole material was star-dust or incandescent gas. We can place ourselves at the point to view this remote period as quickly as we can portray a scene enacted but a moment ago. The whole time in fu-

ture, as far as our powers can conceive, may be placed before our thought in like manner. So that it is clear that in the matter of time the action of the mind is in no wise affected by the interval between that which is remote and that which is near. So, as to space, psychical action *per se* is not confined. We can place ourselves in thought in an instant upon a star so remote that the light which started from it when Adam was placed in Eden has not yet reached us. Hence, as thought is the appropriate work of the mind, we see that its power when it works alone is wholly free from space and time conditions. And in this respect it seems to be akin to all pure power, no matter what modification this may assume. Their action is kindred; which fact argues an identity in essence that can manifest itself in unlimited applications.

INFORMATION FOR A MATERIAL AGENT MUST COME
THROUGH MATERIAL MEANS.

It is an undoubted fact that we gain information from the five or more gateways of knowledge. And, as these act through an organism for the manifestation of a life composed of two factors, so long as they compose an unity for work, the one will, so far as that unity has a purpose, be dependent in some measure upon the other. Science is built up by experiment, and this means that the mind elaborates the information gained in this way into reasoned truth. As an organism, which, for the period of life, is subject to material conditions, and which achieves results through material means, the soul and body conspire in mental action. There is undoubtedly coöperation, and therefore there must be an interchange of signals between the two factors which are necessary to the action of a material agent. But the question now is, whether this is not the result of our dual constitution, and the consequent necessity that the power, so far as it acts with the material

agent, be subject to its limitation. The stronger power must condescend to the weaker in their interaction. But can they not to a degree, even during their union, act separately? There are unconscious bodily functions which go on without assistance from the directing intelligence. There are grosser appetites which may be placed on a par with the functions of mere animal or vegetable growth. There is a perpetual conflict between the desire of the spirit to be pure, and the body to minister to its impure appetites. So there are, as we have seen, pure intellectual actions during which the mind is not in the least subjected to the conditions of time or space. In the higher forms of reasoning, as exemplified in dealing with abstract conceptions, or the first principles of all sciences, the mind acts without being dependent upon the functions of sense. The more subtle and recondite be the processes, the less do they need information or suggestion from the movement of the senses. Pure *a priori* conceptions are undoubtedly the result of the mind's independent power; for no action of the senses can furnish a mathematical axiom or a universal logical conception. To arrive at such the mind acts entirely by its native strength, and shows its ability to attain unaided those fundamental truths which lie at the bottom of all our knowledge. It was the life-work of Kant to establish the truth that the mind possesses this power, and by doing so he cut up pure sensational philosophy by the roots, and silenced for all time the sophistries of Lucretius and Hume. Thus it is clear, that, if the mind can act by itself, it can act in one place or time as well as another; and is subjected to spatial and temporal conditions, only because it must be allied to matter in order to deal with material agents in producing phenomena. When the alliance with a material nature shall have served the purpose of discipline, for which the present life appears to be especially intended, then the separation will take place,

and the mind be free from the impediments of a carnal nature. But revelation¹ teaches us that it shall be united to another body suited to its enlarged capacities. That which is of the earth is earthy; but there are bodies terrestrial and bodies celestial. Physical science teaches us that there is no conceivable limit to the subtilizing of matter. So the pure spirit can be furnished with a body composed of matter so refined as in no wise to impede its movements. It can even be the identical matter of which the mortal frame was composed, yet so refined that it is no longer earthy, but spiritual and heavenly. Thus the doctrine of the resurrection—the stumbling-stone of the philosopher and the mockery of the scoffer—falls in naturally with the conservation and transference of energy, and can be a tenet of science as well as of religion.

THE MIND NOT BOUND BY THE LAW OF CAUSALITY.

In the matter of causality, unless we deny the direct testimony of consciousness, we are compelled to admit that the mind is a self-originating factor. No fact of intuition is clearer, no principle of morality more imperative. For, if it be subject to any force, it cannot be free. And, if not free, its actions can have no moral quality, and can form no element of character. The good or evil of actions with reference to their perpetrator depends entirely upon his responsibility; and this in its turn upon freedom. Freedom involves the power of choice in the agent; a self-originating force of such a kind that, when two or more alternatives are placed before us, we can choose which we please, regardless of the motives offered either by desire or reason. Otherwise there could be no responsibility, no virtue nor vice, in the character of man. For it would not be built up by him, but by the forces which constrained him to act in a certain way. Either, then, the mind is independent

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 40, 44, 48, 49.

of the chain of causality, or there is no moral character in man; and, consequently, no difference between the bad and good. Rewards and punishments are equally wrong. Codes of laws are folly, and judgments passed upon conduct a mockery. Hence there would be no incentive to virtue, and should be no punishment for vice. The consciousness of each man, the constitution of society, and the discipline of this life as a preparation for another, are utterly false and meaningless.

THE OMNIPRESENCE OF MIND.

Again: It is the nature of force to act equally in all directions, unless it be controlled and applied in a specific way by some material agent. This is seen in all the great forces of Nature,—gravitation, heat, light, electricity, magnetism. So far as common experience or the tests of science enable us to judge, we find that all forces project themselves out from their source alike in all directions. They may be deflected from the radial movement, and the fact that they are, gives rise to most of the phenomena of Nature. But when they are unimpeded, they move with equal facility and force in all directions. Moreover, every force strives to exert itself in proportion to its strength. All life consists of motion, and therefore all Nature may be considered as some huge living creature expanding, developing, itself in every way alike. The mind in its action resembles all other forces in this respect. It acts immediately and most strongly nearest to where it is exerted. Hence force of character, whether virtuous or vicious, tends to make itself felt on its vicinage just in proportion to its amount. There may be hindrances which deflect or tend to check; but still the effort is expended, though it remains latent in the body receiving it, which stops that much force; or it is transmitted to do its work on some other object. The force expended by moral charac-

ter may be received by others, but the inertia of vice be so great that the resistance is not wholly overcome, and no visible movement toward reformation be produced at the time. But the expended strength has gone out, as did healing virtue through the touch of the Saviour's garment, and is working like the forces of Nature; often for a long time in secret beyond the power of man to see, but getting things in readiness for an open revelation. Precisely in this way the mind works outwardly from itself, and directly. The great forces which control the world are not physical, but intellectual and moral. When there is much of these at work, the effect may be seen at once by the phenomenal result. The good man in a community is working silently, imperceptibly. The kingdom of heaven comes without observation; and so the influence of a man, working like leaven, from his heart outward, until it purifies his whole nature, and from him goes forth to renovate the world. It grows like the sown seed, whether men sleep and perceive not its growth, or are awake to its visible effects. The physical power of each man may be considered as substantially a uniform quantity, and the force which he can exert be measured accordingly; but the moral force he wields, or the knowledge he masters, is without limit. The dull intellect sees but little even in its immediate environment. It has eyes to see, and ears to hear, equal to those of greater genius. But it neither sees nor hears, except that which forces attention by its immediate presence. The powerful intellect, while it has no higher or wider gateways of knowledge, while it has not greater, often inferior, physical powers, yet masters all the knowledge around it. Such a mind, not by laborious experiment but seemingly by intuition, sees and knows everything. It is alive to all facts of Nature, and joins these together, elaborating new principles, opening up new lines of investigation. The faintest traces of Nature's movements are discovered,

and their meaning is understood. It is not by quickness of sense, but by the energy of intellect, which can see farther, can move faster, can take a firmer grasp. Its influence extends alike in every direction, and to every conceivable limit. The senses do not carry the mind there by their slow conveyances—it outruns them. The senses may expand their powers, but the mind anticipates their action, and gradually dispenses with their instrumentality.

MOST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE INDEPENDENT OF SENSE-
PERCEPTION.

The greater part of knowledge, under any theory, is by intuition, without the mediation of material instruments. For somehow the mind grasps reality directly. It goes by its own way, travels at its own expense, and pays no toll to physical nature in the rapid results it achieves. This fact is clearly seen in all great inventions and discoveries. They are made by the mind coming in contact with that which is not given through the material sense, and which never could be marked by one who waits its slow movement. For imagination constructs an entirely new arrangement of the relations between things. This is in a proper sense creative; for it projects a working scheme, and discerns how the materials which have been furnished by the senses would act if placed in a new connection which it anticipates. By its power of combination according to the laws of Nature, which it discovers through its independent action, it perceives that an untried arrangement of ideal materials will perform a new work, or execute an old process in a better way. New inventions in mechanics, new mixtures of elements in chemistry, are made in imagination, and the result foreseen by what Bacon so well calls "Anticipations of Nature," and progress is made in the arts of life. But this fact is seen in a still more im-

portant sense in those cases where the intellect determines *a priori* what must be the course of Nature.

A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE MUST PRECEDE EXPERIENCE.

Scientists often scorn the *a priori* theories of those whom they ridicule as metaphysicians. But they should remember that Kant declared there must be a planet exterior to Saturn a century before astronomers discovered Neptune. And the discovery was made by Leverrier and Adams by directing their calculus and their telescopes according to an imagined condition of things made by the independent action of the mind, which conceived and figured relations which the senses had never known, and then proceeded to apply its intentional powers according to that scheme. There is a kind of prophetic knowledge displayed in philosophic thought, just as there is prescience in the mind of the real prophet. His thoughts are in sympathy with the truth. He looks far down into the roots of things. He leaves phenomena behind. He deals with ideas, the spiritual embodiment of physical forces. He is in communion with those laws which rule the world and shall be valid forever. He has discovered his kinship with the truths which underlie all Nature, and by obedience to them is enabled to interpret them to the world. He sees far ahead of his time, and voices the teaching of omniscience, which men will some day be able to comprehend. Plato in many things saw in advance of the position where Leibnitz stood two thousand years later in the world's history. Such men live before their time, as the proverb says. It would be more correct to say, They live in, and for, all time. The fact is that the principles which rule the world for all time, and in every sphere of being, have become a part of their mental constitution. They are prophets in the double sense of the word; they both speak for, and in advance of, other men. As Isaiah could see the future destiny of Israel

and the coming of the Messiah, even so these seers of thought and physical science divine the truth by living in immediate contact with it. They need no material instruments. They have a lens in the soul which can sweep the vast expanse of space, and extend their knowledge to the utmost bounds of time. This leads us to the consideration of the second Thesis:—

II. RELATIVE OMNIPOTENCE AND OMNIPRESENCE
OF THE MIND.

The Mind is omnipotent and omnipresent in a relative sense, without involving a contradiction of its finite capacities. By this we understand that the mind in its circumscribed sphere is an epitome of that Infinite knowledge and power which both knows and can do all things. There is somewhere in the universe, or rather everywhere in it, both power and wisdom enough to provide its material, to insure its development, and direct its movements. Everything that exists does so by virtue of a "Sufficient Reason," the profound utterance of Leibnitz, who voiced by this terse formula the common-sense of every rational man. If there was not a sufficient reason for any being, it would not exist; and if there was not an adequate cause for a fact, it would not take place. This is axiomatic and requires no proof. It is the best illustration of the analytic judgment in which every man acquiesces as soon as he understands the terms. Therefore, as some Being must be capable of understanding everything as it is in reality, and wise enough to formulate its laws and direct their action, the knowledge must equal the content of Nature. To use the thought of Schleiermacher,¹ the content of Logic should aim at equaling the content of reality. This is the goal after which human reason is perpetually striving; but the understanding being finite, and the amount to be known

¹ Ueberweg's Logic (Eng. Tran.), Pref. 1st Ed., *ab initio*, p. 71 *et passim*.

infinite, there may be a gradual approach forever without attaining the goal. Now from this statement it follows, that if there is any knowledge which is true and reliable in man it must be exercised in the same way, *mutatis mutandis*, that Omniscience knows. If this Being knows in the correct way, and can embrace all truth, then any other being who can grasp any portion of this truth must know it in the same way. For if the finite creature knows it in any other way than as it really is, his knowledge is false; and therefore he does not have the apprehension of the truth. Infinite knowledge must comprehend directly all that is to be known. For in order to know, we must come into such relations with things that their real nature is disclosed to us. The Being who made all things, who arranged them in their relations with each other so as to form a system or universe, must know their constitution and control their movements. And if there are any other creatures who possess knowledge and exercise any power, they must do this in the same way, in their limited sphere, that the Omnipotent Ruler does throughout the whole. The finite creature can ally himself to the Infinite by acting according to the laws by which He governs the Universe. If "man is the minister and interpreter of Nature,"¹ this is possible only by being himself *en rapport* with her constitution and course of action; and this cannot be save by knowledge which comprehends her secrets, and moral character which unites him with the Framer of her laws. Each part of the universe, whether it be a system, cell, or organism, must be fitted to its surroundings so as to act and be acted upon in turn by all with which it is connected. This requires each part to be a necessary constituent of the whole, whose influence is felt throughout.

¹ Bacon, Nov. Org. i. 1.

ATTRACTION, LIGHT, ETC., IN INVERSE PROPORTION TO
THE SQUARE OF THE DISTANCE.

This influence grows less and less according to the distance of removal, which follows of necessity, because it is extended over the increasing area. The wave grows less as the diameter of its circle increases; but its force is not lost even when it ceases to be visible. The particle of dust which floats in the air has its place, according to its magnitude, as surely as the earth or sun which holds it in its tiny sphere. Just so with finite mind. No matter whether it be the weakest, which rises barely to rationality, or the grandest intellect that illumined the life of Plato. Each is an intellectual force, influences according to the measure of its capacity, and can influence only in the manner it knows. For if it knows nothing of the mode of action around it, then it can do nothing except by hazard. In order to control any part of Nature however small, the mind must know its mode of action and adapt itself thereto. Otherwise there could be no purposive result. For we cannot succeed when we are at cross-purposes with the laws of Nature, which compel submission or insure destructions. Nor can we put ourselves in connection with her action except by first knowing her mode, and consciously following her lead.

The *a priori* conception of our mental constitution and the way we gain knowledge of the world around us agrees with the method revealed to us in the Word of God. If the mind of man be capable of knowledge, he must know in the only way that any intelligence can see the reality of things. His mind must be constructed in the same manner as the Divine Mind. We can know nothing about the modes of thought of a Being different from ourselves except according to the much-derided theory of Anthropomorphism. Hence, if there were no similarity between the thoughts of God and those of man, he could not communi-

cate with us in such manner as we could understand. Or if he thought contrary to the reality, then the knowledge we acquire from his revelation, or our investigation of Nature, would not avail us, for the reason that our content of knowledge would not agree with the content of Nature. There could therefore be no communication in either case, and hence no knowledge of Nature; and no control of her movements would be possible. Reverently speaking, God could make no communication with us if he knew things in a different way from what we do—not in degree, but in mode. He can know them only as they are in reality. For any other supposition would involve both ignorance and error; and hence he can inform us in no way except in accordance with that reality.

FINITE AND INFINITE KNOWLEDGE DIFFER NOT IN NATURE, BUT IN DEGREE.

Therefore, so far as we know the truth, we know it as he does; and we know it immediately. Let this statement be not misunderstood. It seems to conflict with experience and the universal convictions of mankind. For we seem to know through media. Only a small part of our knowledge is axiomatic, while we reason through the syllogistic process and facts of perception elaborated by the mind through its own antecedent action and that of others. But axiomatic truth depends on the mental caliber of the individual, and the general culture of the race. That which at one stage of progress seems difficult and must be gained by persevering toil, subsequently becomes so clear that it requires no proof. We pass at once through all intervening media, and apprehend the fact without a process of ratiocination.¹ The directness or immediateness of the knowledge depends upon the intellectual strength of the thinker; and this we may see carried to any extent. La-

¹ Ueberweg's *Logic*, pp. 94, 95, Eng. Trans.

place in many demonstrations of problems in his "Mecanique Celeste" says: "This equation follows obviously from the preceding"; but to the ordinary mathematician the process between would occupy a half-dozen pages of closely packed calculations to make apparent the result which was self-evident to the great author.

ALL JUDGMENT ESSENTIALLY ANALYTIC.

The immediateness of knowledge, then, is measured by that power of the mind to discover it by intuition as axiomatic, and elaborate the truth under the form of analytic judgments. The discovery of the middle term in the syllogism is undoubtedly by intuition. For no number of individual instances could ever warrant a universal truth on the basis of inductions from particular instances; and it is for this reason that all logicians with naturalistic leanings say that the process can never be more than probable. And hence the oft-repeated criticism that the syllogistic process is only a *petitio principii*; an objection which can be brought with as much justice against all analytic judgments. In truth, the conclusion is unquestionably contained in the two terms. If it were not there potentially, it could not be deduced from them. But what is there contained implicitly becomes manifest explicitly by comparison with a third term, which makes the agreement manifest. We admit the criticism against the syllogistic process. But it in no way destroys the validity of the logical method, or its usefulness as an organ: it only goes to prove our thesis, that in the last analysis of the mental process in acquiring knowledge the mind acts immediately. That every person can pass from one conception to another by comparison with a third without the intervention of any concrete factor, and does employ the process involved in Kant's formidable expression, "the concrete unity of Apperception," will scarcely be denied by any psychologist,

or that the increase of this power to grasp by intuition is measured by increase of intellectual vigor. The mind in this case acts simply *a priori*, and by its own resources, quite independent of sense-perception; coming, as it does, in immediate contact with reality. The feeblest intellect has its self-evident truths. It knows, though in a very circumscribed circle. The child in the cradle knows directly its mother from a stranger. Progress in mental vigor widens the circle indefinitely. Plato, Leibnitz, and Pascal grasped the whole content of human thought almost as soon as they directed their attention to any special subject. If the mind were absolutely omniscient, then all knowledge would be immediate, axiomatic, and require no proof.

PHENOMENAL KNOWLEDGE TRANSMITTED THROUGH
SENSE-PERCEPTION.

But it may be justly asked, How does this theory agree with the known facts of physiological psychology? We undoubtedly know the external world through Perception. The five or more senses receive impressions from the outward world, and convey the information so received through the sensory nerves to the brain. This is transmitted in some mysterious way to the mind by that bridge which, according to the commonly received theory, spans the chasm between matter and spirit. In the case of one of the senses, vision, there is a picture of the external object made upon the retina, and we have reason to believe, in fact it is always taken for granted, that the excitation made by this picture is conveyed to the brain. In another case we know that the vibrations of the air strike upon the ear-drum, set it in motion, and this conveys the vibrating movement to the rods of Corti, which in turn affect the auditory nerve, and so the brain is brought into actual contact with the outer world through sound. Why this com-

plicated process unless for the transmission of the outer world to the inner? The same remark might be made for all the senses. The bridge seems to be narrowed to the passage from the movement of cells, or exquisitely fine tissue in the brain, to the mind which is thought to have its royal throne set somewhere here. For the response to the information received by sensation is elaborated by perception, and sent back through the motor and the efferent nerves; and so the mind crosses back by one of the passages of this double span, and gives its report through the organs to the outward world. These are facts so obvious that it seems needless to call them in question. But in reply we remark, that the length of the bridge between matter and spirit has nothing to do with the subject. If the theory founded on Duality in man is true, then the two natures are disparate, and the separation between them cannot be measured by the standard of either, since these as rules for measurement are utterly unlike. Material occupies space and requires time to act. Mind has no discoverable locality, and acts instantaneously, though psychological movement may be influenced by the inertia of the organ through which the power acts. The bridge between mind and matter, even if it be but the passage from the brain as the organ of its action to the immaterial force which is in it and acts through it, is quite as wide as though it were the diameter of the solar system. Distance has nothing to do with the problem. If we admit that the mind is confined either to the whole body or a part thereof, the journey would be as long, and the chasm as hard to pass,—admitting the two factors to be wholly disparate,—as though they held any spatial relation however remote. But the mistake is in conceiving the mind to be subject to any such relation. No psychology has ever located mental or physical power. Its work may be located, because this instrument through which it acts when confined, occupies

space and has position. So long as the body is put in charge of the mind, the information which is gained through sense-perception comes for the behoof of the material part which furnishes it. Pure intellect could not work phenomenally if it had no material instrument to manifest its energy, and the instrument must be cared for, as any other machine, by the superior intelligence of the mind during their union. So much knowledge, therefore, as is gained by sense-perception, and employed by the mind, is furnished exclusively for the action of the material part.

KNOWLEDGE GAINED THROUGH MATERIAL AGENTS
NECESSARILY DEFECTIVE.

For this reason all knowledge gained in this way has imperfections, being limited by the hindrances of a material agent. Even Induction, however far carried, arrives at only a probable certainty¹ while it rests on the standards of sense-perception which cannot demonstrate an absolute uniformity of nature. But the mind when it deals with conceptions originated by itself arrives at absolute certainty, as witnessed by the reasonings of mathematics and pure logic. The mind, therefore, is not dependent on sensation for any knowledge except that which is necessary for the development and preservation of that organ of which it has the charge. This being material, must be governed by knowledge derived from a material source and employed in a phenomenal mode.

WHY IS THE ACTION OF MIND CONDITIONED BY MATTER?

But why, it may be asked, should the mind be subjected in its action to the conditions of a material body? Why must it get most of its information—materialists say, all—from sense-perception? Why should it have the wearisome task of reasoning by induction from facts gained

¹ Jevons' *Principles of Science*, pp. 149, 150, Am. Ed.

through experience, if it can acquire all through the short and easy way of grasping axiomatic truth or knowing all by intuition? It is certainly much easier to ask questions than to answer them. But we may reply, Why is the mind joined to a body in constituting a personality while man lives? Why must force act through material agents in order to work? Why not act directly, and get rid of inertia, friction, gravitation,—by which it loses half its energy? Why a material creation at all for the display of power and wisdom? Why especially the formation of our carnal bodies, which give us so much trouble to care for as to health; to feed in order to give them strength; and to restrain lest their passions lead us to ruin? Surely the mind could act with infinitely more efficiency if it were freed from the ills that flesh is heir to, even in a worldly point of view, to say nothing of our relations to a higher life. Such, however, are the conditions to which human life, in common with all the material universe, is subjected; and the reason of this is one of the secret things which belong unto God. But our business is to explain the mode in which the mind acts in gaining knowledge. The force which man exerts, whether physical or metaphysical, if the doctrine of the conservation of energy be true, existed before it was united to a body; and, by the same principle, will continue to exist after the body has been dissolved, and its power as the instrument of mental action is gone. We do not know why a material world was formed. For there must have been a time, even if we go no farther back than it is the delight of the geologists to take us every day, when the world was not in a condition to admit bodies like ours. Pretty much everything that then existed was in a state of vapor, very much like our conception of spirit, subtle, impalpable.

PRIMORDIAL FORM IN WHICH MATTER EXISTED.

And if we in imagination go still farther back, and the process as witnessed by the geological ages, and especially in the historical periods, be reversed, we will eventually come to a time when this which at a later period is scarcely to be discriminated from spirit, was absolutely pure spirit as judged by any tests we can conceive. But when this pure power, energy, or spirit, was transformed and developed into phenomenal material, it must become subject to space and time conditions; and there arises a visible organized universe. There is not, however, any increase or diminution of that spiritual energy which must have existed during all the past eternity—only a change of form, so that “the things which are seen were not made of the things which do appear.”¹ It is the necessary condition of power exhibited phenomenally that it be through material instruments, and subjected to spatial and temporal limitations. Hence it follows, that any finite creature—and everything made must be finite—must have a limited power, and its perceptible influence extend to a circumscribed arc depending upon the amount it possesses. It can work within the limits prescribed by this amount, and the limit it prescribes to itself is possessed of self-originating activity. Hence the word Omnipotence, as used in this article, seems to be a contradiction, and certainly is so if taken in its strict meaning. But the signification intended by its use here is, that it can do all things without the possibility of successful obstruction within the sphere that it was appointed to fill; being therein limited only by its own voluntary action. If it be a portion of the absolute power which pervades the universe, and which can do all things without any hindrance, then the finite being is omnipotent within its sphere. Everything except God must be imperfect and subject to limitations *ab extra*; yet

¹ Heb. xi. 3. See the Greek.

they may be complete in that for which they were created. Hence the meaning we would attach to the omnipotence of mind is, that it can send out its activities and increase their efficiency in all directions, and without any cessation. "Plato's brain" appeared to comprehend all that men thought about during his eighty years' sojourn, and pretty much all that has engaged the attention of subsequent speculators. Whatever limits were placed to its activity did not arise from any inherent imbecility, but from the organ of its phenomenal action. Had the "fleshy nook," where that wondrous power of thought dwelt for a time, been more robust and longer lived, the mind would have continued to expand indefinitely. This may be said of each rational being.

THE MIND ALWAYS IMPEDED, NEVER AIDED, BY BODILY INTERFERENCE.

Whatever check it receives is from the physical weakness of the body with which it is for a time conjoined. The progress of knowledge in the individual and the race is checked only by the obstacles which are incident to a connection with a decaying organization. In this respect there is a marked contrast between all other species of power and that possessed by the mind. The other kinds are in definite quantities wherever they are manifested, and tend to diminution through use by exhaustion or dissipation. But the mind grows by use. Its growth is measured exactly by its use, and there is no bound fixed to its increment. The amount of thinking which an active mind can accomplish is almost incredible. Take such men as Aristotle, Grotius, Leibnitz, Gladstone. They seem to know and do as much intellectually as all the rest of mankind in their age combined. Yet why is this? Doubtless in part natural endowments; but in large measure industry and the possession of a healthy physique, which al-

lows almost incessant application. And when they become weary, it is the body, the brain—not the mind, for this grows stronger by use. There is, therefore, both theoretically and practically, no limit to physical action. It is omnipotent when it allies itself with the truth as expressed in natural law; and thus yields a willing obedience to the power and intelligence which rules the universe.¹ In the same modified sense the mind is omnipresent. Of course it is not meant that the mind can be present everywhere; either at any time, or during all finite time. This would require it to be equal to the Supreme Intelligence in capacity. What is held here, again, is that it is not confined in its action to any locality. It comes in contact with all around it, just in proportion to its native or acquired activity. The child's knowledge is confined to the limits of the mother's arms and the cradle. Through the senses, as physiology teaches, it reaches out to everything which makes an impression. Undoubtedly it uses the "gateways of knowledge" to go out beyond itself and explore nature.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ORGAN AND THE POWER USING IT.

But here, again, we must sharply distinguish between the organ and the power. Epicharmus says: *ὁ νοῦς ἀκοῦει ὄρα, κ.τ.λ.* The organs of sense do not perceive a whit more than the optical lens, or the vibrating tympanum which the air sets in motion. The organ does its work of perception for the material agent. The impression is made on the retina, and carried by the optic nerve to the chief ganglion, and there, acting upon a material instrument, causes this to respond by a material activity. But the object does not come into the eye or the finger ends; much less into the delicate structure of the brain. It still remains fixed in its

¹ Nov. Org. Baconi, l. 129, "*Hominis autem imperium in res, in solis artibus et scientiis ponitur. Natura enim non imperatur, nisi parendo.*"

own locality, which the mind by its own power determines, and correlates to the system with which it is connected. The bodily senses have nothing to do with the formation of knowledge, except to receive the physical impression. This impression, if we heed its declaration, says that the object is in actual touch with that which receives it. This may be seen in the case of young children, or adults who have been blind from birth but relieved by surgery. But the mind says they are removed, and fixes them in their places. The senses cannot go to them when they are remote, because they as material organs cannot leave their place. But the mind determines their relative positions in space. It therefore must come into connection with them to know where they are. If it were confined to the body, then the external object would of necessity have to come there also, in order to be recognized. These facts are patent without the possibility of gainsaying. The sense organs do not go away from the body to come in contact with the external object. This could not be, however near it might be to the physical limit of their reach in space, or to the present in time. But when perception reaches to those objects which are in the utmost bounds of the physical universe, or the farthest removed periods of time, the impossibility becomes more manifest. There is, however, practically no limit to the power of the mind in gaining knowledge in either sphere. It must then in some way come into immediate relation with the object which it knows. For if it did not, if it is localized in the body, and the material organ cannot separate itself from the nervous ganglion, then knowledge would be rendered impossible. For the organ could not go out to the external object, and this could not leave its place to come to the mind. Hence there could be no connection. Nothing can be clearer than that the common theories of Perception do not account for the facts.

INEXPLICABLE SPIRITUAL VISION.

There are facts of Clairvoyance—not the folly of spirit-rapping and so-called mediums, but, as the word truly signifies, *clear seeing*—which are well established. Every intellect possesses this power to some degree. The case of medical men, especially their father, Hippocrates, in their ability to diagnose disease which cannot be explained by any physical criteria, is in point. So in men of genius in every pursuit there is a power of discernment which cannot be described in words or measured by any tests. The marvelous power of mental activity in times of peril, or in great crises as of Huss at the Council of Constance; of commanders in time of battle; of engineers and pilots coolly braving excruciating death to save those under their charge, shows the absolute control of the mind, and its power for separate action. The highly gifted mind sees everything with which it comes in contact, in its true relations. By an imaginative combination of these relations in forms which are new to men, but in themselves old as reality, the man of genius becomes the inventor, the painter, the architect, the poet, the leader in moral and philosophical movements. In discerning the great principles which underlie the phenomena of nature, material or spiritual, the senses have actually nothing to do. They see only isolated facts, and never can combine even those which are open to their immediate apprehension. This must be done by the mind acting independently by an *a priori* power of Apperception, as Kant so tersely calls it, which it alone possesses. And as to the underlying principles, the senses give absolutely no information. The spirit alone can lift the veil of phenomena, so aptly called *Maya*, "Illusion," by the Indian sages, and see the Reality, which is physical force and intellectual power. These cannot be in the material organism. For in that case it would discern only the individual instance, and could

never by itself separate from the concrete the underlying idea so as to make a general, much less a universal, principle, applicable to all cases. The sense-perception necessarily forms a separate representation, and never could rise higher than the individual experience. Hence the mind sees universal truths by its separate energy, and this is of the same nature as true clairvoyance when the mental vision is not subjected to space and time conditions. Without insisting on the well-authenticated cases where the mind has a clear knowledge which could not possibly be gained by sense-perception—such as those related of Swedenborg; the friend of Tennent when the latter was prosecuted and had no means of proving his innocence; and many others where valuable information was given about matters which it was impossible for the actors to know through physical means; or on the many instances in each person's experience where he has gained trustworthy information in matters of paramount importance to himself by deep and protracted reflection on a particular subject—we may say, in general, that the mind derives its most important truths by its own action independent of all sensible perception.

The ignorant and the vicious, moreover, have as much physical strength, the sense organs are in as perfect condition, as those of the saint or philosopher; and yet they retard rather than advance the world's interests. But the virtuous and the wise know the truths of morals and of physics, and can employ them for valuable uses. They can utilize them in what they are now doing, or project them into the future and see what their action will then be, because their minds have come into immediate contact with the laws, physical or spiritual, which will continue to govern the universe.

For the present the information conveyed by the senses is to be utilized by the mind for the service of both in the united organism, and while the two factors have interac-

tion each must contribute its share. The senses are furnished to convey information suited to their use; and, so far as is necessary for bodily action, this is conveyed through their agency, and therefore must be subject to spatial and temporal relations. But sense-perception has been proved by Kant and others not to be the only source or end of knowledge. For the mind does not gain its acquaintance with reality as contrasted with phenomena in that way. Man rises by virtue of his spiritual nature to the domain of absolute, of universal, knowledge of principles and truths which it applies *per se* to extend its dominion over nature. This kind of knowledge must be arrived at by the mind's independent action; and in proportion to this mastery which it gains over natural law the need of material factors diminishes. The constant progress in this direction indicates a future stage, for which the present is disciplinary, when the need of media, through which the mind now acts in part, will wholly cease; and it will see things as they are, and comprehend truth without any intermixture of error.¹

We are therefore justified, by the facts and principles acknowledged either consciously or unconsciously by all theories of Perception, in asserting that the mind knows things immediately because it acts everywhere, and according to the measure of its capacity, in its own sphere. The knowledge conveyed by the senses and utilized through material forces is necessary for the use of the material organization, which is the partner of the mind during its sojourn on earth. But it is the mind, and not the body,

¹ Ἀρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσῃ καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ τοι ἐφ' ἑκάστον, μήτε τὴν ὕψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθησὶν ἐφέλκῃ μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἑκάστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεῖν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγὴς ὅτι μάλιστα οφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὠτῶν καὶ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν, σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειαν, κ.τ.λ. Plato, Phædo, 65 E-66 A. St.

which knows, and from its nature cannot be confined to any locality. It must be wherever the thing is that is known at the time of knowing, else knowledge would be impossible.

KNOWLEDGE BY ALL MINDS MUST BE GAINED IN THE
SAME WAY, *mutatis mutandis*.

If there be mind in nature, and knowledge can be gained by it, this must be through a process which sees things as they really are, and not through sense-interpretation of phenomena. Hence, if there be a Supreme Intelligence, this must comprehend all reality in its essential nature; and if this Intelligence create or develop other minds they must, while necessarily inferior in capacity, know in the same way if they know correctly. This, the postulate of reason *a priori*, is also the declaration of what purports to be a direct revelation from God the Supreme Intelligence. This we accept and with profound reverence. We accept it both because it comes attested by all the evidence which a record from by-gone ages could possibly possess; and, also, because it witnesses its own credibility by its perfect adaptation to the wants of our nature and its effects upon the moral character and well-being of those who obey its teachings. This Revelation says that God made man in his own image,¹ a statement repeated for substance, *passim*, in the Holy Scriptures.² Wherein does this likeness consist? Not in bodily form; for God as a spirit cannot be represented by any material image, and he has most emphatically forbidden any attempts in that direction. The image of God in which man was made must consist in the likeness of spiritual essence, the intellectual and moral nature. This likeness exists in some degree in every man that comes into the world; and it is the work of probation and discipline, constituting the entire employment of life,

¹ Gen. i. 26, 27.

² 1 Cor. xi. 7; Col. iii. 10; James iii. 9.

to make¹ this likeness complete. In the case of the perfect man, the Exemplar, it was complete both in knowledge and holiness. Since it is admitted that God knows all things immediately, without investigation or reasoning, to render this possible he must be present everywhere, originating all things, directing their inception, progress, and completion; all these acts being immediate in that they are not subject to spatial and temporal relations. Therefore it follows that every creature "made in his own image, after his own likeness," must know as he knows in kind, but not in degree. There is a sphere of influence, wider or narrower, for every creature; where, according to its capacity, it knows, or can by effort know, all that comes within its sphere of action. The real knowledge which any one attains is to be certified to others by its work. But there is a deeper knowledge than this,—a knowledge of principles, of fundamental truths, which underlie all phenomena, and render these possible. This the mind grasps by itself. It comes in direct contact, in fact can arrive at those ultimate data which do not submit to experience, in no other way. This power all rational beings possess to a limited extent, but it is the prerogative of genius, and the coefficient which raises the ordinary powers up to those which control the thoughts of the world, and interpret nature in the present and for future ages.

While nearly all theories of Perception proceed on the assumption that Mind and Matter are disparate, so that there should be no commerce between them, yet this contradicts experience. For we see them, however disparate they may be, joined, and working together so as to constitute one personality. Yet it is certain that, on a strict interpretation of this doctrine, there could be no manifestation of either to the other without an intermediate actor. For matter of itself is inert. It cannot move; much less

¹ "Our wills are ours to make them Thine."—Tennyson.

perceive, think, or form judgments. And, though the mind can do all these, yet, unless it did them through a material medium, it could not show its work to others unless like itself. The spirit might think for itself, might exercise all the *a priori* functions which Kant and Hegel allow it, yet this would be only for its own behoof in a phenomenal world. It could not deal with anything but what was kindred to it, that is, pure spirit. But it is the condition of our life on earth that it be carried on by two factors acting in concert, as all other operations in nature which involve the material instrument and the metaphysical agent. So any other mode of action would not be possible under the conditions we find ourselves holding to other beings like ourselves, and the material world with which our temporary life is inseparably connected.

NEITHER MONISM NOR DUALISM HAS YET EXPLAINED
THE FACTS OF OUR EXISTENCE.

The difficulty of explaining this fact has given rise to all the theories of Perception, such as Occasionalism, Preëstablished Harmony, Seeing All Things in God. It has caused many acute thinkers from Democritus to Spinoza and Huxley to assert that there is only one factor, and that material. Others, the more numerous and more acute, have held that we can know nothing but the spiritual; the rest being phenomenal and unreal. Like can be known only by like¹; and therefore we, as spirits, can know nothing but what is spiritual. All knowledge, therefore, consists in knowing the spiritual ideals, the original images after which things are made, and the modes of thought of others like ourselves. But if we consult common-sense—and without taking this into our confidence, our necessary activities prove us fools—the assertions of science are empty, because they have in nature no corresponding con-

¹ Empedocles, in Arist., *De Ani.* i. 2.

tent, and therefore cannot be applied. When we eat, it is always a Barmecidal feast; when the earth quakes, it is an illusion caused by the tremor of our nervous system; and when the highwayman robs us and leaves us half dead, the whole is imaginary. The attempt to realize such a theory proves its absurdity. Both of these factors, subject and object, are necessary on any conception; and are involved in all, even the most abstruse and *a priori*. For in this last case the mind must act upon itself, being both subject and object. These conceptions are embalmed in language which is the petrefaction of thought; and show that all men proceed on the assumption of these two factors. This demonstrates that any material explanation of nature is self-contradictory. The factor which acts must be in the form we call immaterial, or spiritual. This we see in all the appliances in machinery or science. The force is not discernible to the material organ, except by what it does. Yet we know it must be present by its effects. The cause must equal the effect; and this cannot be the bare material of the instrument; since this, by itself, is never known to act. Nor is the size of the tool diminished to an amount equal—(nay rather, it is increased)—to the work it has done, which shows that it is the immaterial agent that does the work. The wire will not convey the message, either by telegraph or telephone, unless it be charged by some force which we knowingly conduct there, or can account for being there. The body does not move unless there be life to arouse it into action. It may be as complete a moment after dissolution as before; but, after the living power has departed, there is neither speculation in the eyes, nor cunning in the hands. Hence there is absolute necessity of power of some sort to produce action. What Power is, whether physical or mental, we cannot explain by phenomenal marks; but it undoubtedly is in its last analysis the sum total of what exists as effective energy directed by intelligence.

FORCE AND MATTER THE SAME UNDER DIFFERENT
ASPECTS.

Hence it is the same thing under different modes of existence, whether in the form of the grossest material or the most refined essence. The Development theory, devised either in mocking disregard of its influence on religious thought, or in conscious hostility to its claims, postulates a condition of things in the geological ages when the materials of the solid world were in a liquid form. The internal heat of the earth, the thin crust of firm material, which encases a mass of liquid fire seething with a heat more intense than the blowpipe can produce, clearly prove this view. For the hardening crust, as is witnessed by the diminishing frequency of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; the many external craters—some of them changed into lakes in the volcanic peaks—are a voucher for this theory. Let us in imagination antedate the palm and fern era, when tropical vegetation covering the polar regions was converted into anthracite and petroleum. The spheroidal form of the earth denoting the swell at the equator of plastic material by rotary motion; in a word all scientific investigations—which were not undertaken for the purpose of confirming the scriptural account of the earth's formation—go to show that there was a progressive change from the less dense and solid form; and that this process has gone on during countless ages. Taking up the thread of this process inversely, and carrying it backward during all the time so obligingly furnished by the geologists, we come to a condition when, what farther along was star-dust, an incandescent gas immeasurably more subtle than hydrogen (gas), and we see what is material approaching the form of pure spirit. At least it is as far removed from solid body as scientific thought can express; and if it be not spirit, still time enough is allowed by science of the

doubting sort to carry on the process of subtilizing absolutely *ad infinitum*.

THE QUANTITY OF FORCE FOREVER THE SAME UNDER
EVERY FORM.

The force in the universe was the same as now, according to the accepted theory of "Conservation." The power to act and the intelligence to develop along one certain line rather than another was either immanent in the subtilized materials, or, if separate as a personality, would have to be omnipresent, in order to act on each particle, and omnipotent to control these in the particular way which an Intelligence equal to the construction and government of a universe would require. We see that material can be changed into power. The coal which generates heat to move the steamer or the railcar was once tropical vegetation. Earlier it was heat which moved from the sun through space; and still earlier the sun was nebulae or subtle gas, and we have no reason to say that the subtilizing process stopped short of pure spirit. Again: when the coal is burned, the greater part of its material is changed into its equivalent, heat. If our processes were less bungling and wasteful, it would furnish much more applicable power. If they were perfect, there is reason to think that there would be absolutely no residuum of material. All would be transferred from material into its equivalent power. But it is still true, in the most accurate results of the most self-sufficient science, "that when the human intellect divides nature, there is always a remainder."¹ But this is because the instruments with which man works are partly material. When he divides pure number there is no remainder. When he deals with abstract geometrical or logical formulæ, there is no remainder. So, if he could have a purely mental workshop for

¹ Goethe.

his laboratory, he could change any material into its equivalent power; that is, he could see precisely the composition which, in its final analysis, can be expressed in terms of force or energy. So we are justified in saying, that there is only one substance in the universe. And this is neither material nor immaterial, as these words are generally accepted; but a higher unity which includes both. Getting down to the level of our conceptions, the phenomenal part is constituted of matter, while the dynamical form is force or spirit. The spiritual in its last manifestation is material. The material in its first or highest and most refined form is spiritual. There are infinite gradations between them; yes, we repeat, infinite gradations. This is an absolute truth. For the universe is infinitely great in its extent; and the organism of matter in the atom is infinitely small. Space has no bounds, and time no limit in either direction of its succession. So that which we, for convenience, call Mind and Matter are merely two successive stages of one and the same substance. We disavow pantheism, and believe emphatically in a personal God, revealed to us in the Scriptures, in our consciences, but, most of all, in the person and life-work of Jesus Christ.

PROCESS OF CREATION.

But we hold that Creation is merely a transfer of a part of the power and intelligence of the Supreme Being, the Almighty Power which fills all space and time, into another form. Hence the Evolution theory, as the name of this transformation, pleases us well. But there can be no evolution along fixed lines and for a definite result which can be the basis of a rational science, without a Personal Intelligence to fix the lines, and to provide the causes to produce such results as we see everywhere, and which we are compelled to accept as marks of Design. The Immanence of Finality, the last ditch of him who vainly imagines he

can expel God from his universe, also pleases us well. For God is immanent, both in the wisdom which devises the plan, and in the power which executes the design, and transfers a part of his energy into phenomenal matter. God is everywhere in his works, as the Creator, as the Designer, as the Governor; but he is there as a Personal Agent. We cannot conceive of anything being done save by a personal agent, either directly or indirectly. Most assuredly we have never witnessed anything done in any other way. For we act in this way exclusively. We project our thought and experience outward, and by their actions, both alone and in combination with our own, we are sure that other men do the same. And this being our only standard of judgment, we are estopped from arguing from our ignorance, and saying, Evolution, Mechanical Finality, Fortuitous Concurrence of Atoms, or any other equally inconceivable and irrational system, is the plan on which the world was built.

But, if these things be so, how does this theory of Transference of Equivalents aid us in discovering the way Perception is effected? There is still phenomenal matter to which all our senses give testimony. If we cannot believe these, what can we believe? Their actions underlie our life. And if we live under a scheme of Optimism, they tell us the truth. Certainly by trusting them we get the irrefutable results of science. But again: Our consciousness tells us that there is something besides matter, something that uses this merely as its organ. There is that which thinks and moves, which wills and knows. This is not matter in the gross form of the earth beneath our feet; or the fuel which produces heat to do our work. These are certainly different in form from the agent which employs them. But yet they may be the same under different modifications. Matter, as we have seen, is force, even spirit *ἐν δυνάμει*. Force or spirit is matter *ἐν ἐντελ-*

ἐχέῖα. The one is equivalent to the other. The albenna with which Cleopatra painted her eyes, the stibia with which she brightened her swarthy cheeks to ensnare Anthony, led to the battle of Actium. The food which Bismarck ate was transformed into the bodily form, and this in turn into the intellectual vigor which effected the overthrow of Louis, and wiped out the disgrace caused by the part which Magdeburg and the Rose played in that memorable interview between Louise and the great Napoleon. Mutual transference between matter and spirit is perpetually taking place. We may not be able to tell the process; for, as Bacon says, "The greater part of her work, Nature does in secret."¹ The results are palpable, the process hid; but the fact that there is an unseen energy at work is indubitable.

WHERE IS THE TRANSITION FROM ENERGY TO MATERIAL?

The question now properly arises, At what point does the change or transfer take place so that the one factor passes over into the other? Nature does not move *per saltum*. Her processes are so regular, so quiet, and so subtle that in most cases it is impossible to discover her movement. Between wide intervals the difference in development can be discovered; but any two successive steps cannot be distinguished apart. If we take matter in the form of incandescent gas, and granite or fossil gold, the diversity is greater than words can adequately express. Doubtless if we had powers acute enough to follow the change back from the most subtle gas to pure force or spirit, the gradations would be as many, and the differences as great. But the star-dust or subtle ether contains all the elements of the granite or gold; not merely dynamically, but ἐν ἐντελεχείᾳ. So, if these subtle elements arise by creative or transforming power by which equiva-

¹ Nov. Org. i., Aphorism 4.

lent energy is embodied in material form, if this subtle matter is traced back in its development till it reaches a mode so refined that it is then Spirit or Mind, this ultimate mode of existence embraces all that is contained in any of its subsequent forms. At one time it is mind or spirit; at another stage of condition it becomes phenomenal, subject to the grasp of the senses, and is space occupying. Where the transition is from one to the other cannot be fixed. The knowledge gained by the senses is all relative. There can be no absolute standard in any weight, measure, or capacity. We call one large, another small. So we call one form of existence Force, or Mind; another Matter. But the exact place where the one ceases to be and the other begins is like a line which divides, but has no breadth or thickness.

EVERY LINE WHICH DIVIDES NATURE IS ITSELF INDISCERNIBLE.

This same limit exists in all transitions. When does day begin and night end? When, except by an arbitrary point, can we say of any two correlatives, The one ends and the other begins? All things which resemble in any degree are embraced under a particular category, which makes them the same in that special mode, though they may differ in all others. But things which are equivalent in force are the same in all that constitutes existence. What we call Creation, what the evolutionist calls Development, is a transference of a part of the infinite Fountain of Being, Intelligence, Force, by voluntary modification, which is thereby changed into material, and therefore becomes phenomenal. It is still kindred—aye the same—with its Source, its Maker, and can affiliate with all that is kindred with it; can know itself under all its changes even as it is known by its Originator. Thus we conclude that Mind can know Matter immediately as a product of the

former; and that the latter possesses modifications suited for recognition by that which formed, which governs, and makes it subservient to its own uses. So far as Mind acts for itself, it needs no medium; it knows directly. So far as it acts through materials and becomes phenomenal, this must be by impressions made upon the senses. And these are referred to the mind for interpretation, which in turn sends back the message rendered into terms of sense-perception, which is intended to effect material changes through like means. The five or more senses are necessary to enable the mind, while it acts through a material body, to communicate with and regulate its action; and hence in such action transfers its force into sensuous phenomena.

IV. CONCLUSION. THE TWO FACTORS, MIND AND MATTER,
ACT UPON EACH OTHER DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY—THERE IS NO BRIDGE TO CROSS.

The facts to be accounted for are, that the two apparently dissimilar factors are united and act in concert. But the explanation is, that they are not disparate in essence, but merely dissimilar in form. These in their combination make a rational being suited for action in a phenomenal world, "the minister and interpreter of nature," which, as the subject to be acted upon, consists of the corresponding factors of matter and force. The denial of either does violence to that common-sense according to which we are compelled to act, if we preserve the being and attributes of our ordinary life. These two corresponding factors in man and external nature act upon each other in the same way, so far as consciousness teaches us with regard to our own action, and which we must project outwards if we will interpret the phenomena of that world with which we are in touch. In both cases there is immediate interac-

tion. *Spiritus intus alit, mens agitat molem.*¹ The one of these factors we call Physical, the other Metaphysical; yet they are not diverse, save in their modes of action. If they were wholly diverse, having nothing in common, they could not affect each other. Will power could not influence matter in the pursuit of physical science or mechanical action; nor could the corrupt lusts of the body seduce the soul to yield if there were no responsive inclination to coöperate. They act and react on each other in perfect harmony, as kindred in nature and purpose. The body whose lusts are subdued becomes a fit temple for the Holy Spirit. The problem is how this interaction is effected. The one is localized, the other ubiquitous; not subject to the limitations of either time or space. Are they then really different? We know that they can be changed into each other: transformed without loss, so that they persist in remaining equivalents. So much matter produces its equivalent in energy, while losing only its form. This energy does its work, and in turn is restored to that great sum of power in the universe without any loss. It is gathered up again by organic life, and enters into the matter which this embodies, and becomes a store of force to be changed into energy again. Thus there is a constant interchange, and this by imperceptible gradations; the interaction being so subtle that the change cannot be observed except after long intervals. The conclusion inevitably follows that the two forms of being, Mind and Matter, are the same. Hence the process of Evolution is only the transference of Force or Mind,—the Hegelian Idea, the Will and Idea of Schopenhauer, the Substance of Spinoza, the *δυνάμις δυν*, or *εἶδος* of Plato, the Omnipotent Intelligence of the Sacred Scriptures—into phenomenal realities by Creation. This Eternal Being summed up in himself all that ever has been or will be.

¹ Virgil, *Æneid*, vi. 726, 727.

CREATION A TRANSFERENCE OF ENERGY.

This Personality transfers a part of his power and intelligence into finite matter and spirit; just as we see parts of Time and Space—both in themselves infinite,—measured off by natural standards into definite portions. Both power and intelligence are modifications of one and the same Essence, whether exhibited under physical or metaphysical conditions. The force becomes matter, as we call it, yet at first so subtle that the change could not be discerned by finite intelligence. This material, the primordial elements of phenomenal things, develops by immanent force and teleology until it forms a universe of physical and metaphysical factors. They interpenetrate each other and are connected by such intimate reunion that, acting and reacting immediately, they know each other directly.

• The organ becomes fitted to the spirit, even as the latter does to its fellow, as may be seen in the force of bodily habit. Were the souls of two persons most closely resembling in character to exchange their habitation, neither soul nor body would know what to do with each other, because their respective habits would be diverse to a degree to render the new union insupportable. When in the course of evolution the material is organized into man, the immaterial factor which is immanent remains spirit, and knows its fellow by immediate knowledge which we call Intuition. The Supreme Intelligence knows all things without the intervention of sense-perception or reasoning: knows everything because everywhere both in the potency of evolving and the wisdom of designing. Finite Intelligences, if they can know the present or foresee the future, must do this by virtue of being formed after the same model. Thus the *a priori* conceptions of reason agree perfectly with the utterances of Revelation, that man was made in the image of God, who, being infinite, knows all in his sphere, which is the universe. Hence it follows that

man knows in the same way in his sphere, which is finite.

THE DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION SHORN OF
MANY DIFFICULTIES.

The theory of Sense-Perception is thus relieved of its chief difficulties. "God has made all things double [double folds] over against each other."¹ The duality begins in unity where all is mind and force combined in one personality. The one factor is placed over against the other in appearance, but remains one in reality. The factor called Mind remains immaterial, and is free to act as will without spatial or temporal limitations. It remains forever identified with matter which is called force, and is its equivalent. And thus the doctrine of the Resurrection, which involves a renovated and subtilized body² as its perpetual companion, is capable of scientific explanation. The energy and intelligence can be subjected to limitations on every hand, and must act as material to become phenomenal. As mind it is untrammelled, save as the companion of an earthly body during its course of discipline for a higher stage of action. It grasps the material and holds it in an embrace which is indissoluble. For if there be an interchange, so that one is swallowed up in the other, the whole force or mind is still conserved, remains constant to itself, and undiminished even as before evolution. Accordingly the difficulties of Perception, or the problem of how two disparate factors can act on each other, vanish. For they are not two, save in phenomena. They are one in reality. As they are united in the evolution of new forms, their action is immediate; and, as they are ever together in the production of phenomenal action, there is no bridge to cross between them.

¹ Job xi. 6, Hebrew Text.

² I Cor. xvi. 44, 45.

ARTICLE II.

THE VALLEY OF DECISION.¹

BY PROFESSOR ROBERT MARK WENLEY, SC. D., D. PHIL.

ON an eventful occasion like the present, you will be prepared to agree with me, that once at least, if never again, a time comes, red-lettered for aye in the career of every strong man, at which the smooth, noiseless current of daily life is stopped suddenly, and the hour, empty of vulgar little cares, compels reflection by its very strangeness. The past, stretching away back to a hazy horizon, looses its usual compelling grip, stands in abeyance almost. The future repels, because of that utter vacancy, always the main mark of the untried and unknown. As a result, we realize intensely that we *are* here now; realize this, too, with an unfamiliar thrill compounded of several conflicting emotions—hope jostling apprehension, joy mingled with solemnity, a certain sense of accomplishment or completeness restrained by unaccustomed hesitancy. Of course, as all who have served awhile in the ranks of the battle of life understand, many diverse, often sharply contrasted, circumstances may induce this peculiar tension, may bring one at a stroke into that quiet yet momentous period when he finds himself alone face to face with self, and only the still, small voice breaks the awful silence. But, in the career of the *educated* youth, it is plain that *two* occasions particularly tend to place a species of check upon natural exuberance, to concentrate lively attention upon practical problems that call for *prompt* decision, and yet,

¹ Commencement Address delivered before Oberlin College, June 27, 1900.

paradox though it be, are fraught with mighty issues, destined mayhap to make or mar a lifetime. Who among us can ever forget the last days of the last year at school? Or, again, who can efface from vivid recollection the weeks that brought the dying college career to terribly swift close? The common round ceased; the daily task filled the fleeting hours no longer; and beyond, the big, foreign world loomed up large, enforcing thought, conjuring apprehension, pressing the necessity for a personal interview with self. An enormous question-mark appeared to stare one in the face; what resources had we managed to assemble, what supports were at our disposal on which we might fall back?

Each returning summer, on these laughing June days, surrounded by the gay Commencement throng, those of us who are older know for a surety that the smiles, the brilliancy, the congratulations, the gifts, are often but as froth on the surface, concealing many a sad heart, or serving to distract attention for a brief interval; and these hearts are sad, because of perplexity. The responsibility thus cast upon the speaker of the hour waxes when he has the wit to call to mind that his words are meant for those who go, not for the happier who may remain, not for the scarred veteran who sighs himself back to his own graduation. His it is to descend once more into the Valley of Decision, remembering his own sojourn there, bringing news of the arena that lies ahead where he has since been bearing some part in the mighty warfare of existence or scintillating amid its shifty skirmishes.

The task, believe me, cannot be regarded lightly; it cannot be undertaken easily. For, as time speeds on in silent flight, a man's difficulties alter, nay, he changes with them; to realize to the full what is now passing in the souls of those who stand to-day where he stood some twenty years ago, becomes harder and harder. "A mad fellow

met me on the way, and told me I had unloaded all the gibbets, and pressed the dead bodies." Is not this sometimes a just commentary on the Commencement Address? The distinguished, the successful speaker, had long since buried his dead, and a dead tale was the best yarn he could bring himself to spin. An effort must be made, therefore, to escape from the Circumlocution Office which, as Dickens said, was beforehand in the art of perceiving how *not* to do it. You and I, my young friends of the Graduating Class, must together lay hold upon the realities of the present crisis—for it *is* a crisis, fraught with deep moment in the life of each one of you apart—and a human life is the most precious, the most indestructible thing in the whole of God's universe. The youth find it difficult to fathom the fact; but as surely as the days flash by, the elders perceive with increasing clearness the absolute truth of the old, old saying—it profiteth a man nothing if, in gaining the entire world, he lose his own soul.

As I have hinted, the reasons why crises overtake men time and again lie in the very constitution of human nature. Be we boys or girls, men or women, our life shapes itself in the formation and execution of plans or purposes. This ability to devise an action beforehand, to work it out as we can or may, serves most of all to mark us off from the brutes which perish. Like us, they suffer hunger and thirst, passion and pain, disease and death. But they cannot plan as we do; their instinct furnishes but a poor parody upon that lordly reason whereby we hold rule over them. Their planning—the beaver for his dam, the bird for her nest, the bee for its hive, the monkey for its pilfering—seems a somewhat straightened affair when considered attentively. Means and end lie near each other, no large intervals need be bridged, seldom are new processes demanded on the instant. With man, on the contrary, unforeseen spaciousness of outlook reveals itself constantly;

fresh aims emerge, and so, unfamiliar ways must be trodden constantly, while unanticipated obstacles rise up endlessly to balk the realization of the scheme. By a natural consequence, mere living puzzles us with worries as it never oppresses the beast; for we invite disappointment by that law of our nature which bids us seek ever higher, larger, untried things. Aspiration comforts us, not achievement; we want more worlds to conquer. Blessing and cursing proceed equally from the same source—this is the first, the last, nay the eternal, enigma of human nature. Blessing it is that we attempt so much, curse that most often we can accomplish so little. The things which we would not, these we do; the things which we would, these we cannot do. And, as if to double our burden, we *know* it all, everything conspires to brand it upon our attention. Nay, further, as if to strain us to the uttermost, we are so constituted that, just when we seem to meet direst disaster, we frame yet newer plans, thus inviting worse defeat still. For, afflicted though we may be, hope never deserts us wholly; as our strength is, so are our days. Amid shattering of our dearest desires, we ever echo the words of the poet:—

“My own hope is, a sun will pierce
The thickest cloud earth ever stretched;
That, after Last, returns the First,
Though a wide compass round be fetched;
That what began best, can't end worst,
Nor what God blessed once, prove accurst.”

But, even at this, something remains to tell ere we can see fully why, once at least in a lifetime, all of us must pass into the valley of decision. Many of our plans, governed by reason though they be, share in a measure the limitations characteristic of animal instinct. Means and end often stand in close proximity with us, just as with beaver and bird, bee and monkey. Perhaps, indeed, the ordinary daily purposes, those thoroughly familiar to every-

body, strongly tend to rest on this level of middlingness. To-morrow at two, I shall play golf; on Saturday evening I shall go to supper with a friend who lives at the other end of the city; next month I shall travel into northern Michigan and remain for a few weeks; while there I shall sail a little, read some light literature, enjoy fishing or shooting, and ramble over the bluffs with acquaintances. These plans, or others exactly like them, form a large portion of our common life. The vast majority present but small difficulty, simply because means and end fit; no sooner said than done, is the familiar phrase which well describes them. Yet, even if such purposes do, as a matter of fact, go far towards engrossing the average energies of the average man, we can see easily enough that they do *not* contain, possibly do not even indicate, the inner spirit that most stamps mankind with its unique, troublous aimfulness. For instance, it is of a surety not such plannings, narrow in their scope, that tempt us to exclaim,—

“ How inexhaustibly the spirit grows !
One object, she seemed erewhile born to reach
With her whole energies, and die content,—
So like a wall at the world's edge it stood,
With naught beyond to live for,—is it reached?—
Already are new undream'd energies
Outgrowing under and extending farther
To a new object.”

No! The truest life, that which bulks biggest on the scrolls of world-history, cannot but be moved by larger ideas, consecrated to purposes of another kind, possessing incomparably wider scope. And the point to be borne in mind is that you and I, who count for so little seemingly on the great stage of existence, share just such plans with our mightier brethren.

What, then, are these larger, profounder, more pervasive aims that serve to disclose a man's highest humanity most fully? Those, it may be said in a word, which weigh

with us in our better, our more serious moments; in the moments when we realize the responsibility of living, and perceive the opportunities wherewith our strangely complex endowments are fraught. Let me attempt to illustrate this.

I have tried to show already that the smaller purposes, which serve to fill up the ordinary round of common life, present few insurmountable difficulties, because means and end lie close to one another. A few dollars, a comparatively feeble exertion of will, or a mere momentary whim, suffice usually for practical consummation of the projects conceived of on this plane. But, unfortunately for mankind, from one point of view, fortunately from another, no such otiose method meets the soul when it braces itself to execute one of the larger aims which best reveal the stuff whereof a man is made. Suppose one of us takes to-day such a resolve as this—twenty years hence, I shall be at the head of my chosen calling; or this—I shall try to contribute something permanent to the common stock of knowledge, say, by making a brilliant invention, or by writing a really great book; or this—from now onwards I shall lead a righteous life. All of you can see for yourselves that purposes of this sort are wholly diverse from the familiar resolutions relating to meetings, visits, and brief journeyings that cover our day-in, day-out doings. Great as the contrast may be, the bigger plans are not so absurd, so impracticable, as some seem to think. They happen to be plans just as essentially as the rest. The contrast lies in the fact that a long, and often weary, road extends far, far into the future between the aim as conceived, and its result as built into, or constituted part of, life. Further, the length of the road, and its frequent weariness, are due to the plain truth that means and end do not fit immediately. The means to carry out such resolves cannot be said to stand near; a small part of them indeed does touch

us at every moment; but the whole must needs be assembled slowly, even painfully. In other words, we cannot but reckon on mastering circumstances so as to create our own means; and experience everywhere insists that circumstances always present a strong, frowning front. It is not for us to go round them trumpet in hand, and await their fall, as did the Israelites at Jericho; we are quite unable to take them by storm. The lengthy processes of sapping and mining force themselves upon us; a strong heart, confident of itself, yet conscious of its limitations, alone can accomplish much.

But, I appeal to you, is it not just such tasks that are characteristically worthy of a man? He is not set here to fritter away his few brief years in a continual round of little trifles, serving to fill the moment mayhap, but leaving not a wrack behind. And the sooner he takes grave counsel with himself in the valley of decision, the better. A valley it is, because the outlook seems so dark, and the path so difficult. Yet, on the other hand, a valley of *decision* it is, because, just in proportion as Fate is taken on the instant, can any one hope to conquer a place for himself in this world. He who fails in a great attempt accomplishes more than he who meets marked success in a small. And to succeed in the larger effort demands no more than stronger will, intenser strenuousness, deeper truth to self, above all, greater faith.

Now, *the* danger run by every youth at the outset of his opening career centers in a tendency to acquiesce in the easier way. Immediate successes attract, and naturally attract; but for the young, immediate successes cannot but be puny—this belongs to the nature of the case. Are you going to be contented with the minor achievements? Are you going to deceive yourselves into supposing that you have come through the valley of decision, when you have not even taken into account the factors on which every

worthy choice must be based? Are you going to rest satisfied with mere standing-room among the unknown throng; or are you going to exert every effort to serve your day and generation with your whole heart and mind and soul, remembering that they beseech you for such service and that, in a mighty land like this, they are preëminently worth serving?

Young people are slow to understand the truth that, in every walk of life, no matter how crowded and unpromising it appear, there is room and to spare at the top. To make this more vivid to you, let me say that, in my own profession, I can count on the fingers of one hand the men who command instant attention. No doubt, it is a long pull to get there. But, after all, is it worth your while, if you have to go into the contest, aiming at the occupancy of a lower place? Plainly, the attempt at least cannot fail to appeal to the entire manhood and moral force of each disciplined person. Is any youth deliberately determined to repay the community for all the advantages he has received—in the matter of education, for instance—with aught but the purest coin of character he can command? When the case is put before you thus clearly, I cannot doubt what the choice of every one possessed of sterling selfhood must be. If one fail in a great effort, he will at all events have brought forth out of the riches of his soul the highest that he possessed; if he succeed, he will have added another career worth emulating to the national stock in trade which, remember, forms the capital of civilization. I do not ask you to be old men in your youth; but I do say that in youth are laid the foundations of future success; youth lost or frittered away can never be recalled. Sir Walter Raleigh, an old-time hero of mine, who surely had seen experience and to spare, sums the situation in a nutshell: "Bestow thy youth so that thou mayst have comfort to remember it, when it hath forsaken thee, and

not sigh and grieve at the account thereof. Whilst thou art young thou wilt think it will never have an end; but, behold, the longest day hath his evening, and that thou shalt enjoy it but once, that it never turns again; use it, therefore, as the springtime, which soon departeth, and wherein thou oughtest to plant and sow all provisions for a long and happy life." Or, as I might venture to condense the situation in a phrase: Hope is the dream of those who are awake. You will never gain respect by soliciting it, you must command it; and to this end, as all masters will confess, there leads but a single, narrow path.

This brings us to the second aspect of the matter. I have emphasized the necessity for self-reliance, for personal force. Is there not something else? Most decidedly.

The youth who has taken his decision well often fancies that the world is a place where, in fighting his way, he can do just what commends itself to him, without much reference to others. "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" Fortunately, this question cannot be held either so foolish or so proud as it may seem at the first blush. For, almost certainly, a stage occurs in the development of character which tends to express itself in some such language. The child differs from the youth, both differ from the adult, and all three are marked by their own curious mannerisms, especially when the views of men and things peculiar to each come under consideration. For children and those as yet in the early bud of expanding youth, the world and life can hardly be said to exist. Small difficulties and tiny trials do doubtless occur to cloud the blue sky. The baby may not have everything he whimpers for; he must be in tutelage to parents and nurses; but this supervision presses lightly upon him as a rule, because he reposes confidence more or less complete in his overseers. Similarly the young boy and girl do not often

come into collision with any very real problems. Their various guardians interpose between them and the hardships of living. And although, once in a way, the irksomeness of being governed may serve to draw salt tears, after all, this proves no more than a passing shower on a sunny day. But, as every one knows, such a state of affairs cannot last for ever. As he begins to pass into early manhood, the boy is apt to experience sharply the numerous rebuffs and rebukes that the world has a sad habit of administering. Social conventions restrain him; old beliefs, which he can neither appreciate nor understand, weigh upon him like a nightmare; on many sides he finds his activity curbed. He frames ideals, draws broad pictures of a fine future, only to call down mockery for his pains. Aspiration is balked, for society will not adjust itself to his notions; nay, it appears to thwart, often with amazing originality. Thus the youth comes to harden his heart, to persuade himself that an attitude of uncompromising opposition is alone consistent with his dignity, mainly because the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak. The zealous will greatly outruns the insight of reason, which nothing but experience renders supple. The "clever young man," as his ill advised friends love to call him, is not necessarily conceited. Far rather, a universe that wears the guise of unsympathetic stubbornness forces him into an attitude of protest. Not knowing why things are as they happen to be, he finds fixed limits set on every side to his self-realization. He would fain reform his surroundings by adjusting them to his own ideas. The years that have passed over his head are not yet sufficient to have taught him that, like charity, reformation begins at home. The need for adjustment, for wise use of nearest opportunity, for substantial unity with at least some important group of his fellow-men, has still to become clear to him. And, by a most natural sequence of ideas,—which follows upon a

frequent sequence of events,—he comes to exclaim, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?"

The loneliness felt inevitably by every one in traversing the valley of decision is often set in deepest shadow by this common tendency to be at odds with the rest of the world. Reflectively considered, however, it contains some promise of good omen for the future. For the antagonism I have attempted to indicate cannot be regarded as permanent in the immense majority of cases, nor, on the contrary, does it simply put an end to itself. Really it bears lessons regarding the nature of that larger world beyond whereto all young persons are traveling speedily—none more speedily than you, the graduates of to-day. I ask you, by way of conclusion, to consider this aspect of the matter with me for a little.

When one happens to be struggling for a foothold in this world, or when one is face to face with circumstances that render prompt decisions indispensable, then self tends to throw the entire horizon in shadow. Nevertheless, it must be accepted as a maxim that self counts for nothing save in and through coöperation with others. In a word, as no one of us has anything completely his own, it becomes absurd to talk of doing what one wills with his own. I believe that this truth stands in special need of reinforcement with those who are on the threshold of their serious career. Yet, when we stay to consider it for a moment, its roots, though struck deep down in the nature of things, are traceable enough.

Naturalists often emphasize the paradox that man, albeit ruler among animals, is the most helpless creature at birth, and requires the longest time to reach anything like maturity. The chick has hardly left the shell ere it begins to peck; the duckling takes to the water at once; the nestling wings it in a week or two; in three months the puppy can execute no little damage in his mistress's best

parlor; colt and calf are soon in a position to show their frolicsome paces. But the babe's life hangs by a thread for many days; given conditions even slightly unfavorable, and infant mortality often assumes alarming proportions; in any case, months must pass before the child can even stumble around. At every turn he stands in dire need of watchful care—a care which must continue unrelaxing for some years. On the face of it, all this implies that he owes to others most of what is valuable in his selfhood. Again, we frequently hear, to a lad's advantage, that he comes of a good stock, or, as another phrase has it, out of a good nest. Family life, that is to say, furnishes him not merely with material nurture, but with that moral and spiritual disciplinary attention which, when soon begun, moulds the plastic character so as to determine seriously the direction of its maturer growth. For, in the small society which we call the family, men first learn the indispensableness of social relations. Now, all this is but another way of saying that such personal solicitude as we have a right to demand is intertwined inextricably with the subordination of our own unchastened whims to the duties we owe our immediate circle. You will see readily that two sides are involved here. On the one hand, the more carefully a child is trained and tended by parents and others, the more is his value as a human being recognized and enhanced. On the other hand, the more a child receives from this nurture, the more he falls in debt to the family and friends who have protected and cherished him. Whether we like it or not, the whole circumstances of our early helplessness and of our later training in the ampler relations of life have induced us—without our even knowing it—to become composite beings, made up as much of what proceeds from others as of anything pertaining to ourselves exclusively. For example, it is impossible for a son to be generous towards a mother who has been true to

her most ordinary trust; it is equally impossible for him to be generous to a father who has risen to realization of the privileges of fatherhood. And this for the very simple reason that in the son, mother and father live. They have spent themselves for him, and he is indebted to them for a large part of the foundation whereon he may ultimately build aught that is worthy. So, only by coöperating with them could he ever have become what he now is. What is true in this respect of the narrower domestic life holds similarly of the broader civic relationship.

A main difference, if not the sole difference, between that earlier stage of coöperation or interdependence, illustrated chiefly by the family, and the later era typified in our relations to the larger communities of the school, the municipality, the state, and the nation, or to great groups of our fellow-men either in politics, in religion, in the various professions, or in social organizations,—a main difference, I say, between these two centers is in our comparative unconsciousness of the one, and in our ever deepening recognition of the other. *The* difficulty is that the young who, like you, are about to proceed to a full share in the second stage, frequently prolong the period of unconsciousness too far. The familiar attitude of opposition, to which I have been adverting, may be traced partly to this cause. Yet, certain it is that, if you will but tarry to think for a moment, you will be saved some at least of the disagreeable consequences.

Consider for a little our educational system, whereof you are among the latest products. You know it so well, and on such a day as this in the history of Oberlin College, with its splendid traditions, the broad facts ought to strike home to you so keenly that you will have small difficulty in understanding the matter on hand. Is it enough to say that the boys and girls who have enjoyed its advantages *owe* something to the community which foots the larger

part of the bill? We are all aware that this happens to be the ordinary way of stating the case. Yet, although a certain measure of the truth finds expression thus, the most essential aspects of the situation receive no recognition. The scheme of public instruction in this country, its manifold defects notwithstanding, has served to level up without leveling down. The "educational ladder" is something of a tradition in the United States to-day, but its first inception must be traced to the freedom from presuppositions incident naturally to a new country. So early as 1642, not a generation after the first landing from the "Mayflower," the General Court of the young Colony "by a public act enjoined upon the municipal authorities the duty of seeing that every child within their respective jurisdictions should be educated." In 1647 this legislation was made more emphatic. Every township having fifty householders had to appoint a person "to teach all such children as should resort to him to read and write"; while every township having one hundred householders was directed to "set up a grammar school, whose master should be able to instruct youth so far as they may be fitted for the university." This system, as you all know, is universal in the States where education has been organized carefully; and it implies that the whole latent talent of the country may be tapped. Every child whose parents are so minded, no matter how lowly their sphere in life, has an opportunity to receive the highest education that the school system affords. And with what result? The inhabitants of this broad land are, with the single exception of the Scotch, the most generally educated people in the world. Now this means simply that, by recognizing its own responsibilities as concerns education, society in the United States has developed characteristics peculiar to itself. In other words, the environment in which you young people live possesses marked features of its own, and in

these you are vital partakers. You see, then, it is not merely that you *owe* society something for the advantages you have enjoyed; but the far more important and profoundly influential fact that your whole life, your understanding of its conditions, your conception of your relations to your fellow-citizens, are widely different from what they would have been had you been brought up in other surroundings governed by another system.

These being the circumstances, you can see easily how profoundly foolish it is for us to talk as if we, each one of us apart, possessed aught exclusively of our own, with which we might do as we please. From our first conscious days we have been breathing a definite social atmosphere; this has entered into us, becoming bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh. And if, in the past, by the instrumentalities of family life and the educational system, we have thus been brought into unity with our neighbors, we may rest perfectly assured that, in the future, and most emphatically with regard to the great decisions affecting our career, we shall not escape the same human contact—to succeed we must take our fellows into our confidence. Depend upon it, a man grows rich only as he increases in loyalty. This is the reason why so much stress is laid, and laid rightly, on good manners, to take a very simple instance. These are not mere fashions to be contemned; they are rather indications of that respect for and unity with the feelings of others which happen to be bound up closely with true success. We often “see a world of pains taken, and the best years of life spent, in collecting a set of thoughts in a college for the conduct of life; and, after all, the man so qualified shall hesitate in his speech to a good suit of clothes, and want common sense before an agreeable woman. Hence it is, that wisdom and valor and justice and learning cannot keep a man in countenance that is possessed with these excellences, if he want the inferior

art of life and behavior called good breeding." As a rule, bad manners proceed, not from impudence, but from ignorance of one's fellow-men, and from that most fatal species of ignorance which goes by the name of thoughtlessness, disregard, inattention.

We see, then, our opportunity and our condemnation. The great crises of life, the moments that stand out big even after many years have run by, tend to emphasize individuality and, for this very reason, to induce a certain sense of loneliness and independence which, although true, because grounded on fact, are, when all has been said, but half true. We *must* pass through the valley of decision if we are ever to rise to an important place in the service of the community. Accordingly, our loneliness ought to be transformed by a recognition of our unity with our neighbors. How will the conclusions at which we may be tempted to arrive affect father and mother, brothers and sisters, teachers and friends? How will they reflect on the reputation of this college? How will they influence the opportunities that our fellows may afford us to minister to the state and the nation? Be sure that a place awaits each one of us; but be sure too that no one of us can become anything except in so far as he takes decision to occupy such place, to fulfill such mission as life presents him with. We are dependent upon others, not merely for what we are, but even for what we suppose ourselves to be. And this is as true for evil as for good. I cannot become a leading politician but for others who *will* that I should lead. I cannot become a great orator unless others feel and confess the influence of my words. And in the same way, I cannot become even a murderer except there be some one to slay. And so, *the* crisis to be surmounted in the valley of decision needs no more complicated statement than this: What kind of social relations shall I use my entire influence to preserve? The answer must be

sufficiently plain to all. Those in which the good of self, which is one with the good of others, finds best expression. To be filling my time and place as a lawyer, I must be a good lawyer to my clients; as a preacher, I must be a good pastor to my people; as a teacher, I must be a good instructor to my pupils; and so on for every walk. For, only as I make up my mind to be thus good, can I grow into goodness myself, can I possess myself of anything of any kind that is worth my while.

Thus, the choice in the valley of decision cannot be viewed as a matter of pure self-interest. It urges upon us deeper realization of life—of what it is, of what it is for. The power of a man's character lives in others as much as in himself. Life pursued in the light of such knowledge cannot fail to partake also in a kind of faith. For, "though it seems to us an infancy, and be clothed in swaddling-bands, it cannot but grow into consistency and unity as time advances, it cannot but at the last stand invested in a beauty and power which are without rent and seam, being woven throughout."

ARTICLE III.

ISAIAH THE MYTH AND ISAIAH THE PROPHET.¹

BY HOWARD OSGOOD.

ISAIAH THE MYTH.

THE multiple division of the prophecy of Isaiah is not new. It is more than eighty years old, and the successors of the first great divider have not yet quite attained to the vigor and number of divisions by their learned and bulky forerunner. In 1816-19 Eichhorn, at sixty-four years of age, published his "Hebrew Prophets" in two volumes. It was the ripe fruit of more than forty years' study. He divided the sixty-six chapters of Isaiah, containing 1,292 verses, into sixty-four sections, and of these he assigned only 300 verses, less than one-fourth of the whole, to Isaiah. The other 992 verses he divided among many "unnamed" writers living from B.C. 710 to 465. Eichhorn made these divisions and assignments because he felt them. As he tells us in his former work,² "The most convincing passages can only be felt." One of the most imposing ex-

¹ S. R. Driver. *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. New York, 1891 and ff.

——— *Isaiah*. New York. n. d.

T. K. Cheyne. *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah*. London, 1895.

——— *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah*. Polychrome Edition. New York, 1898.

J. Skinner. *Isaiah*. 2 Vols. Cambridge Bible for Schools. 1896-98.

George Adam Smith. *The Book of Isaiah*. 2 Vols. New York, 1889-90.

——— *Isaiah*. *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*. 1899.

H. Cornill. *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Freiburg, 1892 and ff.

B. Duhm. *Jesaia*. *Nowack's Handkommentar z. Alten Testament*. 1892.

² *Introduction to the Old Testament* (1803), Vol. iii. p. 65.

amples of the firm conviction induced by this ability to feel is found in his treatment of chapters xv. 1-xvi. 12, twenty verses. He says: "For experts in fine appreciation of the Hebrew language who have long accustomed themselves to distinguish the fine differences of expression and ideas in ancient writers, there are more numerous and convincing proofs from the contrast of language, of idea and treatment, of coloring, in short, of the whole manner in which the various parts in Isaiah are wrought out. What a difference, for instance, between the parts undoubtedly belonging to Isaiah and the oracle against Moab [chaps. xv. and xvi.] of which I have spoken! Does he work up and round off his expressions elsewhere as he does here? Does he in his pictures show such palpable hardness and roughness? Does he thus ardently strive to appear learned? Does he needlessly heap up geographical names? Is there in the whole piece a single trace of the customary manner of Isaiah?" Feeling thus with the fine appreciation of an expert in the Hebrew language (which he had then studied for over thirty years, being fifty-one years old), it was to him unthinkable that Isaiah could have written chapters xv. and xvi. If this ground of judgment was secure, it would have stood all coming tests. But a further study of thirteen years blasts the diagnosis by "fine appreciation of the Hebrew language," so that in 1816, the same Eichhorn quietly assigns chapters xv. and xvi. back to Isaiah. Eichhorn on Eichhorn is a far more instructive study than Eichhorn on Isaiah. His work on "The Hebrew Prophets" has been so seldom rescued from the dust that Gesenius and, alas, Cheyne misquote it.

After eighty years, what is the latest word on the division of Isaiah by the followers of the school of Eichhorn? It has been suggested that six of their foremost writers be taken, and their results compared. Two shall be of the Episcopal Church of England,—Driver and Cheyne; two

shall be British Presbyterians,—G. A. Smith and Skinner; and two shall be Germans,—Cornill and Duhm. They are all of the same school of criticism, able, learned, and in high position, and their latest works quoted are all of the past ten years and easily found. There are no better exemplars of this school. There are none who can more truly tell us of each other. We shall therefore be saved from mistaken criticism by the repeated and clear decisions of these learned men.

All these writers make the basis of their assignment or denial of parts to Isaiah to be the correct date of the writing and the events of history about the correct date. For to them prophecy is the foresight of leading men aroused by the special events of periods in their career. The time with its events and the words, ideas of the writer, answer to each other as matrix and type. The date is most important because every year from 740 to 700 B.C. was seething with the cross-purposes of Egypt and Assyria to gain the land of Canaan; with invasions, and schemes to avoid invasions; with contests against confederate Israel and Syria; with slavish submission to Assyria; with the final overthrow of Israel. The capitals of Israel and Judah were only forty miles apart, and the southern boundary of Israel was only some fifteen miles north of Jerusalem. What happened to the one was of supreme importance to the other. The territory of Israel and the western parts of Judah were the common runway of hostile forces during all the activity of Isaiah. No period of the history of Israel was filled with more numerous and more startling occurrences. The changes were so swift, so vast and dominant, that Judah was not the same for any two years together. Hence, if the time and the events are the only correct interpreters of the writings, the first need is to get the right point of view as to the date and its history.

A careful comparison of the works of these writers

shows us that they agree in assigning to Isaiah, or to his time, 310 verses out of the 1,292. On 246 verses they disagree; some assigning and some denying them to Isaiah. On 736 verses they agree in denying that they are Isaiah's.

We will take these divisions in order and see how far they agree in their chief reason, the dates, for assigning or denying these parts to Isaiah.

First: those parts which these writers unitedly assign to Isaiah's time. On chap. i. 1-31, they differ from 1 to 39 years; on ii. 5-iii. 26; v. 1-30, they differ from 5 to 18 years; on vi. 1-13, they differ from 5 to 35 years; on vii. 1-viii. 22, they differ from 8 to 39 years; on ix. 7-x. 34, they differ from 5 to 39 years; on xiv. 24-27, they differ from 10 to 21 years; on xvii. 1-14, they differ from 1 to 39 years; on xviii. 1-7, they differ from 1 to 10 years; on xx. 1-6, they agree; on xxii. 1-25, they differ from 7 to 21 years; on xxviii. 1-29, they differ from 1 to 39 years; on xxxi. 1-9, they differ from 1 to 4 years.

With the exception of Smith, who most often agrees with Driver, there is no constant accord between these critics. For instance, on i. 1-31, Driver and Smith put it all at 740-735; Cornill, part 735-722, and part after 701; Cheyne, part 701, and part 722; Duhm, part 740-735, part 711, part 701; Skinner, 734. Driver and Smith are in the minority; two-thirds are against them. What Driver and Smith say is a whole of a certain date, Cornill, Cheyne, and Duhm say is a mosaic of far-separated dates. The events out of which that chapter arose Driver and Smith say were those of the beginning of Isaiah's writings in the troubles of the closing reign of Jotham; Cheyne says they were partly those of the latter part of Hezekiah's reign and partly of the bitter struggle before the overthrow of Israel; Cornill says they were partly those of the bitter struggle before Israel's fall and partly of the latter days of Hezekiah; but what Cheyne says arose in 701

Cornill says arose in 735-722, and what Cheyne says arose in 722 Cornill says arose in 701. And so we find unceasing change throughout all these attempts at dating these writings they ascribe to Isaiah, but never a majority agreement, except on xx. 1-6; there they agree, for the chapter was dated by the original writer.

The average of differences in dating these 310 verses would be about twenty-two years. When we remember what is told us of the boiling caldron of Isaiah's times, these differences are sufficiently large and decisive to induce much thinking on the part of the reader of these works. Our own land has seen mighty changes within thirty-nine years. What should we think of six critics who were as far apart in dating the speeches of our best statesmen during these thirty-nine years? Or of six British critics who were as persistently contradictory in dating Milton's writings?

There are still larger prospects before us. On the 246 verses which some assign and some deny to Isaiah, we find the following differences: On ii. 1-4, 490 years; on iv. 1-6, 540 years; on ix. 1-6 and xi. 1-16, 202 years; on xii. 1-6, 490 years; on xiv. 28-32, 375 years; on xv. 1-xvi. 12, 620 years; on xix. 1-25, 390 years; on xxi. 1-17, 163 years; on xxiii. 1-18, 397 years; on xxix. 1-24, 184 years; on xxx. 1-33, 165 years; on xxxii. 1-20, 485 years; on xxxiii. 1-24, 545 years; on xxxvii. 6, 7, 22-35, and xxxix. 5-7, 401 years. The averages of these differences would be about 378 years. Eichhorn's stumbling-stone, xv. 1-xvi. 12, is still making trouble to his followers. Driver and Smith do not know. Skinner knows that it is not Isaiah's. Cheyne says 722 or 589, a query to a single mind of 133 years. But Cornill knows that it must be dated before Isaiah's time, 780, though Duhm is just as sure that it could not have arisen before 160; a slight divergence of 620 years on 21 verses. While this is the

highest figure reached in these differences, it is only a little in advance of others. There are four divergences of over 400 years, and two of over 500 years. Minor deviations are hardly worthy of regard beside these abysmal chasms.

There remain those parts which all these writers deny to Isaiah. On xiii. 1-xiv. 23, they differ 12 years; on xxiv. 1-xxvii. 13, 410 years; on xxxiv. 1-xxxv. 10, 378 years; on xxxvi. 1-xxxix. 4 (exc. certain parts previously mentioned), 320 years; on xl. 1-lv. 13, 17 years; on xlii. 1-4, xlix. 1-6, l. 4-9, lii. 13-liii. 12, 155 years; on lvi. 1-lxvi. 24, 250 years. The average divergence on these sections would be about 220 years.

When we ask these critics for the latest word of their science on Isaiah we are told, We agree in referring 310 verses to Isaiah and in denying 736 verses to be his; on 246 verses we disagree as to their belonging to Isaiah or his time. When we ask further for the reason why they assign certain verses and deny other verses to Isaiah, they point us to the verses as showing the date, and to the date and events as giving rise to the verses. But as soon as we look at these foundation-stones of their several edifices we find that they are absolutely contradictory. Here are six learned critics, each one of whom is in the smallest minority, condemned by his fellows in that he does not know when any part of Isaiah arose and, therefore, cannot rightly interpret it. If an outsider ventured to suggest that possibility, it would be assigned to traditionalism, to ignorance, to inability to judge these deep things fairly. But their friends do not assign any of these states of mind to these critics. And yet they without scruple condemn each other as wanting in the basis of all true knowledge of the writings before them. The decision of this court must be accepted.

Let us suppose that a book written in English, extending over seventy-five pages octavo, is placed before six

eminent critics of English for their decision as to the date of its composition. They decide that it is a compilation, but they cannot agree as to when the parts were written. One of them decides that a certain part bears the stamp of the age of Chaucer and Wycliffe; another decides that that very part is plainly stamped with all the marks of the age of Victoria. Another declares that a section could only have arisen in the age of Elizabeth; by still another that section is assigned to the present day. And so they stand utterly antagonistic to each other on all parts of the asserted compilation. The writing remains. But those critics very thoroughly discredit their claim to a science of English criticism. No man in the day of Chaucer could so write English as to make it seem in any respect like that of the present day, and no man to-day could successfully imitate the writing of Chaucer's day. Shams in literature are as certain to be discovered as shams elsewhere.

For one hundred and twenty years the dissection of *Isaiah*, beginning with feeble attempts, has gone on, and now we can trace its whole course down to this self-contradiction by the school that has claimed this dissection as its own, and smiled at the backwardness of those who would not follow them.

Not only do these critics condemn each other, in every new edition they condemn their own past judgments. Where one has dated a number of verses in one edition, we find in his next edition that he dates it two hundred years later. In one edition he is sure the verses belong to *Isaiah*, in the next he tells us they certainly do not belong to *Isaiah*. If they can so easily change one way, they can, like Eichhorn, just as quietly change back again. For a long time chaps. xl.-lxvi. were by all this school denied to *Isaiah* and assigned to a single writer in the exile, and it was thought a mark of advanced views to believe in the "second *Isaiah*." That has now passed to old tradition-

alism. Those chapters are now divided by this school among three writers, whose dates float in the air down the centuries. The "second Isaiah" used to be praised as excelling in all the marvelous powers possessed by the first Isaiah. But now with Wellhausen, Smend, and others, the second, third, etc., Isaiahs have sunk to mere wooden copyists, without an original thought.

There is another primal point on which these writers are very instructive,—the question of style. No man, not even Herbert Spencer, has been able to tell us what style is, further than it is the expression of the man. For a hundred and twenty years there have been discussions of the style of Isaiah by those who claim to dissect the writings. What was long certified as Isaiah's because it was his style is now denied to him because it is not his style. What was denied to Isaiah because it bore no marks of his style is now assigned to him because it is undoubtedly in his style. Beginning with Koppe in 1779, the history of ascription and denial of parts of the book to Isaiah with the reasons given by each critic is interesting reading.

Our six critics profess to tell us what is written in Isaiah's style and what is not his style. The style answers to the date and events, and knowing these they can without fail detect the style. A glance at the Polychrome Isaiah will show how many colors are needed to indicate the shadings of style, not merely in long sections, but in verses and parts of verses. In Eichhorn's words, "Experts in fine appreciation of the Hebrew language who have long accustomed themselves," etc., now can tell to a word or particle just where and to whom it belongs. There are even fine points where a small word is decided not to belong to any of the numerous writers of the parts of Isaiah, but has been inserted by some ignorant copyist or tyro of an editor. Such things astonish us as the outcome of much learning.

Whether our critics are justified in their attempted minute distinctions of style will be exemplified by taking large sections where there is a wide field to put in play all knowledge of lexicon and grammar, all the science of Hebrew philology, all acquaintance with the events of history, and from this vantage-ground to decide the style of writing. Let us take the twenty-four verses of chapter xxxiii. Driver, Smith, and Skinner put this in 705-701, during the turmoil of Sennacherib's invasion; Cheyne says, it reflects the peaceful days just after the exile; Cornill says before 250, that is, it reflects the days when Judæa was ground small between the Ptolemies and the Selucidae; Duhm puts it in 160, when the Maccabees were making their death struggle for liberty. Or, let us take the twenty-five verses of chapter xix. Driver says 720, that is, two years after the ruin of the ten tribes, and when Sargon was marching through the land to Egypt; Smith says 703 or after 700; Cornill says after 701; these were the last years of Hezekiah, filled with fears of Assyrian conquest; Cheyne and Skinner say after 538, that is, in the calm of Cyrus's protection; and Duhm says 330, when Alexander had conquered and ruled all western Asia. And so we could go through a long list. Where one tells us it is the style of peace, another assures us it is the style of war; where one declares that it is the style of ruin, another decides that it is the style of repose, and another is certain it is the style breathed by the last hopeless battle against overwhelming forces. If it is the child of one, it cannot be the child of the other. All human experience and knowledge for six thousand years are against the supposition that the same child can be born of three mothers living two hundred years apart from each other. Whatever the style may be, one thing is certain, these critics, by their own testimony against each other, decide that they have utterly failed to comprehend the style, and, by

that same testimony, know not what and whence it is. It seems well-nigh incredible that, after a century of its life, a school that prides itself on applying its science to the solution of questions raised by it, should present to the world a host of self-contradictory hypotheses as "the results of the latest scholarship and of the most thorough critical inquiry." Can that be called a science where its most eminent men are all at odds on the fundamental facts?

How is it possible that learned men can on seventy-five pages of writing reach merely an unending whirl of decisions as to date and style and interpretation? There is only one solution,—the one given and exemplified by the very learned Eichhorn; that it is the criticism of personal feeling, and not of established laws drawn by induction from a great mass of facts. What Eichhorn asserted eighty years ago as the basis of judgment, Cheyne continues to assert,¹ that the judgment of passages is founded upon impression; or, as stated more bluntly by another, "What I think, that is scholarship." It is the school of impression and sensation. Each one gives his impression, his varying impressions; and, when we gather these impressions together, instead of being a bunch of fruit or a bouquet of roses, they are a knot of thorns. Instead of the calm inductions of an acknowledged and united science, we have the Polychrome display of personal impressions. But no amount of learning can give weight or authority to mere impressions, and a world of impressions can never make a science. In the words of a distinguished German critic, "A science which offers us a chaos of unproved hypotheses as verified facts cannot arouse in us any remarkable confidence in the justice and propriety of its method." These are "the oppositions [antitheses] of knowledge falsely so-called" from which we are exhorted to turn away.

¹ *Isaiah*, Vol. ii. p. 209.

These are of the myths and interminable genealogies to which we are charged not to give heed. Myths are the progeny of impressions.

THE PROPHET.

The book of Isaiah, whether in Hebrew or English, still stands complete. Nothing has been lost, nothing can be lost from it. It is published in too many million copies, spread all over the world, ever to return to Lagarde's phantom, a single copy, and so be despoiled. Men's views of the book may be as diverse as the winds, but the book itself is secure. It stands now and invites the most thorough search, as it has stood for nearly three thousand years. Each reader has the right to form his own opinion.

In spite of the hundreds of volumes written upon this book, it is a matter of surprise to find, that, whether read in Hebrew or English, the words used are among the simplest. Exclusive of proper names, there are in the Hebrew Bible about 6,413 words used; of these 1,800 (1,798) occur only once, about 724 occur only twice, about 448 occur only three times. So that there are only about 3,443 words used more than three times. That is, the Hebrew Bible, of about fourteen hundred octavo pages, is all written by the common use of less than four thousand words. Remembering the results achieved,—historical prose, poetry of the highest order, prophetic prose that vies with poetry in its lofty flights, all concerned with the deepest, highest thoughts and aspirations of the mind,—it is amazing that such results should be attained with means so small. The eighteen hundred words that occur but once prove, that, beyond the small number of words commonly used in the Old Testament, there was a large stock from which the writers drew very sparingly. The Hebrew writers of the Old Testament deliberately chose the popular speech, a small section of the

whole language, and by that expressed all they had to say. This becomes very apparent on comparing the various books of the Old Testament. Isaiah, in 76 pages octavo, uses 2,186 words, of which 262 are unique. The Psalms, in 97 pages, uses 2,170 words, of which 165 are unique. Jeremiah, in 96 pages, uses 1,653 words, of which 103 are unique. Ezekiel, in 84 pages, uses 1,535 words, of which 160 are unique. Isaiah makes larger use of the current Hebrew vocabulary than any other book, and yet he makes use of only one-half of it. Jeremiah and Ezekiel find less than one-half amply sufficient for all their purposes.

The same is true of the Greek New Testament. Exclusive of proper names, its vocabulary consists of about 4,867 words, and of these about 1,613 occur but once, and about 654 occur but twice; leaving only about 2,600 words as the common usage of the New Testament. Considering all that is said and taught in the New Testament, this vocabulary is extremely small. Yet Christ and Paul and John and Luke find ample stores there to express all they had to say. In the Bible, and in the best writing in any language, it is not the extent of the vocabulary, but the use made of the vocabulary; not the words, but the meaning the context gives to the words; not the letter, but the spirit breathing through the words, that distinguishes the writing and the writers. To express great thoughts on the loftiest themes in simple, popular words is the work only of minds of the highest class thinking clearly. Swollen words may be the sign of learning, but they are not the mark of clear thought. He whose clear thought has never been excelled, and who could speak in more tongues than all those around him, preferred to speak five words that he might instruct others also, than ten thousand words in a tongue not understood by those who listened.

That positive choice also marks the book of Isaiah. Clear thought on the highest themes is there expressed in

the simplest terms. That fact stamps the book as the production of the highest intellectual powers. Want of intelligence and command of proper expression cannot be truthfully urged against this book. The reason why one must read this book over and over again before he can feel at all sure that he has gained its thoughts is because the thought is pressed down, shaken together, running over, in these simple words. Like the Gospel of John, its clear expressions are guiding stars in the infinite depths of the heavens. It is not art concealing art, but an overpowering theme has caught up the writer and carried him along to its end. What Macaulay said of Bunyan may easily be applied to Isaiah: "The vocabulary is the vocabulary of the common people. . . . Yet no writer has said more exactly what he meant to say. For magnificence, for pathos, for vehement exhortation, for subtile disquisition, for every purpose of the poet, the orator, the divine, this homely dialect, the dialect of plain, working men, was perfectly sufficient."

A striking feature of the whole book, as it lies upon the surface, is that it is the intense pleading of a loving Father's heart over erring, disobedient, suffering children. From the agony of a rejected Father in the first chapter and second verse to that most tender promise in the last chapter, "as one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you," there is the unceasing call in words of yearning affection with promise of blessing: "Seek ye Jehovah while he may be found, call ye upon him while he is near: let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts; and let him return unto Jehovah, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon."

This rejected but yearning tender Father is Jehovah, the only God; "the first and the last, and besides him there is no God"; "besides him there is no Saviour"; "he created the heavens and stretched them forth, he spread abroad

the earth and that which cometh out of it, he that giveth breath unto the people and spirit to them that walk therein"; "the everlasting God, the Creator of the ends of the earth"; "the Creator of Israel; your King." Before the only God, all idols, all thoughts of another God, are "vanity and naught, wind and confusion," "a lie in the right hand," and bring upon those who harbor them the flame and flood of Jehovah's destruction.

Jehovah, who abundantly pardons, who blots out their apostasies for his own sake and no more remembers their sins, is set forth by the whole book as the God of holiness, "the Holy One of Israel." He would bring the rebellious from sin and apostasy to their Father's home, that they may be holy, walk in the way of holiness, and abide in holiness. From the first to the last of the book there is utter hatred and indignation against all forms of unholiness, and the terrors of its recompense are spread before the people as though a volcano shot up into the heavens its fountain of fire, and covered the earth with streams of lava.

Jehovah is throughout the whole book the God of truth; all his counsels are faithfulness and truth. His supreme abomination is a lie. That is the mark of all who depart from him; their refuge is a lie, and treachery to God and man. In justice and righteousness the lie and the liar, the hiding-place and the hidden, shall be swept away by the hail of Jehovah's wrath.

There is one further point that is of importance. From the beginning to the end this book is filled with foretellings. The future of individuals, of nations, the outcome of treachery, the result of wars, the ruin of the false, the glory of the true Israel, follow one another without a break. It is absolutely denied again and again in this book that man can foretell the future. All pretenders to foretelling are called liars, and Jehovah makes their madness plain.

All the foretellings in this book are ascribed to Jehovah, who alone can foretell (xli. 1-5, 21-29; xliii. 8-21; xliv. 6-9, 24-28; xlv. 1-17; xlvi. 8-13; xlvii. 11-15; xlviii. 3-17). The foretelling of Cyrus by name (xlv. 24-xlv. 7), of which so much is made by those who do not believe in foretelling, is interwoven all the way through with the repeated statements that it is the word of Jehovah, "who maketh all things, . . . that frustrateth the tokens of the liars, and maketh diviners [foretellers] mad." "He declares the end from the beginning."

There is not in the whole book one word of palliation for sin, of collusion with deceit, of apology for guilt of obliquity towards unchastity of thought or act. The purpose, everywhere apparent, is to manifest Jehovah, the only God, as the God of holiness and truth, who pardons all rebels that return to him with their whole heart, but who will surely destroy all who persist in sin. Everywhere and equally it proclaims the highest standard of morals, whose fountain-head is the God of truth, to whom every one on earth, from the king to the beggar, is directly answerable.

In the face of this purpose and this standard of morals, pure as God is pure, the book presents itself everywhere as Jehovah speaking in the first person through the writer, or in words which he has commanded to be spoken. More than four hundred times does Jehovah use verbs in the first person, and one hundred and thirty-six times are long passages ascribed to Jehovah, "Jehovah said," "Jehovah spoke," "Jehovah commanded," etc. But these are only a small portion of the words ascribed to Jehovah in the first person; for long passages occur where Jehovah speaks, using the pronoun "me," "mine," etc., but not the verb in the first person. These passages could not be the words of the writer, unless he is to be charged with insanity or intentional blasphemy. We refer to such passages as v. 1-7; x. 25; xlii. 2, 3; xix. 25; xxxiv. 5; xli. 1; li. 4-11; lii. 13;

lv. 8, 9, etc. A careful search of the whole book will glean only a few words or short passages, except in the historical chapters xxxvi.-xxxix., where it can be the prophet speaking his own, and not the words directly commanded by Jehovah. The book is open. Any one who will read the book through with care can see for himself.

In the first part of the book (chaps. i. 1.-xxxix. 8), some eighty-two verbs are used in the first person by Jehovah, and fifty-six times passages begin with, "Thus said, spake Jehovah," etc.; while in the second part (chaps. xl. 1-lxvi. 24), there are some three hundred and twenty-five verbs used in the first person by Jehovah, and eighty passages begin with, "Thus said, spake Jehovah," etc. Both parts of the book, therefore, are covered with these ascriptions of its own words to Jehovah, but they are more than three times more numerous in the second part than in the first.

Now before its own teachings in every part, before the only God, the God of truth and holiness, whose burning wrath shall surely destroy "the prophet teaching lies," were these ascriptions of the whole book to Jehovah as the author made in conscious truth or in a conscious lie? There can be no escape from that alternative. Either God spoke, commanded those words to be spoken, or he did not speak them, command them to be spoken. If God spoke them, then the whole book is immediately exalted to the God of truth's revelation of himself, his grace, and his purposes in the world. But if God did not speak all these words, then the ascription of them to him many times on every page is a lie, perjury of the deepest dye, while the book affirms by every argument and quoted example the purest morality. Is there in the literature of the world in all its ages a companion picture to that? Is it possible for the human mind to hold and exploit at one and the same time a whole truth and a whole lie fused into a solid mass? Until another instance is found of teaching the loftiest

morality proceeding from God as its author, permeated everywhere with blackest perjury, it will be held to be inconceivable.

The book of Isaiah presents the same alternative as does our Lord Jesus Christ. He professed to be God, to come from God, to speak the words God gave him and commanded him to speak, and on the heart acceptance or rejection of these words by men depended their acceptance or rejection by God. If God never spoke through him or by him, if eternal salvation does not depend upon the acceptance of Christ's words, then before God and man what was Christ but the greatest deceiver the world ever knew? The only seeming way of escape from this alternative is by denying, as is often done, the validity of the writings in the New Testament. But the denial of this validity does not solve the difficulty. The writings remain, and the question, How could intentional liars reach the greatest heights of morality, and draw in life and death the only perfect character the ages have ever seen?

This book, then, is characterized by the highest intellectual power expressed in the simplest terms, by the knowledge of the only God, the God of holiness and truth, who hates and will punish all who persistently oppose him, but who calls his disobedient children to return that he may pardon and bless them; and by the purest morality. And with all that it claims to be the word spoken by God himself.

It is time now to ask, Have we any certain knowledge as to the human writer? Isaiah is mentioned in i. 1; ii. 1; vii. 3; xiii. 1; xx. 2, 3; xxxvii. 2, 5, 6, 21; xxxviii. 1, 4, 21; xxxix. 3, 5, 8. Nowhere in the book itself is it said that Isaiah was the writer of all its parts. No reputable author ancient or modern on issuing his book states that he wrote it all. They put their names at the beginning of their writings, and that is received as a guarantee that what

follows is their writing. Isaiah did that. But we are not left to inferences. To those who believe that God is the real author of the New Testament and that its writers wrote "not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Spirit teacheth," the witness of God in the New Testament will be amply sufficient to put to rest all doubt as to the writer of the book Isaiah.

We will take first those passages in Isaiah which the New Testament ascribes directly to God:—

Isa. vi. 9, 10: "Well spake the Holy Spirit by [through] Isaiah the prophet" (Acts xxviii. 25).

Isa. vii. 14: "Spoken by the Lord through the prophet" (Matt. i. 22).

Isa. viii. 17, 18: "He [Jesus] . . . saying . . . and again" (Heb. ii. 11, 13).

Isa. xl. 6-8: "The word of God which liveth and abideth. For" (1 Pet. i. 23).

Isa. xliii. 6: "Saith the Lord Almighty" (2 Cor. vi. 18).

Isa. xlix. 6: "For so hath the Lord commanded us, saying" (Acts xiii. 47).

Isa. xlix. 8: "That ye receive not the grace of God in vain, for he saith" (2 Cor. vi. 2).

Isa. lii. 11: "Saith the Lord" (2 Cor. vi. 17).

Isa. lv. 3: "He raised him up from the dead . . . he hath spoken on this wise" (Acts xiii. 34).

Isa. lrv. 17; lxvi. 22: "According to his promise" (2 Pet. iii. 13).

It will be observed that three of these ascriptions to God are taken from the first part, and seven from the last part of the book.

Secondly, passages ascribed to Isaiah.

Isa. i. 9: "As Isaiah hath said before" (Rom. ix. 29).

Isa. vi. 9, 10: "The prophecy of Isaiah, which saith" (Matt. xiii. 14); "For that Isaiah said again" (John xii. 39); "By [through] Isaiah the prophet" (Acts xxviii. 25).

Isa. vii. 14: "Spoken . . . through the prophet" (Matt. i. 22).

Isa. ix. 1, 2: "Spoken by [through] Isaiah the prophet" (Matt. iv. 14).

Isa. x. 22, 23: "Isaiah crieth" (Rom. ix. 27).

Isa. xi. 10: "Isaiah saith" (Rom. xv. 12).

Isa. xxix. 13: "Well did Isaiah prophesy of you" (Matt. xv. 7; Mark vii. 6).

Isa. xl. 3; "Spoken of by [through] Isaiah the prophet" (Matt. iii. 3); "Written in [through] Isaiah" (Mark i. 2); "As it is written in the book of the words of Isaiah the prophet" (Luke iii. 4); "As said Isaiah the prophet" (John i. 23).

Isa. xlii. 1-4: "Spoken by [through] Isaiah the prophet" (Matt. xii. 18).

Isa. liii. 1: "The word of Isaiah the prophet . . . which he spake" (John xii. 38); "These things said Isaiah" (John xii. 41); "Isaiah saith" (Rom. x. 16).

Isa. liii. 4: "Spoken by [through] Isaiah the prophet, saying" (Matt. viii. 17).

Isa. lxi. 1, 2: "The book of the prophet Isaiah . . . where it was written" (Luke iv. 17).

Isa. lxi. 1, 2: "Isaiah is very bold and saith"; "But as to Israel he saith" (Rom. x. 20, 21).

All parts are equally assigned to Isaiah. It is most instructive to mark how the Lord Jesus Christ quotes the book of Isaiah.

Isa. vi. 9, 10: "Unto them is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah which saith" (Matt. xiii. 14).

Isa. xxix. 13: "Well did Isaiah prophesy of you, saying as it is written" (Matt. xv. 7; Mark vii. 6).

Isa. liii. 12: "For I say unto you that this which is written must be fulfilled in me" (Luke xxii. 37).

Isa. liv. 13: "It is written in the prophets" (John vi. 45).

Isa. lvi. 7: "It is written" (Matt. xxi. 13; Mark xi. 17; Luke xix. 46).

Isa. lxi. 1, 2: "There was delivered unto him the book of the prophet Isaiah. And he opened the book and found the place where it was written. . . . And he began to say unto them, To-day hath this scripture been fulfilled in your ears" (Luke iv. 17, 21).

The Saviour attributes both parts of the book to Isaiah the prophet. But he also quotes its passages with special intensity by the simple form, "It is written," for by the Saviour's teaching what was written in the Scripture "must be [i.e. a moral necessity] fulfilled" (Matt. xxvi. 54, 56; xxvii. 9; Mark xiv. 49; Luke xviii. 31; xxi. 22; xxiv. 44). Following the Saviour's method of special insistence, the following passages are quoted in the New Testament by the introduction, "It is written": Isa. xxv. 8; xxvii. 9; xxviii. 11, 16; xxix. 10; xli. 16; xlv. 23;

lii. 5, 7, 15; liv. 1; lix. 7, 8; lxiv. 4. The following are ascribed to the prophet or in the prophets: liv. 13; lxii. 11; lxvi. 2. The following are termed by Christ and the New Testament writers, "Scripture," i.e. what is written: xxviii. 16; xli. 8; liii. 7, 8; lxi. 1, 2.

These passages are by no means all that are quoted in the New Testament. They are all that are introduced by some form of ascription to God, to Isaiah, to a prophet, to Scripture. But other passages are quoted without any form of introduction, of which the Saviour's awful description of hell is a striking example, "Where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched," Mark ix. 48, taken from the last verse of the book of Isaiah.

If from this we pass on to the New Testament use of Isaiah's thoughts and terms we should need a volume and not a single article to show the overflowing of that abundant stream from Matthew to Revelation. The New Testament has not left us in any doubt. It agrees with and puts its stamp upon every claim of the book of Isaiah: it was spoken by God through Isaiah; it contained foretellings, some of them fulfilled in Christ's person and day, and others await fulfillment; it is "the book of the words of Isaiah the prophet."

"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto men rather than unto God, judge ye."

ARTICLE IV.

COLERIDGE AND HIS POETIC WORK.

BY PROFESSOR THEODORE W. HUNT, PH.D., LITT.D.

LIFE AND CHARACTER.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, son of Rev. John C. Coleridge, of Devonshire, England (Ottery St. Mary), Headmaster of the Grammar School, was, from the first, a character of unique and even eccentric interest. As he says of his own boyhood, "I never thought as a child, never had the language of a child." As a mere lad, he was inquisitive as to the nature and reasons of things, speculative and imaginative, cogitating or dreaming when his companions were playing.

At school at "Christ's Hospital," we find him at Cambridge, in 1791, which university, for some unexplained reason, he suddenly left, enlisting as a private in the Fifteenth Light Dragoons, returning, however, to Cambridge in April, 1794. In 1795, he entered on the rôle of a lecturer at Bristol, a city of importance in the history of Coleridge, as it was there he met Southey, whom he had seen at Oxford, and Lovell, the publisher, which two married sisters of the lady, Miss Fricker, whom Coleridge was yet to marry. His lectures, "Conciones ad Populum," as they were called, were designed to be popular, political discussions, in the service of what he deemed to be the rights and liberties of the people. In 1796, a journalist in the pages of *The Watchman* and, later, in *The Morning Post* and *Morning Chronicle* and *The Friend*, all of these schemes were unsuccessful, as might have been supposed,

by reason of the poet's unfitness for such a line of work, and the capricious nature of his mind and plans. It was in these years that he had in view, with Southey and others, his pantisocratic scheme, a semi-socialistic and political plan to be carried out in republican America, on the banks of the Susquehanna, a species of romantic adventure, as it would seem, especially attractive to British literary minds. Coleridge, in this respect, was a fanatic, making plans involving large capital, when he had scarcely funds enough at his command to meet his ordinary expenses.

In 1797-1800, he began what has been called his critical career, as a student of philosophy at Göttingen, studying the German language and civilization, and, especially, German metaphysics. His well-executed translation of the dramas of Schiller, shortly after his return to England, revealed the practical results he had reached in the mastery of German.

At Keswick, 1800-04, we reach the crisis of his life, for it was now, when his literary ambitions were at the height, that we find him succumbing more and more slavishly to that accursed opium-habit which was, at length, to occasion the loss of physical and mental vigor, the miscarriage of his best schemes, and the consequent loss of all heart and hope. There are few, if any, examples in our literary history sadder than that of Coleridge, in this respect, and he thus belongs to that list of unfortunate English authors that so strikingly represents the self-inflicted loss of mental and moral strength. It is not strange that it was at this time (1802) that he wrote his pathetic "Dejection: An Ode," a kind of Elegy on his own misfortunes, due to physical causes.

"A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,
 A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief,
 Which finds no natural outlet, no relief,
 In word, or sigh, or tear. . . .

My genial spirits fail;

And what can these avail

To lift the smothering weight from off my breast? . . .

There was a time when, though my path was rough,

This joy within me dallied with distress,

And all misfortunes were but as the stuff

Whence Fancy made me dreams of happiness:

For hope grew round me, like the twining vine,

And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine.

But now afflictions bow me down to earth,

Nor care I that they rob me of my mirth."

In England again in 1806, a physical and mental wreck, he remained there till 1816, when he committed himself, in sheer desperation, to the guardian care of a Mr. Gilman, of Highgate, to whose kind ministries Coleridge owed it that he secured any measure of bodily improvement. The letter which he wrote to Gilman as he was about placing himself in his hands, and the picture of this opium-ruined genius coming to Gilman's home, with the proof-sheets of his beautiful poem "Christabel" in his hands, form one of the most touching scenes in English literary history. Feeling, as he did, that now, for the first time, there was some hope of restoration to health and congenial labor, he wrote, in his letter to Godwin, as follows: "If I should leave you restored to my moral and bodily health, it is not myself only that will love and honor you; every friend I have (and, thank God! in spite of this wretched vice, I have many and warm ones, who were friends of my youth and have never deserted me) will thank you with reverence." Such complete restoration, however, was not to come, as for nearly a score of years, in this quiet home, under partial emancipation from his opium-habit and in modified literary activity, he passed his life, and finally closed it in 1834. It was in 1817 that his "Biographia

Literaria" appeared, with its invaluable criticisms on poetry. In 1818 he lectured in London, his discussions covering the wide province of European civilization and literature, and English letters, and kindred topics,—his Shakesperian critiques forming one of the best contributions ever made to this special department of study. It was natural that in 1825, far on in his life of study and meditation, his "Aids to Reflection" should appear, interrupted as the work had been by poverty, disease, opium, and want of method as a man and student. Of his closing years, the details need not be given. It was when he knew that his end was near, that he characteristically wrote, "Hooker wished to live to finish his 'Ecclesiastical Polity'; so, I own, I wish life and strength had been spared to me to complete my philosophy." On July 25, 1834, he died, in the midst of his unfinished plans, "more of a great man," says Thomas Arnold, "than any one who has lived within the four seas in my memory." This may be extreme eulogium, but serves to show what an impression Coleridge made on so cautious and candid a critic as Arnold—praise, it may be added, in which Arnold of Rugby is by no means alone. The summary of his life and character as a man and an author is found in his want of will power, in what has been called, singularly enough, by De Quincey, his lack of "fiber." From whatever point of view we examine his career, this defect comes into prominence, expressing itself in various forms, as indifference, indecision, caprice, and visionary scheming, an almost total absence of the regular and resolute. It appears in the wayward freaks of his boyhood; in his fitful life at Cambridge; in his entering the English army; in his slavish surrender to opium; in his tours through Europe; in his choice of friends and pursuits, and in the general tenor of his life.

It was this that lay at the basis of his domestic unhap-

piness, naturally expected from a marriage partly forced upon him, and partly of his own fanciful choosing. Just as good Richard Hooker was kindly informed by Mrs. Churchman, who was nursing him in his illness, that she had a promising daughter who, if desired, could do it just as well, and the affable English divine acquiesced, to his ultimate sorrow; so, as two sisters had, respectively, married Southey and Lovell, and there was a remaining sister who was seeking an evangelical alliance, Coleridge was courteously informed of the fact, took the hint, and out of sympathy with the belated maiden closed the social contract. So his great pantisocratic scheme in the New World was the offspring of this want of will, he not knowing from one day to the next where he would settle or what he would do. So, in authorship, his plans were equally vacillating; with theology and philosophy one day, and poetry the next; with translations of dramas one day, and dreaming the next. It was thus impossible for him to complete any plan, to leave any such thing as a finished philosophical system or connected body of literary work.

There are two elements of special attractiveness in his character that should be noted. One was his *tenderness of spirit*, as evinced by his interest in children, expressed in his poem "To the Children of Christ's Hospital"; by his sympathy for the suffering, as expressed in his poem "To an Unfortunate Woman"; by his anxiety lest he might be a burden to his friends; by his deep interest in rising and struggling authors, and by his domestic life, even after discord entered. A further feature was his *reverence of spirit*, as he wrote "An Evening Prayer" for children; a series of "Meditative Poems" and "Religious Musings," declaring, as he was dying, "As God hears me, the originating . . . and sustaining wish . . . in my heart was to exalt the glory of his name," and, he added, "to promote the improvement of mankind." Thus he lived

and died, his own worst enemy, a great experimenter in the realm of thought; and leaving the English world yet in doubt as to what he might have done, had his splendid faculties been fully under his control.

HIS POETRY.

It is now in place to examine Coleridge's poetic work, even though, by the general consent of critics, his ablest work was in the province of prose; such productions as his "Aids to Reflection" and his "Lectures on Shakespeare" giving him a high place among English writers. Fully three-fourths of his authorship was of this order. In the threefold division of an author's life and work given us by Mr. Traill, his biographer, the first period is called *The Poetical*, extending from 1772 to 1779, the date of the beginning of his German life and his more specifically critical and philosophic labors. Thus we find him, in common with Pope and others, "lisp[ing] in numbers" in his boyhood, the results of which are given us in what are called his "Juvenile Poems." Such important selections as his "Monody on the Death of Chatterton," his twelve Sonnets, his "Religious Musings," and "Ode to the Departing Year" belong to this earlier era; as, indeed, "The Ancient Mariner," the First Part of "Christabel," "Kubla Kahn," and "The Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni." In fact, this poetic period, though so early, included some of the best years of his life, before he became involved in the mazes of German metaphysics and in the deeper mazes induced by opium. It is now (in 1794) that he was working with Southey and Lovell in Bristol, in the composition of "The Fall of Robespierre," an experiment in dramatic writing that did no credit to any one of its three composers. It was shortly after (1796-97) that his acquaintance with Wordsworth assumed permanent form, one of its happiest results being the joint preparation of

"The Lyrical Ballads," published in 1798; the far larger part, however, being by Wordsworth. "The Ancient Mariner," as we are told, had been planned and partially composed as Coleridge and Wordsworth roamed at will over the Quantock Hills. These "Miscellaneous Poems," or "Poems on Various Subjects," as they were called in the first edition (1797), exhibit most of the marks of immaturity, with exceptional features of real poetic fervor. As Saintsbury bluntly expresses it, "'Religious Musings,' though it has had its admirers, is terribly poor stuff; 'The Monody on the Death of Chatterton' might have been written by fifty people during the century before it. 'The Destiny of Nations' is a feeble rant, but 'The Ode on the Departing Year' strikes a very different note." It was this occasional striking "of a different note" by Coleridge that, despite all his poetic defects, kept alive his fame, and led the English people to be on the alert for something from his pen still better, that "different note" being at length so different, in "The Ancient Mariner" and "Christabel," as to satisfy, in part, the expectations of the public.

It is not a little to the praise of Coleridge that when (in 1798) he prepared and issued a second edition of his poems, though adding twelve new selections, he omitted nineteen of the first edition of fifty pieces, candidly stating in the preface that his former poems have been "rightly charged with a profusion of double epithets and a general turgidness."

Hence his main poetic period was in 1797-98, practically but two years, the years in which those poems were produced on which his fame at present rests, his translation of Schiller's "Wallenstein" (in 1799) belonging essentially to the same productive period. His unwonted poetic effort in these few years and the high character of it revealed his capability in this direction, while also seeming to anticipate, in part, the mentally deadening effect of

opium; dating, especially, from his life at Keswick, in 1800. The close of the eighteenth century was practically the close of his poetic career, though it was after this that he completed his "Christabel." Apparently forecasting his sad experiences yet to be passed, he applied himself with all the energy at his command, it being but occasionally after this that he roused himself for a season from the influence of the deadly drug whose slave he had become. The only marvel is, and it has not been sufficiently emphasized, that it was from 1800 on, when he was in the later stages of the opium-habit and consequently waning health, that he wrote his notable Lectures on Shakespeare and other topics and his various prose productions, the closing years of his life at Highgate being marked by intervals of extraordinary sanity and literary activity. This is true, though he was really a broken-hearted mourner at the funeral of his own splendid faculties. Such a living death is without parallel in the scope of English letters.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS POETRY.

In turning now to a discussion of the chief characteristics of his verse, it may be noted, at the outset, that most of these features are common to his verse and prose, constitutional or acquired, and thus affecting, in one way or another, every separate product of his pen, his self-induced physical habits determining the action of his mind.

Glancing first at *the defects*, we mark:—

1. The Political or Semi-Political Type of his Verse, as in "The Destruction of the Bastile"; "The French Revolution"; his Sonnets to Erskine, Sheridan, and Kosciusko; "The Destiny of Nations"; his "Ode to France," and most of his dramatic verse, as "The Fall of Robespierre." This is not to say that acceptable verse of a high order cannot be expressed on civic themes and for political ends, as in the soul-stirring sonnets of Milton and Words-

worth, but that Coleridge did not, as a rule, so express it, and was not capable of so doing. Despite his well-meaning enthusiasm on the French Revolution, as a movement on behalf of civil liberty; and his equally well-meaning though visionary schemes as to his Pantisocracy, the ideal home of freedom of faith and action, his talent was wholly elsewhere; the natural action of his mind being introspective, and not excursive and far-reaching. Moreover, his political theories were so changeable, through Republicanism and Toryism and Socialism and other Isms, that he had no well-defined cause to plead—no clear, ringing note of appeal, as Milton had in the days of Cromwell; so that where we should find genuine passion and sublime outbursts of loyalty and civic pride, we meet with the veriest platitudes and truisms on liberty and country. In his twelve sonnets, there is no one that rises to the level of a masterly poem, being devoid of strong thought and stirring expression, while they are often marred by that overwrought diction to which he was too prone.

2. We note, further, a half-dozen poems excepted, that there is no sign of a clear and strong Poetic Instinct; no evident presence of "the faculty divine" or of the "vision divine"; no interior poetic perception, that sees at once the hidden beauty of thoughts and things and is able to embody it in poetic form; little governing poetic passion, that makes a poem an impersonation, and sways the soul of the reader who yields himself to it without reserve. Here and there, as in "Christabel" and "The Ancient Mariner," there is a temporary and partial manifestation of it; but it is no sooner evident than it is gone, and the heaven-soaring poet descends at once to the earth, and abides there. If he failed to accept what he regarded as Wordsworth's too practical, everyday theory of verse, he failed to exhibit any higher theory of his own, so as to show to the English world what poetry should be. It is

clear that nothing can atone for the absence of this poetic gift and function. The fact that Coleridge's "Lectures on Poetry: its Genius and Expression" are far above the average order, and still well worth the reading, is proof in point that he had but little of the genius which he extols, and whose presence he himself regarded as an element of poetic power and success.

3. An additional defect is The Fragmentary Nature of his Poetry, as, indeed, of his Prose. It is fitful and capricious, marked by that "dispersiveness" of which critics have spoken; so that when he wrote a representative poem, it was almost as much of a surprise to himself as to his friends. "Christabel" is an unfinished poem; so favorable a judge as his own son Hartley insisting that he could not have finished it, if he would. So, with "Kubla Khan" and other poems, his poetry throughout having this unfinished character. Such fragments came, undoubtedly, from his divided interests as a prose writer and poet; as a day-dreamer and social reformer; as an author and a critic; as a metaphysician, theologian, and versifier; as a romancer and realist. His favorite ideal of the possible combination of the natural and supernatural was of this order. From financial straits and other causes he even essayed the rôle of a Unitarian preacher at Shrewsbury, for which office, indeed, he showed some talent, and which he was induced to remit by the offer of financial aid. A glance at the later portraits of the poet will reveal that he had the clerical face and dress, and was, to this extent, "approved," as Emerson would say, to the ministry. Shortly after this, he was at Keswick, gradually surrendering body and soul to the ravages of opium, and thus unfitting himself for any high and acceptable service in the cause of truth or humane letters.

There is, however, a *more favorable* view of the poetry of Coleridge, and we note:—

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1. That his Poetic Diction is often chaste and expressive enough to call for special emphasis. Critics have freely spoken of the melody and music of his lines, of his metrical skill displayed in conveying thought which in itself is but little above the ordinary. We hear of his "cadence-changes," of his "gorgeous meter," while so good a judge as Swinburne, himself a notable example of an English metrist, speaks in high praise of the lyric aptness of Coleridge as a versifier.

One of the evidences of this rhythmic diction and sense of the harmony of verse is seen in the large variety of his meters. In this respect he is superior to Pope, who carried the English couplet to such an extreme. Hence, if we turn to the poems of Coleridge, we are at once impressed with this variety, as seen in couplet and quatrain; rhyme and blank verse; the six-line, eight-line, and the nine-line stanza, after the manner of Spenser; and sonnets, with their requisite fourteen lines. In "The Ancient Mariner," while the prevailing form of stanza is the quatrain, other varieties are found; as, also, in "Christabel," are found couplets and quatrains freely interchanged. In fact, all the accepted kinds of foot and line are present, and adapted, in the main, to the changing character of the thought involved. Coleridge, in his justly celebrated "Lectures on Poetry," discusses the subject on the side of Poetic Genius and Poetic Expression. Whatever may be said as to his lack of the former in any marked degree, no one can justly deny him a good degree of excellence in the latter. He had the language-sense, a poetic taste to choose the right and give it its right place in the line, and thus fulfill one of the prime conditions of poetry.

2. A further mark of excellence is the Mystical and Romantic Element apparent in his verse, so that the expression applied to "Kubla Khan," a "dream-poem," might aptly be applied to scores of others; notably, to

"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," "Christabel," "The Tale of the Dark Ladie," "The Three Graves," "Alice Du Clos," and "Phantom or Fact." These titles are suggestive of the fanciful and mythical, of the office of the poetic imagination in the line of romance, of what has been called "psychological curiosity." Such a title as "The Sibylline Leaves" is of a similar type. One of his earliest poems, "The Songs of the Pixies," a race of beings invisibly small and hurtful or helpful to man, is a poem of this kind. He speaks of himself as a boy "reading or fancying; half, one; half, the other." It is this half real and half unreal feature that gives to our author's verse a kind of ethereal or semi-spiritual type, reminding us, at times, of some of the Prose Tales of Hawthorne or Poe, often embodied in what Whipple has called "his exquisite delineations of the heart." "If I were asked," says Devey, "to individualize the character of Coleridge's poetry, I should place its distinctive feature in bringing into prominence the relation of man with the spiritual universe." It is this unearthly element that is so often seen, and which so often holds the reader to the page when more regular and historical methods would fail to do so. That such a feature should be found in a poet whose special lore lay in the sphere of metaphysical studies is, at first, somewhat surprising, until we recall the fact that much of the philosophizing of that day was vague and purely speculative, leading to no definite result in the establishment of truth. If to this we add the poet's constitutional tendencies and the peculiarity of his personal habits, we can readily see that there was full scope for the fantastic. Even as a prose writer, he was unrealistic, and thereby vitiated much of his influence.

3. Emphasis may also be laid on the prominence given in his verse to Natural Life and Scenery—to sketches of the outer world of sea and earth and sky. There is no

more pleasing and effective element in Coleridge's poetry than this, and it saves from oblivion much of his verse that would otherwise be forgotten. Some of his poems evince this throughout, while others possess it in occasional lines. It is here that he betrays his relation to the Lake School of Poets, and is proud to do so. It is here that he comes into closest sympathy with Wordsworth and others who have extolled the charms and glories of physical phenomena. It was when wandering over the Quantock Hills that "The Lyrical Ballads" and "The Ancient Mariner" were practically composed. Inquiring where "Domestic Peace" may be found, he writes:—

"In a cottaged vale she dwells,
Listening to the Sabbath bells."

In his lines on "Fears in Solitude," he describes the far retreat from war and tumult, as—

"A green and silent spot, amid the hills,
A small and silent dell! O'er stiller place
No singing skylark ever poised himself. . . .
Oh! 'tis a quiet, spirit-healing nook!
Which all, methinks, would love; but chiefly he,
The humble man, who, in his youthful years,
Knew just so much of folly, as had made
His early manhood more securely wise."

His "Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni" has justly become an English classic. His "Reflections on having left a Place of Retirement" are lines in which he pours forth in tenderest strain his reluctant withdrawal from the scenes he loved, and in the center of which he would fain spend his days—a place where, as he writes—

"We could hear
At silent noon, at eve, and early morn,
The sea's faint murmur. . . .
A spot which you might aptly call
The Valley of Seclusion."

So, in writing to his brother of the old home at Ottery St. Mary, he says:—

"A blessed lot hath he, who having passed
His youth and early manhood in the stir
And turmoil of the world, retreats, at length,
To the same dwelling where his father dwelt."

So, on through his verse, ever and anon he breaks forth in praise in that his lot was cast among the hills and lakes of England. It is this fact as much as any other that intensifies the sadness of the sight of this child lover of nature, when in his closing life at Highgate he was bereft of heart and hope by the fatal curse of opium.

4. A final feature deserving mention is the poet's Vigorous Invectives against National Sin and Wrong—his impassioned pleading for the Rights of Man. It was this element in his nature that explains his attitude toward the French Revolution and socialistic projects, though at times he was led thereby to gross extremes. Thus in his "Ode to the Departing Year," he scored the unholy ambition of nations, and hesitated not to warn England. In his "Fears in Solitude," he wrote—

"We have offended, oh, my countrymen! . . .
From east to west
A groan of accusation pierces Heaven. . . .
We have drunk up, demure as at a grace,
Pollutions from the brimming cup of wealth. . . .
Yet bartering freedom and the poor man's life
For gold, as at a market! . . .
We gabble o'er the oaths we mean to break;
For all must swear—all and in every place,
College and wharf, council and justice—court;
All, all must swear, the briber and the bribed.
Merchant and lawyer, senator and priest,
The rich, the poor, the old man and the young,
All, all make up one scheme of perjury
That faith doth reel."

Thus the terrible arraignment continues, and lest he be accused of malice, he adds:—

“ I have told
O Britons! O my brethren! I have told
Most bitter truth, but without bitterness. . . .
O native Britain! O my Mother Isle!
How shouldst thou prove aught else but dear and holy
To me, who from thy lakes and mountain hills,
Thy clouds, thy quiet dales, thy rocks and seas,
Have drunk in all my intellectual life.”

The poem is worthy of Milton, nor do we know in English verse of a stronger protest against a nation's weaknesses and crimes. So in other poems, as in his dramas and translations, we hear an earnest voice in behalf of right.

Such are the main features of merit in the poetry of Coleridge by which he has taken and held his place in the second group of English bards—with Moore, Southey, Landor, Scott, and Shelley. The language of Saintsbury “that in verse, at least, if not in prose, there is no greater master than Coleridge,” cannot be indorsed. The author of a few poems of rare merit, his special worth lies in the fact that, in common with the best minds of his time, he struck “a new note,” the sure promise of the “new poetry” just at hand. It is this which atones in Coleridge for many minor blemishes, and forces the critic to rank him higher than his work actually justifies. In this sense, at least, he had “the vision divine,” the vision that saw in advance the imperative need of the time; and enough of the “faculty divine” to enable him in part, at least, to satisfy that need.

ARTICLE V.

THE BOOK, THE LAND, THE PEOPLE; OR,
DIVINE REVELATIONS THROUGH
ANCIENT ISRAEL.¹

BY PROFESSOR SAMUEL IVES CURTISS, D.D.

THE student of the Bible may take either of two main attitudes with respect to it; one of loyal acceptance of the views of past generations with regard to its origin and composition, and of loving reception of its teachings as they have been interpreted by our fathers; the other of critical study of the book, not only of its contents, but also of the claim that it has upon us as an authority over our hopes and our lives. The theological student is called upon to attempt the latter, both for his own sake and that of others. By virtue of the themes which will be more or less the subjects of his thinking in his ministry he will be summoned, whether he will or not, to examine the foundations of his faith; and he will be sure to find some in his congregation who will question him regarding the current criticism of the Scriptures.

The theological seminary offers the safest place for the examination of these subjects. In this field the student needs the sympathetic instruction of those who have long been engaged in a critical study of the Scriptures. Specialists in any department of knowledge should be far more familiar with it than those who merely have a general acquaintance with the subject. The church should not

¹ An address delivered in the Union Park Congregational Church at the opening of the Forty-third year of the Chicago Theological Seminary, October 4, 1900. The Seminary year began on Wednesday of the preceding week.

doubt the sincerity of her scholars, simply because the views they present are not those of the traditional school. None who in their thinking, or the result of their investigations, have deviated from the old lines have ever been able to escape the charge of heterodoxy.¹ Taylor, Stuart, Park, in their day were denounced by some as unsound in the faith.² The church has indeed a right to be sensitive regarding the instruction of those who are to be her ministers, but she should not be unreasonable.

Nor should the student in the delicate and difficult work in which he is to engage be too free in charging any of his professors with undermining his faith. During all the history of seminary instruction there have been men who have believed they were in peril from the teaching of some professor. This has been especially true in those departments where the current views about the Bible have been shown to be erroneous. There was a time when some of the most learned believed that the Hebrew vowel-points were a part of the original revelation to Moses. It was demonstrated that certain combinations of the Hebrew consonants could be read in many ways, and from this it was argued *a priori* that the vowel-points must have been revealed to Moses. For years the discussion raged, learned volumes were written, the peace of the church was disturbed. But it was proved beyond a peradventure that the massoretic system of punctuation arose subsequently to the time of Jerome (346-420). When the question was once settled, it could no longer be deemed vital. No harm came from this proved fact.³

¹ This was true of Jerome. He was called a *falsarius*, *sacrelegus* and *corruptor Sanctarum Scripturarum*. See Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi . . . Opera (ed., Valarsius, Veronae, MDCCXXXIV), Tom. i. col. 305; Tom. v. col. 387, etc.

² I can well remember, when I was about to choose a seminary in 1867, that I was advised not to go to Andover, on account of the "heretical teachings" of Professor Park.

³ Schnedermann, *Der christliche Glaube und die heilige Schrift* (Basel,

It is natural enough that many a student finds himself summoned to examine the foundations of our faith in a way which seems, at first, to imperil the entire structure. This fear comes from confounding certain cherished beliefs about the Bible with the teachings of the Bible itself. To relinquish these opinions about the Bible seems equivalent to relinquishing the Bible, and all critical studies about

1884), pp. 36, 37: "Darüber kam die evangelische Theologie des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts zum grössten Theil in schwere Bedrängniss, absonderlich die reformirte, aber auch die lutherische. Die Mächte des Abgrunds schienen ihr losgelassen und zu toben wider den Herrn und seinen Christ. In heller Angst warf sie Schanzen über Schanzen auf . . . Angstvoll wandten sich gläubige Christen an Buxtorf, den Vater und den Sohn, nach Basel. Die zögerten lange; dann erschienen umfangreiche Bücher des Sohns, in welchen dieser mit halbem Herzen den verlorenen Posten verteidigte. Freudig setzten nun die Schweizer Kirchen 1675 das Bekenntniss auf, die Punkte seien alt."

The following statement from a large folio by Cappellus in an edition prepared by his son indicates his position with respect to the vowel-points as well as that of his opponents—Ludovici Cappelli Commentarii et Notæ Criticæ in Vetus Testamentum, (Amstelodami, MDCLXXXIX), p. 702: "Ex his omnibus liquido patet, 1. Puncta ista hodierna nec ab Adamo, nec a Mose, aut Prophetis, esse ante captivatatem Babylonicum usurpata in Scriptis suis. 2. Nec post reditum a captivatate, ab Esdra, aut alio, fuisse ante absolutum Talmud excogitata, sed a viris quibusdam Judæis Sapientibus, post 500, a Christo nato annum fuisse inventa."

On the other hand, the position of John Buxtorf, Jr., is seen in his quarto volume, entitled *Anticritica* (Basileæ, 1653), p. 9: "Sic ergo in ea quam caeperam tela pertexenda pergens, *Quæstionem etiam Secundam, de Punctorum Vocalium et Accentum Hebraicorum Origine et Antiquitate*, peculiari Tractatu, pro gratia mihi a Domino concessa, ita pertractavi, ut ostenderim, in hac etiam quæstione Hebraeos omnes, tam Veteres, quam Recentiores, pro Punctorum Hebraicorum Antiquitate stare et militare, et vel eorum Originem ad Mosen, et Authores Sacrorum librorum ipsos; vel saltem ad Esdram, eorum inventionem, te ad libros Sacros adscriptionem, referre; uno excepto Elia [Levita], recenti Hebraeorum Grammatico, qui superiori sæculo floruit. Cum Hebraeis ergo et ego, Sententiam de Antiqua et authentica origine praeferens." Cf. Hottinger in his *Thesaurus Philologicus* (Tiguri, MDCLIX), p. 401: "Alii puncta vocant, Traditionem Mosis e monte Sinai; ita quidem, ut juxta quosdam, Moses punctorum figuras non modo a Deo acceperit, sed et scribendo expresserit; juxta alios vero orali tantum traditione ad tempora Esrae propagavit qui primus illas scribendo expresserit."

the origin and composition of the Scriptures may seem to be unprofitable and unedifying. It is certain, however, that people are making more inquiries regarding the Bible than in respect to any other book. The minister may meet such inquiries with the statement, that, as Christianity has demonstrated its divine power and origin, these difficulties regarding a divine revelation, admitting that they exist, need give no occasion for anxiety, and hence no effort need be made to explain them. This, I say, is a position which every minister may take, because it is true that the divine origin and power of Christianity cannot be impeached by a consideration of any difficulties in Scripture. As teachers of the people we can frankly admit, "These things are difficulties which we do not attempt to explain."

But I suppose there is not a Bible school in the land where some explanation is not attempted; either by denying that any difficulties exist, or by giving some specious explanation. Those who pursue such methods do not reflect that such work, if attempted at all, must be thorough; that to assume positions that are not true, or that are but half true, is worse than useless; that it is better not to begin any investigations unless they are carried through in the spirit of scientific inquiry. On all subjects of research in other departments it is customary to give the latest and most trustworthy information. No one would respect a teacher in astronomy or chemistry who should retail exploded theories. Nor would his faith in these sciences be shaken, because some old hypotheses regarding them were proved to be wrong. It seems an injustice, then, that those who are called upon to be leaders in investigation regarding the Bible,—and who cannot escape this responsibility if they would,—should sometimes be regarded with suspicion, that their motives should be too often impugned and the results of their studies ridiculed, as if those who should know most about the subject they are called upon

to teach should be most ignorant of it, as if they were not solemnly summoned to search for the entire truth as far as they are able. They deserve in their efforts the sympathies and prayers of the church of Christ. While it may seem as if their work was that of tearing down, it is rather that of building up. It is to show that after criticism has done its utmost, both Lower and Higher,¹ we have the same gospel in all its essential elements.

I have chosen as the subject of my address, *The Book, the Land, the People*; or, *Divine Revelations through Ancient Israel*. I hope to be able to show that those things which are ordinarily regarded as difficulties disappear in a natural way if we consider the phenomena of the Bible, of its authorship and transmission as they really are. On the other hand, it seems to me that an examination of the natural characteristics of the Oriental peoples to whom and through whom the Bible was given, as disclosed by the Orientals of Syria and Palestine to-day, affords convincing proof that it was not of man in its original plan and purpose. When we consider the natural characteristics of Orientals we shall clearly see that no theory of evolution can account for the Bible as summed up and interpreted in the gospel.

I. We often speak of the Bible as one book by one di-

¹ Professor Green (*The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*, New York, 1895, p. v) well remarks: "The Higher Criticism . . . has come to be considered one of the most dangerous forms of infidelity, and in its very nature hostile to revealed truth. . . . This is not the fault of the Higher Criticism in its genuine sense, but of its perversion. . . . It seeks to ascertain by all available means the authors by whom, the time at which, the circumstances under which, and the design with which they [the Scriptures] were produced. Such investigations, rightly conducted, must prove a most important aid to the understanding and just appreciation of the writings in question.

"The books of the Bible have nothing to fear from such investigations, however searching and thorough, and however fearlessly pursued. . . . The Bible stands upon a rock from which it can never be dislodged."

vine author. This is in a sense true, when we take into account the unity of purpose in the Scriptures as centering in the person and work of Jesus Christ. But when we look at the Scriptures, even in a superficial way, we find traces of many human hands, and perceive that God has not made one revelation of himself, but many, according to the needs of different ages. The Revised Version of Hebrews i. 1, 2 expresses this clearly: "God having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son."

The attitude of Israel toward these manifestations of God has been variously described. At the same time we have in the Old Testament the record of many revelations. We might thus incline to think that the word *Biblia*, in its original signification, books, is more truly descriptive than our term *Bible* in its present meaning, book. At the first blush the term *Divine Library*, or *Bibliotheca Divina*, first used by Jerome,¹ does not seem to be far out of the way. But a more critical study of the composition of the Scriptures reveals the fact that such a designation is likely to be misleading. It may indeed be asked, whether, according to the enumeration in our English Bible of sixty-six books we have not sixty-six separate volumes in the *Divine Library*, some of which doubtless existed among the Jews as separate rolls, of which we find a frequent example among the Jews to-day in their rolls of Esther. But we discover when we examine the Pentateuch in a critical way—not to speak of other portions of the Old Testament—that it was made up of different elements. All modern critics, both at home and abroad, are essentially agreed as to the existence of these elements, as to their characteris-

¹ Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi, *Op. cil.*, Tom. ii. p. 901: "Pamphilus presbyter, Eusebii Cæsariensis Episcopi necessarius, tanto Bibliothecae divinae amore flagravat, ut maximam partem Origenis voluminum sua manu descripserit, quae usque hodie in Cæsariensi Bibliotheca habentur."

tics and the way in which they have been combined.¹ There is difference of opinion as to the age and succession of the documents which have been brought together in the first five books of the Bible, assigned by tradition to Moses. These documents have not been recast and fused together according to our Occidental methods, but pieced together as one might make a harmony of the New Testament from the Synoptics. Much sport has been made of this theory of the composite character of the Pentateuch by men of the traditional school, especially in uncritical attacks in some religious papers. It is not the way an Occidental would prepare a legal work; but it can be demonstrated that narratives in Kings and Chronicles have been prepared through the patchwork combination of earlier sources.² This method of composition is also favored by a characteristic of Orientals which I mention for convenience in this connection. Syrian Orientals have powerful memories, but are lacking both in analysis and synthesis. It is the testimony of one of the most eminent professors³ in the Syrian Protestant College at Beirut, that this contrast between the Occidental and the Oriental came out in connection with his two sons who led their classes in the study of medicine. While their Oriental classmates could give the lectures they had heard word for word, the recitations of this surgeon's sons were their own mental product in this respect that they had digested what they had heard, and, when examined, gave it to their professors with the stamp of their own individuality. This peculiarity of the Oriental mind of being able to reproduce that which has been committed to it, but not to assimilate it

¹ Cf. Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch* (New York, 1893), pp. 143, 144.

² See *Style as an Element in determining the Authorship of Old Testament Documents*, in the *American Journal of Theology* (Chicago, 1897), Vol. i. pp. 318-325.

³ Rev. George E. Post, M.D.

and cast it in a new form, is favorable to the modern critical theory of the Pentateuch of piecing together different documents. In the same breath that one laughs at this as absurd, he might laugh at the Oriental in his native costume or manner of speech. In scientific discussions, ridicule, the arts of the dialectician, should have no place.

To many it is a fatal objection to the modern critical theory, that the Pentateuch is referred to in the New Testament, and especially by Christ himself, as the work of Moses. Men in our age so anxiously claim their own mental progeny that we can scarcely conceive of an age and country where this was not the case. Modern criticism seems to have demonstrated that the legal code, known as Moses, both in its traditional and written form,—as the Psalms were known among the Jews as David,¹—contains a combination of the legal enactments of Israel from their oldest code in the Book of the Covenant² down to the latest in the Priests' Code.³ This code then was all known as Moses. In attributing all their legal traditions to him, the Jews had no thought that he himself was not the author of the unwritten legal system.

We have an apposite example in modern times and in a modern country. I refer to the last edition of Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar. Those familiar with the history of this work—not to speak of the Hebrew Lexicon—know that it has passed through at least twenty-six editions; of these at least thirteen have been since the death of the author in 1842. The editions have not been stereotyped, but each has been printed from type especially set up. This has been done that Gesenius, while living, and

¹ Heb. iv. 7.

² Ex. xx. 22-xxiii.

³ Driver, *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* (New York, 1897), p. 10. "This last designation is in strictness applicable only to the ceremonial sections in Ex-Num." The term, however, is extended so as to embrace all passages in Genesis and Joshua which betray the same age and style, and which are designated by P.

those who prepared each subsequent edition after his death, might have an opportunity to reconstruct the grammar with reference to the latest progress in connection with the Hebrew language. Here then is the strange fact of a grammar, of which Gesenius was the father, but so changed in the process of years that he would not recognize it as his own mental product if he were to come to life. In catalogues of books, in the work of the class-room, this grammar bears the name of Gesenius.¹ The modern art of printing enables us to follow the history of each edition back to the first; but we have not the same way of determining Israelitish law when Moses was its first promulgator and expounder, or of the successive digests of it. There is no dishonesty in giving the name of Gesenius to the different editions of the Hebrew Grammar, and no Jew could for a moment think of dishonesty in ascribing all the law to Moses, nor could he be conscious of the revisions through which it had passed during the centuries. It would be impossible, unless it were revealed to him, to know which laws were first announced through Moses and which came through a later legislation. Nor is this essential. We have, perhaps, a similar phenomenon in the titles given to the Davidic psalms relating the circumstances under which they were written by him. The tendency to increase the number may be seen in the LXX, which assigns an author to every one of the thirty-four psalms,² which in the Hebrew Bible have no sign of authorship, and in later Jewish tradition which, as I have remarked, finally ascribed all to David.

In the Prophecy of Isaiah we have, according to the modern critical theory, not only the prophet's own oracles, but also those of others. This appears from certain his-

¹ Cf. the well-known history of Webster's Dictionary.

² Cf. Murray, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Psalms* (New York, 1880), p. 103.

torical allusions which seem to be clear and unmistakable. There are references in certain passages to a condition of things during the Babylonian exile.¹ These various oracles have been placed with those of Isaiah, and his name is prefixed to the entire collection in the editions which have been prepared by the Jews. Some of the oracles so placed, may have been by his pupils. Some of them definitely bear his name, others do not. They are all grouped with the Isaianic literature, and are anonymous. This, however, is not strange, when we consider that among the Hebrews the message was everything, the messenger was of less account. Of this, too, we have an illustration from modern times. There has never been a more distinct personality in American journalism than that of Horace Greeley. His name and that of the *New York Tribune* became synonymous, and yet there were contributions from other pens besides his own;² all appearing in the same paper, and not distinguished from his contributions except as his editorials bore certain earmarks; that is, Horace Greeley made the *New York Tribune*, was its animating spirit, but what he himself wrote could only be determined on internal evidence. This illustrates only the fact, that, in producing great reforms, the moving spirit may associate others with himself and may perpetuate his influence, without connecting his own productions with his own name. If the *New York Tribune* were now known as *Greeley's Tribune*, we should have in its issues from the time of Greeley an illustration, imperfect indeed, of the Prophecy of Isaiah, containing much from that peerless prophet, but also more from other writers who had been swayed by his personality, who wrote much as he would have written had he been living during the Babylonian exile. We might take another

¹ Cf. Driver, *Op. cit.*, pp. 211, 212, 216, 230.

² E.g. Mr. H. Greeley was severely attacked for his views on the Sabbath question on account of an article prepared by Rev. W. W. Atterbury, which had been published as an editorial.

example from the *London Times*, or "Great Thunderer" as it is called, which represents principles rather than men. Hardly any prophecies could be more impersonal than those of Isaiah. With two or three exceptions they reveal scarcely anything of their author. Apart from the illustrations offered by Gesenius' Grammar and two great newspapers, such a combination of authorship in connection with a great name as is postulated under Moses and Isaiah seems quite incomprehensible to an Occidental mind. But, as we have seen, we have an illustration of the same thing in the Psalter, subsequently known as David, the authorship of which Jewish tradition attributed to him in connection with the ten elders,¹ Adam, Melchizedek, Abraham, Moses, etc. Indeed, a large part of the Old Testament is anonymous. After all, the human authors are not our guarantee for the divine character of Scripture.

We are not, then, to put too much emphasis on the threefold arrangement of the Old Testament as Law, Prophets, and Writings, or their subdivision into twenty-two books. This is the work of the Jewish editors who have brought together the different books of the Old Testament, and has no special bearing on the authorship of each book, or the period when its constituent elements were given. The lawbook of Israel as found in the Pentateuch seems to be proved to be the product of centuries. This is also true of the Psalter, or ancient hymn-book of Israel, which must have run through a number of editions before it reached its present form. It is certain, too, that the oracles grouped under the name of Isaiah, including those which were uttered during the life of that great prophet, do not culminate until five or six generations after his death.

¹ Babylonian Talmud, Baba bathra (Amsterdam, 1645), folios 15, 16:
 דוד כתב ספר תהלים על ידי עשרה זקנים על ידי אדם הראשון על ידי מלכיצדק
 קעל ידי אברהם ועל ידי משה ועל ידי הימן ועל ידי ידוהן ועל ידי אסף ועל ידי
 רשעל בני קרח

We may advance a step further. The fact of revelations of divine truth is not conditioned by any theoretical forms of human authorship. It is as idle for us to specify in what style the Bible should be written, according to our Occidental ideas, as it is to determine what clothes the law-givers, prophets, psalmists, and evangelists who received these revelations should wear. It might seem to some that a man clothed in camel's hair with a leathern girdle about his loins, with a bare breast and bare legs below the knees, would not be a fit representative of the King of kings. Doubtless our modern costumers would think a full-dress suit and patent-leather boots more becoming.

But the glory of each divine revelation is that it speaks the language of the people of each age to whom it is addressed; that it seeks to reach their hearts. Hence we are not to prescribe the forms of literature in which divine truth must have been expressed. We have no right to theorize as to the way in which God would speak to such a people in order to be worthy of him. Our study of the medium has simply to do with the message as it was given. We are not to think any mode of representation unworthy of God which divine wisdom might employ to reach the people. Hence we have no right to say that a revelation must be clothed in the form of history, but never in that of fiction; must be stated as actuality, but never in the forms of symbolism; might use poetry, but must shun all dramatic elements. It is true that the substance of each revelation cannot be divorced from the form; hence it is that the study of the form is of such interest and importance. But no evangelical student of the Bible should have any word of reproach for any man, who, while maintaining the fact of divine revelations, feels that, when necessary, he may freely discuss the manner of these revelations, and that the fact that these revelations have been made does not depend upon the way in which they have

been given; that is, the proof that God has made a series of revelations cannot be shaken by any assured results of criticism. There is only one *a priori* position that we have a right to postulate in the discussion of this question, and that is that God would use such a mode of representation in dealing with a given people as would reach them best.

The question, then, whether the Bible contains a series of revelations from God is of infinitely more importance than a consideration of the individuals by whom, and the times when, these revelations were spoken or written down. The divine author from whom the Scriptures emanated is everything: the human instrument through whom the messages came, while of interest, is of subsidiary importance. It is not a Moses, a David, or an Isaiah that is a guarantee of a divine revelation. If this were so, a large part of the Old Testament, as we have seen, would be without the seal of such great names for its authority, since it is anonymous. It is the people through whom the revelations came, rather than the individuals, who are to be the object of our study. These we must consider in their abode and in their special customs and characteristics, for these have infallibly determined the forms of the revelations that have been made. A study of the manners and customs of the people and of their mental characteristics, as I have observed, tends to remove some of the most serious difficulties from the Old Testament which have taxed the ingenuity of apologists for adequate explanation. On the other hand, a consideration of the teachings of Christ, especially in the Sermon on the Mount and as appearing in the Gospels, running counter to these manners, customs, and characteristics, furnishes a most powerful proof that the revelation made by the God-man in word and life is not an evolution from anything that preceded in Judaism, but is divine.

It is undoubtedly true that the Old Testament is too often judged with respect to that which is supposed to be its permanent and world-wide character. The temptation to put all parts of the Bible on the same basis, as authoritative for men of every age, has led to some strange uses of portions of the Old Testament which are clearly local and temporal in their character, which incorporate the views and practices of the times, and are thus indicated in the teaching of Jesus. It is well known that professed Christians during the centuries, both Catholics and Protestants, have found warrant for some of their most unchristian and cruel acts in the accounts of the dealing of the Israelites with their enemies. Imperfect ethics, shifty evasions of the truth, even cruel massacres, have found justification in the example of ancient Orientals, whose acts have not been read in the condemnation which falls upon them in the gospel. Add to this the fact already stated, which needs to be especially emphasized, that each portion of the Bible, both in the Old and New Testaments, was originally given with reference to the history and needs of a particular people and a particular age. Neither legislator, prophet, nor psalmist was concerned with the wants of a people far away, but with those of a congregation then present. The power to touch other hearts, to be the medium of spiritual longings and aspirations through the centuries, came through those being the medium of such longings and aspirations who first gave them expression.

II. While this is so, much of the power of the Bible as a world-wide book is due to the country in which it was produced. Though so limited in extent, there is no land so small which furnishes such a microcosm, so that the mountaineer, the dweller on the plain, the sailor, the fisherman, the inhabitant of the temperate zone, or the one dwelling in torrid climes, may all find something in this book of wonderful variety.

To speak a little more in detail, the climate of Jerusalem is largely that of the temperate zone. In winter there is frost and snow. Even in summer the traveler may be surprised to find his thermometer in the evening and early morning falling below 60° Fahrenheit.¹ But he can easily pass in three hours of rapid driving—a journey which probably took the ancient Israelite twice as long—to the Jericho and the Ghor, or the deep valley of the Jordan. He can find indications of a tropical climate in the dry and thirsty soil and in the vegetation, but if he desires to discover a higher degree of heat and a vegetation that is even more tropical, let him go to Callirrohe, on the east side of the Dead Sea, where Herod the Great went shortly before his death, in the hope of betterment. There he will perceive the climate and vegetation of Nubia. It is one of the great surprises of the traveler in summer to find so many parts of the country where the nights are cool, while the days are hot. He can well understand the plaint of Jacob: "In the day the drought consumed me, and the frost by night" (Gen. xxxi. 40).

Or if we turn to natural scenery, while Palestine and contiguous regions have not the grandeur of some countries, its inhabitants could easily contemplate a scenery which has stirred many an Old Testament writer.

None can visit Mount Sinai, or the Mount of God, can see it in its various aspects of majesty, without being impressed with the vividness of its portraiture by the ancient writer, and the reinforcement which the place gives to the Ten Commandments. Mountains like Hermon and Lebanon are far above the commonplace in scenery. They are fitted to inspire with the rarest emotions all who climb their summits. Even Jermak, Tabor, Carmel, and the Mount of Olives—not to mention others—must powerfully

¹At 6.30 A.M., on June 20th of last year (1900), my thermometer registered at Hebron 55° Fahrenheit, and at Jerusalem, June 17th, at 7.45 A.M., 62°.

influence the imagination. It is no small thing that some of the Scripture writers have seen them, and felt something of their power.

If there is no inspiring river like our Hudson, or the Rhine, there are still features about the Jordan, so unique among rivers, as to give color to both the Old and the New Testament. Those who live by the sea, whether by fresh or salt water, have not been neglected in the allusions to the Sea of Galilee and to the Mediterranean, which are always so present in the Psalms and the Gospels that the sailor and the fisherman need not feel that the Bible is merely a landsman's book. Such natural features, in the allusions of Scripture, appeal to men in every age, and render the Bible universally adapted to be understood and appreciated in its references to the climate and physical characteristics of the country. Hence, while it was written for the people of a particular country, through the physical peculiarities of that country it is wonderfully adapted to the people of every clime.

There is another factor in the land where the Bible was produced, which, in a providential way, has contributed powerfully to its world-wide mission; and in this respect we have a marked contrast between the Old and the New Testament. The Old Testament in its present form, aside from one¹ of the documents used in the Hexateuch and the Prophecy of Hosea, is the work of Judæans; the New Testament has received its characteristic features from Galileans, or those who were free from the narrowness of Judæa. In the first place, then, we have the natural separateness of the southern kingdom, where the religion of Israel before the captivity received its most special development. Afar from the great world-empires of Egypt and

¹The so-called Elohistic document; cf. Addis, *The Documents of the Hexateuch*, p. lv: "Hence, though there is much dispute about the place in which the Jahvist wrote, there is a general consensus of the critics that the Elohist belonged to the Northern Kingdom."

Assyria, until Judah became a vassal state, and even afterwards, the religion of Israel was less in danger of being overwhelmed by foreign influences. But when Judaism became only self-seeking and fanatical, as in the time of Christ; when Christianity was to become a world-wide religion, and the Bible a world-wide book through the addition of the New Testament,—it is from Galilee that our Lord and his disciples came, where they might catch something of the universal spirit of Roman civilization, by their close proximity to one of the great arteries of Roman travel. The apostle Paul too, notwithstanding the pharisaic narrowness of his education, is better fitted to become an apostle of the Gentiles through the liberalizing influence of Roman citizenship.

III. I pass now to consider the people to whom and through whom the divine revelations that we have in the Scriptures were made. As Hebrews they are recognized as Semites, all of whom had a kindred speech.¹ The term is a loose one; that of Orientals or people of the East is still looser, unless we limit its application.

We have the great advantage, not only of being able to study the land in which Israel lived, but also the people. By these I do not refer to the Jews, who, while retaining their racial peculiarities, have been so powerfully molded by the different nations in which they have found a home, so that there is a great difference between a Polish, a Spanish, and a Chinese Jew. The best type of ancient Israel in characteristics, in manners and customs, and at some later periods of their history, especially among the peasant class, is confessedly among the Arabs and fellahin of Syria and Palestine. There are certain portions of the country where you might see Abraham, as if he had risen again, or meet Rebecca or Rachel at the well, or see David with his flock, or Elijah in his hairy mantle. You may be reasonably

¹ Cf. Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (Boston, 1893), pp. 1-8.

sure that you have the same dress, the same usages, the same modes of speech. The study of the modern Arab and fellahin, then, is an important help in understanding some of the peculiarities of the Old Testament which seem strange to the Occidental mind. We shall find that the same institutions and the same characteristics exist to-day in Syria and Palestine as we find in the Old Testament.

In our study of the Old Testament we must recognize the existence of the institutions of ancient life which have left their impress upon the legislation and history of the Old Testament. Our Lord himself has indicated the temporary character of such institutions, though sanctioned by the great name of Moses (Matt. xix. 8). These institutions which no Christian would feel for one moment called upon to defend, or should consider it necessary to explain away, are blood revenge, slavery, polygamy, easy divorce, and, on occasion, the massacre of peoples of a different faith.

It is surprising to the modern traveler in the East, who looks at modern life more narrowly than the modern tourist, to find that blood revenge is still practiced, that the institution constitutes a most serious peril to any one in Syria or Palestine who may slay another in self-defense. The institution of cities of refuge among the Israelites was necessary because of this custom. But blood revenge is simply a manifestation of the spirit of revenge which finds expression in a few of the psalms usually called imprecatory.¹ I know it is argued by eminent authorities that times come when such psalms are justified;² but we may

¹ These have been well classified by Albert Barnes in his *Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical on the Book of Psalms* (New York, 1869), Vol. i. pp. xxiv-xxvi.

² B. B. Edwards, D.D., *Imprecations in the Scriptures*, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. i. pp. 79-110; J. J. Owen, D.D., *The Imprecatory Psalms*, *Ibid.*, Vol. xiii. pp. 551-563; Edwards A. Park, *The Imprecatory Psalms, Viewed in the Light of the Southern Rebellion*, *Ibid.*, Vol. xix. pp. 165-210.

be sure we have an echo of the Oriental heart,¹ and not of the spirit of the gospel, when we read:—

“ O daughter of Babylon that art to be destroyed ;
Happy shall he be that rewardeth thee
As thou hast served us.
Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones
Against the rock ”—(Ps. cxxxvii. 8, 9).

Christ has by implication clearly condemned all such utterances which have been allowed to stand in the Old Testament. All those institutions of the Old Testament which are so often criticised—as polygamy, divorce, and slavery—find abundant illustration among Syrian Orientals to-day. In some respects their practice is far inferior to that of the Old Testament. But it is the same people regarding woman as a possession obtained by purchase, or capture. It is true that the provisions for slaves in the Old Testament are exceedingly humane, seemingly the best that could be devised in that condition of society.

The wholesale massacres ordered in the Old Testament are akin to Oriental ideas of the treatment of those who are not co-religionists under certain circumstances. In the Pentateuch we have an enumeration of peoples whom the land was ready to spue out, because of their corruption. Such travelers as Doughty in his “Arabia Deserta,”² and antiquarians like Macalister of the Palestine Exploration Fund, have found in their researches and excavations

¹ This is essentially the position of Albert Barnes, who says, *Op. cit.*, pp. xxix, xxxvii: “ There is nothing to prevent our regarding this as a statement of the actual feelings—the pleasure—the satisfaction which they would actually *feel* who should wreak vengeance on Babylon. . . According to this view, the expressions which are used in this record are not presented for our imitation. The mere fact that they are recorded as having occurred in the lives of good men is no evidence that they are right, or are to be followed by us.”

² *Arabia Deserta* (Cambridge, 1888), Vol. i. pp. 265, 266: “ The herdsmen’s grossness is never out of the Semitic nature . . . Little Joseph is a talebearer to their father of his brethren’s lewd conversation in the field. Such are always the Semitic nomads. Palestine, the countries

indications, as they have thought, of the truth of this characterization of the Old Testament writers. Some of the vices of these peoples were abominable and unmentionable.¹ The divine command as to their extermination may be likened to a surgery, necessary for the preservation of a people with such a high mission as Israel, yet it is massacre, so well understood by the Oriental, of which we have examples under the Turkish government in its dealings with the Armenians,² but relieved by statute of its most revolting features in the kindest treatment of female captives which that age knew.³ We may say, then, that the divine revelations which were made to Israel under the Old Covenant did not set aside any of the great institutions of Oriental life, though seeking to regulate them and to remove their most objectionable features.

beyond Jordan and Eden, given to the children and nephews of Abraham, spued out the nations which dwelled before in them, and had defiled the land: the Beny Israel are admonished, lest the soil cast out them also. In Moses is remembered the nomad offense of lying with cattle [this is said to be openly practiced by donkey boys in Egypt, as was reported to me by a tourist; besides I was solicited to be present at such an exhibition]; the people are commanded to put away guiltiness from the land by stoning them: in Arabia that is but a villainous mock, and which the elder sort acknowledge with groans and cursing. The pastoral race being such, Israel must naturally slide back from Moses' religion to the easy and carnal idolatry of the old Canaanites." Cf. Zwemer, *Arabia: The Cradle of Islam* (New York, 1900), p. 41 and note.

¹ The evidences of unthinkable vices of the ancient Canaanites, discovered by Mr. Macalister, were exhibited to me by Dr. Wheeler of Jerusalem, who saw in them abundant justification for the annihilation of these peoples.

² Mr. Fowle, of Cæsarea, Turkey, is authority for the statement, that the revolutionary society among the Armenians deliberately sought to bring on a massacre so that the Christian powers might intervene. They rightly reckoned that, according to the Oriental principle of solidarity (cf. Josh. vii.), the whole Armenian people would be held responsible for the acts of the revolutionists. The Turks began the massacre, because the Armenians, through these revolutionists, had lifted up their hands against the Sultan (cf. 1 Sam. xxvi. 11).

³ Deut. xxi. 11-14.

Let us now pass to a consideration of some Oriental characteristics as they have affected the form of the revelations. It was of course possible for the Divine Spirit to eliminate these, but a revelation which should cut itself loose from the forms of speech and expression of a given people would be of but little, if of any, use to that people.

The thinking of the Syrian Oriental and his mode of expression tends to hyperbole. Otherwise he feels that he is making no impression. From childhood, accustomed to such forms of speech, he gets much the same idea from such language as his Occidental brother would from a precise and prosaic account. He describes a little trickling stream as a copious fountain;¹ he speaks of the presence of some people in a village as that of all the inhabitants. In a moment of excitement, he may address two persons, in a courtyard, a woman and a boy, as O world!² In his desire to secure the services of a physician for an ailing lad he may say, that he is the only son of his mother, when she has two other boys.³ He may break forth in an eloquent poetical description of the renown and riches of a bridegroom and may describe the splendor of his mansion, when the subject of this laudation has done no great deeds and is a poor man living in a hovel.³ Such are the people who were made the instruments of divine revelations. When we compare the Old Testament with other Oriental books, we see evidences of restraint, that Oriental imagination and

¹ Mr. Theophilus Waldmeier of Asfûrijeh, near Beirut, who was in Abyssinia ten years and who has been in Syria thirty years, says: "If a native found a little water, he would say he had found a fountain. You must always understand that the Oriental uses the language of exaggeration. It may come from this that Orientals would not credit his statements unless he used strong language. He does not mean to tell a lie, but he wishes to make an impression."

² Examples furnished by Dr. George E. Post, professor in the Medical Department of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut.

³ From an interview with Rev. John Zeller of Jerusalem, who has been a missionary in Syria about fifty years.

Oriental speech have not had a free hand, that they have been preserved from all fantastic extravagances.¹ At the same time there are many clear traces of Orientalisms both in the Old and New Testaments. If we understand the language from our Occidental point of view, we shall be misled, both in certain descriptions and in the use of some passages in the Old Testament to which we are inclined to ascribe literal dogmatic value. It is certain that the Old Testament historian who is describing the magnificence of Solomon is writing like an Oriental (1 Kings iv. 20; x. 27). The same is true of the author of John's Gospel, when he says: "And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose the world itself would not contain the books that should be written" (John xxi. 25).

The Oriental is least of all a scientific historian. He is the prince of story-tellers. Narratives, real and imaginary, spring from his lips which are the truest portraiture of composite rather than individual Oriental life, though narrated under the form of individual experience. He knows nothing of the labor and accuracy indicated in the prologue of the Gospel according to Luke: "Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to draw up a narrative concerning those matters which have been fulfilled among us, even as they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, it seemed good to me also, most excellent Theophilus; that thou mightest know the certainty concerning the things wherein thou wast instructed" (Luke i. 1-4).

¹ Cf. the Story of Joseph in Genesis, with the Tale of the Two Brothers, Records of the Past, Vol. ii. pp. 137-152, and the twelfth Sura of the Koran respecting Joseph. Conspicuous examples of Oriental fancy run wild may be found in Hershon, Genesis with a Talmudical Commentary (London, 1883), p. 63. "Rab Jehudah said in the name of Rab: 'Adam's stature reached from one end of the world to another,' as it is said (Deut. iv. 32), That God created man [Adam] upon the earth, and from one side of the heaven to the other." Sanhedrin 38b.

The investigations of the untrained Oriental are practically worthless.¹ Of philosophy he has none. But he is peculiarly sensitive to impressions. He is under the spell of authority, whether right or wrong. From his point of view, might makes right. If God has spoken, his decree must be right, because God has uttered it.² By his very limitations he faithfully reproduces that which has been given him, sentence for sentence, and perhaps word for word.

He is not a mathematician. He is inclined to deal in round numbers like ten, forty, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand.³ The large numbers he reports are likely to be ten times those of actuality.⁴ One is reminded of this inability to report numbers in the account of the forty thousand stalls for Solomon's horses, of which we read in 1 Kings iv. 26, which is reduced to four thousand in 2 Chron. ix. 25. In this connection I well remember the remark of a devout New England deacon,⁵ who was a diligent and reverent student of the Bible years ago, that he thought there must be some mistake about some of the numbers in the Old Testament. It is true that in copying documents errors would be more likely to be found in numbers than elsewhere, but it is not unlikely that some of the very large numbers in the Old Testament cannot be taken literally in their original form.

¹Dr. Post stated that in the preparation of his work on the "Flora of Syria, Palestine, and Sinai" he had paid considerable sums to Orientals for botanical collections, but had found them practically worthless.

²The same eminent authority says: "They think God makes right and wrong by edict."

³So Dr. Post, and Miss Jessie Taylor of the Moslem School for Girls, who has been in Beirut since 1865, and others.

⁴Doughty (*Op. cit.*, Vol. i. p. 130) says of the Arabs: "Their minds have little apprehension of the higher numbers. I have commonly found their thousands to signify hundreds, so that the tenth of their tale very nearly agreed with my own reckoning." Cf. Palmer, *The Desert of the Exodus* (New York, 1872), p. 72.

⁵Deacon A. W. Porter of Monson, Mass., a staunch supporter of Mary Lyon, and treasurer of Mount Holyoke Female Seminary for many years |

An Occidental may feel that the admission of these orientalisms in the Old Testament tends to weaken its authority. But we must remember that its revelations and teachings were designed for an Oriental people, and in adaptation to their language, customs, and modes of thought were admirably fitted to meet their needs. Most of the Old Testament was spoken before it was written. Its earliest narratives passed from mouth to mouth, oral law preceded written law, oral prophecy, with inconsiderable exceptions, preceded written prophecy, oral songs and proverbs preceded written. We may see how Hebrew parallelism was a powerful aid to the memory, and was a natural device for this purpose. An oral gospel preceded a written gospel, and Paul sent his letters to definite churches and individuals. We should expect, therefore, to find special adaptations to particular people, and in the Old Testament to an Oriental people. The establishment of this principle may serve to explain the presence of certain things in the Old Testament which cannot be reasonably accounted for in any other way.

We turn now to consider the evidence which we have in the human authorship of Scripture of its divine origin and authority showing that it cannot be accounted for by any naturalistic theory of development. This is true of many features in the Old Testament and is far more true of the entire spirit and teaching of the New. We can say in the most positive way that the Bible, as summed up in the gospel, and as judged by its effects, cannot be accounted for as a merely human book. As we have always lived under a Christian civilization it may be difficult for us to appreciate the truth of this proposition, which must seem evident to every mind which has come under the power of the truth, or which is capable of exercising sound judgment. The ideals and demands set forth in the Sermon on the Mount, as well as in other parts of the gospel, are

entirely contrary to human nature, and are utterly foreign to the ideas and conceptions of Orientals. There is time to give only a few examples:—

1. In the attitude towards woman. The Oriental regards woman as an inferior being. Of this persuasion there are many examples. The orthodox modern Jew daily thanks God that he is not a woman.¹ Even in the Old Testament she is reckoned inferior to man. The legal estimation of a female child is considered half that of a male (Lev. xxvii. 1–8), while the mother remains in her uncleanness twice as long for a female birth as for a male. It was just as proud a boast in the time of the patriarchs that a woman had borne her husband sons as it is among the Orientals to-day (Gen. xxix. 34). Even Paul's judgment of her, though far in advance of his time, seems to have been affected by his Jewish training (1 Tim. ii. 11–15).

In Islam this unfavorable judgment of woman is even more conspicuous, and is "one of the greatest blots" upon it.² She is not considered as being without a soul, as is oftentimes reported, as in Karl May's "Am Jenseits";³ but

¹ In the Prayers of Israel (כוס ישועות) (Prag, 1864), in the order for morning prayer the Jew is directed to thank God (1) that he is not a heathen, (2) that he is not a slave, and then (3) that he is not a woman:—

ברוך אתה יהוה אלהינו מלך העולם שלא עשני אשה

² Palmer, *The Qur'ân* (Oxford, 1880), Part I. p. lxxv, writes: "One of the greatest blots on El Islam is that it keeps the women in a state of degradation, and therefore effectually prevents the progress of any race professing the religion."

³ "And Islam teaches that woman possesses no soul, and therefore cannot participate in the everlasting joys of Paradise" (p. 85). Where does Islam teach this? The Koran says expressly (Sura xliii. 70): "Enter ye into Paradise, ye and your wives happy."—Trans. Palmer; cf. xiii. 23; xl. 8. But Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia* (London, 1829), p. 348, is authority for the following statement which partially supports May's assertion: "Women being considered in the East as inferior creatures, to whom some learned commentators on the Koran deny even entrance into Paradise, their husbands care little about their strict observance of religious rites, and many of them dislike it, because it raises them to a nearer level with themselves."

there is occasion for this report in the treatment that she receives at the hands of Moslems. Religious acts on her part are looked on with disfavor. The joys of Paradise are not denied her, but she exists in this world simply to minister to the faithful.¹ Marriage is only for the sake of children. Woman has no companionship with the man who has bought her by the payment of dowry, and who holds her as his thrall.² At any time, and for any cause, he may dismiss her simply by saying, "You are divorced."³ He may bring from one to three other wives into the same tent, or apartment, if he desires and has the means. He may marry the next day after her death, if he chooses, without losing social standing.⁴ She may have borne him sons; if she ceases to please him—and women fade early in the East—he can send her away. She cannot permanently retain any of her children. She may marry again, but it must be with a loss of prestige. The changes in her matrimonial life may come so often that she may sink

¹ "Islam says that woman is only created for the purpose of being a servant of man with her body."—Karl May. The picture of sensual delights in the Koran, the discussion of women in other books, and the attitude of the Moslem world towards her, confirm this statement. (Cf. Sura lxvi. 10-40; lv. 50-78; and Book xiii. On Marriage, in *Mishcat-ul-Massabih*, or A Collection of the Most Authentic Traditions regarding the Actions and Sayings of Mohammed, Calcutta, 1810, Vol. ii. pp. 76-155.) Islam's conception of the function of woman is utterly debasing, and not for a moment to be compared to the noble purpose assigned her in the account of creation as the helpmeet for man (Gen. ii. 18).

² According to the Koran (Sura iv. 38), the husband may beat his wife, and this is a common practice. Cf. Jessup, *The Women of the Arabs* (London, 1874), pp. 7-19; and Doughty, *Op. cit.*, Vol. i. p. 236.

³ See *The Hedaya, or Guide; A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws* (London, MDCCXCI), Vol. i. p. 213.

⁴ This according to the testimony of Moslems. Mr. Fowle relates a shocking instance of a Christian who, on the death of his wife, persuaded her sister to marry him, and, in order to save expense, combined the invitation to the marriage with the announcement of the funeral. The man even had a photograph taken of the deceased in her coffin, of his children, of himself, and of the bride!

as low in thought and character as the poor Occidental prostitute.¹

Whatever examples there may be of marriages of affection among Moslems, the historical Christian churches, or among the Druses—the latter may freely divorce their wives, though they may not have more than one wife at a time²—the Oriental type of woman still remains. Whether among the Bedawin of the desert or the Syrians of the town, woman unaffected by Christ's teaching is low down in the social scale, far less loved than the Arab's sons; far less valued than a beautiful mare. There is bitter disappointment and sorrow in an Arab or Syrian household when a daughter is born; there is joy when the mare casts a filly.

Closely connected with this cheap rating of the sex is the prevalent impurity of speech among the men and women of the East. This grossness appertains to the Arab of the desert³ and to the man of the town. It is characteristic of the fairest inmate of the harem⁴ as of her less favored sister of the rural district. Little children speak freely of things that should be remote from the knowledge

¹ Doughty, *Op. cit.*, Vol. i. p. 322.

² Jessup, *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-29. A prominent Druse from a town near Salchad told me that most Druses had to experiment several times before getting a wife that was satisfactory. He was living with a second wife.

³ Doughty, *Op. cit.*, Vol. i. pp. 265, 266.

⁴ Testimony of a woman who loves Moslem women and has mingled with them many years, and who has trained Moslem girls to be pure of speech. She said: "The conversation of women is abominably filthy. . . . Druses and Moslems are alike in this." This obscenity follows naturally enough from the view mentioned by Doughty, *Op. cit.*, that the Oriental thinks such talk permissible, "since it is God that has thus founded our nature." It seems evident that in the modern Oriental world the same freedom exists which is assigned by tradition to Mohammed. Cf. Leyde, *The Asian Mystery*, p. 226. There are many other references to standard works that might be cited, abundantly confirming the above statement.

of childhood.¹ But how can it be otherwise, when we consider the relations of the sexes? and the fact that when a Moslem must allude to his wife or harem he uses the masculine gender, or apologizes for mentioning such an unclean thing?²

It is impossible, on any theory of evolution, to account for Christ's estimate of woman. His treatment of her was at once respectful, delicate, and brotherly. On their human side he seemed to regard women as equals,—not as inferiors. It would be instructive to recall the recorded instances in which he spoke to women and they ministered to him, his lingering at the well to help the Samaritan woman (John iv. 7-29), his treatment of the one who had so sorely sinned, who anointed his feet (Luke vii. 37-50), and in the disputed passage (John viii. 1-11), is infinitely above the ideals and conceptions of Orientals, uninfluenced by his teachings in any age.

But even more remarkable than this is his conception of marriage, of one man for one woman, until death do them part (Matt. xix. 3-9), thus doing away with polygamy and easy divorce, the great foes of woman's dignity and prosperity,—all this so contrary to Oriental ideas to-day.

The highest demand, however, of all is purity of thought and speech, which are at the foundation of purity of life. The wanton look—which is only warded off by that livery of disgrace, the Oriental veil—is forever forbidden under breach of the seventh commandment (Matt. v. 28). A rigor of which the Oriental world never dreamed, and which is contrary to human nature in every age and clime, is demanded. Well may woman who owes such a debt to her Saviour be foremost in the church and in every good work.

2. Another example of an ideal promulgated by our

¹ Testimony of Dr. Frank I. Mackinnon of Damascus.

² Jessup, *Op. cit.*, p. 12: "'May God elevate you' above the contamination of this subject." Women are considered unclean from the age of puberty until they can no longer bear children.

Saviour which is utterly contrary to Oriental practice through the millenniums is in the abrogation of blood revenge. This, as we have seen, is one of the most pitiless institutions of the East. It has not had its origin because Orientals are more cruel in their vengeance than other ancient peoples. We read of it in the account of Cain, who, as Abel's murderer, must fear the avenger of blood. It is recognized in the account of the covenant made with Noah: "And surely your blood, the blood of your lives, will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it: and at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed" (Gen. ix. 5, 6). This is not merely a demand for capital punishment, but for the death of the murderer by the nearest of kin. Like polygamy, which is traced back to Lamech (Gen. iv. 19), it is one of the most ancient institutions of the East; hence most difficult to eradicate. The law of vengeance makes no distinction between the murderer and the manslayer, each is equally in danger of the avenger of blood.¹ The most sacred duty of the nearest relative, as unaffected by European or Turkish law, is to seek the death of the murderer or manslayer, or of some one else who belongs to his tribe or sect. This law was so thoroughly ingrained in Oriental life, in Old Testament times, that there was no attempt to remove it, but, as in the case of other Oriental institutions, simply to regulate it (Num. xxxv. 12; Deut. xix. 6, 12; Job xx. 3, 5, 9).

But the principles inculcated by our Lord leave no room for blood revenge or personal vengeance. His dying prayer on the cross for his murderers is an example of this, "Father, forgive them." His charge to love one's enemies (Matt. v. 44), indeed the whole spirit of the gospel, while

¹ "No distinction is made between murder and accidental homicide."

—Rev. A. Forder, for more than five years missionary at Kerak.

it does not do away with the punishment of the murderer, does away with the avenging of blood. It cannot exist under civilization that is truly Christian.

3. The death of Christ on the cross for the sins of the world (John i. 29; Gal. i. 4; Rev. i. 5; cf. Matt. xxvi. 13; John iii. 16, 17; 1 John ii. 2) is a representation entirely alien to the ideas of the Oriental world. One might die for his own tribe or clan, but to die for enemies (Rom. v. 6-10), for men of other tribes, for every tribe under heaven, is not the conception of an Oriental. It is true that in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah we have the preparation for this idea; but there, in the mind of the writer, it seems to be limited to Israel, for it is Israel that lament their blindness as to the true character of the Servant,¹ and who recognize the vicarious character of his sufferings in their behalf.²

4. The crown of the Bible, the essence of the gospel, is in God's love message to the world (John iii. 16) and in Christ's commission to his disciples just before his ascension: "Go ye therefore and teach all nations" (Matt. xxviii. 19). We find such conceptions even in the Old Testament when we read in Isa. xix. 24, 25: "In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth; for that the Lord of hosts hath blessed them, saying, "Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel mine inheritance." Such words as these bear the stamp of their divine origin, for they are contrary to all Oriental ideas and

¹ Cf. Cheyne, *The Prophecies of Isaiah* (New York, 1884), Vol. ii. p. 42: "He [the prophet] takes his stand among the Israelites of a later age . . . and hears their penitent musings on the natural rejection of the prophecies respecting the Servant, all of which were in the course of coming true."

² *Ibid.*, Comment on verse 4. "This is the first of twelve distinct assertions in this one chapter of the vicarious character of the sufferings of the servant."

standards. The spirit of the Oriental, unaffected by Christianity, is well expressed in a petition quoted by Leyde, in his "Asian Mystery," from a manuscript of the Nusairiyeh, "that God may take out of their hearts what little light of knowledge and certainty they may possess."¹ It is a fact, attested by missionaries of longest experience and residence in Syria, that even Protestant Christians, bound as they are by clannish prejudices, have hardly the conception or the desire for the conversion of Moslems and Druses. Naturally they do not consider it possible. This is not merely because of the mortal danger to which a Moslem is exposed when he becomes a Christian, but because it is so difficult to break down the wall of Oriental particularism, which keeps out all the world except some favored sect.

Mohammedanism is sometimes spoken of as one of the three great missionary religions and as making many converts, but they are not converts to the great Lover of the world.² They are rather those who become vassals of a party. A confession with the lips is sufficient. The man who has been all his life a Christian and who is a native preacher has a musket leveled at his breast, and is told to confess Islam or die. He refuses, and in an instant a bullet pierces his heart. The Oriental unmastered by Christ has no conception of a gospel for all mankind.³

Think then of the Scriptures, which grew up through more than a millennium, with divine messages originally

¹ P. 163.

² Cf. Tiele, *Outlines of the History of Religion* (London, 1884), p. 98: "The God of Mohammed stands no higher than the common Semitic ideal of morality. He is an arbitrary, vengeful, bloodthirsty tyrant."

³ It is true that Mohammedanism is a universal religion, but it has no gospel. Cf. Tiele, *Op. cit.*, p. 103. "Its triumph in Arabia was due to political considerations, and to the absence of anything better to occupy the field. The way for its diffusion was paved by arms, and the pecuniary and civil privileges conferred on believers among vanquished peoples secured for it a multitude of adherents. . . Founded among a people which developed late, it is the youngest and also the newest, of the universal religions."

addressed to a particular people of the East, in different ages and under different conditions in the Old Testament preparing the way for the coming of the Great Deliverer, and in the New testifying of his words and acts. Conceive of law, psalmody, prophecy, and history bearing clearly the impress of the race and times that produced them, and yet in their demands, doctrines, and ideals infinitely above the conceptions of Orientals in every age, setting forth in some of the prophets, contrary to Oriental particularism, a salvation which takes in all the world. Conceive of one born of the Oriental peasant class, casting aside all Oriental prejudice and narrowness, and presenting ideals of personal character, social standards, and relations to the world, whose realization has been the despair of the choicest spirits in every age; one at the best so limited in his earthly surroundings and experiences and yet so world-wide in his sympathies and sufferings. No Oriental peasant, no sage that the Oriental world has produced, no mere man, could by any possibility have climbed such heights. He is divine, and his gospel is divine, and the Old Testament that prepared the way for him is divine. The fact of divine revelations to man culminating in the greatest revelation through Jesus Christ stands unassailable. The power of the Scriptures and of Christ is not in what they say of themselves, but in the appeals which they make to the heart and conscience. Before them the sinner stands convicted and condemned, without assurance of salvation except as they reveal it. In them is the only adequate hope and consolation which human hearts can find. In Christ alone, as revealed in the New Testament, is the salvation which the world needs. Love begets love. The love of God as revealed through Christ breaks down all barriers in every age, and opens the entire world.

The manner in which God has communicated his will to man, first through the mouths of his chosen servants, and

then through the record of their teachings, is of small account before the great verities of our Christian faith. The difficulties disclosed by a critical study of the Scriptures can in no way affect the divine origin of the revelations made by God to his ancient people, except as men magnify them so that they lose their power to see the divine character of the Bible as a whole. The unlettered Christian, or the modern critic may each so rest in the power of the gospel as not for one moment to be disturbed by the human elements and marks of imperfection that we find in the Scriptures. They are but the fond language of the great Father addressed to the child ear and the child heart of his people through the remote ages of the past. They cannot affect the reality of the divine revelation made through Jesus Christ.

Of the fact of such a revelation we must all be persuaded. The gospel of Jesus Christ in all its richness and power must be the aim of all our study. A persuasion that it, and it alone, is the power of God unto salvation must be the overmastering conviction of our lives if we are to become such ministers as our age needs.

ARTICLE VI.

✓
THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE.¹

BY PROFESSOR ERNEST LUDLOW BOGART, PH.D.

YEARS of industrial expansion are usually marked by a more than proportionate number of labor troubles, and the past year has been no exception to this rule. Of the numerous outbreaks that have occurred none is more interesting or instructive than the strike of the anthracite coal miners in Pennsylvania, while some important conclusions as to the future of organized labor may be drawn from its outcome. The magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the industry in its influence on the consuming public, the conduct of the strike, and finally the terms of its settlement—all call for a thorough understanding of the situation. Before proceeding to a discussion of the strike itself, however, we must consider briefly the conditions of the anthracite coal-mining industry as a whole.

¹ The writer has preferred not to burden the pages of this article with frequent references and footnotes; some acknowledgment is however necessary. The facts as to the conduct of the strike have been gathered from the daily press; a two-years' residence in the anthracite region had acquainted him with the conditions of the mining industry. The following are the best articles on the subject, and have been freely used: "The Anthracite Combinations," in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. x. p. 296, and "The Anthracite Mine Laborers," in the *Bulletin of the Department of Labor* for Nov., 1897; both of these careful articles are by Dr. G. O. Virtue. The situation in the bituminous fields is admirably set forth by Dr. J. E. George in two articles in Vol. xii. of the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*: "The Coal Miners' Strike of 1897" and "The Settlement in the Coal Mining Industry." Arbitration in the coal industry in England is described in an article by J. B. McPherson, in the *Bulletin of the Department of Labor* for May, 1900.

Practically all of the anthracite coal produced in the United States comes from the deposits in the Blue Ridge Mountains lying between the Schuylkill and Lehigh rivers and the Susquehanna. These coal basins extend over an area of about 470 square miles, and are distributed throughout several counties. If all the veins were located in one place, they would occupy a space about twenty miles wide and a little less than twenty-four miles long. The coal seams vary from six to sixty feet in thickness. Originally one vast bed of coal, the area has been broken by geological action into three distinct fields known in trade circles as No. 1, or the northern or Wyoming field, comprising upper Luzerne and Lackawanna; No. 7, or the middle or Lehigh field, comprising Hazleton and the upper Schuylkill region; No. 9, or the southern or Schuylkill field, comprising Shamokin and the greater part of the Schuylkill region. During the last year 366 mines were in operation, which employed 140,583 persons; the output of the mines for 1899 was 54,034,224 tons, about one-third of the total coal product of the United States.

When an industry is so highly localized as this one is, its concentration in a few hands is an inevitable result. And when to the ease of a centralized control is added the economic advantage of a unified management, the pressure towards combination becomes irresistible. Accordingly we are not surprised to find the anthracite coal-mining industry centered in comparatively few hands. By far the larger part—about 72 per cent—is mined by nine railroads, which are at the same time the carriers of the entire output of the region. The concentration of the industry has resulted in fierce competition between the rival companies, and lower prices have always followed increased production. From the beginning the cry of “overproduction” has been continually raised, and the necessity of limiting in some way the output has been recognized. There seems

to be no doubt but that the capacity of the anthracite coal mines is greater than the demand on the part of the public for coal at prices profitable to the operators. The mines can produce perhaps 72,000,000 tons a year; the public will consume about 55,000,000 tons at paying prices; if the mines are run to their full capacity then the prices will fall and the mines may even be conducted at a loss. This is the condition which has confronted the operators from the beginning, and it is not strange that they should have sought to restrict production by combination.

The first general combination of anthracite producers, or rather carriers, was formed in 1873, as the result of a period of glutted markets, low prices, and "cut-throat" competition. An agreement was effected between the six great corporations which then controlled the greater portion of the coal lands, which allotted the amount to be shipped by each to tide-water and fixed the price at which it should be sold. As a result, prices were maintained fairly well for a couple of years, but it soon became evident that the companies were overrunning their quotas and not living up to the agreement. In 1876 the dissolution of the combination came, and there followed a wild scramble among the companies to see which could throw the most coal upon the market. Prices fell from \$5.18 to \$2.91 a ton at New York. Shipments rose from 18.5 million tons in 1876 to 20.8 million in the following year. By the end of the year the companies were ready to unite once more. Accordingly in 1878 another compact was made, which regulated only the amount of coal mined; the fixing of prices was left to the individual companies. When this agreement was dissolved at the end of a year, a new plan of curtailment was adopted: when a weakening of the market indicated that too much coal was being mined, work was stopped at all the mines for a number of days. But a five-years' trial of this method showed its evils and

ineffectiveness, and it was followed by another agreement similar to that made in 1878.

"This is the last formal agreement of which there is any record. About the beginning of 1887 the Pennsylvania courts and the New York Legislature were inquiring into the management of the anthracite trade, and it was thought inadvisable to invite further investigation by renewing the compact. Moreover, the Interstate Commerce Act had gone into effect January 1; and under that law combination was thought to be illegal." There is every reason to suppose, however, that such a combination still exists, and this is certainly the popular belief. Although this is emphatically denied by the railroad officials and coal operators, the sales agents of the companies still hold meetings and "discuss the state of the market." Whether there is a formal agreement or not, there is no doubt that production is restricted and prices are maintained by a "friendly agreement" of the anthracite producers. Though usually spoken of as a "trust," the industry is probably no more nearly on a trust basis than it has been for years.

It is not our intention here to vilify or to defend this combination; it is enough to point out its existence. Given the conditions of the anthracite industry—a high degree of centralization, rendering combination comparatively easy, and absolutely destructive competition if no agreement were effected—and it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. Probably too the danger of such a combination to the consuming public has been exaggerated; there is a very strict limit to the price which they may exact, in the competition of bituminous or soft coal, which constantly threatens to displace anthracite for smelting and other purposes. The advantage which such a compact organization gives the employers in a struggle with their men is, however, undoubted, and it is this point which directly concerns us now. To understand how the

men were able to wring concessions from them we must accordingly turn to a consideration of the other party to the struggle—the miners.

The first impression is of an unorganized, heterogeneous mob, separated by almost impassable barriers of race and language, and helplessly fettered by ignorance and poverty. The majority of the miners are of foreign birth, as many as twenty different languages besides English being spoken; and yet they were organized and held together during a period of over forty days and finally led to victory. The history of the coal-mining industry is full of struggle and conflicts between employers and miners, waged with varying success. Up to 1868 the miners were almost unorganized, but in that year the Workingmen's Benevolent Association was formed and successfully opposed a reduction in wages. Its unreasonable demands, its arrogance in victory, and its generally immoderate policy resulted in its downfall after some seven years of constant conflicts.

Up to this time the mines of Pennsylvania had been worked almost exclusively by Americans, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, English, and German. But after the labor troubles of the early seventies, immigration of another sort began, and the Poles, Hungarians, and Italians first made their appearance. They were brought in as contract labor by the operators, who hoped thereby to obtain a more docile set of laborers, and gradually displaced the other miners. It took a decade of a constantly increasing influx of Hungarians, Slavs, Bohemians, and Russians before an aroused public sentiment secured the passage of the alien contract labor law of 1885. But by that time the mining population had completely changed its character, and to-day probably four-fifths are of foreign parentage.

One of the results of stimulated immigration is a large surplus of laborers in the coal districts, which is in itself one of the crying evils of the situation. While they may

all be given employment under favorable conditions, many of them must necessarily remain unemployed a large part of the time, owing to the seasonal nature of the business. Mr. Brooks quotes a mine owner as follows on this point: "We can't give them work enough even at ninety cents a day because of the ups and downs of business. When things begin to improve, we must have enough on hand to satisfy the demand, and that means, when business slackens up, that many have to be idle."¹ This overabundance of labor and consequent irregularity of employment has resulted in lower annual incomes, which again have partly necessitated and partly followed a lower standard of living. Exaggerated as the newspaper reports have been, there remains the undisputed fact that the Italians, Poles, Huns, etc., are content to live on less, to live in worse houses, and under worse conditions, than the Americans or Germans. Such a lowering of the standard of living is not only fraught with the gravest danger to the whole laboring class, as it threatens to become permanent, but it renders those so living less able to withstand the periods of unemployment.

Much has been written and spoken against the strike as a means of effecting their demands, and labor unions have been condemned because of the disapproval attaching to this method of industrial warfare. And yet, when all is said and done, a strike is merely an incident in the labor movement. It is a violent protest designed to call general attention to the conditions against which the strike is directed, and finds its justification, if at all, in the fact that it does expose to public view conditions which might otherwise have continued unnoticed and uncorrected. But it is at best a crude weapon, and with their growth in power and responsibility the unions are resorting less and less to

¹ John Graham Brooks, art. "An Impression of the Anthracite Coal Troubles," in the *Yale Review*, Vol. vi. p. 307. Cf. also a letter from a A. Pardee & Co., in the *Outlook*, Oct. 13, 1900.

this method. Among the anthracite coal miners, however, such a move seemed necessary, for the double purpose of showing the operators the strength of the union and securing if possible its recognition, and as a means of uniting the miners themselves. The union of the miners—the United Mine Workers of America—was very powerful in the bituminous fields, but had shown almost no strength in the anthracite district. During the past year, however, the work of organization had been energetically carried on; and, in spite of the difficulty of uniting such diverse elements, the union had enrolled about 8,000 members in the anthracite region, though enthusiastic unionists claimed as many as 50,000. It is impossible to say just how many there were, but it was certain that the union miners were greatly in the minority. They hoped, however, in the event of a successful strike, that the non-union men would join the union, as they had done in Virginia in 1897 and in Illinois in 1898.

A convention of the United Mine Workers was held in Hazleton, Pa., on August 13 and the following days, about 300 delegates from the surrounding district being present. At this time a list of grievances was submitted, and it was determined to apply to the executive board for permission to strike on September 10. This proposition was considered by the board at a meeting in Indianapolis, and after some delay, due to the prospect of an outside settlement of the difficulties, the strike order was finally issued on September 13, to take effect on Monday, September 17. After reciting the negotiations which led to the strike, the president of the union concluded as follows:—

“Be law-abiding, self-respecting, and quiet; do not allow any person, whose interest it may be, to provoke you into quarrels and violations of the peace. . . . With a thoroughly aroused public sentiment behind us—a cause the justice of which cannot be successfully questioned—and the mine workers united and determined to stand until their many wrongs have been righted, we have supreme faith in the ultimate success of our

cause. Do not wait for any further notice to strike, but cease work in a body on and after Monday, September 17.

By order of the National Executive Board,

JOHN MITCHELL, President,

W. B. WILSON, Secretary-Treasurer."

It is difficult to say exactly how many miners answered the strike call of President Mitchell, but on the evening of September 17, he estimated that the strikers numbered 112,000; a day later it was claimed that 118,000 out of the total number of 142,000 miners had ceased work. Before the settlement of the strike most of the miners had joined the strikers.

Much more difficult than the ascertainment of the number of those involved is the determination of the merits of the questions at issue. That the miners had many real grievances there was, however, no doubt, and to a consideration of these we may now turn. A statement issued from the United Mine Workers' headquarters during the strike summarized their demands as follows:—

"What we want is: 1. A better enforcement of existing mine laws. 2. To obtain that which is fully our own—i. e. the value of labor actually performed and hitherto taken from us. 3. To obtain the right to purchase our implements of labor at a fair market value and escape from the compulsory rule which forces us to pay the operators more than twice what the same material can be purchased for at retail in the open market. 4. To allow a readjustment of the wage scale that will more nearly conform to the normal conditions of the anthracite trade and establish as nearly as practicable a uniform price for each class of work in and around the mines."

In addition to these concessions, the strikers demanded recognition of the union by the operators. There is considerably more in these demands than appears on the surface, and to thoroughly understand them we shall have to investigate the miners' grievances somewhat more in detail. Taking them up in the order indicated above, we find the following:—

(1) The existence of the company store, where the men are expected to trade, expenditures made there being de-

ducted from their pay at the end of the month. The miners claimed that they were charged exorbitant prices for all goods, and one of the operators is reported to have said that he could afford to mine coal without a profit if he could run his company store. One of the strikers furnished the following list of prices charged at such a store: for a 25-pound bag of flour, \$1.85; coffee, 30 cents a pound; tea from 30 to 80 cents; sugar, 7 ½ cents a pound; boots, \$4.75 a pair; a suit of clothes, \$25, etc. The state factory inspector reported in 1894 that the prices charged by company stores were about 20 per cent in excess of those charged by independent stores. It may be said in answer to this, that such stores are in the main confined to small, independent operators; an act of 1891 forbidding mining corporations in Pennsylvania from conducting general supply stores. While some of these stores are honestly conducted, for the benefit of the miners and not the profit of the operators, they are nevertheless a constant source of irritation to the men. These cannot help but feel that to trade elsewhere is to court discharge, though the employers invariably insist that not the slightest compulsion is used to influence them. The unwillingness of the operators to surrender them, and the arguments by which they justify them, both show how little they appreciate the attitude of the miners. Whether it is a belated "*patriarchalische*" view of the relations between employer and employee, or a desire for gain which maintains them, they are in either case equally distasteful to the men, and have for years been a prolific source of trouble.

Of the same nature was the complaint of the miners that they were compelled to pay 50 cents a month to the company doctor, whether they were ill or not. As a matter of fact the company doctor is charged for only by individual operators, and not by all of these. But while the company store may be condemned, the company doctor should

as certainly be upheld. Without such compulsory payment most of the workers would not receive proper medical treatment. It may be regarded as a system of mutual medical insurance, impossible without the compulsory feature.

(2) In apparent violation of the laws of Pennsylvania was the practically universal custom of monthly payments of wages, which the miners demanded should be made bi-weekly. A public statement made by John B. Garrett, Vice-President of the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, may be quoted in this connection:—

"Semi-monthly pay is observed by us in few cases, being all in which the men have demanded it. It would be observed everywhere were the demand made as required by law. I may frankly state, however, that in my judgment more frequent payment is undesirable for both the employer and the employe, as pay days, whenever and as often as they occur, are followed by decreased efficiency on the part of the men, resulting in reduced time, lessened output, and consequently increased cost."

(3) One of the fruitful sources of complaint lies in the system of "dockage" which prevails in the anthracite region. Each colliery has its "check-docking boss," who is paid by the company, and whose duty it is to inspect the coal as it comes from the mines and deduct any excess of slate and dirt over a certain amount. It is obvious that such a check is necessary, for the operator can neither afford to pay the miner for slate as coal, nor to have it hoisted out of the mine. It is equally clear that an opportunity is thereby given the employers of unfairly reducing the men's wages; and even when administered with perfect fairness by the employer the system may result in arbitrary or spiteful treatment by the docking boss. The miners claim that they are docked excessively, and that from 10 to 12 per cent of their earnings are so withheld from them. At best they look with suspicion on the administration of the system, and demand that a representative of their own be appointed to act as inspector in addition to the employer's representative. A better under-

standing and greater confidence in each other would go far toward remedying this evil, which is one of practice rather than of principle.

(4) Another grievance related to the size of the car and the amount of coal included in a ton. This was formulated as follows in a statement of the executive board of the United Mine Workers:—

"The laws of the State of Pennsylvania make 2,400 pounds a ton of anthracite coal, yet anthracite coal miners are compelled to mine from 2,700 to 4,000 pounds for a ton. . . . Where they are paid by the car, instead of being required to furnish a well-rounded heap on the car at the breakers, as was originally agreed to, they have gradually been compelled to increase the amount of coal in each car by building the same perpendicularly from six to eighteen inches above the edge."

The two counts in this indictment are really one, the claim being that the workers are made to mine a greater amount than they are paid for. At first sight this looks like the gravest injustice, and has been generally so construed by the public, and yet it seems to rest largely upon a misapprehension. A prominent railway official volunteered the following explanation:—

"The use of the word ton as applied to 3,360 pounds (or other number) is a misnomer; it is simply a unit of measurement which might be called a car or a cart-load or by any other name, and is the quantity of actual coal plus bone, slate, or other foreign material, for the removal of which a certain payment is made under the agreed scale of wages. It was probably originally adopted as representing approximately the amount of crude material from which a ton of prepared coal could be expected, but the amount would necessarily vary at the several mines and from the same mine at the hands of different workmen."

(5) The grievance upon which the greatest emphasis was laid throughout the strike as evidence of unfair treatment of the miners by the operators was the exorbitant price charged for powder. The miners were compelled to purchase the powder used in mining from their employers, paying \$2.75 per keg for a grade of powder that could be purchased elsewhere for \$1.50 per keg. The powder charge of \$2.75 a keg had been first established by the agreement

of 1874, and represented the market value of powder at that time; although the price of powder had fallen almost half since then, the miner was still charged the old figure, the difference representing the amount of his alleged exploitation by the employer. In answer to this charge the operators asserted that the compensation of the miners was not decreased by the high price of powder, as his net earnings were always considered in fixing his wages. Another quotation from the statement by Mr. Garrett will perhaps render this clear:—

"If a man is employed for a special piece of work in which powder must be used, the superintendent agrees with him as to the amount which he should earn with industry and with care of the materials entrusted to him; then the value of the powder required in a day's work is added to the intended daily wage, and the sum of the two is agreed upon as the pay of that man for the work in question. Thus, if a man were valued at \$2.50 a day, and with due care would use a keg of powder valued at \$2.75 in five days, the day's consumption of powder, 55 cents, would be added to \$2.50, and he would be paid on a basis of \$3.05 per day, and charged with powder used at the price agreed upon. . . . It is well that the public should understand that there would be no occasion for the price of powder to enter into the pay of the miners were it not that safety of person and property absolutely requires that the operator should keep a firm hand upon both the quality and quantity of powder taken into the mines."

In spite of this plausible explanation—the fact was not denied—the public was inclined to believe that the grievance was a real one, and indicated unfair treatment of the miners. If it made no difference whether the price of powder were high or low, it is difficult to see why the operators should have been so reluctant to concede this point. Certainly in the hands of unfair employers it afforded an opportunity for extortion of much the same nature as excessive docking for impurities. It has for years been a source of irritation and criticism on the part of the miners.

(6) Under the question of wages there are two separate points to be considered—the absolute amount of the wage and the manner of its determination. Leaving the former

of these questions for a moment, let us inquire first as to the method of remuneration. We may pass by those cases where time wages are paid, and confine our attention to the earnings of the miners themselves, which are determined by piece work. The grievance here consisted in the use of a sliding scale, according to which the wages of the miners were regulated. To thoroughly understand this we shall have to go back a few years and trace its development. In 1869 an agreement was made between the unions and operators, one of the features of which was the adoption of a sliding scale of wages in the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions, the scale differing in the two districts. In the Lehigh region wages were dependent upon the price of coal at tide-water. When the average price of coal at Elizabethport was \$5 per ton, the "basis" rate of wages was paid; when the price of coal advanced \$1, wages were increased 15 per cent. In the Schuylkill region wages were based upon the price of coal at Port Carbon, then an important shipping point on the Schuylkill, 2 miles above Pottsville. When the average price of coal was \$3 at Port Carbon the basis rate of wages was paid; for each 25 cents advance in the price of coal, wages were increased 5 per cent. This system has been retained to the present, though the rates have varied; and while on the surface it is eminently fair to the men, in practice it has worked out rather harshly. It has been said that a few railroads own three-fourths of the coal fields and are practically the sole carriers for the total product. These roads charge exorbitant freight rates for transporting the coal to tide-water, and the high rates fall most heavily on the miners under the sliding scale. With coal at a given price at tide, the higher the freight charge, the lower the price of coal at Port Carbon; and it is upon this price that the miners' wages depend. Likewise in the Lehigh region there is ground for complaint, for wages there are based upon tide-water prices, and these are uni-

formly lower than prices in the interior, where two-thirds of the product is sold.

(7) More vital, however, than any of these grievances was the demand of the miners for higher wages. This was the real point at issue in the strike, the others being more or less incidental to it, and by the concession of this demand on the part of the operators the strike was brought to an end. It is difficult to ascertain exactly what the earnings of the miners were during the last few years. Figures enough were offered in evidence by both sides, but as they were usually statements of daily or monthly wage rates, with no indication as to how many days the men worked, they had little value. Operators showed pay slips which indicated earnings of \$200 a month and more, while miners opposed to these others showing a net wage of less than \$20 a month. In a statement issued early in the struggle by the United Mine Workers it was claimed that "the average wages of the anthracite coal miner for many years has been less than \$250 annually." The report of the Bureau of Mines and Mining of Pennsylvania for 1899 showed that during that year only 54,000,000 tons of coal were mined; that would mean an average of 385.7 tons for each of the 140,000 persons employed. If they received as much as \$1 for each ton mined that would amount to only \$385 a year. It can be seen how meaningless any statement of the rate of wages is when we read in the same report a few pages further on that the average number of days worked in the mines of the anthracite region was about 180, or just one day in two for the year. Nor is this unusual: for the six years 1885-90 the Reading collieries were operated an average of 219.2 days; and for the years 1890-95, an average of 187.1 days. The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that, whatever the rate of wages, the net earnings of the miners were wholly insufficient to maintain a worthy standard of living.

(8) A final demand of the strikers, or at least of the union men among them, was that the union be recognized, that is, that negotiations be carried on through the representatives of the union and the final agreement be made with them. This the employers refused to do. "I know it to be a fact," said one of them, "that the operators to a man will never consent to treat with Mitchell, either through arbitration or any other means." It is to the credit of the leaders of the men that they did not insist upon this point, when they saw that such action would jeopardize their real gains. Negotiations were carried on largely by outside parties, and in the final settlement the union as such did not figure.

Mr. Mitchell and the other strike leaders came in for their usual share of abuse at the hands of the operators and a part of the press. There would have been no trouble, was their cry, but for the interference of the professional agitator. But in the anthracite coal strike the agitator was not the cause of the trouble; that had existed long before he appeared on the scene. The discontent and the bad conditions were back of him; he was really only an effect. It is true that the labor leader or the walking delegate is often ignorant, immoderate, and troublesome, as he has shown himself in the Chicago building trade disputes. But to prove the agitator a nuisance is not to prove your case good.

Having set forth the situation in the anthracite coal fields and the causes of the strike, let us now turn to a consideration of its conduct and final settlement. The strike order was to take effect September 17, but before that date many of the miners had laid down their tools. On the 17th work was suspended in practically all of the collieries in the northern region, most of them not even going through the formality of blowing their whistle to summon the men to work. In the middle and southern regions a

few of the mines continued to run as usual, and a number of others with reduced forces. The operators endeavored to belittle the extent of the movement as far as possible by keeping the mines running. They, as well as the friends of the miners, and even the strikers themselves, predicted an early end to the strike and the defeat of the strikers. But as the strike progressed and the number of those who laid down their tools increased, the leaders became more hopeful. Organizers were put in every field to urge the men to quit, and when these methods failed a force of strikers would march upon a colliery and drive the men home. These marches were the occasion of several riots and conflicts between strikers and sheriff's deputies as well as the coal and iron police, who are a body of special guards employed by the operators to protect their mines.

The first few days passed without any serious outbreak, but on September 21 a serious riot occurred, resulting in the killing of three miners and wounding several others. Sheriff Toole and twenty deputies were escorting some non-union miners to their homes when they were attacked by a large number of strikers at Shenandoah, and in defending themselves used their revolvers on the crowd. As a result of this encounter the sheriff appealed to the Governor for aid, and the next morning found General Gobin and a force of 2,200 soldiers encamped around Shenandoah. The second fatal riot of the strike occurred on October 10 at Oneida, where one guard was killed and several men badly wounded, as the result of a march on the collieries by the striking miners. Six days later saw the greatest march of the strike, over 4,000 men invading the Panther Creek Valley in a final effort to close the mines there. A special train, however, brought a regiment to the scene in time to turn back the army of strikers. In these marches the miners were not only encouraged, but often led by the women. In spite of these outbreaks there was compara-

tively little lawlessness, and the men observed in the main their leaders' injunction to be law-abiding. Credit should be given the operators for not bringing outside labor into the district—a move which would certainly have provoked further outbreaks. On the other hand the efforts of the union were directed to preventing any violence, and some thousands of the men signed the pledge to abstain from intoxicating liquors during the strike.

From the very beginning of the struggle the clergy used every means in their power to terminate the strike and to prevent trouble. The Rev. Father Phillips, of St. Gabriel's Church, Hazleton, a prominent figure throughout the struggle, at first advised the men strongly against striking, but a week later issued a public statement in which he announced himself in favor of the movement and arrayed himself on the side of the men. Through his instrumentality Archbishop Ryan of Philadelphia was brought to the anthracite region, who did much to effect a settlement by his influence with the operators. Nor were the Protestant clergy behindhand in urging a settlement of the difficulties by means of arbitration; requests were made from all over the country of the Governor and others in authority to conclude the strike.

The union leaders claimed from the first that they had been willing to submit their demands to arbitration, and that they had only entered upon the strike after the operators and railway presidents had refused to treat with them. The executive board of the United Mine Workers pointed to the preamble of their constitution as evidence of their willingness. This declares that the union "desires to use all honorable means to maintain peace between ourselves and employers; adjusting all differences so far as possible by arbitration and conciliation, that strikes may become unnecessary." This assumption of righteousness was decidedly negatived, however, by the treatment accorded the

firm of G. B. Markle & Co., during the strike. This firm had had an agreement with their employes since 1884, one of the features of which was the arbitration of all matters which could not be settled otherwise. As the grievance of the miners in the employ of Mr. Markle differed somewhat from those of the strikers, they decided not to go out with the other miners but to submit them to arbitration, and Archbishop Ryan was agreed upon as arbitrator. Mr. Mitchell, however, decided that no partial agreements could be made with individual operators, but that there must be a uniform agreement for the whole anthracite region. The efforts of both sides were concentrated for a while on the miners at Jeddo—the miners to bring the workmen there out on strike, and the operators to secure a separate adjustment of these difficulties and thus to destroy the unanimity of action. Finally, the men were persuaded to join the strikers and break their agreement with Markle & Co. Mr. Mitchell expressed regret at the necessity for such action and declared Mr. Markle a ‘fellow-victim,’ who was sacrificed by the other operators. Public opinion, however, could not justify so easily this distinct repudiation of an admirable agreement with a firm which had distinguished itself for its fair treatment of its employes. It may have been necessary as a strategic measure in this industrial warfare, but if so that fact only strengthens the argument for some other method of settlement than the arbitrament of force.

In spite of the sensational reports in the daily press it cannot be said that the strike caused a great amount of additional suffering. The normal condition of the anthracite miner is, however, bad enough to serve as material for a vivid picture of misery. At most of the collieries September 15 was pay-day, and at the others October 1, so that the miners were tolerably well supplied with funds when they began the strike. No aid was given by the

union until September 28, and then in the form of provisions and clothing rather than cash. Although offers of assistance came from the bituminous coal miners and various other unions, Mr. Mitchell was able to decline them all. Had the strike continued a little longer there is no doubt but that the suffering would have been greater.

The effects of the strike were by no means confined to the strikers, however. Many other lines were forced into idleness as soon as the supply of coal was cut off, notably the railroad men. The Erie & Wyoming Railroad laid off 75 per cent of its men on September 18; a couple of days later the Lehigh Valley laid off 800 men; and similarly on the Delaware & Hudson, the Ontario & Western, the Lackawanna, and the Reading. By October 3 navigation had ceased on the Schuylkill canal, there being no more coal to ship. The effect of the strike was soon felt by the consuming public, as the price of coal was rapidly advanced by the dealers.¹ It was calculated that the supply on hand would last until October 15, and when that date was passed and the strike still remained unsettled, fear was felt that the anthracite trade would be demoralized for years to come or perhaps lost forever. One sales agent wrote to an operator in Wilkes Barre: "One of my largest customers tells me that consumers are getting to like bituminous coal and that they think they will keep on using it."

Hopeless as the strike had appeared at the outset, before the end of September it seemed probable that the men

¹ The following are the retail prices charged for anthracite coal in New York City during the first ten days of the strike. Bituminous or soft coal retails at \$4.50 a ton.

Date.	Red ash.	Pink ash.	White ash.
Sept. 17.....	\$5.75	\$5.50	\$5.25
" 18.....	6.00	5.75	5.50
" 19.....	6.50	6.25	6.00
" 20.....	7.00	6.75	6.50
" 21.....	7.25	7.00	6.75
" 25.....	7.50	7.25	7.00

would gain their demands. On September 27 the operators offered the miners the 10 per cent advance in their wages which was asked for, on condition that they return to work at once. This was regarded by the men, however, as an attempt to break the strike by stampeding a part of the strikers back to work without consideration of their other grievances, and was therefore rejected by them. Mr. Mitchell stated the 10 per cent increase alone was not what the men wanted; "they must be treated with as a body before this strike can end." But he paved the way for a compromise by adding that a 10 per cent advance alone was a great victory. A few days later the following notice to their employes was issued by the Lehigh Valley, Wyoming, and Lackawanna coal companies:—

"We will adjust rates of wages so as to pay our mine employes on and after October 1, and until further notice, a net increase of 10 per cent on the wages heretofore received, and will take up with our employes any grievances which they may have.

"Note.—It is understood that powder will be sold to miners for \$1.50 a keg and that the difference between this rate and the old rate of \$2.75 shall be taken into account in figuring the net advance of 10 per cent for this class of labor."

Other railroad companies followed this move, and on October 5 the Independent Coal Operators' Association of the Wyoming Valley issued a similar notice. As the individual operators had hitherto been uncompromising in their opposition, this action removed one of the chief obstacles to a compromise. The position of the independent operators was a peculiar one. As a result of the complaint over high freight charges, the system had been very largely adopted in 1892 of the railroads buying the coal of the small operators at 60 per cent of the prices obtaining at tide-water. It then made no difference to the independents whether freight charges were high or low. But now they declared that they could not grant the 10 per cent increase in wages unless the coal-carrying companies agreed to re-

duce their tolls, or, to be more exact, to allow them 65 per cent instead of 60 per cent of the tide-water selling prices for their product. As the independent operators granted the wage advance it was generally understood that they had secured the desired concessions from the railroads.

The next step was taken by the miners. A convention was held in Scranton on October 12 and 13 to consider the offer of the operators, and, under the leadership of President Mitchell, it was voted to return to work, provided the operators abolished the sliding scale and promised that the 10 per cent advance would continue six months. The following is the text of the resolutions adopted:—

"Whereas, The anthracite coal operators have posted notices offering an advance of 10 per cent over wages formerly paid and have signified their willingness to adjust their grievances with their employes ;

"Whereas, They have failed to specify the length of time this advance would remain in force, and have also failed to abolish the sliding scale method of determining wages; we would recommend:

"That this convention accept an advance of 10 per cent, providing the operators will continue its payment until April 1, 1901, and will abolish the sliding scale in the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions; the scale of wages in the two last-named districts to remain stationary at 10 per cent above the present basis price; and that the companies will agree to adjust other grievances complained of with committees of their own employes.

"Should this proposition be unacceptable to the operators we recommend that all questions at issue be submitted to a fair and impartial board of arbitration.

"We would further recommend that under no circumstances whatever should there be a resumption of work at any of the collieries until all the operators signify their acceptance of this proposition and official notice is given that the strike is ended, and all return to work in a body on the same day."

Within less than a week these demands were granted and the strike was practically won by the men. An agreement by the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company and the Lehigh Valley Coal Company to abolish the sliding scale, reached at a conference of operators in Philadelphia on October 17, marked the final stage in the negotiations. All other conditions fixed by the miners'

convention were accepted by the companies. Accordingly they posted notices to that effect, a move which was followed within the next day or two by most of the other companies. Nothing apparently now remained to end the strike and resume work but the formal order from strike headquarters. But a hitch occurred here. The union leaders objected to having the reduction in the price of powder taken into account in calculating the 10 per cent advance in wages; but as the operators were firm on that point and the other demands had been conceded, the order was finally given on October 25 for the miners to resume work on the 29th—just six weeks from the beginning of the strike.

The outcome may be counted as a substantial if not complete victory for the miners. The price of powder was reduced and the sliding scale abolished; a net advance of 10 per cent in wages was also granted, though there was included in this the reduction in the price of powder. Still, Mr. Mitchell declared he was satisfied with the result, as the miners got a 10 per cent increase over their former earnings, with a guarantee that there should be no reduction before April 1, 1901. Calculated in money these gains were purchased at a cost of not less than \$10,000,000. For the period of the strike the men lost in wages about \$4,000,000, while the operators lost the same amount in profits. There was a loss of perhaps half as much in railroad earnings. But in addition to this direct loss to those immediately involved, we should add the loss in wages of \$60,000 for 1,000 idle railroad employes, and \$500,000 in added cost to consumers by reason of the advance in the retail price of coal.

While the strike was ended, it was distinctly stated by the union leaders to have been merely a "preliminary skirmish." Within two weeks the executive board of the United Mine Workers, meeting in Indianapolis on Novem-

ber 12, declared that they should continue their efforts until they induced the operators in the anthracite region to meet their representatives in annual scale conference. Another struggle is therefore probable next April, which will involve the question of the recognition of the union. Aside from trade reasons the settlement in the present case was largely forced upon the conflicting parties by outside pressure, partly as a result of public sympathy for the miners and partly of political considerations due to the affiliation of most of the operators and railway managers with the dominant party. Both sides wished a settlement before election.

There were several reasons why public opinion was largely in sympathy with the miners in their struggle, and which might perhaps encourage them in a future strike. In the first place, in addition to low wages, which has been partially remedied, there are other grievances which have not been corrected. These include the ancient abuse of company stores, the payment of wages at monthly instead of bi-weekly periods—both of which are supposed to be obviated by State law,—the alleged unfairness in the measurement and dockage of cars, the irregularity of employment, and the length of the working day. In spite of the hazardous and disagreeable nature of this underground industry, and the fact that in the neighboring bituminous fields the day is only eight hours, the anthracite miners are compelled to work ten hours a day.

In the second place, the conduct of the strike was such as to deserve commendation. When one considers the number of men and interests involved, the diversity in race and language, and the character of the men, the general freedom from violence was remarkable. The complete confidence of the men in their leaders, the endeavors to secure redress without striking, their moderation, and their abstention from insistence on personal recognition—

all these things distinguished the officers of the United Mine Workers from the professional agitator. Organized labor, as well as the business interests of the employer, have suffered so often from self-seeking, immoderate, and ignorant leadership that it becomes a duty to recognize the capable and earnest conduct of this strike.

In the third place, it is difficult to see how the operators can consistently deny to the miners the right to organize. They themselves are organized, not only as corporations, but by secret combinations and in open associations. "Indeed the organization is so compact and its power so complete," writes a correspondent of the *Outlook*, "that in the past the miner discharged by one operator has found it impossible to secure work from another operator save by the subterfuge of changing his name." Whether this state of affairs still exists or not, there is no doubt but that throughout the strike the employers were bitterly hostile to organized labor and refused to have any dealings with its officials. The men on their part are determined that the union shall be recognized. It is evident that in this particular instance the advance in the wages of the miners, which was generally recognized to have been just, would not have been brought about save through the organized efforts of the United Mine Workers. The settlement of this question is therefore only postponed.

It will be instructive, in conclusion, to glance at the situation in the bituminous coal fields in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The miners in these States had struck in 1897 and had obtained most of their demands—a 10 per cent advance in wages, an eight-hour day, and an annual agreement between representatives of the organizations of both parties. The first such agreement was adopted by a joint convention in January, 1898, and, in addition to fixing wages and conditions of work, arranged a system of arbitration by which strikes were to

be avoided. District boards of conciliation were to be provided for each field for the settlement of local grievances. State boards were to dispose of matters affecting two or more districts within the State, and an interstate board was to adjust differences that might arise between the miners and operators of different States.

This is a good example of "collective bargaining," of which another notable example in the United States is the agreement between the National Metal Trades Association and the International Association of Machinists.¹ In England the Durham and Northumberland coal miners have had collective bargaining for a number of years with marked success. There the Board of Conciliation, composed of operators and coal miners, meets to stipulate general prices and conditions which shall be maintained in the industry. But the special application of these prices to different localities is attended to by "joint committees." This was the method followed in the bituminous States after the Chicago convention of 1898.

It is necessary to the success of such collective bargaining that the agreement be subscribed to by a majority of operators and miners, and for each side to be thoroughly organized. Practically it has meant compulsory membership in the miners' union in the bituminous field; and at the same time the extension of the union has had the hearty support of the operators. The growth of the organizations insures stability and solidarity, and since the adoption of this method both sides declare themselves satisfied with the results.

That some such method of settling industrial disputes should be at least attempted before resort is had to strikes or lockouts needs no argument. In the case of a natural monopoly like the anthracite coal industry, which has

¹ See an article by the writer on "The Machinists' Strike," in the *Yale Review*, Nov., 1900.

passed into the ownership and control of a few men, and which fills a primary want in our civilized life, it should not be at the option of these individuals to say whether the industry shall be stopped. Nor should the miners have it in their power to stop production while their grievances are being redressed. If voluntary arbitration is inadequate, then here, if anywhere, compulsory arbitration should be had. Failing some such peaceful way of securing industrial stability in this field, the arguments for further control or even nationalization of the coal mines gain force.

ARTICLE VII.

PRESIDENT SAMUEL COLCORD BARTLETT:

A CHARACTER SKETCH.

BY PROFESSOR GABRIEL CAMPBELL, S. T. D.

THE fall of Richmond, the martyrdom of Lincoln, and the shouts of, and to, our victorious returning army were still in the air when, in the early summer of 1865, immediately after commencement, I took train for Chicago in order to visit the theological seminary where Professor Samuel Colcord Bartlett was a leading spirit, and to settle the question, Shall I take a professional course in the East or in the West?

Vividly I recall my conference with Dr. Bartlett, who impressed me at once as a man of an uncommonly well-balanced brain, energized by a vigorous and fine physique.¹ Glancing over my letters, he remarked with a gentle irony, "I had your place in my class; I sympathize."

He then proceeded to give his reasons for coming to Chicago. The city had surpassed all in its growth; it was the center of the country, the emporium of the opening West. Its people are from the East, the choicest spirits; they are the "brightest and best of the sons of the morning." The churches are crowded—fifty more churches needed in the city. He had been drawn from Manchester, N. H., to one of the strongest, but had decided to throw himself into an institution for the education of the ministry; for the East does not supply the demand. He has had a call to Andover, but is satisfied this is the richer field. The sem-

¹ For recent portrait, see Frontispiece, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January, 1899.

inary, already in seven years, has a new building full of students, an adequate working library, a faculty small, but of the best, with endowed chairs. Chicago, moreover, had honored herself during the war. She sent to Washington the commission who induced Lincoln to issue his Emancipation Proclamation; and from the State had gone forth both Grant and Lincoln to save the country.

September finds me one of Dr. Bartlett's students in a class he used to call remarkable. Entering at the close of the war, two or three members had been commissioned officers, two had studied and practiced law, one had been a leader in a state legislature; the chief institutions in New England were represented, as well as the larger religious denominations.

Professor Bartlett had the chair of Biblical Literature, but the field for discussion was practically unlimited. Science and Genesis, ethnology, Messianic preparation and prophecy, Jewish and Roman law, the harmonization of the Gospels, Hebrew and Greek idioms, eschatology, higher and lower criticism—these were among the prominent themes. Our teacher proved himself a master. As a logician he was *facile princeps*. Of the admirable thinkers who have been my instructors, in Germany as well as in this country—not excepting Trendelenburg—he was the swiftest of all to detect a fallacy. Of course I refer particularly to matters on his own ground, where he had secured the latest evidence, weighed and decided. Still this logical aptitude gave the characteristic cogency to thought and speech which was always dominant and, to thinking minds, always attractive. It was *the* characteristic of the man.

As an instructor it was his unrelenting purpose to build on the verities: and, under his trenchant criticism, the Bible grew luminous. And it may be well to remark that at that period the attacks upon the Bible and revealed religion were more general and more violent than at the

present time. In Germany the Tübingen school of destructive critics was at the zenith of its power; and the same movement in England under scientifico-literary auspices had led Dean Mansel, of Oxford, to propose practically the recognition of Christianity as a religion of faith without knowledge. Among theological students his Bampton lectures on the "Limits of Religious Thought" was the most exciting book of the day. It was to meet this tendency that Tennyson wrote his "Higher Pantheism." Well do I remember my old president (Tappan) saying to me confidentially, that it was his opinion that we would have to give up the Gospel of John. Infidelity as a modern Goliath of Gath was defying the hosts of Israel; it was high time for a David to cull the smooth stones from the brook.

Professor Bartlett was accordingly a thoroughgoing representative of the apostolic injunction, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." He requested us to raise questions; and right loyal was our response. The more we followed up the authorities—doubters indeed some of us were—evidently the greater his enjoyment; and sometimes he intimated he had spent much of the night in revision. We admired his sincerity and his exactness: no evasion of facts; no enthronement of minor matters, and clinging to a poor defense. Our faith increased as we caught the inspiration of his. At times, as we came down from the lecture-room to mingle with the throng on the street, it seemed as if we had descended from a mount of transfiguration, and the restless world had no true vision.

As president of the theological seminary, Dr. Bartlett had proved to be singularly well adapted to Chicago life. His mind was scientific rather than metaphysical. He cared little for theory that outran practice. His logical endowment gave him a quick decision in affairs; he read essentials in matters of business as if by intuition. I quote

a few sentences from the resolutions recently passed by the faculty of the seminary: "Rev. Dr. Bartlett was a tower of strength to the seminary in its early years, a thorough biblical student, an exact and ripe scholar happily exemplifying at once the conservative and progressive spirit in theology. He was a sagacious counselor in the affairs of the seminary and, as its years of financial distress came and went, he heartily labored and sacrificed for its existence and support. He left his chair of instruction to assume the presidency of Dartmouth College with the deep regret of his associates of the faculty. We are thankful to God that He gave him to us during so many years."

And now that the Chicago institution has rounded four decades of growth, we see how wisely the founders planned and builded. Perhaps no other school of the prophets in the country has so large a body of students and instructors, and is so well equipped. If during the last score of years a son of Yale has been the presiding genius, and a splendid building stands for his name and fame,—and most worthily does President Fisk deserve the honor he has received,—it will be modestly claimed for our son of Dartmouth that during the score of years he gave himself to the Chicago enterprise, he outranked the son of Yale, and, had he, as in the case of Vermont University, declined the presidency of his *alma mater*, he had no doubt held the permanent presidency there. To no other institution can one look for the parentage of that most successful development more rightfully than to Dartmouth College. And we may trust that Chicago, mindful of her noble and self-sacrificing pioneers, of the greatness and excellence of the results achieved, will yet, early in the coming century, honor the sons of Dartmouth by erecting to this patriarch of the young city a Bartlett Hall, which for years and years shall stand as a beacon to youth who seek for the true light.

President Bartlett's life divides somewhat suggestively.

Reaching the Platonic age of fourscore, his years of instruction, as in Plato's case, cover precisely half. This second half divides again: he comes to Hanover at sixty. The first half of his life falls also into two divisions. Until he is twenty he is the collegian, spending boyhood days at his home in Salisbury, and his preparatory years at Pinkerton Academy. The second score of years he teaches and preaches about equal times; studying theology at Andover and preaching a couple of years at Monson, Mass., before coming to Manchester; teaching in Peacham Academy and as tutor in Dartmouth; then half a dozen years as professor of Intellectual Philosophy in Western Reserve College.

Dr. Bartlett came to the presidency of Dartmouth in 1877; and during his administration of fifteen years the college made great advance. He found it heavily in debt, unable to pay current expense. The debt was cancelled, and the annual deficit forestalled. Endowed chairs were increased from one to six, the professorships from twenty to thirty-four, new chairs being established in Modern Languages, English Literature, Chemistry, Political Science, Astronomy, and Rhetoric. A Latin-Scientific course was added to the Classical, and a liberal number of subjects offered as electives. An honor system was devised and introduced; and there was so large an addition of funds for scholarships that all needy young men could be assisted. Meanwhile the number of students increased until the class graduating in 1894 was the largest college class in fifty years.

New buildings appear: Rollins Chapel, Wilson Hall for library and reading and reference rooms, Bartlett Hall for the Y. M. C. A., Thayer School building, Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, and the Wheelock Hotel, which was rebuilt by the college and kept under college control. To these may be added a winter building for baseball, and the park tower; the college church is enlarged and remodeled;

a president's house and several other structures are purchased for the use of the college; and funds are forthcoming for the new Butterfield Hall. The college park is reformed under a landscape artist; the new athletic field is developed and opened; concrete walks extend throughout the village; measures are set on foot for the new system of waterworks; the college library is greatly enlarged; and all the salaries are raised.

During the fifteen years the total sum of contributions to the college aggregated more than seven hundred thousand dollars. Of the structures mentioned, the tower was mainly an amateur project, with intent of providing a comely ornament for the summit of the park, which would at the same time be itself the means of affording a superb view of this portion of the Connecticut valley. The graduating classes, from 1885 onward, furnished financial aid in liberal sums, a cut stone indicating the height built by each class.

The Y. M. C. A. building was the president's special labor of love; for he felt, that, from the united, consecrated endeavor of the Christian young men, must come in the long future, Dartmouth's genuine religious development. The first proposal was to have an assembly hall and a reading-room as a part of the new library building, the books and periodicals to be cared for by the college librarian. This idea not proving feasible, Providence seemed speedily to open the way for the existing handsome edifice; and after much effort, in which not a few rallied to assist, it was completed, equipped, and dedicated; and was rightfully named Bartlett Hall.

Before my arrival in Hanover there had been a sharp conflict between President Bartlett and members of the faculty. As to the merits of the case I have no definite knowledge. The trustees having decided to stand by the president, I never could see, in faculty meetings or else-

where, any trace of hostility, did any exist. A learned physician, when asked if he was not surprised that so many people were sick, replied, "I wonder rather that so many people are well." Professor Sanborn once remarked, "The trouble with college professors is that they are all philosophers." The wonder is not that conflicts arise, but rather that they do not arise oftener. Certain it is that President Bartlett preferred men who would stand up for their convictions. I can testify that he took a special pride in the faculty of Dartmouth; and it is evidenced, in his handwriting, that no other college or university in New England has in proportion to numbers so able a body of instructors. On the other hand the strongest expression of appreciation of Dr. Bartlett that I have ever heard was by a colleague, not now living, who had been a leading antagonist. It should be added, that one of the last recommendations President Bartlett laid before the trustees was, that the salaries of the professors should have a further advance, in order that the college, in this regard, may compare more favorably with the larger institutions with which it is now brought into competition.

In faculty meetings, Dr. Bartlett presided with unquestioned fairness. Seldom arguing at any length, he would usually indicate his preferences, but keep the issue so clear that opponents did not miss the mark. At that time discussion was rife; everything came before the entire faculty. A scene, oft repeated, rises in memory. The contest has been raging, for, well, an hour and a half, the faculty about equally divided, each party right and invincible, the speeches short but so rapidly successive a man must have his breath drawn if he gets "the word," as the Germans say. At length a short pause. The president's glasses come quietly down on the tablet of his chair, and with admirable composure he breaks the silence: "Well, gentlemen, what'll you do?"

Usually the discussions were on matters of policy. In case, however, a reckless student was on trial, and the president thought the faculty's action too severe on the prodigal, there was never any indication that the student had the slightest intimation from the president of his personal sentiment in the matter. What was done, was done. It was the act of the college.

But it is not in executive functions that the gifts of President Bartlett find their most congenial growth; he is the scholar rather than the man of affairs. Dr. Woolsey, on resigning the presidency of Yale, testified that the mere routine of his administrative office would have been irksome, but for his privilege of reaching young men in the class-room. President Bartlett would despatch his official details to bury himself *con amore* among his books; his study was the center of his everyday devotion. And it was the height of his happiness to issue forth from this sanctum to pour out his treasures to the senior class.

The captious and subtle attacks upon the Bible and its religion, already referred to, had led him—naturally skeptical of what has not been legitimately tested—to make a far-and-wide critical survey of the facts in the case. The result is satisfying; indeed, more and more so, as archæology and true criticism make the evidence increasingly complete. He devotes his life to the defense of the Sacred Word. And this one thing he does. All else is collateral.

Upon the issues of the press, especially in Germany, he keeps a watchful eye. In order to verify Old Testament history, he visits Egypt and the Holy Land. He follows the track of the Israelites in their exodus from their Egyptian masters, point after point, back to Palestine. He compares the authorities, and his book "From Egypt to Palestine" is the result.

He spent much time also in further local verification of biblical geography and chronology; and his work,

"Sources of History in the Pentateuch," given as a course of lectures at Princeton, ensues.

But he is not confined to a critique of religion in its ancient development. The light and life of the world that now is, have as powerful an attraction—even more powerful. Indeed the whole field of history becomes tributary to his endeavor. He has a genius for catching the moving spirit of great events, and of the great characters that shape them. His baccalaureate sermons become radiant with historic fact and comment. Christianity, as a divine force in the world, he follows from land to land. The outcome "Sketches of Missions" is a storehouse of information as to practical progress. More than this, his published stores of knowledge become efficient. For years he was a corporate member of the American Board of Missions, and a leading director in its counsels. In the missionary meeting of his local church he was the ever-faithful watchman ready with message as to the "signs of promise." His benefactions are liberal. And when his son, his namesake, has finished his training, he cheerfully seconds his consecration to missionary service in a foreign field. It is Christ's kingdom that is to be established, to dominate in the world. The ideal man is the herald of that sovereignty. I think the most inspiring short address I ever heard President Bartlett deliver was his eulogy on Spurgeon at the vesper service in Rollins Chapel. Thus in the religious life the scholar and the man of affairs become unified.

The culmination of Dr. Bartlett's lifework, indeed in large measure a summation of all his studies, he finally publishes in his eightieth year, "Veracity of the Hexateuch," inscribing the book to his students in these words: "To my former pupils at Western Reserve College, Chicago Theological Seminary, and Dartmouth College, this witness to THE TRUTH is affectionately dedicated."

In the preface he mentions that, "for a long course of

years, he has followed the discussion, examining all available materials"; and at the close of the volume he states confidently his conviction that "the fundamental historic veracity of the Hexateuch remains unshaken." Has an abler work on this subject been produced in recent years? Has Dr. Bartlett accomplished anything else in his round of achievements which will bring the college more permanent honor?

Upon his arrival as president of his *alma mater*, his teaching was simply a development in outline of his former subjects. Old Testament History and Christian Evidences are introduced by a course in Natural Theology; and in these branches he concentrated the accumulated wealth of his studies and travel.

So familiar had he become with the products of scholarly criticism and with the advances of science as related thereto, so carefully had he analyzed the speculations of the modern opponents of theism and of Christianity, so clearly did he see the victorious march of truth in face of all sophistic inventions, that, when he exposes the pseudologic in his later writings, there is evident a trace of grim humor. This develops more conspicuously in his oral lectures. His subjects, otherwise difficult and uninteresting, were thus made attractive. Here I may quote from the excellent funeral address by President Tucker: "The resources of his learning, the force of his logic, the play of his wit, were all at his service as he needed them. He never diverged from the path of an argument, but he knew how to make the territory through which he passed yield its own objects of interest by the way."

In the class-room, flashes of mirth were common. One winter day, in taking his exercise (which must never be omitted), as he was walking up River hill, actually a sheet of ice, he slipped, and fractured a bone of his forearm. A few days thereafter, his lecture course beginning, he ap-

pears before the class with his arm copiously bound up. It was well known, at the time, that at the end of the bridge that crosses the river there was covert liquor-selling. As the president commences his lecture he touches the fractured arm, remarking, "I went down to the bridge, and took the penalty."

At the sixtieth anniversary of his graduation two classmates sat with him at the alumni dinner. In responding for his class, he said: "Three who have not yet surrendered are here; and we don't propose to surrender."

There was a naturalness about his play of wit which was especially enjoyable. It was unpremeditated, pure, and impersonal. Unlike most humorous persons, he had no stock of stories, in fact, no stories. He would relate a ludicrous incident with capital effect, but it came up spontaneously, and was part of a general tide or exuberance of pleasant feeling. I never heard him even quote a profane word, or make a vulgar allusion. Nor did I ever hear him, even in after-dinner speaking, where merry fling and thrust had become the order of the day, utter a sentence that would cause personal pain.

In conversation he was genial because genuine; without flattery, and yet with a constant recognition of intelligence and taste in others; and this respect, courtliness indeed, was early developed. At a commencement dinner, a few years ago, a classmate said of him, in his response: "Even while a student, in nobility and manliness he was to all intents the president of the college."

Some have fancied that Dr. Bartlett was wanting somewhat in fine feeling, more or less mechanical and distant in his deportment. The very poise of the man was liable to misinterpretation. The cogency I have mentioned, his unfailing logical balance, herein lay the secret of his strength. The sensational, mere sentimentality, were alien. Nevertheless, he was a man of strong and tender

susceptibilities. As a father he was wrapped up in his family. How often have I inquired after Sam or Will or the golden-haired lassie of Chicago days, and his eyes would gleam with affection as he made reply. His volume "Anniversary Addresses" is dedicated to his wife in the words that follow: "To the memory of her, to whose clear judgment, helpful suggestions, and sympathetic approval each of these discussions was first of all submitted, this volume is lovingly dedicated"; and his tribute to Dr. Parker, the revered professor of Latin, reminds us of Cicero's Lælius. The unfortunate student often did not suspect the sympathy which the president was not permitted to express. At a campfire of the old soldiers his fervor of appreciation was jovial and eloquent. As a wedding guest he could rejoice with the rejoicing; at the house of mourning he could weep with those that weep.

With health of body and health of mind, his religion was a healthful religion; nothing spasmodic; always a word of cheer. The beatitudes were his daily bread. In no other place did he seem so much at home, speak so much at home, as in meetings for conference and prayer. Without pretension of learning, without sentimental tone or rhetorical phrase, with that coherence of thought which was peculiarly his, he spoke of the Father and of the Son, and of us, the children. I may quote again from President Tucker: "We have witnessed the inspiring spectacle of an advance into age which satisfies our thought of its possibilities. The ripening of character, the softening and mellowing of the nature without loss of power, the fruitage of the spirit while the life is yet fresh and strong, all this we have seen and rejoiced in, and now acknowledge in grateful testimony."

If in any respect Dr. Bartlett seemed to lack emotion, it seems to me, it was because he abjured affectation. He could not manufacture. He waited for the thought to pro-

vide its normal result. The beautiful must be apprehended in order to inspire. Emotion, when genuine, is the sequence of intellection. The philosopher sees truth before he loves it. As a student Dr. Bartlett played in the college orchestra; his hand never lost its skill. He gave lectures betimes on modern painting, as part of the art course. Beautiful, true, right, good were combined in his baccalaureate discourses. Under the power of these ideas his whole personality seemed to kindle, and choice strains from the poets came to his service. I quote from "The Value of Character" (1890): "The true man

'Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph.
Held, we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
Sleep to wake.'

'He is not dead but sleeps; no good man dies,
But like the day-star only sets to rise.'

For we may not forget that the harvest may come when the sower is gone."

Perhaps the supreme effort of his life was his oration at the unveiling of the Webster monument in front of the Capitol building in Concord. It was meet that the president of Webster's college should speak; and well did he rise to the occasion. Born near Webster's home, knowing him, having heard him at Bunker Hill, he gives a rare appreciation of New Hampshire's greatest statesman. It was my privilege to sit near Dr. Bartlett, and as he came to comparison of the son of the State to the State itself, his inspiring eloquence is an abiding recollection. This is the passage I refer to:—

"The dark, unbroken sweep of its primeval forests well symbolized the vast resources of his capacious intellect; its marvelously varied surface of grove and meadow, hill and dale, was a fit emblem of the many-sidedness of his ways; its June verdure is not brighter than the freshness of his whole nature to the last; its bubbling springs and trickling

rills are not more playful than the genial humor of his private life, nor its still lakes more profound than the depth of his affections; its granite cliffs reappear in the massive solidity of his character; its mountain heights in the towering ascendancy of his powers; while its rushing rivers, swollen by the melting snows of spring, alone can represent the tide of his eloquence. . . . And as long as her fountains shall gush, her lakes shall gleam, her rivers run, and her mountains rise, shall the memory of Webster be fresh in his native State."

President Bartlett was married twice. The first Mrs. Bartlett lived but one year. The second, to whose memory he wrote the touching dedication, was the worthy wife and mother who by thoughtful care and affection aided much, no doubt, in bringing the successes. Of the children, one son, the youngest, is a missionary in Japan; another, a pastor in Lowell, Mass.; the daughter is wife of Rev. Dr. Stimson, of New York; the eldest son, professor in the college.

President Bartlett was a man for the time, raised up by Providence. In an age of science, no devotee of the physical was more critical in method. In an age of doubt, his competency to find the truth was a marvel. His faith was complete; it was founded in reason; I do not hesitate to say, it was scientifically justified. In an age that tends to mysticism, he would hold men to facts, to laws of evidence, to verification; he was the apostle of sound doctrine. When, for instance, Mr. Moody was holding his meetings in Boston, some would-be critic publishes the charge that Mr. Moody quotes words of Christ concerning Jonah which are not authentic. Immediately Dr. Bartlett publishes an answer citing authorities and vindicating Mr. Moody.

He was as well the exponent of the generous as of the exact. There was no narrowness in his creed; duly reverent toward the mind of the majority, he keeps in view the

eternal principles. When in the American Board he clasped the hand of Dr. Fisher, of Yale, in token of the close of the conflict, it was with the abounding hope that a more rational day was approaching.

An incident may illustrate his participation in the life of the time. At the advent of the bicycle, he must examine. He examines; he invests. As he was shy about appearing on the street, the new athletic field became the arena of his constitutional. During his last autumn, within a week or two of his decease, the octogenarian might have been seen regularly, early in the day, speeding around the alumni oval with agile grace. His perennial youth *was* thus preserved; and, with advancing years, he became an object lesson in health and temperance. How alcohol or narcotics would have dismantled such powers! And he won approval. The young men saw that he was devoted to their interests, and, upon occasion, their appreciation would assert itself. When he resigned, the enthusiastic ovation at the commencement dinner was a spontaneous outburst of heartfelt admiration such as we rarely see.

Commencement goes by with its throngs that came and went. It is the closing day of June, 1892, and after eleven in the evening. The president of Dartmouth College sits at his desk. Once more he must go through his papers. Perhaps something has been overlooked—some matters unfinished. He grants a request here—puts his name there. The day, the month, the administration are passing. The college bell sounds—in sixty years never sweeter—it is twelve o'clock. The burden is lifted: he is free. He

"wraps the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

The cares of office laid aside, more pleasurable duties fill the days and years—his best writing, his ablest teaching. The Board of Trustees of the college close a series of resolutions with the words, "The college acknowledges her debt

of gratitude as she enrolls his name among her most distinguished sons." As to his work, the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, to which he sent some of his most scholarly articles, expresses the opinion that he was "one of the ablest and most active forces which have been effective in directing theological, educational, and sociological movements in America during the last half-century."

The demise¹ of Dr. Bartlett was the more deeply felt, being, as it was, the climax of a series of losses to the college—indeed, a depletion of the faculty. Seven officers of Dartmouth had been called to the better world in less than that number of years: Judge Chase, Professors Parker, Pollens, Ruggles, and Hiram Hitchcock, Senator Patterson, and Dr. Frost. They were men of the finest spirit and intelligence; and, it may be added, all sat on the same aisle in the college church.

My last interview was on his last Sabbath afternoon. He was half reclining on the sofa, evidently improved; hopeful, but with premisings. With no fear for the future, there's gladness in voice and look. "Glad to stay—glad to go." An attack of indigestion has lingered for a fortnight. The mental digestion has been overpassing the physical; and the heart is struggling to make the peace. The mental powers are still in their full vigor. What a protest against the claim that these capacities decline at fifty, or even earlier! Fifty is the age that brings the philosophic mind, according to Plato; and he reasons well. It must be a poor training that fails to develop the highest gifts. Here is a mortal passing through the tempests, but there is a great calm. A few months ago these were his words at the funeral of a student: "What, oh what, should we be,

¹Announcement has already been made, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1899, of the death of President Bartlett, which occurred November 16, 1898. The same notice contained a list of the books published by Dr. Bartlett and of the articles written by him for the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

with all our loves and longings, our meetings and partings, but for the life to come? Thanks, unspeakable thanks to Him who hath brought life and immortality to light, and changed the whole outlook over the grave of youth, manhood, and old age alike." But it is near the time for the vesper service. As I say "Good-by," his words of gratitude for my visit follow me through the closing door.

A day or two thereafter—eventide again—as before, he rests on his couch. A little ointment needful, he applies it himself. He is conversing genially with his daughter and others when—lesion of the heart—he sinks quietly back, unconscious, breathes a few moments, and—the Joy of the Lord.

"Twilight and evening bell."

It tolls the fourscore years.

The next time I saw my old teacher he lay in the parlor. The wreaths of flowers were lovely; but the radiance of that face, it was not of earth; it was not of mortals. And, as, in the college church, the great company of youth looked upon the familiar, serene, countenance, natural yet supernatural, unemaciated, it seemed to possess a strange, indescribable fascination. He lingers, and will linger, in our memories. But earth's light appears less attractive. A form is missed; ah how much! a form, a voice, a soul. There's a deep sense of vacancy and of loneliness. But heaven is brought nearer, and we thank God.

Perhaps I cannot more fittingly conclude this imperfect sketch of one who was the type of New England's best than by quoting from the hymn he had the Seniors sing, class after class, at their final chapel service:—

"Oh, that each in the day of his coming may say,
'I have fought my way through;
I have finished the work thou didst give me to do.'
Oh, that each from his Lord may receive the glad word,
'Well and faithfully done!
Enter into my joy, and sit down on my throne!'"

ARTICLE VIII.

COUNT TOLSTOY'S SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWS.

FROM AN INTERVIEW.

BY THE REVEREND EDWARD A. STEINER.

WHEN I first saw Tolstoy, fifteen years ago, he was a victor fresh from the battle-field, chasing darkness from his own heart. It was the time of experiments in bearing burdens, plowing fields, and mending shoes; and all these things, which cost him many a tear and many a sweat-drop, seemed fanatical, useless, and profitless, when writing a line might have brought dollars which would have enriched the poor. But the poor became enriched by Tolstoy's bending of the back over the sandy soil of Yasnya's beautiful fields. He bore their burdens; he learned of their woe. He was following in the Master's steps; thus the Master did, and for the selfsame purpose.

At that time a beautiful boy with dreamy eyes was playing about his feet; a child, Danielo, the idol of his heart, the child of his old age. With ruthless consequence Providence asked him who preached renunciation as the first condition of entrance into life, asked him to give up this treasure, and the death angel came and took him; and the great heart throbbed, but was silent; and the blue eyes glistened, but held back the tears. It was the time of his greatest reaction against society and the church, and much of that which he said then and did then, has either vanished or has melted itself into his life. To-day the ruggedness still remains; but the mountain is covered by snow, and the boulders sleep underneath the coverlid of Heaven's eiderdown. The rough, discordant truths have in them still the ring of conviction; but there is melody in what he says, music in his voice, and charm in his gesture and movement.

Like all Russian villages, Yasnaya has one street, very broad, very dirty, and very crudely built, although a few brick houses are in process of construction. The children seem a little better clad, and the peasants a little more washed, than those of other villages. It also differs from other villages in Russia in that it has a hill, and at the foot of that hill is a dense park, and within that park lives the Count. The entrance is flanked by two homely little towers. To the left is a duck pond, which, in former days, was a boating-place. Further on to the right, in the clearing, what seems like a forest, is a tennis ground, and there is much

merry laughter as we approach, for the love game has invaded the Count's domain and has found many fair victims.

The Count was expecting me, and hardly had I stepped from my bone-breaking telega, when that voice of long ago, weakened somewhat by illness and mellowed by age, greeted me heartily, and I was asked to accompany him on his walk, which proved to be the most interesting part of my visit to him. His form was somewhat bent, his hair whiter, his sharp eyes still keen, but warmer, and the touch of his hand was as firm, but more cordial.

The portraits of him which we see are very fair likenesses, though they present a mountain without the light of the sun, beaten metal without the glow of the fire. The face does not belong to any race; it is not Slavic, certainly not Teutonic. It is a face of the original humanity as it came fresh from the hand of God, and made at a time when there was much to create, and the details seem to have been left out. His eyes are too small, the nose large, the cheek bones have not been chiseled down into their proper places. His step is still elastic, and to walk with him and not have to run is an impossibility, especially for such a short-limbed creature as myself.

We walked through the park, its strong oaks shading the path unto darkness, and stepped out into the fields and meadows of Yasnaya. This place he loves passionately, and every tree and shrub seems to greet him as he passes it. Undulating fields are circled by dense beech woods whose silvery bark reflects now the light of the sinking sun. The nightingales are singing their joyous songs; singing of love and gladness. They have been witnesses of struggles and trials, and in response to their songs have heard many a sigh.

We stepped out upon the road which leads toward Moscow, the road which has been the Mecca of many a pilgrim. They came driving or walking, laden by riches and woe, seeking peace. Sons of rich men who had wasted their all; students, who, in the half-awakening of their minds, were lost in doubt and were seeking a path for themselves; women who had transgressed and who had been sinned against, came hither, to seek peace and life. They came like John the Baptist into the wilderness, some of them repelled by the locusts and wild honey, others putting their shoulder to the task, making hay while the sun shone, raising blisters upon delicate hands, but growing strong in nature's sanitarium and with God's physician.

The peasants whom we met, returning from their day's labor still with elastic step and graceful motion, were remarkably well clad, and the women were remarkably handsome. They all greeted him reverently, and he had a word for each. There was no condescension on his part, no worship on the part of the peasants. They love the Count, and yet not so much as one might expect from what we have read; for, if you hear them tell the story, they will say, "The Count has done nothing

for us," and yet he has won them from drink ; he has kept them from starvation ; he has roused them from ignorance. He did not make, nor did he care to make, paupers of them, for what he requires of himself, he requires of others ; namely, to give everything, and ask nothing in return.

In spite of the Count's peasant dress, his coarse linen blouse, the common black belt, and mended boots, there are ages between him and the peasant, and, in spite of himself, he towers above them. He is the Count ; they are the peasants. To be as near to them as he is, has cost him endless struggle. Many a time the spirit of his ancestors rose within him, and he stretched his hand toward the cane which had danced so lustily upon the backs of the Mujicks in olden days, for they did exasperate him ; yet he always withdrew. But those eyes could not help smiting the offender and cowing him into submission.

He had strange ways of educating his peasants, educating them through hardship, through sacrifice. When one told him that there were only three spades in the village, he told him it was well thus ; for, in lending, they were learning to love. It is a method which often works the other way. He has stumbled and fallen like all mortals, and plowed into his face are the furrows of woe, drawn by disappointment. He has had a weary road toward the cross—or rather, underneath the cross—and many a time he has fallen, bleeding and cursing.

On we walked toward the setting sun between the ripened grain-stacks. Rabbits ran by us fearlessly, and the field birds were not frightened from their nests ; for it is a long, long time since the last gunshot wounded one of God's creatures. The nightingale grew silent, the crickets chirped, and in melancholy mood we talked of failing health and coming death. Breaking into a silent moment, I asked him, "Count, what about the future ? I mean the future of humanity. What will be the ultimate form of society ?" "The future," he answered, "is with God to know, and for us to prepare. Our business is to live right now, and God will make all things right then." Startling was his remark about Socialism. "The greatest enemy to humanity is this Social Democracy. It is the preparation for a new slavery. It teaches a future good, without a present betterment. It promises golden streets without the bloody Gethsemane." "But, isn't Socialism a preparation for an ideal state ?" I asked. "No ; indeed not. It is just the contrary. It will regulate everything, put everything under law. It will destroy the individual ; it will enslave him. Socialism begins at the wrong end. You cannot organize anything until you have individuals. You are making chaos instead of cosmos. You will breed terrorism and confusion which only brute force will be able to quell. Socialism begins to regulate the world away from itself. *You must make yourself right, before the world around you can be made right.* No matter how wrongly the world deals with you, if you are right, the world will not harm you, and you may bring it

to your way of thinking. The modern labor-leader wishes to liberate the masses while he himself is a slave."

While he spoke his eyes rested firmly upon me; the sentences came from his lips like water from a spring. There was no possibility of replying; one could not disagree with him. He continued his speech—a sermon among the oaks which I alone heard—waking in me the consciousness of the self; impressing upon me the value of the individual and the power of the soul. He did not overawe or master me, but he made me master of myself. What he said there in his own speech, in that language which has all the melody of the Italian and all the forcefulness of the German, sounded in my ear like a recall to fundamental Christian ideas. I seemed to feel like Nicodemus, who heard as news what he should have known as a fact: "You must be born again." It resounded in the silence of the forest: "You must deny yourself; give up—renounce—sacrifice—follow me." These were the echoes of his speech. "You must teach the whole truth—no half-truth. If you teach that, you lie," and his voice rolled like thunder, and his eyes flashed lightning. "Young man," he continued, and he touched my shoulder, and his eyes searched mine, "art thou a teacher in Israel, and knowest not these things? What right have you to teach that which is not the word of Jesus?" He said this not in anger, but firmly and kindly.

"What do you teach about salvation?" he asked me abruptly. I told him. "You men," he said in reply, "are just beginning to see that salvation is not by magic, and that a man's salvation begins in the struggle of his own soul, and ends when he believes the words of Jesus." I asked him to tell me his view. "You remember my paragraph about the thief on the cross?" I asked him to repeat it, and he said, "Like the thief on the cross, I believe in the doctrine of Jesus, and this has made me whole. I once was filled by despair of life, and fear of death, but am now full of happiness and peace. Like the thief, I knew that my past and present life was vile. I knew that I was wretched and suffering, and that all those about me suffered and were wretched, and I saw nothing but death to save me from this condition. I was nailed to the cross of suffering and sin; and, as the thief saw before him, after the sufferings of a foolish life, the horrible shadows of death, so I beheld the grave opening before me. In all this I felt like the thief, but he was about to die; I still lived. Just as soon as I understood the words of Jesus, life and death ceased to be evil, and I tasted a joy which death cannot take away. That is salvation within the reach of everyone."

We had run our ten miles, and many a mile deep into the heart of things. We had wandered aimlessly into a forest, and path and highway were both lost to us. It seemed strange that just then he was belaboring me because of my Christological views, for all at once he said, "I have lost the way." "We are in the woods," I replied, and he

caught the meaning of this slang phrase, and said, "No; not I. I will find the path, which is the law of Christ, and we will be out of the woods soon. You will wander in the darkness, though you say you see a great light; but the main thing is to see the path, and that you haven't found. It can be found only by giving up,—surrendering all,—and that is the reason that so few enter into the narrow gate. Young man," he said, taking my arm, and leading me over tangled underbrush, speaking in a half whisper, "sell all that thou hast." It was a call to a consecration which was far from formal speech. Deeper and deeper cut his convincing words; and then we found the path, and walked upon it toward the well-lighted, welcoming house.

The dogs danced about the dear old Count, and I made the acquaintance of Biolok, a Siberian sledge-dog, a liberated creature, whose former masters are but slaves, whom the Count would like to liberate also. Rushing out of the house came a well-knit youth, of some eighteen years, who embraced the Count affectionately—a boy disciple from a neighboring estate who had just returned from a summer's campaign of education. He was clad in peasant garb, his face was strong and handsome, a youthful John who was seeking the approval of his master. Yet this master acted like a boy with his disciple—laughed, joked, pinched the young fellow, clapped his hands in glee. In fact, there was nothing grandiose about him. He was just a brother with a brother mortal. This is to me one of the most agreeable things about the Count—his humility. He never speaks of himself as a master, a prophet, or an apostle. He listens as if he were a pupil, and when I had finished an interview, it was always a question in my mind as to who did the interviewing.

Upon the subject of art the Count has decided ideas. In spite of his simple life, he has æsthetic views which he seeks to satisfy. His contention with modern art is, that it has not created its own standard, but that it clings to pagan ideas which are unwholesome and unchristian. "Why," he said, "women make anatomical museums of their parlors, and call that displaying taste in art. The Greeks deified the body; our time should deify the spirit, and only that is art for us which represents spirit, which not only holds up the mirror to the times, but which also says what the times should be. There is no such a thing as art for art's sake, but there is such a thing as art for truth's sake. If art is here to give pleasure, it must be true pleasure. The art for to-day must be the art of to-day, and not the art and ideals of centuries ago. Our worship of the product of old masters is often a blind following of blind leaders, and disastrous to households and nations. Just as much as I wish the women with whom I associate to be decently clad, just so much do I require of the art with which I surround myself." These seem to me sound principles which we might heed.

From this subject it was easy to speak of Wagner and Nietzsche, the latter having just died. "Nietzsche," said the Count, "was the chief

egotist of the century, and, no doubt, he was abnormal even before he became insane. I have a theory," he continued, "that all insanity is due to egoism—too much thinking upon self; and if I ever visit an insane asylum I shall try to test this theory."

"Money, what a curse it is," the Count continued, without any seeming connection with our previous conversation. "It is cursing my own children, and I am delighted when they lose it. Doesn't it seem strange to you? Just so I should be delighted if Russia were whipped in China. You see that I am a dreadfully inconsistent individual."

Yes, he is a great piece of humanity, and he spoke as a man speaks who, half confused, is reaching up toward the Divine, yet he knows the way and walks upon it in undisturbed quiet, this great toiler in the deep of human suffering. In the twilight of our forest walk, or by the candle light in the sitting-room, I can but faintly draw his picture or echo his thoughts. To understand him one must not only read him, but one must meet him; see the kernel in the human shell; hear the giant in thought ring out his defiance against church and state, and see him, the repentant sinner, smiting his breast; see him fighting like a giant and toddling like a child, his arms stretched out toward the mute sky; a king dealing out of his treasury, a beggar asking for mercy. Tolstoy reaches the greatest heights because he walks upon the lowest plain. Everywhere is seen in him the incomplete, the struggling, the inconsistent.

He is a rationalist, and yet so mystical and spiritual that one may see Heaven's glow in his eyes and a halo about his head. He is an individualist. He calls out the liberating words of Paul, "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made you free," and yet he is bound to humanity by every suffering nerve-string. The worst that can be said of Tolstoy is just this: he is incomplete, but he is honest. He is cruelly honest. It is an honesty which becomes almost a travesty in the blurred light of our own day. Yet he means to help, though he hurts in the helping. He believes it is easy to be happy by renunciation, if we overcome that which makes us unhappy. "It is better for thee to enter into life halt and maimed," and he is entering thus—poor because riches would cast him into hellfire. He has entered the narrow gate which so many seek and so few find, because it can be found only by those who will climb the rugged steeps which lead to it.

A few orthodox thoughts came to me in this unorthodox atmosphere. The first was, that the spirit is to-day the most powerful agency in the world. For example, here is an unprotected man, who hates the sight of guns, living in a military country under despotic government, attacking it mercilessly, yet he remains unharmed. Here he lives in this isolated spot, humbly, hating notoriety, seeking not the praise and companionship of men, yet this small place has been sought by the hungry eyes of thousands, and his name is trumpeted by the lips of the weak and ignorant. "Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit," saith the Lord.

Another thought came to me forcibly, and it is this : the need of emphasizing to-day the new birth. We have reacted so much against the emotional element in conversion that we have no conversion at all. I felt in *Yasna* something of the pangs of the new birth ; what it means to unwrap one's self from the cocoon of selfishness and sin and feel the glory of taking wing as God's liberated child. There came to me there in the stillness the call to heroic sacrifice, "*Zur Entsagung.*" To renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil—all these old truths knocked again at my heart as they never had before. In some way, old truths became new truths. I have since that time seen resting upon them the real light, as if I had walked awhile with Him of old who called to his disciples to forsake all and follow Him.

I missed one thing in Tolstoy—we all miss it—because of his agnostic view in regard to the person of Christ. It robs the Count of a precious experience, of a personal companion, of much which makes spiritual atmosphere. I missed that in him, but he missed more in me, and misses more in us. I hold the Christ Divine, and would not let him be robbed of one jewel in his royal diadem, and put no one above Him. To Tolstoy this is a matter of no interest ; it matters not who Christ was ; but when one reads the Gospel, it is not enough to say it is divine and then put the custom of a place, the law of a country, above it. Tolstoy illustrated this point thus : "I was passing one day before the Borovitsky gate at Moscow. Under this gate was an old lame beggar with a dirty cloth wrapped about his head. I wished to give him alms, but at that moment a soldier rushed from the Kremlin, wearing the state insignia of military dignity. The beggar fled at his approach. The grenadier, after a vain attempt to come up with the fugitive, poured forth imprecations upon him. He spoke in the name of the law. I immediately asked the grenadier : Have you read the New Testament ? He replied that he had. I recalled to him the passage which begins, 'If thine enemy hunger, feed him.' The soldier was troubled at first, and then replied : And do you know anything about military regulations ? After that he returned triumphantly to his post." Here was proclaimed by a poor, ignorant man, the opposition between the gospel of love and the regulations of hatred ; between the doctrine of Jesus, full of compassion, and the social state, built of pitiless laws.

He was the only man that I ever met, who had solved with an inflexible logic the question which eternally confronts us in social relations, rising continually before every man who calls himself a Christian. Those who are shocked at the least suggestion of qualifying the divinity of Jesus, often qualify his teachings. Here Tolstoy is as firm as a rock. To him the words of Jesus are the words of God. These are his words to me that night : "It does not matter to me who Jesus was. I can get along without knowing or saying, but the words of Jesus are divine ; without them I cannot live." Strange, hard words they were, and they

shocked me, but have I not read somewhere, "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me"? There is almost an antagonism to the church which is painful, and one could wish it were not so, but do you know what church it is and what Christ it preaches, and what lives are lived by those who profess to be his ministers?

No; he is not a Christ, but he is a John the Baptist; his gospel is written on the tablets of Moses; his beatitudes have in them the ring of the ten commandments. They were graven by the finger of Jehovah, not spoken by the gentle Jesus. But his way of preaching the gospel reaches where our way does not reach; his gospel reaches the lowest and brings the greatest low. It is a gospel which cannot be misunderstood; it is as clear as noonday. It is a gospel which rouses in man the will, which awakens the soul, and lifts it from its slumber or sloth to a large life and to heroic service. God needs such men in this, his day—large men who live above the fog; great men ready to sacrifice for righteousness' sake. There are too few who do not hedge and halt and trim, who dare to bear the brunt; too many time-servers, dust-lickers, who grow like mushrooms in the shade, and who die like morning-glories in the broad sunlight; too few of us who believe that the Gospels are for this time and forever, and who are willing that the Kingdom of God should come within us. This is Tolstoy's great cry: "The Kingdom of God is within you, and you are to be the pattern after which the Kingdom of this world is to fashion itself."

"Young man," he said, and they were almost the last words he spoke, "you sweat too much blood for the world; sweat some for yourself first. You cannot make the world better till you are better."

I have seen many a mountain and I love them all,—the Jungfrau in her chastity, Mt. Blanc with his icy collar, the Monk, hooded and shrouded,—but there is one rock standing alone, towering above the village of Zermatt, bride of the sky, mother of life-giving waters, now shrouded in mystic clouds, now sharp and clear standing between earth and sky. It is the solitary Matterhorn which I love best. The Matterhorn among the great is Tolstoy. I still feel resting upon me those eyes with their life-giving warmth; I still hear the mellow voice which persistently but lovingly said, "Young man, you cannot make the world better until you are better," and then I said, "Good night." I may never again say to him, "Good night," but I trust I shall say, "Good morning."

ARTICLE IX.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

PROFESSOR PARK.

THE news of the death of Professor Park reaches me in the center of Siberia, where it is impossible to obtain accurate data concerning the events of his life. A fuller account of his life and estimate of his work must, therefore, be left to other hands. But his relation to the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, as well as the intimacy of my own personal relations with him, renders it imperative that I say a few words in recognition of the event which closes the earthly career of so remarkable a man.

Professor Park was born to be a theologian. This aptitude for deep thinking upon serious subjects began to show itself when he was a mere child. This was partly due to his parental training, and partly to the high character of the New England pastors whom he heard preach, and with whom he came in contact during childhood. But it was principally due to inherited tendencies.

The seriousness of his character, and his great enthusiasm in pursuit of theological knowledge continued to show itself throughout his course of study in college and in the seminary. During his undergraduate course at Andover he exhausted himself in the care of Sabbath-schools, and neighborhood meetings in the surrounding country districts. At the same time his remarkable intellectual attainments early pointed him out as a most promising candidate for a professorship in the seminary. The first place which opened being the chair of Homiletics, he was appointed to fill it in 1836 and occupied it until 1847. The brilliancy of his work in that department can be seen by consulting a portion of his series of lectures published in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA in 1871-73.

At this time, also, his power as a preacher became widely recognized, so that no great public religious gathering in New England was regarded as complete without a sermon from him. Professor Park's sermons were not only carefully arranged in logical form, but highly elaborated and brilliantly illustrated. Their literary character was of a high order, and they uniformly dealt with profound theological themes. A few of his sermons were published in a volume issued a few years ago¹ by Mr. Draper. But this did not include the most striking ones, several of which had been repeated so often by himself, and echoed so much more often by

¹Discourses on some Theological Doctrines as Related to Religious Character. Andover, 1885.

his feeble imitators, that he evidently shrank from putting them before the public in printed form. This shrinking, however, was partly due to the fact that he so constantly revised them and changed the illustrations that their preparation for the press was a difficult matter. The literary excellence of Professor Park's sermons was not, however, their chief characteristic. They were uniformly adapted to the production of an immediate moral effect upon his hearers. He was not a "revivalist," but he was in sympathy with revivalists, and his sermons would never have been amiss during a time of religious awakening.

The only occasions on which I heard him preach were in the autumn of 1872 or 1873, when it came his turn to supply the seminary pulpit for a few Sabbaths at Andover. The audience consisted largely of boys in their teens from Phillips Academy, who were required to attend the service. Professor Park was then nearly seventy, and in infirm health. The themes chosen were of the highest order, relating to the nature of conscience, the majesty of the Divine government, the necessity of an atonement for sin, and the significance of the atoning work of Christ. These great themes so inspired him that his age and infirmities were forgotten both by himself and by his hearers, so that time after time he held the audience spellbound for an hour. The effect was electrifying. A deep religious awakening was produced which was the turning-point in the lives of a large number of the academy students.

On the retirement of Dr. Woods, Professor Park was appointed to the chair of Systematic Theology which he held for more than thirty years (1847-81). Meanwhile he had been prominent in establishing the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, becoming an Editor at the start. His name was not removed from its editorial list while he lived. As Professor Park has not published his theological lectures one must go to the pages of the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* to get in printed form the best fruits of his thought. This will appear, not only in what he personally wrote, but in the range of articles which he solicited. He always regarded the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* as one of his most important successes in life.

Theologically, Professor Park was a Calvinist of the school of Jonathan Edwards, upon an edition of whose works he has spent a great amount of labor. It is hoped that this great work was sufficiently advanced for publication. Unlike many of the interpreters of Edwards, Professor Park regarded him as a believer in the doctrine of human "free will," as well as in that of divine foreordination. A frequent phrase of Edwards is, Every one can "choose as he pleases" in all circumstances. Many interpret this as implying that the will is the slave of the sensibility; that the determination of the will to a given choice is the necessary result of the strongest motive. But Professor Park maintained that the phrase is tautological, and that "to choose as one pleases" = "to choose as one chooses," and so allows for its freedom. Professor Park did, indeed, maintain most strenuously that the determination of the choice is

always "according to the highest motive." But he maintained with equal emphasis that there was no *necessary* connection between the two. He used to electrify his classes by telling them that any one who could not see this did not know the difference between a "moral motive" and a "locomotive." Certainty is not always the result of necessity. The power of Professor Park's preaching was secured by the practical emphasis which he laid on the ability of the sinner to act at once in view of the motives already before him. The present time is always God's time.

In the same way that he interpreted Edwards, Professor Park interpreted the Andover Creed which he conscientiously signed from time to time during all his professional career. This celebrated creed was a compromise between the various Calvinistic parties in New England at the beginning of the last century, and, as he believed, was so worded as to avoid the conflict between the sovereignty of God and the freedom of the human will which appears in some of the Confessions. He maintained that he was in line with the New School Calvinists who joined in framing the creed. One of his last literary efforts was the publication of a pamphlet elaborating his views of the creed.¹

But Professor Park drew back with great force from the more recent effort of the Andover professors to give the creed so broad an interpretation that every sort of belief could come within its boundless horizon. He could not believe that "continued probation" for the heathen after death, which is one of the things explicitly denied in the creed, could legitimately find shelter within it. He could not believe that the strict doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible maintained in the creed was so elastic that the historical character of the Pentateuch could be consistently denied by an Andover professor who quinquennially signed it.

At the same time, Professor Park was as far as possible from being an extremist in the literal interpretation of Scripture. He freely recognized all the rhetorical forms under which the teachings of the Bible are conveyed. He was not one who held to the six literal twenty-four-hour days in Genesis. His celebrated sermon on "The Theology of the Intellect and the Theology of the Feelings"² which led to such a controversy with Dr. Hodge would seem to give as much relief from an iron-bound literalism in the interpretation of the Bible as any reasonable person could demand. But Professor Park consistently maintained that the phrase "beyond reasonable doubt" has well-recognized limitations; and that one who signs a creed or gives assent to the Bible should recognize that in these acts he admits some restraint to the freedom of his speculations. But it would seem that the liberty of interpretation which Professor Park set for himself is not sufficient for many of the present generation in New England and other portions of America where New

¹ About the time of the New Departure.

² *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. vii. p. 533.

England influences have spread. It must be, however, that this aberration is only temporary. Nor is it as serious as that which was corrected in the same regions by the Edwardean revivals. It has no deep basis in the religious needs of mankind, and no sufficient warrant in any of the scientific discoveries of the age. Science does not undertake to call white, black, or to make the present a perfect measure of the past. God is still a Sovereign, as well as a Father. Man, though always a son, is still a "prodigal son." The love of Christ, while speaking unsurpassable comfort to the humble hearted and penitent, is still a revelation of the wrath of God against the wicked who scorn his offers of mercy. The Bible is still a book of matchless power, and is so plain to wayfaring men that destructive literary criticism will fail to accomplish its downfall, as an authoritative and historical revelation of God to man.

The work of Professor Park in the defense and enforcement of these truths cannot be wholly lost, even if partially forgotten. It lives in the influences proceeding from the thousands of ministers who sat at his feet as pupils. It lives in the hundreds of thousands who have been converted under the style of preaching which he advocated and exemplified. It is especially manifest in the mission fields where his pupils are scattered over the whole world. It must live in the innumerable prayers of faith which it has stimulated among all branches of evangelical Christendom.¹

IRKOUTSK, SIBERIA, September 1, 1900.

¹ The following list of Professor Park's longer contributions to the *Bibliotheca Sacra* give but a partial view of the range of his mind. In addition to these essays, he enriched the *Quarterly* with a great number of book reviews and with numerous translations and abstracts. The essays are given in the order of their publication:—

Life of Aristotle, i. 39-84; 280-309.

Intellectual and Moral Influence of Romanism, ii. 451-488.

Natural Theology, iii. 241-276.

Power in the Pulpit, iv. 96-117.

The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings, vii. 533-569.

The Utility of Collegiate and Professional Schools, vii. 626-650.

Replies to Princeton Review, viii. 135-180; 594-647.

New England Theology, ix. 170-220.

Life and Services of Professor B. B. Edwards, ix. 783-821.

Dr. Alexander's Moral Science, x. 390-414.

President Edwards' Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue, x. 705-723.

The Relation of Divine Providence to Physical Laws, xii. 179-205.

Richard Baxter's "End of Controversy," xii. 348-385.

Review of Wayland's Intellectual Philosophy, xii. 403-415.

Taylor's Memoir of Judge Phillips, xiii. 853-891.

Dr. Griffin's Theory of the Atonement, xv. 132-179.

The Text of Hymns, xvii. 134-198.

The Imprecatory Psalms, viewed in the Light of the Southern Rebellion, xix. 165-211.

What Can be Done for Augmenting the Number of Christian Ministers? xxviii. 60-98.

RELIGIOUS FUTURE OF SIBERIA.

OUR ordinary thoughts of Siberia are so connected with its penal settlements that we fail to appreciate the vast interests which are gathering about its regular colonists. At the present time the exiles in Siberia proper are less than three per cent of the population; while the majority of these enjoy a freedom which has scarcely any restriction other than that which prevents them from returning for a period to Russia. Siberia has been colonized much as the United States were before the middle of the nineteenth century. Physical conditions have delayed the full settlement of the country somewhat as they did that of the Mississippi Valley before the advent of railroads. The Trans-Siberian Railway, now nearly completed, will hasten the settlement of the country about as rapidly as the transcontinental railways of America have hastened that of the Dakotas and Manitoba. The social and religious future of this vast domain is a subject of great intrinsic interest.

Siberia was opened to Russian colonization early in the seventeenth century. At the same time that the gentlemen of England were colonizing Virginia, the Dutch New York, and the Puritans New England, Russian adventurers and colonists were extending frontier settlements all along the navigable rivers of Siberia, and were meeting with similar obstacles in the displacement of the native pagan population. While the bulk of the original colonizers of Siberia were members of the Orthodox Greek Church, a fair proportion of them were Nonconformists of one sort or another who left Russia for the greater religious freedom which could be enjoyed in a new country. The communistic character of Russian social life favored such colonization in many respects. The Russian village is one of the most democratic institutions in the world. The lands controlled by these villages are worked in common, under an allotment made by officers elected by the entire adult population, including the women who are property holders, or whose male representatives are absent from home.

With this system it is comparatively a simple matter to send representatives to regions where land is plenty, and then select a situation to which an entire community can transplant itself without disturbing its religious or social organization. Many such Russian colonies can be

Methods of Perpetuating an Interest in Hearing the Gospel, xxviii. 334-366.

Memorial of Dr. Samuel Hovey Taylor, xxviii. 366-397.

The Three Fundamental Methods of Preaching: The Writing of Sermons, xxviii. 566-599, 707-739; *The Public Reading of Sermons and the Preaching of Them Memoriter*, xxix. 157-196; *Preaching Extempore*, xxix. 339-384, 720-771.

Review of Dr. Hodge's Theology, xxix. 553-561.

John McLeod Campbell's Theory of the Atonement, xxx. 334-361.

Review of Whichcote's Aphorisms, xxx. 384-393, 764-775.

The Structure of a Sermon, xxx. 534-573, 697-728.

Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity, xxxviii. 147-188, 333-369.

found in Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. For the most part, those who have come to America belong to the sects which are unalterably opposed to military service. But the majority of the nonconformists of Russia are sufficiently patriotic to be most loyal subjects of the Tzar. Hundreds of such settlements of nonconformists are to be found in the best parts of Siberia; especially in the fertile valleys in Tomsk, the southern part of Transbaikalia, and on the Amoor. Most of these villages can be readily identified by the absence of the domes and crosses and pictorial adornments which characterize the regular edifices for worship of the Greek Church.

But, unfortunately, these nonconforming communities are so scattered, and in general have so low a standard of education for their religious leaders, that there is not much hope of their coming to have a preponderating influence in any province of the Empire. They may fitly be compared to those of the Amish, the Dunkards, and the Weinbrennarians in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other central States in America. A high state of private morality prevails in them, and an unusually high average of temporal prosperity among their members. But for the most part they are outside the current of modern progress.

The predominant influence of the Orthodox Greek Church impresses one everywhere throughout Siberia. In fact, in all the large towns there is a superabundance of imposing church edifices, while almost every village is supplied with one which is out of all proportion to the surrounding buildings. On inquiry one finds that the building of a church is a favorite mode for the expression of the pious sentiments of wealthy Siberians. Especially is this the case with those who have become suddenly rich through mining operations. To pacify such gives the clergy have to allow them to have their way. The result is that in numerous cases a church is begun and left in an unfinished state, owing to the failure of the builder's business, or it is found to be superfluous and stands almost unoccupied.

But for the most part these churches are filled every Sabbath with large and devout congregations made up of all classes of people. In all these assemblies, the rich and the poor, the highest official and the lowest subordinate, the prince and the peasant, are found mingling together and joining in the common worship. The service, however, is almost wholly liturgical. The sermons which we have heard have rarely been ten minutes' long. But when the time for the sermon comes, the people press forward and gather as close to the preacher as they can.

There are no pews in the Greek churches. Everybody stands, and this through a service which is rarely less than two hours long. The monotony is, however, relieved by frequent invitations to kneel, and indeed to prostrate one's self upon the floor. The service is also made attractive both by the noble character of the liturgy, and by the superb character of the music in which it is intoned. Indeed, the Russian

church music is unequaled anywhere in the world. The greatest musical masters have devoted their lives to its perfection, and have succeeded in providing the most appropriate and effective musical forms imaginable for expressing the inspiring and transcendent conceptions of the doctrinal system of the church.

The music in the Greek churches is uniformly rendered without instrumental accompaniment of any kind. But one never fails to marvel at the musical richness of the voices of the Russian people, and at the perfection of their intonations. Without doubt they are now the most musical people of the world. In certain portions of the service all the people frequently join in the chant or the anthem. So familiar with the noble strains do they become, that regiments of soldiers regularly close the day by chanting a selection appropriate for the occasion. The musical effect of the harmony in these renderings is sublime. In one of the more unfrequented portions of Siberia along the line of the railway we encountered a special car with a retinue of priests and singers moving about from station to station. As we met it the passengers, especially the peasants and soldiers, flocked around it and joined devoutly in the service.

The Greek Church maintains a strong hold upon the affections of the people by the attention it pays to little children. In our first attendance at a typical service in one of the most imposing churches, we were surprised to see a large number of mothers present with infants in their arms. Nor did any one seem to be disturbed by their occasional cries. But at the proper time these mothers, many of them peasants, pressed forward through the crowd and presented them to the priests, who with manifest interest and sincerity administered to them some fluid food which had been consecrated, and was made symbolical of the pure milk of the gospel. Everywhere we found this to be a regular part of the service, and one in which all seemed deeply interested.

The relations of the clergy of the Greek Church to the people seem to be of the most cordial and sympathetic kind. The fact that they are married and live among their flocks with their families frees them from many of the suspicious and flagrant evils of the Roman Catholic Church. The opposition of the church to images is largely rendered nugatory by their excessive use of pictures. The form of the Saviour on the cross is so skillfully painted that at a little distance one can scarcely tell the difference between it and a statue. The worshipers kiss the painted feet with all the eagerness with which they do the sculptured form. Even more than the Roman Catholics the devotees of the Greek Church cross themselves as they pass their sacred shrines.

The tide of emigration which is now setting into Siberia is so largely composed of colonies of the Orthodox Church, and their numbers are so overwhelming, that Siberia seems likely to be the stronghold of its most conservative influences. The unity of the national church and the su-

perior education of its clergy will conspire to accomplish this result. Still there is much in this for hope. The sacramental excrescences which are most objectionable to Protestants are not essential to the unity and efficiency of the church. These may be lopped off through inward reforms coming about through the gradual spread of enlightenment. Indeed, the strength of nonconformists in Russia is not generally appreciated. The population of the Russian Empire is now about 130,000,000. These are by no means all members of the Orthodox Church. Something like 12,000,000 of these maintain the general doctrines of the church while asserting their independence of its ecclesiastical control. These constitute a most thrifty and important portion of the subjects of the Tzar, and are for the most part unfettered in the practice of their beliefs.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of nonconformists in Siberia. But there are known to be nearly 100,000 in Tomsk, and approximately as many in Transbaikalia and as many more along the Amoor and Zeya rivers. Altogether it is probable that there are 500,000 in the various provinces. These with their more numerous brethren in European Russia have large liberty for the development of their ideas. They cannot be aided much by outsiders except indirectly. The influence of Protestantism is being increasingly felt all through Southern Russia, and the nonconformists are particularly numerous and intelligent in the neighborhood of the Ural Mountains. While the educated Russians generally are open to modern ideas, the Greek Church cannot ignore wholly the spirit of the times.

The conditions of a new country rapidly filling up with settlers are so favorable to the adoption of new customs and the reception of new light, that the coming century may easily see Siberia leading the whole empire into a purer and more spiritual religion.

BATUM, CAUCASIA, October 15, 1900.

ARTICLE X.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE DEEPENING INTEREST IN SOCIOLOGY.

SOCIOLOGY has passed out of the stage in which many thought it only a nine-days' wonder. There was a time when enthusiastic sciolists indulged in as extravagant expectations from the new study as did mediæval professors of alchemy. There were programs for social transformation filling the air like snowflakes and for the most part dissolving when they touched real life as quickly as snowflakes disappear in the ocean. Many of these schemes were so wild and so regardless of what we know of human nature that not a few conservative thinkers looked askance at the whole matter and derided all claim of sociology to be a science. It would be premature, at least, to maintain that it is already on the same footing as a science with chemistry or astronomy. Unity of view in regard to its forces and laws is yet far off. Disciples can find enough disagreement among the doctors to encourage them in almost unrestricted speculation. At the same time interest in the multifarious problems of sociology becomes more general every year. There is every indication that this interest will be permanent and that sociology is making stable progress both as a science and an art.

One of these indications is the increasing number of sociological articles appearing in general periodicals. One can scarcely take up a number of any literary periodical or even substantial weekly paper without finding a sociological article of a sort that would not have been thought of twenty years ago. Any publication that attempts to keep in survey the world's thought must have a department for sociology as much as for ethics or geology or politics.

Another indication of the permanent character of the interest in sociology is the maintenance of so many periodicals devoted either exclusively to sociology or to its cognate themes. Our readers may be interested in a list of some of those that come to our desk in exchange.

The *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* is published in Philadelphia bi-monthly, and contains elaborate discussions in both theoretical and practical sociology that sometimes extend to monographs.

The *Yale Review* is published quarterly at New Haven and announces its aim to be "the scientific discussion of Economics, Politics, and Social Questions."

The *Political Science Quarterly* is the organ of the Faculty of Po-

litical Science at Columbia College, New York. It deals with essentially the same subjects as the two preceding.

The *American Journal of Sociology*, published bi-monthly at the University of Chicago Press, by its title and prospectus holds itself more closely to pure sociology, though not excluding articles on one side suitable for a political science journal, or on the other for a journal of philosophy.

The *American Economic Association* issues a quarterly publication, partly monographs, devoted to the economic section of sociology. The *Charities Review* describes its field by its title. So does *Municipal Affairs*, published by an association in New York. If it be said that the last three named deal with matters that were under consideration long before sociology was thought of, it may be granted without obscuring the fact that the method of treating the subjects has been greatly changed by the influence of general sociology. In the same way sociology shows its influence in the educational journals and in the publications devoted to special reforms. Sociology is making a permanent place for itself.

MUNICIPAL TAXATION.

THE rapid increase of municipal expenditure is an almost universal feature of the time. Better sidewalks and pavements, improved sewerage, better light and water supply, parks large and small, free baths and gymnasiums, and a steady advance of the school system which in some cities now includes large use of the school buildings for free popular lectures, are some of the visible results of the increased expenditure. Some of these items cost much more than formerly in proportion to population because modern rapid transit distributes population over wider areas. Other items have grown because municipalities are undertaking increased functions for the positive benefit of the people. It is yet uncertain how far we shall go in this direction. If municipalities enter upon the policy of owning and operating telephone lines and street railways, it is not settled whether they will conduct these enterprises with a view to cheapening the cost or with a view to making a profit. If the first principle is adopted there will open a vista for the indefinite expansion of expenses. Who can name a limit, for example, to the possible cost of free street cars? If, on the other hand, municipalities enter upon these lines of business in the expectation of profit, the taxpayer may find that instead of having his burden lightened by a surplus he must stand behind a deficit.

There is little doubt that for one reason and another municipal expenses will continue to grow in the years just before us. How shall the income keep pace with the outgo? Rapid transit has lowered the value of large areas of city land. Industries must be taxed cautiously lest they be driven away. Large owners of personal property may move to suburbs or to other cities if the levies are much increased. An effective in-

come tax by a municipality is probably impossible. The Supreme Court has forbidden the Federal Government to resort to an income tax, and no other arm is long and strong enough to collect such a tax efficiently. The municipalities are not permitted to resort to duties like the octroi, once so common with European cities. If municipal ownership of street car, telephone, and similar franchises is adopted as a general policy these will be removed from resources for taxation.

The Parliamentary inquiry into the working of municipal business enterprises in Great Britain is attracting much attention. The final report has not yet been presented, but the drift of opinion among those who have written on the evidence already in is adverse to further steps in that direction. The considerations presented above of the increasing need of municipal resources and the difficulty of deriving larger sums from taxation suggest the wisdom of having municipalities control and tax public franchises rather than own and operate them. The difficulty of much increasing present municipal revenues suggests also the necessity of moving cautiously in the increase of expenditures. Many a town has required years to recover from the injury of extravagant and premature improvements. There is danger that the next few years will see many cases of municipal bankruptcy as the result of too hasty assumption of business functions.

A MUCH OVERWORKED TEXT.

Cain had deliberately and with malice prepense killed Abel. The Lord asked Cain, "Where is thy brother?" The murderer was not ready to make confession, and resorted to an evasive question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" The shrewdness of the question lies in the fact that it implies a negative answer. The fallacy lies in the assumption that there is no middle ground between a brother's keeper and a brother's murderer. In truth the intervening space is so vast as to embrace the larger part of human relations.

To the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" surely the proper answer is not always and everywhere, Yes. That would imply that all of my brothers are more or less imbecile and unable to take care of themselves. It would imply that I am omniscient, always knowing what my brothers need better than they know. It would furnish excuse for all manner of interference in my brothers' affairs, and be the ready plea for no end of paternalism, as well as for every form of "benevolent despotism."

There are times and circumstances that demand the active keeping of others. Helpless infancy and infirm old age are dependent on kind offices. A ship's passengers trust the skill and fidelity of the captain to fulfill the charge he has voluntarily accepted of piloting them to their desired haven. He has agreed to be their keeper, and must not forsake his responsibility, even to save his own life. Some day, also, this captain may discover on the sea a helpless company of shipwrecked men

drifting on a raft of broken spars. He must change his course and delay his voyage to save them, for Providence has made him their keeper. Blood guilt will be upon his soul if he pass such a company without effort to help them.

But in most relations between human beings what they desire of each other is to be let alone. A thousand ships will be met on the ocean that ask nothing but sea-room, to one that is flying a signal of distress to entreat active help.

Happily the universe has been so organized, that, as a rule, in honestly minding our own business we at the same time benefit our brothers. The farmer in taking wheat to market is at the same time carrying food to the hungry. In raising the kind of wheat that will give the largest yield and command the highest price he is producing that which will meet the most wants of his brother-men. Providence in creating the world has taken care that in general men cannot truly and well keep themselves without at the same time conferring benefits on others. A ship finds sea-room for itself by giving room to others, and gives room to others in taking the freest path for itself.

It is both bad exegesis and bad sociology to turn Cain's shrewd sophistical question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" into a categorical affirmation, and call that affirmation a command of the Lord. I am to be my brother's ally and friend, to give him a fair chance and do him no injury; in short, to be his brother. The attempt to be his keeper will make war upon his individuality, and destroy our brotherly fellowship and manly independence.

IS CRIME INCREASING?

THIS generation cannot claim large success in dealing with crime. On every hand in the United States there are expressions of a growing feeling of insecurity in regard to both person and property. Mobs do not seem to be diminishing in the Southern States and are increasing in the North. The daily press of Chicago teems with accounts of robbery and violence on the streets. The police of New York are publicly charged by responsible parties with conniving at crime that will yield a revenue of blackmail. From England come indications of a like sense of a decline of good order. Even the grave *London Times* is taking part in the current discussion of the perils of "Hooliganism" in the streets of the metropolis. The "Hooligan" may not be already a criminal, but is a rough, lawless young person who is now an annoyance on the street by his rudeness, and is certain, if not checked in his natural development, to become shortly a pronounced and habitual criminal.

The prospects of social order in the immediate future turn on the way we influence the class which is now on the verge of crime. If the recruiting of the criminal ranks can be stopped, the future is secure. Those who are now criminals will soon pass off the stage, and if not re-

enforced can be handled with increasing ease. The most important question in regard to our practical penology is its influence on the possible criminals in the community. Apparently the penal code has less restraining influence than formerly. Uncertainty of execution will break the force of a code, no matter how severe its threatenings. It is a great evil that so many criminals escape conviction through technicalities. Another evil is, the multitude of pardons secured through personal or political favor. Is there not also a more insidious but profounder danger in the present tendency to center penological thought so much on the improvement of the individual prisoner as to overlook the larger relation of punishment to the security of society? Recent literature in regard to the treatment of criminals emphasizes the personal side of the matter almost to the exclusion of the governmental side. There is far more effort to find what will reform the individual criminal than what will stop crime in the community.

When the English poor-law saw only the needy individual asking for relief, and gave the relief without even looking at that individual's probable condition on the morrow, and with never a thought of effects on other individuals, the system was not curing pauperism but increasing it. The person helped was made less industrious and frugal, less able and less anxious to provide for himself. Others looking on were led to depend on the public instead of themselves, and remitted their strenuous effort to be self-supporting. Pauperism ate into the body politic like a cancer, and was fast destroying the nation's power of production. Some poor people had a less comfortable time when a check was put upon outdoor relief and disagreeable conditions were attached to public charity. But the better method checked the degradation of England's working population, and gave a new impulse to the economic life of the nation, by the self-reliant spirit infused into her people. Important as it is to feed a starving man, it is more important to do it in such a way that he will be less likely to fall into that condition again, and in such a way that those who look on will be incited to earnest effort never to get into that condition.

So in regard to crime, the particular event or person concerned is not as important as the interests of society involved. When a theft has been committed, society wants the property recovered for the owner, but is more concerned about the insecurity of all property if thieving is not checked. If any crime is committed, society becomes anxious for protection not simply against this one criminal, but against others that may follow his example if not checked. Everything possible should be done to reform the individual criminal, but it is not safe ever to forget that the great aim of a penal code is to diminish crime and protect the law-abiding. The governmental aspect of punishment must be kept more prominent than the personal, or we shall have a continual history of increasing crime.

W. E. C. W.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE RITSCHLIAN THEOLOGY, CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE: An Exposition and an Estimate. By ALFRED E. GARVIE, M.A. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00 net.

This volume contains twelve chapters on the theology of Albrecht Ritschl and that of several of the most important representatives of the so-called Ritschlian School in Germany. Besides the consideration of the philosophical problems, these chapters treat of The Antagonism to Mysticism; The Historical Character of Revelation; The Idea of the Kingdom of God; The Doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ; The Doctrine of Sin and Salvation; and The Doctrine of the Church and the Kingdom. The author has a great deal to say from the philosophical point of view,—sometimes approvingly, but for the most part for the purpose of limiting the general Ritschlian influence against philosophy and metaphysics. But the author does not succeed in showing any valuable religious elements which Ritschl has cut out by his exclusion of speculative and metaphysical inquiries from the sphere of the church theologian. It was certainly the great merit of Ritschl that he did not do what the philosophical critics seem to think he was trying to accomplish, namely, enter the philosophical field. He simply turned from it, because he found the value he sought for in revealed religion, and did not find it in a philosophical view of the world. Ritschl wanted a practical theology for the essential purposes of salvation. Only vital teaching should be placed in the service of the church in its unique task of training believers in the elements of Christian discipleship. Garvie cannot be holding this clearly in view when he asserts, as over against Ritschl's purely practical interest, that theology in general "may also very well obey a theoretical impulse" (p. 192). Garvie would be one of the last persons to wish a theology, constructed under theoretical impulse, to be elevated to the place of *dogma* in the church, and to be made essential for practical Christian fellowship. The church has had already a large, and a very painful, experience with speculative theology so used.

Garvie must be mistaken when he asserts that Ritschl's theory of knowledge seriously limits a theology which has as its task the treating of salvation. Ritschl's "theory of the thing" simply stated is this: that we know things in their phenomena, but we do not know them and cannot know them *as they are in themselves apart from their phenomena*. Garvie believes that Ritschl made too much of this theory, and thinks it

is not important for a theologian to have this, or any other theory of the thing, but that each theologian may be safely left to his own practical "consciousness." If this is true, why not also say that Neo-Kantians, as philosophers, have no need of a distinguishing theory of cognition, but can be left to depend on their consciousness? But if consciousness is in any sense to become a rule it must first be rationally conceived of as such a regulative principle.

A *scientific* theology does not by any means signify, as Garvie elsewhere seems to imply (p. 85 f.), that science or philosophy must have originated it. A theology growing out of the religious conceptions of an historical revelation, may be scientifically constructed out of these religious materials, and, by avoiding metaphysical distinctions, become just what the church needs in its teaching of salvation. And Ritschl believed that every theologian should have some "theory of the thing" by which he was consciously to be governed, if he was to become in any sense of the word a scientific theologian. And by his own principle, Ritschl was able very successfully to keep out of the field of unfruitful metaphysical or merely speculative inquiry; was thrown upon a consideration of the historical and ethical; and enabled to become at the same time both scientific and practical.

Garvie also thinks that the limitations which Ritschl has set to metaphysical inquiries into Christ's divinity must be disregarded. But certainly these inquiries are not to be employed in the service of the church, as of equal value with the religious acceptance of Christ. Such theological speculation in general as Garvie refers to, no doubt belongs legitimately to the field of speculative philosophy and theism. But this is a different world from that into which Ritschl sought to lead the way. Such speculative opinions can have no place as church *dogma*; whereas, the religious understanding and acceptance of the rulership of Jesus Christ are absolutely essential for a vital membership in the Christian community. Garvie also criticises Ritschl's measuring of sin by means of the revealed good in God and the kingdom of God. While Ritschl affirms graded degrees of sin, he finds no adequate conception of sin as sin, to be attainable apart from the knowledge of the good. But this, so far from being a weak view of sin, is one of the marks of the profound in Ritschl. What Garvie proposes as an improvement, by the emphasis of the subjective conscience, does not seem to indicate a sounder judgment of sin, and certainly not a profounder conception of it. He also thinks that Ritschl should have given more place to the work done by Christ in the atonement. For with Ritschl sinners are not reconciled to God by what Christ does, but through what *Christ is for us*. It is Christ himself, and not his works, that becomes our reconciliation. Garvie undertakes to say that Christ in some sense suffered for us the penalty of sin; and yet he draws back from a direct affirmation that He actually did suffer the *penalty* of guilt in the place of the sinner, which he recog-

nizes that the guilty alone can suffer. Garvie does not fully grasp the whole of Ritschl's conception; for, with Ritschl, God does not vindicate his righteousness by means of the punishment of sin, but he realizes that righteousness by the actual establishing of the kingdom of God: and Christ is great for us, not so much in his passive suffering, as in his active obedience, and positive patience, and world-conquering trust.

And Garvie's criticism of Ritschl's conception of love as that which is fundamental in God's character and revelation of himself, reveals rather the limitations of the critic. Ritschl makes the love conception fundamental in God, and righteousness subordinate to love; Garvie would prefer them coördinated with each other. But the profoundest theologians of America have preferred the view which Garvie criticises to that which he would substitute for it. In fact Garvie's criticisms of Ritschl are the weakest part of his work. He has, however, been very fair in it all. And he has been quick to recognize and expose the weakness of the criticisms of Stählin, Dr. Denney, and even of Professor Orr, of whom he evidently stands in some awe. He has therefore done much to correct the widespread misapprehensions of the Ritschlian movement. Indeed more than any other English writer on Ritschlianism has he maintained the true historical and exegetical temper throughout his work. His limitations have been only such as belong to his own theological development and which no writer can overstep; for it is when a man becomes a critic that he measures all by his own conceptions.

The general impression from Garvie's book is very favorable to Ritschlianism. He says of Ritschl that we must do him the justice of recognizing his intensely religious motive as the ground on which he rejected speculative theism; that Ritschl is not destructive but only preparing himself for a work of construction, so that what he takes away from an illegitimate profession of philosophy he gives back to us as a warranted assurance of religion; and that while Ritschl does not see the idea of God brought vitally from the standpoint of philosophy, he does see that the living conception may come directly from the standpoint of religious faith in God. He also approves of Ritschl in his objection to the mystic placing of stress on the sub-consciousness rather than on the consciousness; and says that "while at first sight it might appear as if mysticism offered nearer access to God than Christian faith, yet on close view we discover that as the alleged religious experience is without any content, so the assumed divine contact is without any evidence" (p. 142).

He also recognizes Ritschl's estimate of the exclusive value of the divine revelation as it is to be found in the historical person of Jesus Christ; that Ritschl gave a fundamental place to the Old and New Testaments; and that he accepted miracles, and the resurrection of Christ. He also approves of Ritschl's explanation of the origin of sin as a result of freedom and not of necessity, and therefore as being a real fact. Ritschl does not deny universal sin; he affirms man's individual liberty and per-

sonal responsibility, as they are not commonly emphasized in the traditional theory of original sin which seems to emphasize necessity rather than freedom. And Garvie approves also of Ritschl's definition of Christian perfection, and sees a valuable contribution in it.

This is really the only book in English which seriously sets about the task of giving a genuine exposition of the Ritschlian views. The many little criticisms of Ritschl himself almost seem to be thrown into the text to prevent the conservative reader from supposing that the author has gone over, bag and baggage, into the Ritschlian camp. The book would have been stronger if the criticisms had been left out, and the author had confined himself to his valuable expositions, which he shows himself abundantly able to give. The book would also have been more successful, in the reviewer's judgment, if the author had given all his space in this volume to Albrecht Ritschl alone, and reserved the Ritschlian School for a volume by itself. For in spite of the fact that his treatment of one individual has generally been kept apart from the others, yet the general result, so far as the individuals are concerned, is one of blending and mingling where distinctness is absolutely essential in our historical conceptions. A volume devoted to Ritschl himself, as Garvie has shown he could very well have done it, would have been the best preparation for an understanding of what is truly Ritschlian in the many important followers who are, yet, marked by such strong independence that it is not safe to class them too closely. Garvie, however, has certainly prepared the way in England for an "era of better understanding" of very important conceptions which, unfortunately, have been widely misapprehended and misrepresented.

ALBERT T. SWING.

A **DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE**, dealing with its Language, Literature, and Contents, including the Biblical Theology. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M. A., D. D. Vol. III. — *Kir-Pleiades*. Imperial 8vo. Pp. xv, 896. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. \$4.00.

The third volume of this invaluable work fully maintains the high standard set by the first two. Its contents are peculiarly important and interesting. The following eight Old Testament books are treated : Leviticus and Numbers (G. Harford-Battersby), Nehemiah (Professor Battem), Lamentations and Obadiah (J. A. Selbie), Micah (Professor Nowack), Nahum (Professor Kennedy), and Malachi (A. C. Welch). Of the New Testament books the following seven are covered in articles : Matthew (Professor Bartlet), Mark (Principal Salmond), Luke (Principal Bebb), Philippians (Professor Gibbs), Philemon (Dr. Bernard), First and Second Peter (Principal Chase). The present positions of criticism are fairly stated. In some cases the conclusions reached will appear too liberal to certain minds; in other instances and to minds occupying other standpoints, too conservative. Such a result, however, especially as regards the Old Testament books, was to be anticipated. Of especial value are the articles : Language of the Old Testament (Professor Margoliouth),

Language of the New Testament (Professor Thayer). Other noteworthy contributions along the same lines are : Old Testament (Professor Curtis), New Testament (Dr. McClymont), Old Testament Canon (F. H. Woods), New Testament Canon (Professor Stanton). To those interested in Old Testament criticism the articles, Law in the Old Testament (Professor Driver), Moses (Professor Bennett), Messiah (Professor Stanton), Levi (G. A. Cooke), Passover (Dr. Moulton), Patriarchs (Dr. Taylor), Proper Names (Professor Gray), Melchizedek (Professor Sayce), Nazirite (Dr. Eaton), and Nethinim (Dr. Taylor), will be especially attractive. New Testament students will read with interest the contributions Logos and Pentecost (Dr. Purves), Lord's Day (N. J. D. White), Lord's Prayer and Lord's Supper (Dr. Plummer), and the extended and exhaustive articles on Paul (Professor Findlay) and Peter (Principal Chase). Along the lines of archæology and ethnology mention should be made of the articles Machpelah (Sir Charles Warren), Magic and Magician (Principal Whitehouse), Medicine (Professor Macalister), Moab, with extended treatment of the Moabite Stone (Professor Bennett), Money (Professor Kennedy), Music (James Millar), Palestine (Colonel Conder), Philistines (Professor Beecher), Phœnicia (G. W. Thatcher). Contributions of especial value to biblical theology are the articles on Love (Professor Orr), Mediator (Professor Adeney), Nature, and Miracle (Dr. Bernard), Millennium, and Parousia (Professor Brown), Life and Death (G. C. Martin). Mention should also be made of the able articles Maccabees, and Books of Maccabees (W. Fairweather), and especially that on the Old Latin Versions (Dr. Kennedy).

Altogether the volume contains a remarkable list of articles by able contributors. No biblical student can afford to be without this comprehensive and complete dictionary.

G. S. B.

THE SUPREME LEADER. A Study of the Nature and Work of the Holy Spirit. By FRANCIS B. DENIO, D.D. Pp. xiv, 264. Boston : The Pilgrim Press. \$1.25.

This is a valuable contribution to the body of literature upon the subject of the Holy Spirit that has come into existence during the last few decades. Its value consists in the fact that it is a scholarly application of the historical method with a distinctly practical and devotional aim. The author first traces the development of thought in the Old Testament, in the literature between the two Testaments, and in the New Testament. This work is carefully done in the case of the Old and New Testaments, and the intervening period is briefly considered. In the New Testament Professor Denio finds the data for the doctrine of the Trinity and finds a clear recognition of the Trinity, though in the New Testament period it had not become the subject of metaphysical reflection. The personality of the Spirit is clearly recognized. He considers that "an identification of the Holy Spirit with the glorified Christ is not the solution of such

passages as teach that Jesus Christ is always present with his people and in communion with them."

The second part of the work, in eight chapters, discusses the development of Christian thought upon the subject from New Testament times to the present day. It answers the question, What have Christians learned from the teachings of the Bible and their own experience?

After tracing the development of Christian thought on the subject, the author, in the third part of the book, states his own positive positions, the title of the third study being, "The Work and Person of the Holy Spirit." Here the author does a great service by emphasizing the fundamental work of the Holy Spirit in the normal development of the ordinary Christian life without ignoring or denying the value of special experiences. The statements here are carefully guarded, and based on no narrow range of observation.

The fourth part of the book is devoted to the Holy Spirit in his relation to Christian life and service. It consists of four chapters, and goes over the ground ordinarily covered by devotional treatises on the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The chapters are, however, much stronger and more satisfying intellectually than such treatises sometimes are, because of the thorough critical discussions in the preceding parts of the book. These last chapters contain much that appeals to the conscience and that is spiritually invigorating, and nothing that conduces to morbid or to abnormal experiences.

E. I. B.

THE NEW MANUAL OF PRAISE. Edited by FENELON B. RICE, G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, and EDWARD DICKINSON. Oberlin: E. J. GOODRICH. \$1.00.

The committee appointed by the Oberlin College faculty to revise the hymnal which has been in use in the College and the local Congregational churches for the past twenty years have completed their work. The "New Manual of Praise" is no mere revision, but virtually a new collection, prepared to meet the demands which the growing needs of the church have created. The aim of the compilers has been to preserve all that is poetically and musically the best in the old hymn-book, and at the same time to gather the choicest of the treasures of devotional expression with which congregational song has been enriched during recent years. In the search for fresh material the compilers have not forgotten the claims of the noble body of song from which the church has drawn such deep spiritual nurture in the past. Those lyrics which have become inseparably associated with all that is most universal and consoling in the religious experience of the members of the English and American church for generations retain an honored place in the new book; much that was dogmatic and restricted in thought and prosaic or harsh in expression has been removed; while the collection has been vastly enriched by the addition of poems of the later school of hymnists

—of which such writers as Whittier, Holmes, Phillips Brooks, and Mrs. Stowe are shining examples—who have given chaste and heart-searching expression to those convictions that abide unquestioned amid the changes of creeds.

The improvements in the music of the "New Manual" have been even more decided than in the hymns. The past twenty years have seen the addition of much new material to the treasures of congregational music, and also a positive uplift in taste in spite of many local retrogressions. The editors have carefully considered the rightful claims of conservative preferences and sacred associations, but at the same time they have considered it their duty to the church to reject everything that is unworthy of the dignity of public worship. In some cases where their own judgment preferred another tune to some time-honored associate of a favorite hymn, they have offered a choice upon the same page, in order that differing tastes may be gratified. Throughout the book there will be found a more intimate correspondence than before between the hymns and their associated melodies in respect to style.

The aim has been to compile an anthology of what is most beautiful, spiritual, and suited to public worship in the hymnody and music of England and America, both old and new. It is believed that the book will be found eminently practical, not only for the chief service of worship, but also for the prayer-meeting and the Sunday-school. The latter purpose has been kept prominently in view in the selection of an ample store of children's hymns. The accessory offices of the church—such as communion and baptism, the celebration of festal days, etc.—have been carefully considered. The book contains about 650 hymns and is abundantly supplied with indexes.

MISSIONARY BOOKS OF 1900.

Without controversy, the century just ended is at many points the marvel among centuries, and in particular no other hundred years approaches this one for missionary enlargement and achievement. Moreover, the closing year is also notable among the other ninety-and-nine, in the same realm, as a single phenomenon will go far to prove. More than a hundred books have appeared from the press during the last twelve-month, all well worth reading, which relate to the world's evangelization. From this embarrassment of riches only a dozen or so, for lack of space, can be even so much as named here.

General Works.—Easily first among these is the Report, in two thick volumes, of that epoch-making event, the Ecumenical Conference, held last April-May in New York, containing the substance of all the numerous papers and addresses. THE MISSIONARY ANNALS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (D. L. Leonard), in which missionary progress is presented by decades, with an extended chronological table at the close. THE FOREIGN MISSIONS OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES (S. L. Bald-

win). **NINETEEN CENTURIES OF MISSIONS** (Mrs. W. W. Scudder), designed especially for the young. **BRITISH FOREIGN MISSIONS** (R. W. Thompson and A. N. Johnson). **FORWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE LAST HALF-CENTURY** (A. T. Pierson), making a stimulating mention of some thirty of these. **EVANGELIZATION OF THE WORLD IN THIS GENERATION** (J. R. Mott), explaining and emphasizing the battle-cry of the Student Volunteer Movement.

Particular Mission Fields.—**CHINA'S ONLY HOPE** (Chang Chih-Tung, Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan), this distinguished Chinese statesman having not the least liking for European civilization or religion, but notwithstanding thoroughly persuaded that these "evils" must be accepted with all the equanimity and wisdom possible. **YANGTZE VALLEY AND BEYOND** (Mrs. Isabella Bird-Bishop), one of the very best of this gifted Englishwoman's productions. **VILLAGE LIFE IN CHINA** (A. H. Smith), a work of genius, and most entertaining as well. **CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION** (A. R. Colquhoun). **PIONEERING ON THE KONGO** (W. H. Bentley), by one of the earliest and foremost of the honored pioneers. **TWENTY YEARS IN KHAMA'S COUNTRY** (J. D. Hepburn), telling much about this enterprising and truly Christian ruler in South Africa. **ARABIA, THE CRADLE OF ISLAM** (S. M. Zwemer), by far the best book upon a land and people little known, by one who has been for nearly a decade laying foundations for the Kingdom on the western shores of the Persian Gulf.

Biographies.—**VERBECK OF JAPAN** (W. E. Griffis), relating to the most eminent of the missionaries to the Land of the Rising Sun, worthy to be named with Carey, Morrison, and Judson, by a writer thoroughly competent for his task. **JAMES EVANS, THE APOSTLE OF THE NORTH** (E. R. Young), relating to a hero of the Cross whose field was among the Indians of British America, whose biographer, himself also one of the Lord's heroes, wields an inspiring pen. **PANDITA RAMABAI; THE STORY OF HER LIFE** (Helen S. Dyer), filled with striking facts about India's most gifted Christian daughter, whose heart and life are wholly consecrated to the redemption of child widows and famine orphans. **TUSKEGEE; ITS STORY AND WORK** (M. B. Thrasher), which pictures the greatest of living Negroes, and the foremost of institutions designed to benefit the millions of Freedmen by training a host of leaders in brain, and in heart, and in hand.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

THE ROBERT CLARKE COMPANY, Cincinnati.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFETIME. By GENERAL ROHLIFF BRINKERHOFF. Pp. xiii, 448. 1900. \$2.00.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & COMPANY, Boston.

THE AGE OF FAITH. By AMORY H. BRADFORD, D.D., author of "Spirit and Life," "The Pilgrim in Old England," "Heredity and Christian Problems," "The Growing Revelation," etc. 12mo. Pp. viii, 306. 1900. \$1.50.

LIBRAIRIE FISCHBACHER, Paris.

PUBLICATIONS DIVERSES SUR LE FIDÉISME, et son application, à l'Enseignement Chrétien Traditionnel. Par EUGÈNE MENEGOUZ, Professeur à la Faculté de Théologie protestante de l'Université de Paris. 8vo. Pp. ix, 425. 1900.

LITTLE, BROWN & COMPANY, Boston.

THE PURITAN IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND. By EZRA HOYT BYINGTON, author of "The Puritan as a Colonist and Reformer," "The Christ of Yesterday, To-day and Forever," etc. Fourth Edition. With a Chapter on Witchcraft in New England. 8vo. Pp. xlii, 457. 1900. \$2.00.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, New York.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. (New Testament Handbooks). By BENJAMIN WISNER BACON, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in Yale Divinity School. 12mo. Pp. xv, 285. 1900. 75 cents.

JESUS CHRIST AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION: An Examination of the Teaching of Jesus in Its Relation to Some of the Problems of Modern Social Life. By FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY, Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University. 12mo. Pp. vii, 374. 1900. \$1.50.

SELECTIONS FROM PLATO. With Introduction and Notes. By LEWIS LEAMING FORMAN, Ph.D., Instructor in Greek in Cornell University. 12mo. Pp. lx, 510. 1900. \$1.90.

THE HISTORY OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT; being the History of the Process whereby the Word of God has won the Right to be Understood. By HENRY S. NASH, Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge. 12mo. Pp. xi, 192. 1900. \$1.50.

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRIST IN MODERN LIFE; being a Study of the New Problems of the Church in American Society. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS. 12mo. Pp. xiv, 416. 1900. \$1.50.

MARLIER & COMPANY, Boston.

THE DHAMMA OF GOTAMA THE BUDDHA and the GOSPEL OF JESUS THE CHRIST: A Critical Inquiry into the Alleged Relations of Buddhism with Primitive Christianity. By CHARLES FRANCIS AIKEN, S.T.D., Instructor in Apologetics in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. 12mo. Pp. xvii, 348. 1900. \$1.50.

THE PILGRIM PRESS, Boston.

SKETCHES HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL OF THE ELIOT CHURCH AND SOCIETY, BOSTON. By A. C. THOMPSON. 8vo. Pp. viii, 503. 1900.


CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, New York.


PAUL OF TARSUS. By ROBERT BIRD, author of "Jesus, the Carpenter of Nazareth." 8vo. Pp. xii, 515. 1900. \$2.00.

WORD STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By MARVIN R. VINCENT, D.D. Vol. IV. 8vo. Pp. 624. 1900. \$4.00.

SILVER, BURDETT & COMPANY, New York.

AN OUTLINE OF NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. By DAVID FOSTER ESTES, D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in Colgate University, Hamilton, N. Y. 12mo. Pp. vi, 253. 1900.





C. A. Benton.

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ARTICLE I.

THE LIMITS OF THEOLOGICAL FREEDOM.¹

BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, PH.D., D.D.

THESE two books, of which the earlier derives a renewed importance from the appearance of the later, present two very serious questions to Congregationalists, to the brief answer of which this article will eventually come. But, first, a review of the most salient features of the question-raising books.

I must interject at this point an apologetic remark. I see, as I have reviewed the article, that it is largely written in the first person. It has thus unconsciously assumed the character of a personal confession. I let it stand so. Perhaps I may thus avoid the suspicion that I am attempting to speak for anybody besides myself.

First, then, to the books. Professor Gilbert's has been so long before the public that a brief review of it with reference to a single feature, will be all that need be intro-

¹The Revelation of Jesus: a Study of the Primary Sources of Christianity. By George Holley Gilbert, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature and Interpretation in Chicago Theological Seminary. New York, 1899.

A Critical History of the Evolution of Trinitarianism and its Outcome in the New Christology. By Levi Leonard Paine, Waldo Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Bangor Theological Seminary. Boston, 1900.

duced here. He proposes an entirely objective investigation of the individual teaching of our Lord. He is aware that his results will seem strange to his readers, and he deprecates at the outset all comparison with "traditional beliefs." "A theological test for a historical work is no test at all" (p. viii). The ring of loyalty to Christ is heard in the next following sentence, when he says: "We can get forward in Christian thought only as we become better grounded in the thought of Jesus"; but there is the implication that *as yet* the church knows very little of the true thought of its Master. The damaging effect of such an intimation to the worth of the church, and through that to the teaching efficiency and worth of the Master himself, does not seem to have occurred to our author.

The literary competence of Professor Gilbert is beyond question. He displays intimate familiarity with the leading writers in every department of his subject. The emphasis laid on the historical setting of the teachings of Christ becomes apparent as soon as the book is opened (p. 6 ff.). But an historical fallacy is immediately committed which runs through the whole, the fallacy of neglecting the peculiar elements of *this* history, which either is or is not fundamentally like all other history. It professes on its face to be unlike, for it is introduced by miracle, and teems with the supernatural, and presents an altogether unique personality to our view. But Professor Gilbert, while he does not deny this, makes no affirmation of it, and from the beginning leans very decidedly to the silent assumption that Jesus was a man like all others. Jesus' teaching comes out of his "experience" (p. 14 ff.). At twelve he possessed "a knowledge of the *heart* of revelation," but this was "a boy's knowledge, not a man's," "the knowledge of a boy whose heart was pure, and who walked continually in the clear light of God." When he begins the more specific treatment of Christ's person (p. 167), he

makes this assumption plainer. Jesus "claims and manifests a truly human consciousness." It might be thought that Professor Gilbert, like the "kenotics," was maintaining here merely that Christ entered fully into the lot of man, even by some divine renunciation of attributes or acts (pp. 169, 171, etc.). But ultimately it is plain that this is not his meaning. He is considering Jesus "historically," and the historical eye sees only what the historical observers, the Jews, saw,—a man. Jesus has "the consciousness of *perfect moral union* with the Father" (p. 174), but never is there indication of the consciousness of any other union. "The Synoptic Gospels . . . date the Messianic consciousness of Jesus from the hour of his baptism" (p. 175 ff.). And he finally says, this time commenting on John, that the union of Jesus with the Father "is a union of character, that it is ethical *and not metaphysical*" (p. 199); and that "there is nowhere [in John] a suggestion that the Father is with him, or that he abides in the Father, because he is of the same nature or substance as the Father" (p. 201).

It is a mystery why men should maintain on *historical* grounds, that is, as objective interpreters of the gospel story, that the Messianic consciousness of Jesus began at his baptism. The impression of Matthew is not in favor of it, for the voice from the heavens says¹: "*This* is my beloved Son" (the parallels reading "Thou art"). The like instance in the same Gospel, viz., that of the heavenly voice heard at the transfiguration (xvii. 5), has the same form, "*This is,*" and adds at the end, "Hear *ye* him," which makes it plain enough that the voice was *for the disciples' sake*. Why not at the baptism? Then it would agree with John i. 33, which declares that the descent of

¹ Professor Gilbert lapses from his usual minute accuracy when he quotes the voice as "*Thou art,*" and then cites Matthew iii. 17 with the two other passages, as if it read the same as they (p. 179).

the dove was a sign for *John the Baptist*. I do not, for my part, call it an objective historical rendering of the Gospel narrative thus to neglect the parallel cases and stake everything on a "Thou." But Professor Gilbert does not quite do this. He has also an argument in favor of his interpretation. He says: "His temptation is intelligible only on the view that Jesus believed himself to be the Messiah, and in the wilderness was contemplating the Messianic work. In other words, the Messianic temptation implies that the heavenly announcement 'Thou art my beloved Son' was for Jesus a virtual announcement of Messiahship" (p. 180), the "creative awakening of a new consciousness" (p. 192, substantially). The first of these two sentences is correct; but the second has no argumentative value whatever, unless there be added to it in thought the words "Since he could gain a conception of it in no other way." But what authority has Professor Gilbert for silently assuming this, except the grand fundamental assumption that Jesus was nothing but a man? Could he not have brought the consciousness of Messiahship out of heaven, from which he came?

Professor Gilbert would reply, No! for he does not believe that Jesus came from heaven. The discussion may be here transferred at once, without time-consuming preliminaries, to the Fourth Gospel (p. 193 ff). After remarking that Jesus' union with the Father was unique, and laying just and proper emphasis on the perfection of his *moral* union, Professor Gilbert advances to the assertion, as above quoted, that it was nothing else. Some of his arguments, taken in a restricted application, are good. But what shall be said of this? "Jesus . . . prays that his apostles may be one as he and the Father are one. . . . The union of the disciples which Jesus brought about was purely *ethical* and *religious*. . . . It is impossible, therefore, from the standpoint of Jesus to predicate of his union with the Father

anything which cannot be predicated of the *ideal* union of his disciples " (pp. 200, 201). Has our author never heard of the argument from the greater to the less? Cannot Jesus have meant, As we are in perfect union, first by the internal relations of the divine nature (John i. 1), and then by the consequent perfect correspondence of character (John xiv. 9) and by perfect *moral* union (John x. 30), so they, in their lesser sphere, and in accordance with their powers, are to be in perfect union with the Father and the Son? Of course, Professor Gilbert would urge that we are obliged to bring in matters foreign to this context as shown even by the verses we have ourselves cited. But are they foreign? That is the nub of the question, and to it we shall soon recur.

Similar methods are employed to evacuate the testimony of the Fourth Gospel to every supernatural element of the nature of Christ. He cannot have been literally "sent into the world" because he once said to the disciples "As the Father hath sent me, so send I you." Dr. Gilbert argues: "It is plain that when Jesus speaks of sending his disciples into the world, he does not refer to their coming from some other world into this world. The sending is from his presence, and the world is the field of other labors. *Therefore*, when Jesus speaks of being sent from the Father we are not to suppose that he has in mind a change of worlds, or a change in the form of his existence; but simply the change from the quiet life of a private citizen in Nazareth to the public Messianic career of preaching and establishing the kingdom of heaven." But, again, can he not reason from the greater sending to the less? and *did* he not come from another world himself?

There are a number of other discussions to the same purport which I omit, to come to the most strenuous one, to which the most space as well as the most strength is devoted, the attempt to evacuate John xvii. 5 ("Glorify

- thou me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was") of its plain assertion of preëxistence. The argument rests on the following positions: first, that the words *glory* and *glorify* have one and the same meaning in this and related passages; second, that the glory is a reward for present work; third, that it is the glory of doing the Messianic work and being recognized as the Messiah; fourth, that *therefore*, since the glory for which Jesus prays is of such a nature that it must be future, "he cannot have possessed this with the Father before the foundation of the world, except as it was his in the purpose and decree of God" (p. 221). As to which, in brief we say, For the first there is no evidence; against the second is the fact that he distinctly prays for a glory which he had before that work was done, that is before the world was; against the third is the same consideration, and for it nothing; and as to the fourth it is a complete inversion of the true argument, which is, that, since Christ had this glory before the world, it could not be a future reward for his work.

I delay less on the fine distinctions of Professor Gilbert in reference to this last matter, and omit all the rest he has to say, because the true reply is a deeper one. He has based his whole discussion on a fundamental historical fallacy, the fallacy of treating the words of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel as if they were a verbatim report, and might be discussed apart from the ideas of John himself (cf. the remark, p. 210, on the "evangelist's doctrine of the Logos"). This is the fallacy of *false sources*, and is as bad as that of "ambiguous middle" in logic. Nothing is plainer than that the style of the Gospel is one, and that the reports of Jesus' words have derived decided color from the individuality of their reporter. Therefore, his understanding of Jesus' words and those words themselves are for us *one and the same thing*, and to neglect his understanding and try

to force upon Jesus' words another, and an inconsistent, meaning, is to create another Jesus than the one given us, who is therefore simply the product of our own imagination. And this is just what Professor Gilbert has done.

No one can have any doubt of the picture of Jesus which the Fourth Gospel intends to give us. The Word (i. 1), who was the conscious agent of creation (i. 3, 11) and was God, became flesh (i. 14), and this Word, who always speaks in the first person and is the "I" of Jesus, manifested his glory, which was the glory, not of the reward of the Messiah, but of "the only begotten of the Father." This is the one "who *is* in the bosom of the Father" (i. 18), and "came down from heaven," and was "sent" into the world, and out of the divine memories of his true and conscious preëxistence told what he had "seen" and "heard." When critics say the prologue (i. 1-18) is by another hand than the text of the Gospel, they may consistently, though with little real justification, reject its influence upon the interpretation of the remainder of the Gospel. We do not understand Professor Gilbert to indorse this division. But when it stands as a part of the Gospel, it effectually explodes all the distinctive positions of our author which we have above sketched.

Applying, therefore, no dogmatic tests, but only purely historical ones, we judge that our author has repeatedly committed grave blunders of historical method in his book, and that the results which we have above discussed are historically worthless. And, having made this statement, we shall feel at liberty later to say something about them in their dogmatic aspects.

We may then pass on to the second of the two books to be reviewed. But let us say, in passing,¹ that much of

¹ I have been accused in respect to a similar review once written by me of "patronizing" my opponent when attempting to be just to him and to express my sincere appreciation of certain of his marked excellencies.

Professor Gilbert's work is admirable. He has displayed conscientious and careful accuracy throughout. He has nobly emphasized the ethical element of the Gospel. And no one who has, as I have, the privilege of his personal acquaintance, can hesitate to recognize his simple-hearted and earnest love of the truth. But I cannot deem him to have found it, in those matters reviewed, and in a number of others intimately connected with them.

Professor Paine has also undertaken "an unbiased historical and critical study" (p. vi) of his theme, the evolution of trinitarianism. He follows the course of history from the Gospels themselves down through all the great writers to Athanasius, and then through Augustine down to the New England of the Unitarian controversy, and even of to-day. At the close he proceeds to draw out the historical verdict, and to write the program of the theological future. Throughout he is perfectly clear, incisive, epigrammatic, and alert. There is, fortunately, not the least ambiguity about his style, nor the least reserve in announcing his conclusions. We may know exactly what he means, and judge it on its merits by its rendered reasons. He also spares no antagonist,—and, unfortunately, nearly every living author, and most of the dead, must be reckoned in this category. He will therefore be prepared for equally frank and clear criticism.

The first chapter deals with the Greek trinitarianism of Athanasius, and finds the first stages of its development in the Bible (p. 4). There is no trinity in the Old Testament. Neither is there any in the teaching of Jesus, who "was a Jew, trained by Jewish parents in the Old Testa-

Professor Gilbert will not believe that the only justice he can accept as sincerely meant is complete agreement with himself, nor can I reasonably be suspected of "patronizing" one who holds a position in the denomination and the church at large so much higher than my own. My genuine appreciation of some things and my wonder and dismay at others have gone hand in hand.

ment scriptures," and whose "teaching was Jewish to the core." "In all Christ's declarations concerning himself, as given in the Synoptic gospels . . . there is no hint anywhere of a pre-incarnate life, or of a supernatural birth, or of a divine incarnation. . . . There is no evidence that the idea of a peculiar metaphysical union with God ever entered his mind" (p. 5).

It will be noted that the Fourth Gospel is here left entirely out of the account; and this is because it "is *undoubtedly* a writing of about the middle of the second century, and the author is entirely unknown" (p. 6). Dr. Paine means by "undoubtedly" only that this is *his* opinion, for even Harnack, who is the great leader of the school of historic criticism to which the professor belongs, has said that the limits of 80 A.D. on the one hand and 110 on the other within which the Gospel must have been composed, and its authorship by an "elder" John who wrote in close dependence on the Apostle John, are "certain historical facts."¹ For Godet, Westcott, and Sanday, who maintain the Johannine authorship, Professor Paine would have but scant respect. Dr. Ezra Abbot may be respected, but he had not "the historical and critical spirit" (p. 356). In spite of them all, Professor Paine comes to a decided opinion that John is neither early nor from John. With this firm conviction of the late origin of the Fourth Gospel and its consequent utter lack of historical value as a source of knowledge of Jesus' teaching, he must, of course, waive it aside.

But how did he get this firm conviction? He leaves us no opportunity for doubt, for he has devoted a special section of his appendix to the "Johannine problem." He has no faith in the testimony of the historical authorities for the authorship of the Gospel by John. In fact, we know next to nothing about John. He was probably slain

¹ *Altchristliche Literatur*, pp. 677, 680, 719.

at a very early date. The subsequent growth of legend about him is not remarkable. "Christianity had its very birth in the air of marvel and miracle" (p. 322); but historical criticism has now remanded the whole fabric, the residence of John at Ephesus, and the story of the raising of the dead man, as well as the perpetual sleep of John in the grave and the bubbling of the dust above him (pp. 322-325) to the realm of fable. Of course, "legend crept into the New Testament narrative," but this is "no more surprising than that it should have filled the opening pages of Livy, or disfigured the gossiping biographies of Suetonius" (p. 326). The task of the critic is to eliminate this element.

We pause to say that here is the same fallacy as was committed by Professor Gilbert, the fallacy of neglecting the peculiar elements of *this* history, or of beginning with the assumption that it is fundamentally the same as all other history. Professor Paine is helped in this view by a curious logical fallacy which he is always committing, the fallacy of merely verbal reasoning. A miracle is a miracle to him, and all miracles are under the same condemnation without reference to their place in the history and their significance for mankind. Miraculous healing by a hair from the tail of Peter the Hermit's ass would be as credible as that by handkerchiefs from the person of the Apostle Paul (Acts xix. 12). There is no miraculous age because no reason at any time for miracle. This is to blur distinctions, and thus to deal with words and not ideas.

But the negative results of "historical criticism" go further. Poor Irenæus comes in for a large share. His text is so corrupt as to be of no real value. We do not know what he actually wrote, and if we did, we should be no better off; for he is a puerile reasoner, defending the four Gospels on the ground that there couldn't be less than

four, as "there are four zones of the earth," etc. (I interject the remark that it seems at least reasonable to suppose, as has often been done, that Irenæus is attempting to reason out an explanation of a fact which primarily rested on totally different ground, on the unbroken and uniform tradition of the church, and that he thus possesses much more importance as a *witness* than as a reasoner.) Then, he was too old, and too liable to failure of memory, to be able to give any valuable testimony as to the distant past,—and, if he had not been, he had at best only a contact at the fourth remove instead of the third, as commonly said, with the Apostle, and thus really knew nothing about him. In short, there is no external historical evidence of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel by John.

We are therefore thrown back on the internal evidence, and this is from the start against the Johannine authorship. In the Synoptic Gospels, the historical sources of knowledge of Jesus [when purged of the legendary element by "historical criticism"], "there is no hint of a superhuman preëxistence, or of a *Logos* doctrine. But the Fourth Gospel [and note, now, how entirely and delightfully *this* historian disagrees from, and in fact contradicts, Professor Gilbert] at once goes back of Christ's human birth into the eternity of his divine existence, and out of God himself by a divine incarnation makes Christ proceed; and this divine nature of Christ, as the eternal *Logos* of God, is *the keynote of the whole gospel*" (p. 342). This "radically different Christology" indicates "a long process of evolution," and agrees so fully with Justin Martyr as to indicate "a common chronological stage of evolution" (p. 343).

Then, again, while the Synoptics make repentance the entrance upon the kingdom, in this Gospel we find acceptance of the "dogma of Christ's complete divinity" the *sole* condition of Christian discipleship (p. 343). "The whole point of view is changed." "True religion in the case

of the woman in Luke consisted in works of grateful love; in the case of the restored blind man in John, it consisted in reciting after Christ an article of metaphysical belief" (p. 344). We must pause here to note the fallacy of exaggerated antithesis here committed. The Synoptics have their element of faith in Jesus from the beginning (Matt. viii. 26; ix. 2), and believing *in* Jesus is synonymous with obeying him (John iii. 36); and this was, in the case of the man at Bethesda, to "sin no more" (John v. 14). Professor Paine commits this fallacy repeatedly in the book, for nothing suits him so well as an epigram or an antithesis; and he thus argues again and again about only words, words,—to the confounding of all real reasoning about the things for which they stand. It is perfectly easy to make two writers disagree if you begin by pressing any variation of expression to extremes on either hand which neither would acknowledge, and then declare a contradiction between them. But the only one responsible for the contradiction is the critical manipulator himself.

Still again, the philosophy of the Fourth Gospel is a new one, being essentially tinged with gnosticism! We leave this astonishing statement without comment.

Fourthly, the Synoptic Gospels are plain, their kingdom "essentially of this world" (p. 346), while the Fourth is mystic and transcendental, and lays its emphasis on the heavenly world. "Christ is essentially a heavenly person" [Dr. Gilbert made him essentially a man], "the whole atmosphere of the gospel is unearthly and supernatural," the miracles partaking of this character. "His conversations are all keyed to the same superearthly and heavenly strain." Dr. Paine thus agrees with ordinary Christians in perceiving those characteristics of the Gospel which have made it unspeakably precious and have given it the designation "the heart of Christ"; only, he dislikes them. And he asks: "*Could* such a transcendent, mystical gospel have

been written by one of those Galilean fishermen who, as history tells, were Christ's closest disciples and from whom came to us the primitive synoptic tradition?" (p. 348).

Fifthly, the historical narratives of the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel are "irreconcilable" (p. 348). But Dr. Gardiner, who founded his harmony on "the order of St. John," said, "It will be found that St. Mark *fully accords with this*."¹ Dr. Robinson found no such insuperable difficulty, nor does Dr. Riddle, nor any of the harmonists. I venture to say that when all the critical works of the men who follow Dr. Paine are buried in the rubbish-heap of the centuries, such books as "Farrar's Life of Christ," which are founded on the idea of harmony in the four Gospels, and justify their foundation, will be still read with delight by the church of God. Hence, "the motive [of the gospel] is dogmatic, *not* biographical or historical" (p. 349). "A few events are referred to simply to give opportunity for transcendental and mystical discourses [that reminds one, in its setting, of Renan's designation of the same discourses as "*metaphysiques et lourdes*." I quote from memory.] whose whole strain and character is utterly unlike the familiar, practical, parabolic utterances of the synoptic gospels" (p. 350).

And, finally, Dr. Paine winds up this part of his discussion by a sentence which makes perfectly plain, if it needed anything plainer than the list of mistakes and the illustrations of intellectual blindness which I have adduced, that his criticism is utterly *a priori* and altogether worthless, having its origin in his rooted dislike of the doctrines of the Fourth Gospel. He says: "Were the external evidence for the Johannine authorship of the gospel much less weak than it is, the character of the *internal testimony* furnished by the study of the fourth gospel itself is so overwhelmingly strong against it that it would seem im-

¹ Greek Harmony, p. xxv.

possible to resist the conclusion that is forced upon the mind" (p. 353).

From this review of the discussion of the Fourth Gospel, we may now return to the first chapter of the book. Dr. Paine had begun, when we left it, to trace the development of the "dogma of the trinity." The first stratum is that found in the Synoptics and the Acts. Christ is here "a human Messiah, glorified by a divine mission" (p. 7). The second stratum is found by the legend of the miraculous birth. Attempts to defend this are "worse than vain" (p. 14). The third stratum is in the "intrusion of Greek philosophical thought into the Jewish Palestinian" (p. 17). Paul is influenced by this. He was the true originator of the doctrine of the trinity. He conceived of Christ "as having a certain metaphysical relation to God" (p. 22), and "places him next to God in nature, honor, and power; so that, while remaining a monotheist, he takes a long step towards a monotheistic trinitarianism."

"The faith of the sub-apostolic age remained essentially Pauline" (p. 24), but about the middle of the second century we come to a fourth stratum, the Logos-doctrine, which was of Greek origin, not Jewish (p. 28), and emphasized the divine element in Christ's nature. "Paul starts with the human and proceeds to the divine, the Logos-doctrine reverses the process" (p. 30), the Fourth Gospel, however, remaining Pauline in its Christology (p. 32).¹ Then comes Origen, and finally Athanasius.

The interpretation given to Athanasius deserves more than a passing reference. "The Father, with Athanasius, is the one God, the Supreme and Absolute Being. He never confounds the one God with the Trinity. The three Persons are not one Being. This, to him, is Sabel-

¹ If I followed Dr. Paine's method, I should affirm a "contradiction" between pages 29-31 and this statement, but I prefer to suppose him self-consistent.

lianism. His monotheism is clearly set forth in his 'Statement of Faith': 'We believe in one Unbegotten God, Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible, that hath his being from himself; and in one only-begotten Word, Wisdom, Son, begotten of the Father without beginning and eternally.' Unbegottenness and self-existence are here made the essential attributes of the Father alone. He is the eternal cause and fountain of all being, including even the being of the Son and Holy Spirit. This point is fundamental in the Athanasian system" (pp. 40, 41). The Logos is the real Son of God, and this involves a real generation. This is eternal. The Son is therefore a derived being. The subordination is not official but one of nature. There are consequently three persons, or three distinct beings, of the same generic nature, but *not numerically one*, and these are the trinity. A person and a being are, to Athanasius, the same thing. This he regarded as axiomatic. Professor Paine is especially certain that Athanasius did not teach the *numerical* unity of the Godhead. That he did, is an idea so "ingrained in modern theology" that special attention is given to uprooting it (p. 50 ff.). "*Homoousios*" is distinguished by Athanasius from "*tautoousios*," which means identity of nature. Then, the supposition that "singleness of essence exists with plurality of persons . . . breaks down a fundamental law of logic and psychology. . . . The Greek Fathers were never guilty of such a confusion" (p. 51).

This interpretation of Athanasius is not new, but it may be termed exploded. Were I to argue against it, I should be likely to be charged with getting out of my province, and might be involved in the condemnation which Professor Paine so liberally dispenses to the world at large. I will therefore throw the burden of reply off on Harnack, who cannot be suspected of any partisan bias in favor of

the positions which this article is about to advance, or towards "orthodoxy" of any sort. He says: "This is the key of the entire conception: Son and Father are not a duality, but a *duality in unity*, i. e., the Son has entirely the essence ["*Wesen*," the regular translation of *οὐσία*] which the Father is; he is a unity with the unity which the Father is. Athanasius does not stand for the coördination of both in distinction from a subordination view, but for the *unity and inseparability* in distinction from a view of their *difference and separateness*" (vol. ii. p. 212). "Clearest are the passages in which he ascribes the *ταυτότης* to Father and Son [just what Paine says he does *not* ascribe to them]. Identity of substance is *ταυτότης*." Then follows a series of quotations in which this word or some other form of *ὁ αὐτός* is cited *eight* times! And Harnack even expresses wonder that Athanasius has, as an exception, once done what Paine regards as his *deliberate and characteristic* act, rejected the word *μονοούσιος* for the Son (p. 213). And finally, as if to show how utterly wrong Dr. Paine is as an historian, and, in his view, right as a theologian, Harnack says: "If one asks the question whether Athanasius viewed the deity as a *numerical unity* or as a *numerical duality*, we are to answer, *as numerical unity*. The duality is only a relative one—if one may write the nonsense—: the duality of prototype and image (*Urbild und Abbild*)."
 Certainly it was not "dogmatic prejudice" that led Harnack to contradict Professor Paine's positions so flatly. But he has left our professor not an historical leg to stand on.

Having got his point of ecclesiastical view established in this interpretation of Athanasius, Dr. Paine now proceeds to follow down the course of history. He sees everywhere declension and direct progress towards the final goal of trinitarianism, which is pantheism. Augustine had a monistic philosophy, and hence sought to explain not how

the three are one, but how the one—the numerical unity being the fundamental truth—is three. Thus he deserts Athanasius, though he did not know it in his ignorance of Greek, and later theologians have also been ignorant of it [including Harnack, Thomasius, Fisher, etc.], and took the first step towards pantheism. He distinguishes “person” from “being,” and thus becomes essentially Sabellian. Such is his legacy to the church, Sabellianism rushing forward, on Niagara-like rapids, towards the abyss of pantheism! “The Augustinian Sabellianism sweeps on resistlessly, carrying in its wake Churchman and Dissenter, Calvinist and Arminian alike, and crosses the Atlantic to find a new home in New England” (p. 102). Edwards had little to say on the trinity. Hopkins, in spite of his holding “eternal generation,” was more Augustinian than Athanasian. His “greater disciple,” Emmons, was an “essential Sabellian.” Then the degeneration of New England trinitarianism began. Stuart substituted the vague word “distinction” for “person”; taught numerical unity; and was so unfortunate as to employ the word “mode,” which at once proves him to Professor Paine to be a “modalist,” and hence a Sabellian, for are not the Sabellians modalists?—I am afraid I shall be thought to be caricaturing my author; but I am not. I would be understood to say deliberately that he commits this logical fallacy, which is, of course, that of “ambiguous middle,” over and over again,—I had nearly said, every time he employs the word Sabellian. He deals with words, and with the superficial aspects of things, and neglects ideas. Such a reasoner cannot keep himself free of the most glaring violations of the laws of thought. They are laws of thought and not rules for performing verbal tricks!¹—H. B. Smith

¹ Page 112 ff. I note, in partial confirmation of my assertion about the frequency with which this fallacy is committed, the following pages on which gross examples are to be found: 75, 76, 101, 103, 106, 108, 113, 116, 323.

and Shedd go the same path and end in "modalistic, pantheistic Sabellianism" (p. 116). Joseph Cook is still worse. And, finally, here are Phillips Brooks and George A. Gordon, who teach the "consubstantiality" of the human and the divine, and are thus already essentially at the goal, black pantheism! Thither we are all going, and when finally we have reached there, we must reconstruct our theology from the foundations, or there will be no more religion for us.

Professor Paine has his scheme of reconstruction.

And, first, we have to wait a little, for the destructive process is not yet complete. Men like President Hyde, who calls for reconstruction at once, are premature. But when it comes, it will meet three demands: first, the historical, which is for the abandonment of all dogmatic conceptions of the Bible, as to which, and especially the New Testament, the work of destruction is "but half done," although miracle and the Fourth Gospel are already torn away; secondly, the religious,—and religion is an ethical relation to God and Christ and quite independent of all dogmatic ideas; thirdly, the intellectual, by the adoption of a purely inductive method. Some things about it, therefore, are clear. "The new theology is bound to be monotheistic. Dogmatic trinitarianism is either polytheistic or pantheistic in its very nature, and must be classed philosophically in one or the other of these positions, however hard theologians may struggle against it" (p. 277). "With the old theology of the trinity goes also the old christology, both resting on the same speculative foundations. The inductive historical method brings Christ back to us as a true member of the human race, and turns christology into a branch of anthropology. But while he is thus historically a true man, under human conditions, his moral eminence is not thereby at all endangered, nor his unique place among the media of divine revelation lost.

[By the way, that phrase "media of divine revelation" shows that Professor Paine has himself not quite caught up with the march of a "scientific" theology, for, according to that, all revelation is such only by the soul's *immediate* contact with God in its own self-mediated religious discoveries.] Why may not a man have appeared, *in advance of his age and surroundings*, so exceptional in moral development and consciousness as to become and remain a guide and example to his fellow-men in all religious faith and conduct? Such is a true inductive christology" (pp. 281, 282).—*That* an inductive Christology! *That* from an evolutionist! A man *developed* "in advance of his age and surroundings"! "Why not?" asks Professor Paine. Because he *cannot* be in advance of his surroundings, since it is the "surroundings" [environment] that *make* the man. Professor Paine has still too much of the old theology with its "miraculism" clinging to him. When he gets free from it he will recognize that little can be said of Christ and nothing as to the superiority of his *nature*, which cannot be said of Socrates, and will feel no need to call himself a Christian.

I need not dwell on the remaining features of Dr. Paine's scheme. He discusses the atonement only completely to deny the whole thing, as, of course, he must. I have said enough now to get his book fairly before my readers. I have also expressed sufficiently my conception of its worth. I wish to speak respectfully of Dr. Paine, who is so much my senior, but I must speak plainly. I do not charge him with intentional misrepresentation, with conscious sophistry, or with lack of learning; but I must be permitted to say that a greater collection of historical misinterpretations, of logical fallacies, and of philosophical blunders, it was never my ill fortune to be obliged to read,—and I have read Semler and Paulus. Its very epigrammatic brilliancy is its vice. It is a *witty* book,—and wit plays

with *words*; but as to *thought*, it is saturated with fallacy. This I have abundantly and sufficiently indicated.

I close this review of Professor Paine's book by a liberal consecutive quotation, that he may be permitted to state his conclusion in his own way, without the disturbing intrusion of any criticism however just.

"Although the old orthodoxy has long been trembling to its fall, there still remains deeply imbedded in the historical background of our age a body of traditional presuppositions and prepossessions and assumptions that stand squarely in the way of any radical reconstruction; and until this body of misconceptions is utterly removed, it is vain to talk of a new theological movement that will be of any lasting value. The vital trouble with the foundation and framework of orthodoxy is that there is mixed all through it, as a sort of cement, a mass of presuppositions which are opposed to all the critical results of science and of history and to the affirmations of man's moral consciousness. Such for example are the assumptions concerning the supernatural world and its relations to this world;—concerning miracles as suspensions, if not violations, of the ordinary laws of nature;—concerning a supernatural or miraculous revelation of God to man through specially inspired men;—concerning the Bible as a book of divine authorship and hence perfect and infallible in its religious teachings and even in its history and science;—concerning the historicity of the traditional dates and authors of the books of Scripture;—concerning the metaphysical being and character of God, and concerning the account in Genesis of the origin and fall of man. These are a few of the most striking presuppositions of orthodoxy, and it can be seen at a glance that they are utterly inconsistent with all the discoveries of science and all the latest results of historical scholarship. But it will be asked: Are they not already discarded by all intelligent evangelical Christians? By no means. Take any latest theological book, even of the most liberal evangelical sort, and one will find one or more at least of these traditional presuppositions, half concealed, perhaps, but still assumed throughout. There is but one way of eliminating such assumptions, viz., by a radically new method of procedure.

"The first question, then, in considering how a new theology shall be formed is one of *method*. Propædæutics or methodology is the first necessary stage in a new theological movement. Methodology has to do with *the way* in which matters of religious truth are approached and examined. The materials of theology are not here in question. As I have already suggested, much material of the old theology will enter into the new. Let me not be misunderstood on this point. It is not the *material* of the old theology, but the *way* in which that material is handled, the method of systemization employed, and the unscientific and unhistorical

mixture of true and false materials, that render it useless for the new theological builder. What has continued the old theology so long in existence is the fact that it has preserved and defended so many of the vital truths of religion. Such are the truths of man's free moral nature and responsibility, of sin and sinfulness and its moral effects, of man's capacity for repentance and a new spiritual life, of the religious sense of God and of his moral supremacy, of man's instinctive hope of immortality, of conscience that commands to duty and stirs the conviction of moral reward and punishment, and of the revelations of God's goodness and love in nature and providence, and especially in the gospel of Christ. But while such truths have been held, theological presuppositions and assumptions have been put behind them that have entirely changed their character in a theological system, so that they have become repugnant to the moral consciousness and reason, as well as inconsistent with sound historical and philosophical criteria. It is not these great and essential religious truths themselves, but the way in which they have been shaped and distorted in a system, and mixed with all sorts of errors, mythological, legendary, Jewish, pagan, that makes the old orthodoxy, as a system of truth, a thing to be rejected and cast away" (pp. 249-251).

The "assumptions" of the first paragraph show what Professor Paine would reject; the "vital truths" of the second what he has left.

To this point I have said nothing about the relations of these books to the theological standards. I have complied with Professor Gilbert's demand, and have tested them historically and logically. I have condemned them, and that with the more uncompromising vigor, *because* I was speaking historically and not dogmatically. But now I propose to ask the question, Do these books conform to our standards, and are they within the limits of our theological freedom? And then I propose to discuss, since the question may not be regarded as settled among us, whether there are, or should be, any limits of theological freedom for professors and ministers for all of us, and what such limits are. I say nothing about seminary creeds, or the relations of professors to such creeds. The question is a general, denominational one; and that is the same as to say that it is to be settled on the basis of general considerations and universal reason.

The preliminary question as to these books may be dismissed very speedily. Neither of them agrees at all on the most vital points with any creedal statement which Congregationalists have put forth themselves, or indorsed when put forth by others. Professor Paine's "new theology," to the support of which the whole course of his book tends, is bald naturalism. There is in it no divine Redeemer, no supernatural rescue of lost men—the heart of evangelical theology. As to the person of Christ and his atoning work, Professor Gilbert is equally divergent from all our standards. He may hold, as he is reported to have said he does, a metaphysical doctrine of the trinity; but he affirms that Christ taught nothing as to his own preëxistence. If Christ did not teach it, he did not know anything about it; and if *he* did not know anything about it, no one did, and it is not true. That process of thought is conclusive. I have so much confidence in Professor Gilbert that I doubt not he has followed it, and so has not said what has been imputed to him about the "metaphysical" trinity. There is no metaphysical trinity. Either it is a biblical trinity, or it is nothing!

Two of our theological professors have thus abandoned our evangelical theology. Do the limits of academical freedom extend far enough to include them still?

Now, on the one hand, we are, and ought to be, jealous for a true liberty of thought in the professorial chair. We wish to learn, and we can learn only by an unhampered investigation, not committed to any foregone result. Congregationalists are therefore determined to raise no petty issues. They are willing that their professors should fall into errors, if these are not vital, and will never tolerate the disposition to nag at men for minute variations from generally accepted views. They seem inclined in these days to give considerable play to such deviations. They seem ready to put up with the teaching of views which

they really regard as pernicious, willing to push liberty to a large extension, rather than to appear to extinguish it.

But the church has a practical aim. She is in the world to save men by the preaching of the cross. She has fundamental conceptions as to the ruin of men and the divine method of salvation. She cannot perform her mission unless she hold fast to these conceptions, and hence she must demand that they be held by her ministers and taught in her seminaries. The proposers of new views will, of course, question this position. They will say that the new views are capable of eliciting greater zeal and interest, and of promoting larger and higher work. Theorists always make such claims and always must, for it is the very reason why new theories are propounded that they are believed to be truer and better. But the church has a practical aim, and partakes therefore of the character of every practical institution. She knows that her great doctrines have saving power, for they have proved to be the very hiding-place of God's presence. And she cannot venture to abandon them for views subversive of them, because such views would probably subvert also the work of saving men.

Nor is this merely the resistance to change characteristic of all practical conservatism. There are substantial reasons for doubting the new theories. They are not really new, and their history is against them. They have new forms; but their essence, the denial of the supernatural element in Christianity, is as old as the outbreak of Rationalism in Germany in the middle of the eighteenth century, or of English Deism in the latter half of the seventeenth, or of Socinianism in the sixteenth. None of these forms of theology, different as they seemed to be in their expressions, and different in their origin, methods, tone, and formulation, but identical as they were at bottom, manifested any power of aggressive evangelical activity, or even of survival as phases of Christian life. Where are they to-day?

And with what feelings are they regarded by the living, throbbing heart of an eager advancing church? No new theologian is willing, for an instant, to accept their characteristic names as his own designation. Nor has New England Unitarianism succeeded in commending itself any better to modern evangelicals. Whatever their essential agreement with the denials or affirmations of those bodies may be, the radical element in our denomination are careful to disclaim explicitly either Unitarianism or Universalism.

The present tendencies displayed by the new liberalism are almost equally against it in the eyes of thoughtful lovers of the historical gospel of Christ. It is said that the emphasis is changing in our day, so that "the salvation of the world as a whole" is giving place to the salvation of individuals as the ideal of Christian activity, and that this is a return to the doctrine which Jesus presented in his preaching of the "kingdom." If that is all that is happening, the lovers of evangelical truth need only rejoice. The activities of the church need to be made as inclusive as possible,—and, strange though it may sound to some ears, there is nothing in the professed features of the new movement in the way of essential aim or even method (except possibly the building of a gymnasium under the same roof as the church!) that is particularly new. Some of the most successful "institutional" churches are thoroughly conservative. But there seems to be more of real divergence from evangelical ideals in the social methods of our day, when managed by the liberals, than is consistent with the explanation of a mere change in emphasis. The prevalent hostility to revivals among them is a sign of bad omen. Do they disbelieve in conversion? Are they opposing not merely shallow and hysterical evangelism, as would their conservative brethren also, but all evangelism, and all solemn putting of the question to the individ-

ual soul, Do *you* love Jesus Christ? Are they forgetting the individual in seeking to save the mass? And is the solemnity of individual sin and of individual condemnation by a holy God being lost sight of when men are addressed as masses, and when the methods of the pulpit are exchanged for those of the platform, and those of the church for those of places of entertainment, in the hope of gaining them? Current methods sometimes raise these questions irresistibly. Those who still believe in the old gospel are led to distrust the new by these and like things, and they feel the importance of maintaining the controlling elements of the old ideals in the midst of all the changes of the present, that they may preserve the old power, and the old work. Let the doctrines of the New Testament go, take away the divine Redeemer, the infinite atonement of the propitiatory sacrifice, and, they fear, the saving activities of the church will also be found to have gone. The limits of liberty must be drawn inside of the area of chilling, destructive negations of vital truth.

Professor Paine suggests, and many are now favoring, another basis of church fellowship than the dogmatic. The basis of the suggestion is well expressed when Professor Paine says that "the vital question of religion is not what a man believes, how much or how little, but what the disposition of his heart and will is toward those objects of faith that lie within the range of his own moral consciousness" (p. 204). With that sentence I entirely agree. The fundamental element of the Christian experience is the supreme choice of apprehended duty as the law of life. But when Professor Paine, though declaring that "clear apprehensions of truth are of great religious value" (p. 205), goes on to say that it "is not essential that ministers should have any definite philosophy [of Christian truths] at all," and that "the chances are that a young minister's philosophy would be a very poor one, and a poor one is worse

than none at all," he departs far from truth and reason. In the name of our youth, I protest against this belittling of their power of thought. They *are* competent to arrive at a Christian philosophy, as witness thousands that have. I do not believe that the prime of manhood has any advantage over the mature youth in matters of thought, except in the greater power to *weigh premises*, in that, namely, which experience of life can give. In abstract thought, and in many matters of theology, that advantage is slight. I do not know anything more mischievous in the tendencies of the present day than this cheap belittling of that period of life which has, in fact, produced many of our greatest works of invention and thought, and carried forward most of our greatest practical enterprises. Professor Paine must have had a strange experience with young men in his years of teaching to be able to say what he has.

But, this lesser point aside, Professor Paine would evidently favor an expression which I recently heard, that if a candidate seemed to have the *spirit* of Christ, he should be ordained, even though he denied, or failed to apprehend, so important doctrines as the divinity of Christ. Professor Paine, of course, goes much further than this. But it will always be a question how the possession of the spirit of Christ is to be determined. It is easy to profess the spirit of Christ. It is easy also to display that native amiability and geniality (if one is so fortunate as to possess it) which many a pagan Greek and Roman had, and which in some of its manifestations is strikingly like the gentleness that comes from deep sympathy with Jesus. But docility towards the truth of Christ is a part of his spirit; and no better proof can be given of *some* participation in that spirit than acceptance of the truth. Now, if our churches do not know what the truth of Christ is, they may be careful about applying such a test; but they are

not so ignorant, or so fearful of being in error, as to succumb to this paralysis of action. They believe in the truth enough to commend it to the heathen as their one salvation. They believe in it enough to embody it in their church creeds. And they believe in it enough to say that, if any candidate for the ministry does not know whether Christ preëxisted or not, he is not fit for the holy service. They ought to say this in every case unmistakably.

It may be objected that all such limits are peculiar to theology, and that thought ought to be as free there as anywhere. But the objection rests upon error. The setting of limits to beliefs is not peculiar to theology. It prevails in physics, chemistry, politics, sociology. A chemist who should deny the atomic theory and the law of definite proportions and begin to teach the theory of phlogiston, would find that he had transgressed "limits" indeed! What physicist could maintain his place who should deny the undulatory theory of light, and the impenetrability of matter? And what show would a physician have in a medical association who should go over to "Christian science"? There is an "orthodoxy" in every practical pursuit, and must be. It is not only not peculiar to theology, but it is managed there with a degree of leniency and consideration unknown in the sterner circles of physical science. A Christian church has the same right to its principles, to the maintenance of order and quiet in the performance of its work, and to the safeguarding of its future, that a body of physicians or a college of science has. It need ask for nothing more. It certainly can ask for nothing less.

Another objection, quite commonly insisted on, is that if *any* limits whatever are drawn, men who may be put thereby in jeopardy of their positions will either refuse to prosecute investigations or conceal their results when

gained, thus becoming either cowardly fossils or liars. I do not know that the objection is ordinarily put so bluntly, but that is its meaning! No doubt this would be the result in certain cases, for human nature is weak. Every good thing has its bad side. If any safeguards are put up, some evasion of them will be practiced. But it may be emphatically denied that there is any *special* danger in this direction. I think I know theological professors pretty well, and I think they generally have the courage of their opinions. Instead of being less courageous than other ministers or than laymen, they are probably more so, because of the abstract nature of their pursuits, and their exemption from the daily necessity of measuring their words. They will investigate, because this is their official duty; and they will fearlessly declare their results, because they believe them, and hope to commend them to others. And they will be willing to abide by the result.

For,—and this leads to the next objection,—brave and good men do not expect to carry precious truth without strenuous effort, and they are willing to pay the price for conferring what they believe to be benefits on mankind. The objection is that it is not right to make men suffer in purse or reputation for their honest convictions. True, it is not right to make men suffer when we *know* they are correct; but it is duty to resist evil and error, and until a man can convince his fellow-workers that his new proposal is truth instead of error, he must be content that it should be treated as error. If he is not content, he does not love the truth himself! If he cannot understand why men oppose what seems to them false teaching, he does not understand their love of what they hold to be vital and saving truth; and if he does not understand this, it is because he does not sympathize with it, or share it. Any man who, by his loyalty to what he himself believes to be the gospel, has the first and most

elementary qualification for the professorate or the ministry, will understand what truth costs in this world, and will be willing, yes, *glad* (Acts v. 41), to suffer, if necessary, to introduce it to the church. We shall have, no doubt, fewer rash and immature innovators and fewer theological sensationalists, but we shall have no fewer contributors to sound learning and genuine progress.

A more serious objection to this line of thought is that it is an invitation to schism; and it might lead to a repetition of the "mistake" of our fathers in the Unitarian controversy (1815 and following years), when the orthodox churches renounced fellowship with the Unitarian, and divided the denomination. I grant that the course suggested might lead to a schism, provided our churches are so far advanced on the path of a destructive theological criticism that any considerable number would prefer to leave us rather than maintain the reality of the supernatural, the trinity, the incarnation of the Son, the atonement, and regeneration by the Holy Spirit,—for these are the doctrines proposed for our rejection by the books before us. I do not believe that we should lose any churches on such an issue. But if we did, the question might fairly be put, whether they were not already lost to any constructive work with us for the kingdom of Christ. It is no "mistake" when churches which really *have* no fellowship, announce this fact and proceed to recognize it in their public ecclesiastical acts. A denomination may be really divided, while it pretends to be united. Orthodoxy gained a powerful impulse in Massachusetts when Amherst College, and Andover Seminary, and the new orthodox churches of Boston, and the American Board were founded. Had the orthodox remained in professed fellowship with Unitarians, it is very much to be doubted whether there would have been religious zeal sufficient to found, or maintain when founded, these famous and useful institu-

tions. And it may also be doubted whether there would to-day be any Congregationalism at all in America, had not the First Churches in Cambridge and many another Massachusetts town abandoned meeting-house and funds, and "gone out" for Christ's sake to begin again the work of church-building at the bottom.

And yet a schism is a great evil. Congregationalism in England and America suffers to-day untold evils because it left the Church of England; and Unitarianism lost unspeakably when it forfeited the corrective influences of the evangelical piety and doctrine of the churches which held by historical Christianity. Schism in Congregationalism to-day, if it reached very large proportions, would mean the paralysis of our missionary work at home and abroad, the serious crippling of our educational institutions, the certain decay of the excised churches,—and it would carry dismay and confusion into every other Christian communion in the country. Men would wonder if it is worth while to attempt to build anything permanent or great in church organization, if after such a lesson as Congregationalism received at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and after her unparalleled triumphs during its progress, at the beginning of the twentieth she did not possess coherency enough to maintain her ecclesiastical fellowship. The young, already widely alienated from the church, would be more alienated, and the tide of irreligion in the country would rise higher than it has. And yet, all this is preferable to slow death. Life is so precious that it is to be purchased at *any* necessary sacrifice. The evils, great as they would be, would be less than those felt if the voice of Congregationalism should be given against the atonement, against the incarnation, against the supernatural,—in a word, against salvation by Jesus Christ, the crucified but living and divine Redeemer. That would *terminate* our work, not merely cripple it. That would *close* missions,

merge Christian colleges in state institutions, become ten-fold more indifferent and irreligious than they now are, *kill* churches, discourage Christian brethren of other communions, and introduce in our own body an era of religious desolation such as the world has not yet seen. And if the doctrines of the books under review become prevalent among us, that, sooner or later, will be our history.

My plea is, then, for the more thorough and consistent application among us of reasonable theological tests. We have never ceased to apply them, nor have we been careless at any time. But we have been generous, too generous as it would now seem, for safety and the security of our work. The books before us are more than solitary phenomena. They are indicative of a real and impending danger. They indicate a rising feeling which is shared by a considerable number, that the very foundations and elementary truths of historical Christianity are questionable. They point to the increase of a party which will deny all our fundamental historical principles, and convert our gospel into a "different gospel," and plunge us into theological and practical chaos. We have undoubtedly fellowshiped some who are not "of" us. The time has come for the lines to be more rigidly drawn. I do not plead for the shibboleths of any theological school, I plead only for the central and determinative doctrines of the evangelical system. Men who deny these or are ignorant about them should be informed that their true fellowship is elsewhere. They ought to draw the distinction themselves. Professor Herron in resigning from Iowa College (for reasons, however, not of a theological nature) set a noble example which others might follow, very much to their credit. It is not creditable for a man who has in fact abandoned every distinctive element of Christianity to call himself a Christian and claim fellowship with Congregationalists who stand

firmly by the Christianity of the Gospels, which is the only Christianity that has any right to the name. He ought to be strongly enough attached to his real principles to wish to propagate them without disguise and without the constant hindrance which the system of a denomination, founded on other principles and organized to promote them, throws about him. Believing with Huxley and other such men, he should imitate their frank and honest renunciation of a church they did not believe in. But if such a man will not voluntarily take his true place, it is the right and the imperative duty of Congregationalism, as it values its own existence, to show him his place in unmistakable terms.

In a word, it is time for evangelical men among Congregationalists to vote on ordinations, installations, call of professors, etc., according to their theological convictions. I know that this is often a matter of great difficulty. Often charity and love of peace lead a man to hope that things are better than they seem. A church is often said to be so eager to have some doubtful man settled over it, that it will "produce confusion," "give the church a staggering blow," "cripple the work," or what not, if he is not installed *instantly*. But, after all, the churches want help when they call councils; and councils have duties to God and Christ and his truth. Men ought to vote according to many things, but *now* the faith of the candidate is a very important element of the matter. Those customary pleas are often very far from the mark. I have sat more than once on councils when a majority voted for the installation of an unqualified man "because the church demanded it," when I learned afterwards that the wisest and most influential men in the church did *not* wish it. I was told in this study where I write, but a day or two since, in reference to a council long ago, by a member of the church in question, that he, "had he been a member of

the council, *should have voted against installation!*" And yet he was thought to be *very earnest* for it. Such pleas are all elements of confusion. Councils should have convictions, and they should express them. That is what they are for! And thus they will save the Church.

And, now, in closing, I put and answer briefly those two questions which I said in the beginning these books presented to us:—Is Congregationalism threatened by the inroads of anti-Christian naturalism? My answer is, Yes! Can anything be done to stay its advance? Yes! Let Congregationalists on all appropriate occasions *vote according to their theological convictions!* Nothing more is needed than simply that.

ARTICLE II.

THE SOPHISTICAL ELEMENT IN CHRISTIAN
PREACHING.

BY PROFESSOR CHARLES SUMNER NASH, D.D.

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THE name "Sophist," first applied in a good sense to the Seven Sages, was especially given "to the educated men of ready speech who from about the year 450 B. C. used to travel through Greece from place to place and imparted what they knew for money." The leaders of the class were honorable and honored men. They were sincere, as even Plato concedes. They were highly educated. They were skilled instructors of youth. They rendered good service to literature and oratory. They were stylists, winning their success by skillful and effective exposition and having great influence in forming the style of their time. When they began, prose composition was hardly practiced in central Greece. They were leaders in literature and oratory when Plato wrote the "Republic," and had not lost their position and influence when Demosthenes spoke. "In fact," writes one concerning them, "it is not too much to say that it was the Sophists who provided these great masters with their consummate instrument." "It must not be forgotten," writes another, "that it was Gorgias who transplanted rhetoric to Greece, its proper soil, and who helped to diffuse the Attic dialect as the literary language of prose."

And yet, despite their educational value, the Sophists early fell into disrepute. There were false notes in their work, which, gradually becoming dominant, justified the censure still standing against them. A life devoted to

rhetoric, oratory, and dialectic is fraught with danger to both intellect and heart. The pursuit of form is fascinating; it is guilty and disastrous, when it usurps the throne which belongs to the pursuit of truth. The practice of persuasion may be as ennobling as it is captivating; but it is degrading, when, regardless of truth and righteousness, it drives at conquest and power. Into this pit the Sophists fell at the beginning of their class career. Their plight is described as follows: The sophistry of rhetoric led to that of politics. The sophistry of culture led to that of disputation. Hippias professed to teach all learning, to the end of culture. His successors "claimed to possess and to communicate not the knowledge of all branches of learning, but an aptitude for dealing with all subjects, which aptitude should make the knowledge of any subject superfluous. In other words, they cultivated skill in disputation. Now skill in disputation is plainly a valuable accomplishment. But when men set themselves to cultivate skill in disputation irrespective of the matter debated, when men regard the matter discussed, not as a serious issue, but as a thesis on which to practice their powers of controversy, they learn to pursue, not truth, but victory; and, their criterion of excellence having been thus perverted, they presently prefer ingenious fallacy to solid reasoning, and the applause of bystanders to the consciousness of honest effort. Sophistry was from the beginning a substitute for the pursuit of truth."

Men of such quality could not escape the lances of Socrates and Plato. The latter's antagonism is one of the chief features of their history. Professor Jowett summarizes it thus: "The Sophist in Plato is the master of the art of illusion; the charlatan, the foreigner, the prince of *esprits-faux*, the hireling who is not a teacher, and who, from whatever point of view he is regarded, is the opposite of the true teacher. He is the 'evil one,' the ideal repre-

sentative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and intellectual tendencies of his own age, the adversary of the almost equally ideal Socrates."

Mr. Grote, in his labored controversy, fails to show Plato's opinion to have been unjust prejudice and Plato's mighty influence the one efficient cause of the Sophists' permanent dishonor. Mr. Grote cannot successfully dispute the statement that there is more than enough in the recorded history of these men to explain the odium in which they were held. Their ill-repute, adds Professor Jowett, "was a natural consequence of their vocation. That they were foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties, that they excited the minds of youth," that the less noble were consciously insincere, that they confined their attention to form and style, that they cared little for truth and virtue; these "are quite sufficient reasons to account for the opprobrium which attached to them."

The later Sophists were lineal and degenerate descendants of those of Plato's time. Wholly devoted to form and style, they "did not think they needed even knowledge of fact to talk as they pleased about everything." Cicero's description of them as those who pursue philosophy for the sake of ostentation or of gain reveals their reputation just prior to the Christian era.

The revival of Greek eloquence in the second century after Christ brought new distinction to the Sophist class. The Greek world of that time was an educated world. Almost every town had its grammar-school. Many principal cities contained large universities, to which the graduates of the lower schools flocked in great numbers. Teaching was an honored and lucrative profession, supported in many cases by state endowments and by immunities from public burdens. Professors of literature, rhetoric, and philosophy were in universal demand and of much influence in social

life. The three main elements of the complex education were grammar or a knowledge of literature, rhetoric or the cultivation of expression, and dialectic or an acquaintance with the rules of argument coupled with a literary pursuit of philosophy. The whole system was literary, a study of the remains of a greater past, and for the sake of culture more than for the purpose of practical life.

In this soil there grew up what has been called "the new rhetoric," or literary rhetoric, or sophistic. This rhetoric became very widespread as a part of the education of a gentleman. It busied itself with the masterpieces of the ancients, absorbing their knowledge and especially copying their styles. It thus rested upon the study of literature, in which, however, it sought, not truth and wisdom for activity and virtue, but form and expression for idle culture and intellectual pastime. And the end of it all was the ability to speak impromptu in the artificial oratorical style of the day upon any subject whatever. "From the time of Vespasian," writes Dr. James Orr, "the Empire had been provided with a hierarchy of rhetoricians and grammarians, whose business it was to instruct the people in all liberal arts; and society was overrun with professional talkers, debaters, moralists, ready to supply oratory on any subject to whoever cared to pay for it. There was little in this sophistic declamation to make the world wiser and better."

Springing mainly out of rhetoric, sophistic rooted back also in philosophy. For themes suited to the courts it substituted moral and religious subjects; and for the forensic method of debate and controversy it adopted continuous discussion. Poetical readings gave way to "rhetorical ostentations." Speeches were made deriding heroes and sages, and eulogizing most contemptible themes, such as idleness, fever, gout, dust, the fly, the ass. By the second century every element of reality had disappeared. Dr. Edwin Hatch, in his Hibbert Lectures, says the utterances

of sophistic "were not exercises (*μελέται*), but discourses (*διαλέξεις*). It preached sermons. It created not only a new literature, but also a new profession. The class of men against whom Plato had inveighed had become merged in the general class of educators; the word 'sophist' remained partly as a generic name and partly as a special name for the new class of public talkers."

Very interesting notes concerning the habits of these men are scattered through the literature of the time. Some of them had fixed residences and lectured regularly; some traveled from place to place. They often collected their audiences by personal invitation. Rivals strove for supremacy in public verbal contests. They spoke in private houses as well as in all sorts of public places. They often wore a pulpit gown. They were disappointed if not interrupted by liberal applause, and would solicit approving criticisms at the close of the discourse. They acquired wealth and won high reputation. Some were among the most eminent men of their time, senators, ambassadors, governors. As a class they were conceited, avaricious, and licentious. "Effeminate in mind, extravagant in purse, they are perhaps the most contemptible of all those who have set themselves up as the instructors of mankind." Even more than in former centuries, apparently, they provoked the antagonism of true men. Of course the Christians were unsparingly hostile to them, an example of which may be seen in the "Stromata" of Clemens Alexandrinus.¹ Among other choice figures is prominent his comparison of them to "old shoes, when all the rest is worn and is falling to pieces, and the tongue alone remains." But some of the most scathing criticisms came from their fellow-heathen and even from their own number. Dion Chrysostom, one of the best of them all, likened them to "peacocks, showing off their reputation and the

¹ Book i. chapters 3 and 8.

number of their disciples as peacocks do their tails." The common epithet for them was ἀλαζών, "a word," says Dr. Hatch, "with no precise English equivalent, denoting a cross between a braggart and a mountebank."

All the charges against these "professional talkers" fell under two principal heads: (1) making a trade of knowledge, and (2) unreality. The commercial value of their wares was steady, alluringly large in the leading cases, and enormous in the aggregate. The objection lay, not against the volume of trade, but against its being made a trade at all. This charge was prominent in Plato's indictment and was equally pertinent throughout the succeeding centuries. The commercial spirit was characteristic of the class. From the resulting ill-repute none but the noblest could extricate themselves. The charge of unreality was the more serious. Genuine men knew then as well as now that preachers of morals and religion must speak through their own obedient experience with the disinterested purpose to improve their hearers. And nothing could be worse than speech on such themes by men who failed, and made light of failing, to relate the truth to their own or their fellows' lives. Here again there were superior men, whose reputations took no smell of fire. But the profession was lost. It held truth, so far as it had truth at all, a degraded prisoner grinding out supplies for its own lustful indulgence and ambition, performing in public for the intellectual amusement and derision of the multitude.

In the fourth century, Greek sophistry made its formal entrance into Christian preaching, or, as some prefer to say, completed its conquest of Christian preaching. Its influence had been felt ever since the time of Paul, as one of the chief modifying forces upon preaching, carrying it steadily in the direction of elaborated thought and form. Christianity moved out to the conquest of the Greek world, and found itself compelled to take permanent factors from

the life of its foe. In contact with the complex Greek culture the simple forms of Christianity could not sustain themselves. Informal recitals from Christ's life and teachings were inadequate to the demands of Greek thought. Christian truth must show profound depths to be explored, or the Greek intellect would not be interested; it must offer both matter and motive for splendid, fascinating oratory, or the Greek heart would be indifferent. Such resources of thought and speech Christianity had, and was increasingly aware of. And it was bent upon winning the Greek world unto its Lord. It pushed forward therefore, and took the unavoidable and abiding consequences. Ever since its meeting with Greek rhetoric, Christian preaching has been a very different thing. Its subject-matter has remained the same; its form it took from the Sophists. The change began, so far as appears, in Origen, whose large audiences compelled him to use more rhetoric and oratory as time went on; it culminated in the great preachers of the fourth century, Chrysostom, "the Cappadocian Clover-leaf," and others, who had been trained under the greatest Sophists of the day and had themselves taught rhetoric. Henceforth the Christian addresses were called, not *ὁμιλῖαι*, homilies, but *λόγοι, διαλέξεις*, *disputationes*, discourses, disputations. By adopting these forms Christian preaching won the oratorical throne. Never was Sophist more in demand and in fashion than were Chrysostom and Gregory Nazianzen and Basil. And the reason was that theirs was Greek oratory at the highest culture of the best Sophists, playing mightily the key-board of morbidly emotional souls, upon more vital and grappling themes than heathen sophistry ever knew. In the sense thus indicated, and in this sense only, Greek rhetoric "created the Christian sermon."

This I have called the formal entrance of the sophistical into the Christian pulpit. In truth it was already there,

being a universal constituent in sinful human nature. When Mr. P. T. Barnum justified his business by the remark, "The American people like to be humbugged," he might have added, And they like to humbug. The remark is merely modern American for a truth as old as the race. The unreal, the formal, the commercial, work their corruptions in every literature and every religion. You have the Mohammedan or Hindu fakir, who has given his name to swindling and humbuggery of a trivial sort. You have oriental priesthoods through whose insincerity and imposture and revenue-religion you can drive a coach and four. Says Canon Kingsley in his "Roman and Teuton," "The over-civilized, learned, false, profligate Roman was the very counterpart of the modern Brahmin." Even in Judaism and Christianity this has been a constant factor. The Christian pulpit, whether before or since Chrysostom, has never been free from it, and our end-of-the-century pulpit is not showing itself the first exception.

With reference now to our own time, the multiform and many-voiced indictment of the pulpit shall be given in Dr. Hatch's severe words. He writes: "If you look more closely into history, you will find that Rhetoric killed Philosophy. Philosophy died, because for all but a small minority it ceased to be real. It passed from the sphere of thought and conduct to that of exposition and literature. Its preachers preached, not because they were bursting with truths which could not help finding expression, but because they were masters of fine phrases and lived in an age in which fine phrases had a value. It died, in short, because it had become sophistry. So has it been with Christianity. It came into the educated world in the simple dress of a prophet of righteousness. Around it thronged the race of eloquent talkers, who persuaded it to change its dress and to assimilate its language to their own. It seemed thereby to win a speedier and completer victory.

But it purchased conquest at the price of reality. With that its progress stopped. There has been an element of sophistry in it ever since; and so far as in any age that element has been dominant, so far has the progress of Christianity been arrested. Its progress is arrested now, because many of its preachers live in an unreal world. The truths they set forth are truths of utterance rather than truths of their lives."

To the champion of the Christian church these words are a challenge. The gist of the complaint is that there is enough of the sophistical in the pulpit to account for the church being as recreant to duty, and the Kingdom being as much behind its scheduled time, as they are declared to be. It would be interesting to try to sum up the modern situation, in order to discover the measure of truth in the charge. The present undertaking, however, is more modest,—to notice some of the forms of the sophistical in modern preaching.

The Greek insight discovered the very soul of sophistry. It ran its analysis and condemnation into the two main categories already noted,—the commercial and the unreal. Knowledge and morality were reduced to a money-making profession. Truth and the real uses of life were ignored. Now, just as the Greek said that the second fault was much the worse, so we may call unreality the very essence of sophistry. All its growths, even the commercial, can be traced back to this root; and all outcroppings of unreality may properly be denominated sophistry, using this word in its large historic sense inclusive of its specific application in logic.

Unreality, in this use of the term, is want of correspondence between a representation and the thing represented. That expression only is real which reports correctly the hidden substance. The gravity of the matter is found in the realm of voluntary, responsible beings. Here unreality

is more than mere deficiency. 'To fail to present the truth is to present error. Nor is the trouble simply that erroneous utterance does rhetorical injustice to truth and reality. To reduce the pursuit and employment of truth to the literary level at all is to descend into the unreal. Truth is for the uses of life. It must be kept in vital relations, active in living souls. The Sophists' intellectual holdings were not according to truth, and did not care to be. Their own souls were insubordinate and derisive. Their utterances were no more deeply born than of dialectical skill and rhetorical fluency, and were given no more vital mission than to the hearer's capacity to be entertained and readiness to pay for it. If their deliverances represented real truth, if they passed vitally through the speakers' character and conduct, if they reached the hearers' obedient wills and wrought ethical effects, these features were incidental. The profession could be practiced successfully and often more prosperously without them. And the section which incorporated them and the section which even regarded them essential could not deliver themselves, and never yet have delivered themselves completely, from the mischievous toils of unreality. The sophistical still remains in the Christian pulpit.

In this sphere of personality, want of correspondence between the inner and the outer, between the subjective and the objective, may be either conscious or unconscious, deliberate or involuntary. There is in the Christian pulpit unreality which is also insincere. We have in the ministry *ἀλαζόνες*, *concionatores gloriosi*, *esprits faux*,—in naked English, braggarts, charlatans, mountebanks, false hearts, hypocrites, untruthful, immoral, "holding a form of godliness, but having denied the power thereof." The truth does not pass through their life and their love; it is merely truth of utterance, secretly meant to be no more, openly offered as genuine coin of the realm of character. The

"scribes and pharisees, hypocrites," of Jesus' day fall into this category. The motives of such men for being in religious work form an interesting inquiry. Their number is a most serious matter. Sweeping into view the whole world-wide body labeled "the Christian ministry," including depraved Continental and oriental clergies, co-representatives with us of Christianity before the world, we must, I fear, pronounce the insincere section a large one, perhaps sufficient to justify Dr. Hatch's remark that the sophistical is the great barrier in Christianity's path. Of the Protestant clergy, however, the statement is true that the impostors are so few as to be lost in the ranks of honest men, save for the fact that "one sinner destroyeth much good" and createth a disturbance out of all proportion to his rights.

Far more troublesome is the unreality which does not amount to insincerity, but impairs a character and service mainly honest. Here we deal with the great body of our Protestant clergy; for most ministers, if not every one of us, have some forms and measures of the sophistical unexpelled. Within the bounds of sincerity, therefore, another division. The want of correspondence is first between the preacher and the truth, and secondly it is between the preacher and the people. In both these classes sweeping statements must be avoided. Sophistry is not dominant here. The trouble is often secret, insidious, a dark thread running in and out intricately in the strong and bright strands, an alloy cheapening the nobler metal though seeming to render it more circulable in this wearing world.

Take first the cases where the lack of correspondence is between the preacher's utterance and the truth itself, with his possession of the truth lying midway and vitally related in either direction. It is not simply an honest report of his inner self that the preacher should give; it is an honest report of the truth itself substantially unsoiled and

undistorted in passing through the medium of a submissive and sanctified life. In this department sophistry takes a number of recognizable forms.

The unconverted honest, but mistaken, men in the ministry fall here, of whom the state and ritualistic churches must acknowledge the most. The late Bishop Hannington of the Uganda Mission is an example of the young men who follow somebody's counsel or expectation into the gospel ministry as ignorant as a pagan of needing a spiritual experience. They choose the church just as naturalistically and professionally as other young men elect careers in philosophy or literature or commerce or the army. The preaching of such men is Greek sophistry speaking Christian English. They put forth truth of utterance rather than truth of life. No unconverted man can be a proper Christian minister. If he preaches a spiritual experience through faith in Christ, he misrepresents his own inner state; if he correctly reports himself, he misrepresents the gospel message. In either case he is unreal, a sophist, albeit an honest, moral, and philanthropic one. Except he turn and be converted, he should retire from the pulpit; and being sincere, he will do this when he discovers the falsity of his position.

Rising a step, we come in among the genuine followers of Christ, all of them true ministers in the article of conversion. Centrally they and their work are real. The unreal is not their determining quality, but an admixture. They are not sophists; they are sophistical. One form, perhaps a chief one, of their sophistry is found in the use of the logical faculty. A paper on expository preaching in the *Biblical World* of February, 1898, quotes Dr. Hatch and adds, "Dr. Hatch declares that Greek Rhetoric created the Christian sermon, and that many a modern preacher is a lineal descendant of the old-time sophist, who boasted of his ability to take any side of any subject and by the art of

the orator please, persuade, and carry the people. The meaning of Dr. Hatch is very clear to any one brought up on the average New England sermon of fifty years ago. The object of that preaching was to present a theme in logical order and rhetorical dress. The sermon did not come, 'like the volcano's tongue of flame, up from the burning core below,' but it came from the text-book of theology and the treatise on sacred oratory. It had more of Demosthenes and Cicero than of Isaiah and Paul. It had more affinity with the orations against Catiline than with the invectives of Hosea against Israel. In other words, it was theologically Christian, but in form and method pagan. The weakness of old New England preaching was that it gave the most space to that which in the Bible occupies the least attention. It made prominent what is logically important, but practically of little value. It set forth with ponderous rhetoric that which would be all-essential if we were expounding a theodicy, but that which may be well-nigh neglected if we are seeking to save men."

Concerning this representative utterance, two or three remarks. We acknowledge of course a danger and damage along this line. There is preaching so framed as to glorify the logical powers and processes and to proclaim a system rather than the truth. Students of God's revealed truth are always in danger of becoming scholastic, vain of their reasoning power, apt to spread it into view with an easy, habitual motion as peacocks do their tails—recalling Dion Chrysostom's stroke at the Sophists. The reasoning process is not for its own sake, and must not get in front of the truth. For it to do so is characteristically sophistical. The article quoted states the chief ill effects. One of them is distorted proportion, another the preaching of abstract truth.

The main fault in this critic and many others is found in the sweeping character of their criticism. They are not

content to warn of a danger; they cry that we have already fallen. They are not satisfied to say that the ministry is liable to this sophistry and is more or less tinged with it; they assert that a whole body or age of the ministry is corrupted, or that a certain method is naturally and always so. The writer implies in the foregoing quotation that no utterance appearing in logical order can have come "up from the burning core below," and that no utterance from that source will present itself in logical form. Or, if he means this of the New England ministry of fifty years ago, and of that only, the charge is equally overdrawn. Eminent names need not be called in reply. That New England ministry, though a bit sophistical after this fashion, subjected their reasoning powers to the kindling heart of God, before whom they habitually fell upon their faces. And the kind of Christian character they made by means of, not in spite of, that preaching, is scarcely improved upon by the preaching that scorns reasoning. The criticism is too superficial. Sophistry lodges, not in methods of action, but in the heart of man. The sophist finds certain methods more facile and fruitful, and the sophistical in the honest man gravitates toward those methods. But he becomes a man of strength in proportion as he triumphs over the evil elements in himself, and masters the methods for holy uses. Sophistry is not escaped by running from one method to another. The expository preacher is as likely to be unreal, untrue to truth, in his own way. So is the illustrative preacher. So is the exhorter. We must agree that it is the Bible that we are to preach, divine truth as it actually came in the forms of the great revelation, not a series of abstractions. But we must demur to the implication that such presentation bars out or represses consecutive thinking. The men of strength in the world's life are the thinkers, not the annalists, not the story-tellers. Dr. Austin Phelps has put in his striking

way the thought that the scrappy, anecdotal preacher may fill his auditorium, but when great issues are pending that call for stability and momentum, for safe guarding of interests and advance upon new positions, then the preacher who is a reasoner is like one blast upon Roderic Dhu's bugle horn, "worth a thousand men."

A second principal form of sophistry in men essentially sincere is found in the use of the rhetorical faculty. The essayist just quoted links this with the preceding form, and naturally, for they are found together historically. This is the other main source of Greek sophistry, which has been defined as "rhetoric philosophizing." And here is another valid indictment against Christian preaching. The preceding one was excessive devotion to philosophical form, or form of thought; this is excessive devotion to rhetorical form, or form of expression. Looking back upon the Greeks and out into present life, we readily discover several phases of this sophistry. They all misrepresent the truth. They are also untrue to the preacher's apprehension of the truth.

Cultivation of the rhetorical art may produce this fault. The preacher who strives after the most perfect forms of language and delivery, in honest desire to make the truth as significant and effective as possible, is in this danger. Before he knows it, he may be seeking to perfect his art rather than to wield mighty truth. Then the minister of truth becomes a stylist.

Closely akin to this is effort to conceal poverty of thought under the pleasing drapery of many-colored speech. It is easier for some indolent men to let flow running brooks with no books in them than to pack weighty results of downright thinking into equal speech. These stylists are most ignoble, perhaps *the* most ignoble. If they correctly report their own holdings of truth, they disclose the distance those holdings fall short of the truth's reality and richness.

There is a very illusive and elusive phase of this rhetorical sophistry, which is not greatly harmful in its sincerer possessors. The earnest preacher desires to effect the utmost with every sermon. He knows that the truth is purer than he can see it and mightier than he can render it. He often comes to his pulpit throne too dull and weak for kingly action, if he is to be no more than true to his present self. He longs to feed the hungry flock generously. He knows the people wait for great influences. He must exert himself beyond the action of the truth within him to make them see it clearly and feel it deeply. He is orator enough to do it. He does it. And he is a sophist thus far. By the arts of the orator he makes the truth mightier upon them than it is upon himself. This is a frequent phenomenon in men who honestly think, or more properly speaking feel, that they are truer to truth by being untrue to themselves. This may be so in individual instances and isolated occurrences. But here, as elsewhere, we "sow an act and reap a habit." That one can carry others beyond his own mental state is a perilous discovery. It is at least one step toward the Greek Sophist's boasted "ability to take any side of any subject and by the art of the orator please, persuade, and carry the people." President Tucker was right, when he said in his Yale Lectures, "Preaching consists in the right correspondence between the apprehension and the expression of a given truth. The morality of preaching lies at this point, just where also its effectiveness lies. Preaching becomes unmoral, if not immoral, when the expression goes beyond the apprehension. This is unreality in the pulpit. Doubtless some unreal preaching is effective, but never for long time."

Beyond this lies sensationalism. The same in principle, it is lower because its object is base, viz., immediate and fleeting effect, emotional response to oratorical arts. Though a Talmadge can be true to himself, true to the truth in

him, in such preaching, Talmadge "done small" in half a thousand lesser pulpits cannot. He can produce such emotional response only by simulating fiery feelings, by palming off magnetism for love. The thing is certainly sophistical and forever reprehensible. And the wonder is that honest men can do it ignorantly and not self-convicted.

Such rhetorical sophistries are certainly to be condemned. Earnest men from Plato to the present day are right in striking at them. But the appeal is not well taken from rhetoric and oratory to the Bible. The splendid oratory of Deuteronomy and the surpassing imagery of Isaiah have put the divine stamp upon the finest action of the rhetorical powers in holy things. A preacher has biblical warrant for going out upon the people in the might of his inspired personality; biblical warrant, therefore, for taking such an oratorical panoply as he can wield honestly and effectively.

In passing now to the lack of correspondence of the actual with the real between the preacher and the people, it should be remarked that his two relations, to the truth and to men, are intricately interwoven. Each constantly affects the other for weal or woe. The relation to truth is principal; but it immediately modifies, and is at once modified by, his relation to the world. False toward the truth, consciously or unconsciously, false toward men; and *vice versa*. Accordingly the foregoing forms of sophistry throw their victims out of joint also with their fellow-men. No congregation would attempt to get relations of religious reality with a minister believed to be at heart a sophist with reference to the truth.

The preacher's right relation to the people is that of a self-sacrificing, independent, influential leader, to the end of individual and social salvation. Failing at any one of these points, he declines into unreality and becomes sophistical. A chief failure in this domain occurs when

the preacher drives at lower ends. The Master has prescribed the aim of preaching; it is salvation, everlasting life, "reconstructed manhood," the kingdom of heaven in souls and society; and however phrased, it is in and through Jesus Christ. Reality in the preacher's relation to men requires this aim to be kept distinct and dominant. Subordinate details must come to the front in turn, but always bearing definitely on the great consummation. Christian preaching never can be content with a general aim at humanity, nor even at general improvement in character and environment. The Greek Sophists failed here without caring. And the Christian pulpit reveals the same failure, even in men not guilty of self-seeking. Purpose and effort may be set upon their fellow-men, and yet the effects sought be less than really Christian.

Intellectual nurture may be the object aimed at. Preaching must carry a larger measure of instruction and conviction than any other public speech. Men must be taught transcendent truth. Christians must be established in independent and progressive faith. The failure of historic Pietism is repeated by every pulpit that confines itself to the initial and emotional Christian experiences. Instruction and conviction, however, though usually considered objects of preaching, are only method. The intellectual is the smaller element in that knowledge of God which is eternal life. Mental culture can neither be left general nor made an end. Christianity is both dogma and life, more life than dogma. It is life by means of dogma; it is dogma as the food of life. The pulpit must teach the specific Christian truths, not in order that they may be known, but that, being known, they may produce spiritual brain and brawn. The moral and spiritual value of doctrine is a phrase worthy to hang above the preacher's study table. Nor may the preacher leave the application to the hearer, as is too often done. Not in this world is knowl-

edge virtue. The preacher's business is precisely with people who know and both cannot and will not do. Instruction is the simplest part of his labor. If he pause there, he is shirking, consciously or unconsciously, the major part of his task; he is depriving the people of the chief values of the true preacher's presence. He is but a teacher. And a teacher in a preacher's shoes is so far a sophist.

Or, emotional impression may be the limited object. Feeling has a proper, but not the final, place in the procession of spiritual effects. The sensibility is but the approach to the will. Emotion is but motive power to assault resolve. Impression has no value whatever, if it fail to secure action. And beyond a certain shifting point emotion and resolution, feeling and consequent action, may easily be in inverse ratio. Religious feeling must not become so reasonless and magnetic as to be transitory, so pathetic and soothing as to be a luxury, so intense and extravagant as to drown all thought of action, so aimless and theatrical as to carry no practical interest and lead no whither. Ideal argumentation has been defined as a combination of complete convincingness and just enough excitement of the right emotions to produce the desired action. In these terms ideal preaching may be described as causing just enough excitement of the right emotions to produce the desired action.

Every preacher of any power at all is in danger of this seductive sophistry. Emotional effect is immediate reward of labor. It is instant response to appeal. It is prompt submission to power. It recruits the preacher's exhausted feeling, encourages and exhilarates him, charms his best endeavors from him, testifies to his divine attendance. The sensationalist is the leading sinner here. Schleiermacher lay in this trap, for his primary object was not to instruct, not to incite to action, but to awaken feel-

ing. This is the actor's object, not the preacher's. The latter must ignore the reward of emotional response, guard his hearers from emotional waste, adapt and direct all emotional force toward carrying the citadel of the will by complete and victorious persuasion. Stopping anywhere short of that, he is unreal. The actor in a preacher's shoes is a worse sophist, because usually more immoderate, than the mere teacher.

Or, the aim may be at real improvements in character and social conditions, but those too low for the pulpit. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, preaching reached its nadir. Whatever served ordinary morality and social happiness had place. There were "nature sermons and field sermons." There were "preachers on health, and potato preachers with their popular directions on rational agriculture." The plight of preaching is clearly seen from a remark made when the reaction was setting in, that preaching ought to have the character of a discourse on religion, though not necessarily on the Christian religion.

Many of the new themes crowding the modern pulpit are entirely proper, arising out of the applications of the gospel to our complicated life, and meaning no less than salvation through Christ. But the unreality of themes, which, though not worthless to human life, are beneath the pulpit, is unusually threatening to-day. Religion is now expected to help men live well here; hereafter also, and so much the better, but here primarily. This emphasis upon the present world throws open the door to troops of themes and purposes entirely alien to the pulpit's mission. An English leader of the working classes voiced the very general demand of his followers in all lands, when he declared that "industrial reformation" should be "the aim and work of religion." The preacher of culture is constantly commended, and so is the preacher of ethics, and the preacher of the rights of the common people;

these products are immediately marketable. Yet these speakers must be very sophists in oratorical power to make their themes as welcome as the old topic, "Christ and him crucified," is in its everyday dress. A recent chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales was pertinent and timely when he gave his official address upon "the secularization of the pulpit," and said: "It is always easier to preach about man than about God, because a man must be living very near to God to speak effectively about God. In the broader humanity and larger culture of the present day a cultivated intellect can always find many subjects of literary or intellectual or artistic interest in the Bible to preach about, and these for a time may attract an audience, may instruct and refine them, but there will be something, perhaps a nameless something, absent from such sermons." Professor Phelps has put the gist of the matter in classic language thus: "Select the choice themes for discussion, and only those. Of important themes choose the most important. Deal only with superlatives. Accept only the aristocracy of thought. Not every useful theme is sufficiently useful to deserve a place in the pulpit. Not every useful theme is religious enough for the pulpit. Not every religious theme is important enough for the pulpit."

A second sophistry as between the preacher and the people occurs whereinsoever he preaches as a matter of routine. Few ministers could apply to their pulpit labors the words of the late Dr. N. J. Burton of Hartford, who affirmed at one time that he never had seen the day when he did not take up his intellectual work as eager as a war-horse. Even Dr. Finney sometimes lost his consciousness of the fullness of God. At such a time the preacher has not the relation of reality with his congregation. Duty holds him to a task from which relief would be welcome. To do the best he can is better than to desert the appointment. But that sacred hour calls, and the people wait,

for something far more grateful and zestful than his weary brain and dull heart. A man in such a case often flings himself desperately upon God Almighty and is lifted out of his depression, crowned and furnished for kingly action then and there. If not thus recovered, he spends an unreal and unhappy hour. It is worse if he grows used to the rut and does not greatly care; then his sophistry is ponderable and guilty.

Another unreality appears when the preacher falls behind the people's advancing life. To this failure he is more exposed than any other man. By the very force of circumstances he is in many cases not a man of affairs. Great influences carry him away from everyday, out-of-door life, to live in the things of the mind and of God. The themes in which he must dwell profoundly are transcendent. His gospel is in a certain real sense closed. Its main truths took their classic form nineteen hundred years ago, and come to him printed in a book. It is easy to forget that each generation and every man must learn that Book afresh, and that the preacher's business is to adapt it to ever-changing thought. Twenty years ago, when the world was twenty years slower than to-day, a conservative leader declared that a live preacher must replenish his exegetical library every ten years, and exclaimed, "Is it not easy to see how fatally a pastor may be left in the rear of biblical scholarship?" A preacher's habits of thought get fixed, and his mental action, like his eyesight, slows down with age. This is surely, and more surely, a young man's world. It is as true that the "dead line" is a reality as that it is not. Many men find that line long before death. Well for them, if they take from it an awakening shock, and find themselves still limber enough to be readjusted to the general environment. In some this deliverance is wrought by a searching spiritual experience, as it might be in multitudes more.

Saul of Tarsus was a conspicuous instance of such an escape. There was an honest man moored to the past. The divine revelation had swept around and past him unperceived in its most glorious movement. He would thrust it back within its old narrow bounds, even at cost of the tears and blood of martyrs. His perceptions and employment of truth, though still real to his sincere soul, had become unreal to revealed truth and to the wakening world. The great discovery broke upon a still adaptable soul, and carried him in three Arabian years to the front rank of truth's progress and the world's advance.

No charge is more frequent, if any more ignorant and untrue when made sweeping and universal, than that the ministry is behindhand and out of touch with life. To this charge heed must be given. To stop with denying it will leave it standing in full vigor. It contains truth. The danger is universal. The Greek Sophists could not make their old forms of truth morally and religiously effective upon the new forms of life. There are many clinging to the active ministry, who are stumbling along farther and farther in the rear. As saints they are priceless treasures, whom we would hold in our counsels to the latest moment. But as leaders they are belated and outdated, and should make room for men of the present moment, men of reality, men in throbbing touch with the life which leaps to be gone out of to-day into to-morrow and can hardly wait to do the next and larger thing.

Still another sophistry is found in a failure of independent and influential leadership. The preacher ought to be free and fearless, a positive force in the community. Seldom does a church tolerate a minister seen to be under any man's hand. He must be an independent student of truth, able to form instructed opinions of his own by the help, but not under the dominion, of the world's best scholars. Then he must be equally at liberty as a speaker.

Whatso he finds true, that he should speak, not without tact and discretion, but without respect of persons. And his trained manhood should make itself felt and followed, taking men captive for his Lord and leading them heavenward in triumph. The charge is sneeringly made that the pulpit is under the thumb of wealth and culture, that it dare not speak its mind on burning themes, that it is not strong enough to champion the interests of the modern day against their intrenched adversaries. That this is generally true may be earnestly denied. But no more than other public servants can the minister of religion escape the selfish assaults of power against liberty.

This form of sophistry is often due to weak personality in men not tainted with self-seeking. Preachers are not always the strongest men either by nature or by training. In a social system where the stronger win, they often lose. They bend under the influence of persons potent enough to modify their thinking and to color their message. Thus are produced unreal relations. The case is sophistical, especially when the preacher is uneasily conscious of it. He should regain his independence and leadership. Whether he is ignorant of his bonds, or ignores the divine anointing which can empower the naturally weak, he is an unreal leader. The call is ever timely for men of the first personal power in the pulpit, since the victories of the gospel are in real part "achieved by the very same means and methods of speech by which men are moved by eloquent address on other than religious subjects of human thought."

A more serious sophistry is caused by self-seeking. It was a main count against the ancient Sophists that they made a trade of religion. The same charge is daily flung at the gospel ministry. The emoluments of his profession are said to affect and even determine his action. A recent writer, reporting the rapid growth of liberal theology, says,

"There are men in pastorates who may actually hold these newly discovered beliefs and keep still, realizing that to make them public they would lose their pastorates and living." Such perhaps was the preacher whose parishioner praised him in the words, "He sends me home feeling that I am as good as any man." No requirement is so persistent and imperious as that the ministry of religion be clear of all trace of self-seeking. But critics should discover the impossibility of it. Pure unselfishness is perfection, unattainable in this world even by its devotees. The Christian ministry is straining toward this perfection. The few hypocrites cannot be suffered to give reputation to the honest majority.

The minister is trained to appreciate and dispense the current values of Christian civilization. Books bring him his necessary food. Social privileges rest, invigorate, and instruct him. Travel enlarges and enriches his nature and multiplies his resources. Commendation for honest labor heartens him. Honor and reputation are real rewards. Influence is, speaking humanly, his efficient power. Gratitude is sweet. Love is life itself. Such returns and resources, expressed and conveyed largely by money, it is impossible to despise or refuse. People grateful for religious help will not be restrained from making some recompense. And the agreement is well-nigh universal that religion must have a class of men devoted exclusively to its service, and therefore dependent wholly upon it. The rule in the religions of the world has been, that "they which minister about sacred things eat of the things of the temple, and they which wait upon the altar have their portion with the altar." This was true of the Jewish priesthood. And the custom was introduced into Christianity in the words, "Even so did the Lord ordain that they which proclaim the gospel should live of the gospel."

But in so far as this commercial element affects the min-

ister's motives, he falls to the sophistical level. Any thirst for applause, or hunger for approval; any striving for high place and honor, any service rendered for its money value, any move for larger income, any partiality for the wearers of fine clothing and gold rings,—such things keep green the memory of the Greek Sophists. It is all sinful, and cannot be palliated. It must be conquered by whatever discipline. Self-sacrifice must destroy self-seeking. And while few preachers are totally indifferent to remuneration, few also are they in whom the motives of love and sacrifice do not conspicuously triumph.

Greek sophistry made a valuable and permanent addition to Christian preaching. The philosophical and rhetorical elements grew into preaching; they were not hung upon it. The changes which passed over it in the first four centuries were inevitable. Prophesying must become preaching. Prophesying was spontaneous utterance by any one who felt moved by the divine breath. Dr. Hatch declares that the two forces which transformed prophesying into preaching were organization and the fascinations of rhetoric. Church organization was "inconsistent with that free utterance of the Spirit," and gradually confined preaching to the official class and to appointed services. "Prophesying died when the Catholic Church was formed." And then the captivating oratory of the Sophists impressed its artificial forms upon preaching. "It was not only natural but inevitable that when men who had been trained in rhetorical methods came to make such [Christian] addresses, they should follow the methods to which they were accustomed."

This explanation stops short of the profoundest truth. The changes in preaching were called forth by developing life. Spontaneous, irregular utterance could feed only incipient life. Growth depended upon strong food, thoroughly prepared and regularly furnished. And the win-

ning of a cultured and godless society, and the enthroning of Christianity over the world's manifold life, forced upon the church the means and methods involved in organization, philosophy and oratory. That which reached its first climax in the great Greek preachers of the fourth century was not essentially a departure from the Bible and a grieving of the Spirit of Christ. John Chrysostom's biblical and spiritual quality was up to the level of his oratory. So was Paul's, and Augustine's, and Luther's, and Bourdaloue's, and Robert Hall's, and Thomas Chalmers', and Richard Salter Storrs'. And there are thousands of great and small men along the way whose rhetoric was handmaid to their spirituality. Nor could their spirituality have wrought so grandly, rejecting this handmaid of sometimes excessive zeal. Those early developments of preaching have not lost their vitality. The same necessity still lies upon the church. Nor is it unreasonable to believe that the conditions will remain substantially the same while souls and society are being perfected. Meanwhile Dr. Hatch's lament is as dolorous as it is unjust to earnest preaching: "If Christianity is to be again the power that it was in the earliest ages, it must renounce its costly purchase. A class of rhetorical chemists would be thought of only to be ridiculed; a class of rhetorical religionists is only less anomalous because we are accustomed to it. The hope of Christianity is that the class which was artificially created may ultimately disappear: and that the sophistical element in Christian preaching will melt, as a transient mist, before the preaching of the prophets of the ages to come, who, like the prophets of the ages that are long gone by, will speak only 'as the Spirit gives them utterance.'" The return, it may be replied, cannot be to irregular, unappointed utterance, void of philosophical and rhetorical elements, void, too, of the financial ingredient of earned and honorable support. The return of preaching.

must be simply unto God, bearing all these legitimate and valuable elements, subjecting them to the indwelling Spirit, who will fuse them all together into that sanctified, opulent, and eloquent manhood by which it has ever been "God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe."

ARTICLE III.

✓
THE HISTORIC CHRIST IN THE LETTERS
OF PAUL.

BY PROFESSOR RHYS REES LLOYD.

THE careful student of the Pauline letters often asks himself, How much did Paul know about the historic life of Jesus? How much does he tell his various readers about that life? This article aims to answer these two questions. In trying to do this, it will gather its data from the thirteen letters usually attributed to this apostle. Not a reference to the earthly life of Jesus will be consciously overlooked. Care will be taken to consider thoughtfully all of the so-called "allusions" to that life. But in the consideration of these references and allusions, I shall not call upon the Gospels for help to finish any portion of the portrait of Jesus which Paul may have left unfinished. This process will tend to prevent my reading into certain expressions of Paul ideas which they do not naturally convey to other thoughtful readers. The temptation to read into the words and phrases of Paul ideas that are taught only in the Gospels is very great. But we must watch and pray so as not to enter into that temptation.

Let us then ask, What does Paul teach in these letters about the birth of Jesus? We are told that Jesus was an Israelite (Rom. ix. 5), that he came from the seed of David (Rom. i. 3). Like all other children, he was "born of woman," and born "under law" (Gal. iv. 4; cf. 1 Tim. iii. 16). He was "sent" into the world "in the fullness of the time" (Gal. iv. 4; cf. Eph. i. 6). These expressions contain all of the information given by Paul in answer to our

question. All of them are found in the so-called "indisputable letters." The phrase "the fullness of the time" gives us no possible clew to the year, month, day, or hour in which our Saviour was born. In like manner, "the seed of David" leaves us asking, From what family of the seed of David did he come? Who was his father? What was the name of his mother? To these questions there is no answer, save the phrase "born of woman." Was this expression designed to suggest that there was anything peculiar in the manner of the Saviour's birth? No. Analogous phrases are found in Job xiv. 1 ("Man that is born of woman," etc.), and in Matt. xi. 11 ("Among them that are born of women"), which designate only ordinary, human births. In the absence of anything in this context which requires that the phrase should have here an exceptional meaning, we conclude that it must carry only its usual signification; hence the phrase designates here an ordinary birth.

The apostle gives us no information respecting the place and the attending circumstances of this famous birth. Did Paul know anything about the *thoughts* recorded in regard to the birth by Matthew and Luke? We cannot tell. Speculation, therefore, about his knowledge on these points, seems useless.

✓ Does Paul teach us anything about the childhood and youth of Jesus? Some scholars would have us believe that Paul alludes to the circumcision of the Babe of Bethlehem, when he writes to the Colossians as follows: "In whom ye were circumcised with a circumcision not made with hands, in the putting off of the body of the flesh, in *the circumcision of the Christ*" (Col. ii. 11). Does the phrase "of the Christ" signify that he was the object of this circumcision? When we observe that the circumcision designated by the apostle is a circumcision not made with hands, a circumcision which consists "in the putting off of the body of the flesh,"

we see that "the Christ" is the person through whom this putting off is accomplished. It is performed when man comes into Christ. The circumcision which "*Christ*" *requires* may be the true meaning. Bishop Lightfoot seems to regard Christ as "the author" of this circumcision. If the first view be adopted, then there is here no reference to the circumcision of the boy Jesus. Since this is, in my judgment, the correct view, we are constrained to say that there is no allusion in these letters to the childhood and youth of the Saviour.

The incidents connected with his baptism and temptation, and even these events themselves, are passed by unnoticed. I am well aware that many claim that they have found several references to the baptism of Jesus (e. g. Rom. vi. 3-4; 1 Cor. x. 2; Col. ii. 11). These passages, I believe, do not point back to the baptism of the Saviour by John the Baptizer. In Romans we read: "As many as were baptized into Christ were *baptized into his death*. We were buried ["entombed"] therefore with him through *the baptism into the* [or *his*] death, in order that as Christ was raised from the dead," etc. (vi. 3, 4). The phrase "raised from the dead" shows, when taken with the preceding phrase, "baptized into his death," that "*the burial*" of Christ (ver. 4) cannot possibly refer to the baptism of Jesus in the waters of the Jordan. It points back to his entombment in the tomb of Joseph. These remarks apply equally well to Col. ii. 11; for the context of this passage shows clearly that Paul is referring to the burial of Jesus in the tomb. I fail to see why Hausrath should refer to 1 Cor. x. 2, in connection with the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist. I repeat now the statement previously made, namely, that Paul nowhere refers to the baptism of Jesus in water.

Weary of the silence, and of the general statements respecting the birth and the early life of Jesus, we pass with

eagerness to his public career. This period brings before us the two forms of the Saviour's activity, his teaching and his deeds. Upon each of these we must now seek for light. A careful search of these letters finds only three possible allusions to the teachings that kept the people of Palestine hanging in wonder upon the gracious lips of Jesus. Two of these allusions are so general as to give us no conception of the forms and contents of that teaching. In 1 Tim. vi. 13 we read that "Christ Jesus witnessed the good confession before Pilate." What was this "good confession"? Was it a particular statement? If so, what were its contents? No answers are given to these questions. The other general allusion reads as follows: "And might reconcile them both in one body unto God through the [or his] cross, having slain the enmity thereby; and he came and *preached peace to you* that were afar off, and *peace to them* that were nigh" (Eph. ii. 17). The reader will observe that Christ preached peace *after* he "slew the enmity through the cross"; hence this preaching was done after his crucifixion. This preaching had the Ephesian Christians for its hearers ("To you that were afar off"); consequently it could not be any preaching which was done in the days of his flesh.

Only in 1 Corinthians xi. 23-25 do we find Paul quoting any of the words of his Lord. In these verses he tells his readers that he "received from (*ἀπό*) the Lord that which" he "also delivered unto" them, "how that the Lord Jesus in the night in which he was delivered up took bread; and having given thanks, brake it, and said, *This is my body which is for you. This do to remember me.* In like manner also the cup, after supper, saying: *This cup is the new covenant in my blood. This do as oft as ye drink it to remember me.*" This passage gives us two formal citations from the words of Jesus. We are told that they were uttered in the night in which he was delivered

up. What night was this? We cannot tell. Paul makes no other reference to it. What does this "delivering up" (*παραδίδωμι*) denote? A comparison of this passage with the words "deliver up to Satan" (1 Cor. v. 5), "deliver up my body to be burned" (1 Cor. xiii. 3), "delivered up to death" (2 Cor. iv. 11), shows that Paul is referring to the giving of Jesus into the power of the authorities who crucified him (1 Cor. ii. 8); or to the death itself. Which of these is designated here? Probably the former, because the Corinthian letters give us no hint of the "delivering up" of Jesus to die, either by himself, or by God. The modern reader who studies these letters without the help of the Gospels, will naturally regard this "delivering up" as the putting of Jesus into the hands of the authorities. The Corinthian readers would be driven to this view unless they possessed other information than that which is furnished in these two letters. How much other information they had previously received cannot be ascertained from these, nor from any of the other letters of Paul. Observe that Paul does not tell anywhere anything about Judas. Had he taught that Judas and Caiaphas were guilty of this "delivering up," could he then have taught so often and so indefinitely that God "delivered up" the Saviour?

To what persons was Jesus delivered? The only answer to this is found in the vague statement, "The rulers of this world" (*τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*, 1 Cor. ii. 8). These persons are said to have "crucified" Jesus. This answer is so indefinite as to provoke the question, Did these men rule the world when this Corinthian letter was written? Pilate we know was deprived of his office in A.D. 36, and Herod about A. D. 38. These therefore could not have been regarded as ruling the world at the time Paul wrote this epistle. The indefinite phrase that is used by Paul, though it does not necessarily teach this, might

easily imply it. How many persons had a hand in this crucifixion? Paul gives us no answer. Were these "rulers" Jews, or Gentiles? They were Gentiles, because the Jewish hierarchy would not have been called by Paul "*the* rulers of *this world*." This is as far as we can go in our effort after precise information upon the important historic points suggested by the phrase "delivered up."

Let us now ask, Where and to whom did Jesus address the words which Paul has cited? Upon these questions the apostle gives no information. Did Jesus use these very words? A comparison of these quotations with the words attributed to him in the Gospels reveals many striking differences between the reports. Of the fourteen words which Paul cites in connection with "the bread," only five ("This is my body,"—five in Greek) are found in Mark, Matthew, and Luke. There is one slight difference in the order of the common words. Paul puts the personal pronoun (*μου*, "my") after the word "this"; while the Synop- tists put it after "body." The nine (Greek) words which are peculiar to Paul have no equivalent in any one of our Gospels ("Which is for you. This do to remember me"). Of the twenty words used in First Corinthians about the cup, Mark has seven; but these are not in the Pauline order and forms (cases). Mark quotes thirty words that are not reproduced by Paul. Matthew agrees again with Mark against Paul. Luke, though agreeing only in part with Mark, differs wholly from Paul. The following words are peculiar to Paul's report ("The cup"; "the new," i.e., the new covenant; "which is for you. This do as oft as ye drink it to remember me"). We now see that the commands to "eat the bread," and to "drink the cup," for the purpose of remembering Jesus, are Pauline. This fact could not have been ascertained without the help of the Gospels. The reader will observe that I have not, in this instance, used the Gospels in order to force a particular

meaning into or out of the words cited by Paul; but simply to test their accuracy. Professor Allan Menzies believes that Paul added these *injunctions* to the words of Christ. He writes as follows: "The rite speaks in First Corinthians the language of Pauline theology, of that doctrine of Christ crucified and set forth in his blood by God as a propitiation through which believers should be justified."¹ No one conversant with the modern or even the Oriental method of reproducing the oral words of another will be troubled by the suggestion that Paul, or the Evangelists, may be consciously, or unconsciously, attributing to Jesus some words which were not spoken by him.

The meaning of these words of Christ as they are reported in First Corinthians is not very easily grasped. The phrase "This is my body" has occasioned, by reason of its ambiguity, much controversy. Does it mean that the bread is essentially the body of Jesus? The presence of the (Greek) article before the word "body" naturally suggests this identity. But the facts implied in the context prove that this was not the Saviour's meaning. When these words were spoken, the body of Jesus held "the bread" which he brake; hence it could not have been the bread itself. When Jesus brake the bread, his own body had not been broken; hence it could not be eaten by the Twelve. Enough has been said to show that these Christian words are not very intelligible because of their condensed form and rhetorical character. This expression about "the bread" is not the only dark portion of these sayings. The following words, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood. This do," are not easily understood.

Did Paul receive these words from God, or from Jesus? The use of the name "the Lord Jesus" immediately after "the Lord" makes it very probable that Paul uses the latter epithet of God. The apostle would hardly say, "I re-

¹ *Expositor*, November, 1900, p. 260.

ceived from *the Lord (Jesus)* how that *the Lord Jesus.*" The latter name seems to be used for the purpose of distinguishing Jesus from "the Lord," who revealed the thoughts in question to the apostle. In favor of construing "the Lord" of God, the following facts are presented: Paul teaches that "*all things are from God* (1 Cor. xi. 12; viii. 6). In accordance with this we read that "Christ was made wisdom from God" (i. 31); the spirit is from God (ii. 10-14). The church is the church of God (1 Cor. x. 32). The apostles, the prophets, teachers, etc., are set by God in the church (xii. 28). The gospel which they preach is "the word of God" (xiv. 36). God has already revealed many things to his people (ii. 10). He, therefore, would reveal unto Paul, whom he had saved by his grace (xv. 10), whatever was necessary for Paul to know in order to properly perform his apostolic duties (cf. xv. 3, etc.).

Did Paul receive these words by a direct revelation from God? This question is not easily answered. We may safely say that he could have obtained them from the other apostles, and from Ananias. This being so, it is not likely that God would reveal in a miraculous way that which Paul could have easily gotten from God's agents.

Our attention must now be directed to the allusions that are made to the actions of Jesus. Some of the acts attributed to him are not strictly historic. Into this class we must put the following: "He emptied himself," "became poor," "took the form of a bond servant" (Phil. ii. 7, 8; 2 Cor. viii. 9); "descended into the lower parts of the earth" (Eph. iv. 10); "giving grace" (Rom. i. 5) and revelation to Paul (Gal. i. 12); and also the giving of offices and gifts to different classes of believers (Eph. iv. 1). The self-emptying, spoken of by Paul, precedes or includes both the "taking of the form of a bond servant" and the "becoming in the likeness of men"; hence it cannot denote any act performed by Jesus during his earthly career. The

"becoming poor" must refer to some pre-natal act ; because Jesus was born in poverty. The distribution of gifts to believers (Eph. iv. 1) was done after the termination of his earthly life.

Paul employs some expressions which describe the general attitude of our Saviour rather than any specific act. Into this class the following are put: "Who loved me" (Gal. ii. 20); "Loved us" (Eph. v. 2); "Loved the church" (Eph. v. 25); "Gave himself" (Gal. i. 3; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Tit. ii. 14); "Delivered up himself" (Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, 25). These phrases which speak of Jesus "giving" and "delivering up himself" look at his death from a sacrificial view-point. The contexts of the respective passages fully support this affirmation. These contexts wholly ignore the historic causes of the Saviour's death. No one will surely claim that Jesus gave himself up in the way in which Judas, and Pilate (Luke xxiii. 35), and the high priests delivered him up (Luke xxiv. 20). It is important to note that the words which seem to refer to the act of Judas are in a historic passage of First Corinthians, while the "self-deliverance" of Jesus is found only in Galatians (i. 3; ii. 20), Ephesians (v. 2, 25), First Timothy (ii. 6), and in Titus (ii. 14). Only in Romans do we read of *God* "delivering him up" (*παραδιδόναι*); but this letter does not speak of the act of Judas, nor of the self-deliverance of Jesus. The "delivering up" is ascribed to the Saviour and to God only when the thought of deliverance from sin dominates the context. Since this is unquestionable, the apostle is doubtless using the phrases in question in a sacrificial rather than in a historic sense. Since these phrases are of such a character, they must be excluded from the data belonging to this article.

This exclusion still leaves us four historic acts performed by Jesus on the night in which he was "delivered up" (1 Cor. xi. 23). Paul tells his readers that the Saviour "took

bread" and "brake it." He "took the cup" and "gave thanks." These four comparatively insignificant acts were performed within closed doors in the presence of twelve dull scholars. The designation of the time during which they were performed shows clearly that Paul is here dealing with historic acts. But they receive only incidental attention in this passage. Elsewhere they are not mentioned.

The conclusion of our study of the data pertaining to the public life of Jesus is easily summed up. We have two quotations of the words which he is reported as uttering on the night of his arrest. These may, or may not, be exactly reproduced. If the reports of Paul are verbatim; then those of the Synoptists are not. The persons to whom the Saviour uttered these quoted words are not mentioned. From their context we can only learn that he spoke them to some of his followers. The words attributed to Jesus are accompanied by an incidental statement of four insignificant acts which Jesus performed in connection with the "bread" and "the cup" already mentioned. These are the only strictly historic deeds attributed to him. It is important to remember that these words and actions belong to the period of the Passion. All these came to pass, as Paul carefully specifies, "*in the night*" in which he was "delivered up."¹

This summary causes us to wonder at the silence maintained respecting the marvelous discourses and conversations of Jesus. We find no reference to the miracles which so many of us regard as the indispensable bulwarks of Christianity. The philanthropic deeds receive not even a passing notice. How strange it is that Paul should make no allusion to these twofold credentials of Jesus—his doc-

¹ His conception of Christ as the Passover of believers may have suggested the use of this italicised phrase, and also of "Do this to remember me."

trine and deeds (John xv. 22-24). Not a word is found in these letters about the selection and training of the Twelve. How can such a treatment of the manifold and busy life of Jesus be explained and justified? The answer to this question must be deferred until we have examined all of our data.

We are now prepared to ask, What does the apostle teach about the sufferings and death of Christ? We are anxious to learn all we can about the time, place, circumstances, the cause, occasions, and the manner of this death of deaths.

Four general allusions are made to the sufferings. One of these, namely, that found in Col. i. 24 ("I fill up in turn in my flesh the tribulations (*θλίψεων*) of the Christ for his body, which is the church"), cannot be historic, because it evidently refers to the mystical Christ. From the other three references we cannot secure any definite notion concerning the nature of the sufferings. Only the fact is mentioned ("The sufferings of Christ," 2 Cor. i. 5; Rom. viii. 17; Phil. iii. 10).

The death of Jesus receives very frequent and significant attention. Some of the passages give it only an incidental notice, while others dwell upon it. *The fact* of his death is mentioned twenty times,¹ and its *violent form* is clearly implied in the phrases, "The blood of (the) Christ,"² and "the body of (the) Christ."³ But the following words state clearly that he was put to death by others ("The putting to death of Jesus"; 2 Cor. iv. 10). The Jews are charged with "*killing* the Lord Jesus" (1 Thess. ii. 15).

¹ "Death"—1 Cor. xi. 26; Rom. v. 10; vi. 3, 4, 5; Col. i. 22; Phil. ii. 8; iii. 10. "Died"—1 Thess. iv. 14; v. 10; 1 Cor. viii. 11; xv. 3; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; Gal. ii. 21; Rom. v. 6, 8; vi. 8; vii. 4; xiv. 9, 15.

² "The blood of the Christ"—1 Cor. x. 16; xi. 25, 27; Rom. iii. 25; v. 9; Eph. i. 7; ii. 13; Col. i. 20.

³ "The body of the Christ"—1 Cor. x. 16; xi. 29; Rom. vii. 4. "The body and blood of the Lord"—1 Cor. xi. 27. "My body"—1 Cor. xi. 24.

The mode of his dying is explicitly stated in the twenty references to his crucifixion.¹ There are, then, in all, sixty passages which emphasize in clear terms the fact of his death. I have excluded from these sixty verses the words "Cursed is every one that hangeth upon a tree" (ξύλου, Gal. iii. 13); because this is not a historic reference. These words of the Old Testament do not designate men that were *crucified* by the Jewish authorities. It speaks of criminals, or enemies, who were hung up *after* they had been put to death (Josh. x. 26; 2 Sam. iv. 12). The covert allusion therein to the death of Jesus upon the cross must not be overlooked. I have also excluded from the strictly historic data the following phrases, although they contain clear allusions to the fact of his death: "Our passover hath been sacrificed for us, even Christ" (1 Cor. v. 7); "The Christ delivered up himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odor of a sweet smell" (Eph. v. 2; cf. ver. 25); and also, "A man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all" (1 Tim. ii. 6).

When we seek for the time and place, the historic occasion or the cause, of this crucifixion, we find no specific information to satisfy our search. The designation of the persons who did this cruel deed is very indefinite. In First Thessalonians "the Jews" are said to have put Jesus to death (ii. 15). But this epithet, "the Jews," designates the nation rather than any individuals. We are therefore baffled in our effort to learn what Jews, and how many persons, had a hand in this terrible action. Does the apostle desire to teach that the Jews actually "killed" Jesus? The context seems to warrant only an affirmative answer ("Even as they did of the Jews, *who both killed the Lord*

¹ "The cross of Christ"—1 Cor. i. 17, 18; Gal. v. 11; vi. 12, 14; Eph. ii. 16; Phil. ii. 8; iii. 18; Col. i. 20; ii. 14. "Crucified"—1 Cor. i. 13, 23; ii. 2, 8; 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Gal. iii. 1; v. 24; vi. 14. "Crucified with"—Gal. ii. 20; Rom. vi. 6.

Jesus and the prophets, and drove out us"). The apostles were driven forth by the Jews alone. No foreigners had any part in the persecution. They alone killed the prophets. Did any persons other than Jews have a hand in the crucifixion of Jesus? In the absence of any other source of information, we should have been driven by this context to answer, No. Observe that the apostle says that "the Jews *killed*" (*ἀποκτείνουσιν*) Jesus. This verb seems to be used deliberately. Had Paul employed "crucify," or its cognate noun, the thoughtful scholar would have been led to ask, Did "the Jews" ever crucify men? The apostle seems to have been aware of this. The fact that he never uses the words "cross," "crucifixion," and "crucify" in the Thessalonian letters tends to support the view that the verb (*ἀποκτείνουσιν*) "killed" represents a deliberate choice of Paul.

In First Corinthians we read that "*the rulers (οἱ ἄρχοντες) of this world (αἰῶνος) crucified the Lord of glory*" (ii. 8). These "rulers" must have been Gentiles; for only they "crucified" men. Who were these men? Did they rule the age at the time when First Corinthians was written? To these questions these letters give no answers.

How came "these rulers" to *crucify* the Saviour? Had he willfully violated some Roman law? This question receives no direct answer, save that contained in the words of the context ("The wisdom that hath been hidden, which God foreordained before the worlds unto our glory: which none of the rulers of this world knoweth, for *had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory*"). But these words still leave us asking, Why did they crucify him any more than others of his contemporaries? Had he aspired after the position of one of these authorities? These questions impress upon the mind of the student that Paul does not even hint at the charge which led the Sanhedrin to compass the death of Jesus. The

apostle seems to have accepted the verdict of Pilate, and he has tried to account for the action of these rulers in view of the innocence of Jesus.

All of the data respecting the sufferings and death of the Saviour may be summed up as follows: the fact and mode of the death receive considerable attention. The perpetrators of the deed are described in two general expressions ("The Jews," "the rulers of this age"); but the precise part which each of these groups had in the crucifixion is not made known to the readers of these epistles.

The task of reconciling this verse (1 Cor. ii. 8) with that in First Thessalonians (ii. 15) could not have presented itself to the early readers of Paul; because we have no evidence to show that the one church ever saw the letter of the other church before 80 A. D. Nevertheless, this problem presents itself for our solution. And the only possible way to reconcile them is to say that "the rulers" "crucified" Jesus at the instigation of the Jews. And, because these urged "the rulers" to put Jesus to death, they could be charged with "killing" him (1 Thess. ii. 15).

The next topic that presents itself is *the burial of Jesus*. To this event there is only one specific and clear reference. We read in 1 Cor. xv. 4, "He was buried." The time, place, and manner of his burial are unnoticed. So also are the persons who performed the gracious deed. I am aware that the words "He descended into the lowest parts of the earth" (Eph. iv. 9) *seem to imply* the burial; but they cannot be regarded as a strictly historic statement of it. In any case, they add nothing to the information furnished by the foregoing historic passage. If my interpretation of Rom. vi. 3, 4 and Col. ii. 11 be correct, we must add these two to the one previously mentioned, and so we have three allusions to the burial.

Paul speaks of *the resurrection* in twenty explicit passages, which are distributed as follows: there is one in

each of the five following letters: First Thessalonians (iv. 14), Second Corinthians (iv. 14), Galatians (i. 1), Philip-
 pians (iii. 10), and Second Timothy (ii. 8). There are two
 in Ephesians (i. 20; ii. 5), seven in First Corinthians (vi.
 14; xv. 4, 12, 15; xv. 20), and eleven in Romans.¹ Thirteen
 of the foregoing passages teach that *God raised Jesus* from
 the dead.² In harmony with this affirmation is the testi-
 mony of the verses which teach that "*Christ was raised.*"³
 * The passive statements are confined to First Corinthians
 and Romans, whose readers have been explicitly taught
 that the resurrection was brought to pass through the
 power of God. Since this is so, the readers of these letters
 would naturally interpret the passive phrase in the light of
 the more explicit active statements. This thought of God
 raising Jesus must also guide our interpretation of the fol-
 lowing expressions: "Son of God in power . . . by a resur-
 rection from the dead" (Rom. i. 4); "Christ died and
 came to life" (Rom. xiv. 9); "To know the power of his
 resurrection" (Phil. iii. 10), and also, "Jesus died and rose"
 (1 Thess. iv. 14). Each one of these statements recognizes
 the fact of the resurrection; but not one of them gives any
 other information about it. But the meagerness of the
 knowledge furnished by these verses must not be allowed
 to diminish the force of the many clear passages which
 teach that *God raised Jesus*.

We are moved, however, to ask, Is this a historic or a
 theological account of the great event? Did Paul derive
 this information from historic sources, or is it an inference
 deduced from the necessities of the case? The latter seems
 to be the correct view. It is easy to see how a person who
 was convinced of the fact of the resurrection might easily

¹ Rom. i. 4; iv. 24, 25; vi. 4, 5, 9; vii. 4; viii. 11 (twice), 34; x. 9.

² 1 Thess. i. 10; 1 Cor. vi. 14; xv. 15, 20; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Gal. i. 1; Rom.
 iv. 24; Eph. i. 19; ii. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 8.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 4, 12; Rom. iv. 25; vi. 4, 5, 9; vii. 4; viii. 34.

infer that it must have been performed by God. Knowing that the Jews killed Jesus, he would say that having been put to death by men, the Saviour could become alive again only through the intervention of some agency outside of himself. The only being capable of raising the dead is God; therefore the resurrection of Jesus is the work of God. This logical process was easily pursued and its result was convincing. The Jews were wont to ascribe all good actions, whose origin or cause was unknown, to God, or to a holy spirit. After reaching this result the teaching of the Messianic psalms would lend its support to the conclusion already reached; for they taught that the Messiah would not be left in Hades (Acts ii. 25; xiii. 32-39). This simple, logical process would inevitably appear to an acute mind like that of Paul. Since this *true conception* could be thus easily secured, it is not likely that God would make it known to Paul by a special, supernatural revelation. And we know that it was impossible for Paul to get the thought from any eyewitness, inasmuch as no human eye saw the resurrection. The statement that "God raised Jesus" must therefore be regarded as a theological inference derived logically from a study of the circumstances and nature of the event.

It matters little what opinion we hold about that phrase, inasmuch as it is so indefinite. It still leaves us asking, How did God raise him? Who saw God doing this? And these questions wait in vain for answers from Paul. The apostle tells the Corinthians that Jesus "was raised *on the third day*," i.e., after his burial. But since the date of the burial is not given to us by Paul, we cannot ascertain the date of the resurrection. We now see that while Paul gives great prominence to the fact of the resurrection, and also to the agency of God in bringing it about, he leaves us in the dark as to the manner, witnesses, and time of the same, except that it was brought to pass on the third day after the burial.

In marked contrast with the silence respecting much of the life of Jesus is the prominence which the apostle gives to the witnesses of *the appearance of Jesus after the resurrection*. Paul enumerates in First Corinthians six distinct appearances of the Saviour. He first showed himself to Peter, then to the Twelve, then to upward of five hundred brethren at once, then to James. After this he was seen by all of the apostles, and last of all by Paul (1 Cor. xv. 5-8; ix. 1).

This list is remarkable for the orderly array of the appearances, and for the grouping of the witnesses. The orderliness of the statement is due to the fact that the author is giving the events chronologically. The adverb "then" shows that Paul is recording these appearances in accordance with the time of their occurrence. And the words "first" and "last" clearly show that he is giving to his readers a complete list. Its completeness is only challenged when we recall that the Gospels give us records of other manifestations. Only one of this list is mentioned in the Gospels. At any rate, only one of these groups can be identified with the eyewitnesses of the risen Jesus as these are portrayed by the Evangelists. John (xx. 3-10)¹ tells us of the appearance to *Peter* and to "the other disciple." I am fully aware of the effort of Professor J. Agar Beet and others to identify the appearance "to the Twelve" with the appearance which Luke says was made to "the Eleven and to those with them" (Luke xxiv. 36, etc.). But how can "the Twelve" be made to mean "the Eleven and those with them." The chasm between these two expressions he tries to bridge with the following baseless assertion: "*The Twelve* [italics are his] had so thoroughly become a technical term for the original apostles both before

¹ Luke xxiv. 12 is absent from the Western; hence it is regarded by Westcott and Hort, Plummer, Schaff, as probably, if not surely, an interpolation. Tischendorf omits it. If we regard it as genuine, its witness may be added to that of the verses in John.

and after (Acts vi. 2) the death of Christ that it is used here, although one had fallen from the ranks" (Com. on 1 Cor. xv. 5). This assertion is wholly untenable. If we leave the passages in question (Luke xxiv. 36 ff.; John xx. 19 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 5) out of our view for a moment, then we shall find that wherever "*the Twelve*" is used the epithet always designates twelve persons. This is true of Acts vi. 2, which counts Matthias in with "*the Eleven*." Paul does not employ the epithet elsewhere; consequently we have no basis in his letters for affirming that it was "*a technical term*" with him for the Eleven.

After the defection of Judas, Matthew (xxviii. 16) and Luke (xxiv. 9, 33; Acts i. 26) always use "*the Eleven*" of the remaining apostles. Mark xvi. 14 shows that long after the days of Paul "*the Eleven*" was "*the technical term*" for the loyal apostolic group. The words of John xx. 24 ("*Thomas one out of the Twelve*") does not militate against my contention, inasmuch as the phrase "*out of the Twelve*" actually refers to twelve (cf. John vi. 71; Luke xxii. 47; Mark xiv. 43; Matt. xxvi. 14). Enough has been said to show that the contention of Meyer, Alford, and others, which is repeated by Professor Beet, is without any biblical foundation. In despair of finding any evidence in the New Testament, they refer us to the Latin use of the words *Decemviri* and *Duumviri*,—an argument which needs no refutation. All *such* efforts to harmonize irreconcilable statements create disrespect for Christian scholarship, and breed unbelievers. All that can be honestly affirmed about these appearances is this: the list is presented by Paul in a frank, easy, and orderly manner, and it undoubtedly represents the sincere belief of this godlike and intelligent servant of God. And this epithet, "*the Twelve*," may have included in his mind that number of persons, or he may have used it carelessly of that number. Which of these two views is correct, we cannot answer.

Some scholars, I know, have tried to harmonize the appearance to the "upward of five hundred brethren at once" (1 Cor. xv. 6) with the manifestation which Matthew tells us was made to "the Eleven" (Matt. xxviii. 16-20). Against this attempt is the fact that Matthew says that "the Eleven" saw Jesus. He gives no hint of the presence of any others. And we must not be wise beyond what is written, if we would honor the text. Paul, on the other hand, uses words which do not naturally nor necessarily include "the Eleven."

The reader of the Pauline words has doubtless noticed that they do not teach us anything about the localities and the times of these manifestations. The form and manner of the Saviour's appearance are also left unnoticed.

The appearance of Jesus to Paul, although it did not take place during the earthly life, requires special consideration. Some affirm that Paul saw Jesus in a vision. Is this the teaching of the letter to the Corinthians? Be it remembered that only in First Corinthians (ix. 1; xv. 8) and Galatians (i. 16) is there any real or apparent reference to this event. But the Corinthians did not have the Galatian letter in their hands; hence they could receive no help from that letter to interpret their own. And our business is to try to secure the meaning which the words of First Corinthians would convey to the Christians at Corinth; because it must be presumed that Paul expected them to understand their letter without the help of any of his other letters. The natural impression which any Greek reader gets from 1 Cor. ix. 1 is this: Jesus appeared in some objective manner to Paul; because the word *ἐώρακα* always bears this meaning (cf. John i. 34; iii. 32; iv. 45; xx. 18, 25, 29; xix. 35; *Luke ix. 36*), unless the context specifies otherwise. In 1 Cor. ix. 1 the context seems to demand an objective manifestation ("Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?"). Only an objective vis-

ion could have put the apostle on the same plane as the Twelve. If Paul pointed to an inward vision, he ought to have indicated this in a clear manner. Such an indication is not given in this context; hence the readers at Corinth would naturally understand his words as designations of an objective appearance. But this passage points to the same sight as that mentioned in 1 Cor. xv. 8 ("He appeared to me also"); hence both denote objective manifestations. This interpretation of the verb (*ᾤφθη*) seems to be required by the context. The appearance to Paul seems to be of the same kind as those given to the other groups named in this context; for *the same verb is used of each in precisely the same way*. Meyer teaches that all of these groups, except Paul, had seen Christ in "bodily" form (Com. on 1 Cor. xv. 8). He claims that *ἔσχατον* separates these from the "later appearances in visions (Acts xviii. 9) or some other apocalyptic way." This adverb was intended to separate them only as to time. It certainly was not intended by Paul to indicate a difference in manner, especially such a difference as is assumed by Meyer. The natural impression conveyed by this narrative is confirmed by the use of *ᾤφθη* and *ἑώρακα* of the same objective manifestation of spiritual persons in Luke ix. 31 and 36 (cf. Matt. xvii. 3; Mark ix. 4; Luke i. 11). And this verb *ᾤφθη* can indicate in regard to Paul only the same kind of appearance as it does to "the upward of five hundred brethren *at once*," which, from the nature of the case, must have been an objective sight. Any other interpretation than this of the verb in these verses is imported into it at the bidding of some other authority than that of this context, or of this letter.

So thorough a critic as Pfeiderer writes of these two Corinthian verses, which describe the appearance of Jesus: "He traces his call to the Apostleship to an appearing of Christ, which he ranks, as essentially similar with the ear-

lier appearances of the risen Lord. It is accordingly beyond doubt that Paul was fully convinced of the objective reality of the appearance of Christ with which he was favored."¹ Professor Bruce also says that "the objective character of Christ's appearance to St. Paul is by all means to be maintained."²

In the consideration of the passages in First Corinthians, I purposely avoided any discussion of Gal. i. 16 ("To reveal his Son in me") because I desired to secure the impression which those at Corinth would get from their own letter. I see no reason for using the Galatian verse to pervert the natural meaning of the words written to the Corinthians. Those are strictly historic phrases; but this can hardly be said of the rare phrase *found only in Galatians* (i. 16), and which must be interpreted in harmony with the teaching of Galatians and also with the principles that guide God's dealings with unbelievers. We know that God reveals Jesus *to* men before he reveals the Son *in* men. To this affirmation all the Bible yields unquestioned support. "To reveal Christ in " Paul in order that Paul *might preach him* must denote such a revelation as would indicate that Christ was a reigning power in his soul. This is the force of the kindred expressions that are found in this letter ("Christ liveth in me," ii. 20; "Until Christ be formed in you," iv. 8). But such a condition as this could arise only after Christ had been revealed to these individuals. This statement is in fullest accord with the teaching of the Pauline letters. We conclude, therefore, that this phrase, "reveal his Son in me," denotes the revelation of Christ *in Paul as the result of the previous and implied revelation of the Son to Paul*. An inward revelation of Christ in an ungodly man is clearly unbiblical. If this be

¹The Influence of the Apostle Paul on Christianity (Eng. Trans.), p. 27.

²St. Paul's Conception of Christianity, p. 32.

correct, this passage is not a precise parallel of the historic phrases of First Corinthians. The parallel with those is the implied revelation of Christ to Paul.

Whether my interpretation is accepted or not, it ought to be evident that the employment of this theological phrase as a key for the interpretation of the historic phrases of First Corinthians is unscientific. Such a procedure, to say the least, lacks straightforwardness, and ignores the teaching of Paul.

The preceding discussions make known unto us the fact that Paul claims that Jesus appeared to five different groups of persons at various times. Some of these persons are mentioned by their well-known names, and one group (the apostles) is described by a term which puts the identity of its members beyond dispute. But the time, place, and manner of these several manifestations are not designated.

We must now pass to the consideration of the data pertaining to the Ascension. The apostle informs the Ephesians that Jesus "ascended on high" (Eph. iv. 8, 9), "far above all the heavens" (iv. 10). In another letter he writes, "God highly exalted him" (Phil. ii. 9). The passage in Romans viii. 34 implies the ascension, for Jesus "is at the right hand of God"; while Timothy is explicitly told that the Saviour "was taken up in glory" (1 Tim. iii. 16). These statements constitute the source of our explicit information of this event. At best they only affirm the fact of going up. The place, the time, the witnesses, the form of the Saviour, and the manner of the ascension are not stated. The words "He was taken," or received, "in glory" are too indefinite to justify any affirmation respecting the manner. This phrase seems to be out of harmony with the active phrases of Ephesians ("He ascended"), unless these be regarded, for the sake of harmony, as incomplete descriptions of the fact. The careful reader has no doubt observed that only one of these refer-

ences is taken from one of the four undisputed letters of Paul, and this one only vaguely implies the event (Rom. viii. 34). ✓

Our examination of the data of our subject has been completed. Our surprise at the meagerness of the information imparted to us is far from being matched by the satisfaction of its strength. The phenomena presented to our attention show clearly that these letters were designed by their author only for the churches and individuals to whom they were written. If we insist on claiming that these epistles were penned "for the permanent instruction of the churches of the world," still their form and contents will show palpably their lack of fitness for such service.

How shall we account for the silence of these letters touching the miraculous birth, the infancy and baptism, of Jesus, the descent of the Spirit upon him, the heavenly attestation, the trial by Satan, the teaching and miracles of Jesus, and also respecting the topics discussed in this article? Are we authorized to teach that Paul was ignorant of all of the things? By no means. There was no necessity for crowding all of his information upon any one of these topics into all, or even into any, of these *letters*. Yes, "letters," not treatises. Four of them are private letters to individuals, who were not expected, as the form and contents of the respective missives clearly demonstrate, to give them publicity. These epistles were written to persons who had heard Paul preach at length, or who had conversed with him leisurely in private. The letters supplement, therefore, more or less the oral instruction which had been given to these readers.

Shall we, because of their supplementary office, maintain that Paul knew as much about the earthly life of Jesus as we do? Shall we teach that he believed in the Gospels of the Infancy, and that he knew as much about the teaching and miracles of Jesus as we do? No. We cannot tell

from these letters how much, or what, he knew about the topics concerning which he is silent. Our duty, therefore, touching his knowledge of these matters, is to be silent. We cannot tell how much he had taught these respective individuals and congregations. The addresses attributed to him in the Acts are far from authorizing us to teach that Paul knew as much about the earthly life and teaching of Jesus as we do. We must learn to march abreast with facts, no further, else disaster will overtake us. With the facts, we are with the Almighty.

We must not fail to notice that, *probably*, the chief reason for the little stress laid in these letters upon the historic Christ, is the fact that Paul was converted through the risen, spiritual Christ. This fact seems to form the lens whose color is imparted unto every object seen through it. Paul's theology is a logical development of the teaching involved in the question which the risen Saviour addressed to him, and also of that which seemed to his rabbinic mind to be involved in the circumstances of the time. The information is not, for this reason, any less of a revelation given to him by God. The Christ Paul knows and glories in is a spirit, who, by reason of this, can dwell in the individual believer, and who can also be said to be the habitation of the spirit of the believer ("In Christ"), and be one with all those who trust in him. The body through which this spirit—Christ—reveals himself to the world is the body of true believers.

Salvation, in these letters, seems to be hung upon trust in this Life-giving Spirit, rather than upon assent to a series of propositions concerning either the earthly career or the essential nature of Jesus, or of any particular part of his teaching. A life of love springing up out of a firm trust in a person is at a premium in these wonderful writings.

ARTICLE IV.

REMINISCENCES OF ATONEMENT THEORY.

BY PROFESSOR GEORGE MOOAR, S. T. D.

✓ FIFTY years ago, a boy born in Andover, schooled in Phillips Academy, whose pastor was a trustee of the seminary, to whose eyes the faces and forms of the Professors Woods and Stuart had been familiar, could hardly pass his minority without thinking of the assertion that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures. All the more, if, because of close family connection with the biographer of Edward Payson, he had felt the evangelical passion of that fervid preacher; or if, in odd moments of a Sunday, he had been wont to turn over the pages of some volume of the *Panoplist* containing accounts of the events which accompanied the sundering of old ties in the churches of the Puritan fathers.

Nor would his interest in this topic be lessened on being transferred for his college course to a Berkshire valley. For in that county Jonathan Edwards had written some of his seed-thoughts, and Samuel Hopkins had been his near neighbor. Stephen West, who had succeeded Edwards, had continued for nearly sixty years pastor in Stockbridge, had been an influential trustee of Williams College, and had written one of the earliest and best treatises on the Atonement. Edward Dorr Griffin, who also composed an elaborate discussion on the same topic, had presided over the college during those very years in which Mark Hopkins and his brother Albert, natives of Stockbridge, were taking their college course. These brothers were of the Hopkinsian blood. Great as became the formative in-

fluence of the elder of these brothers over the intellectual life of his students, the immediate personal power as respects religion was at this time swayed by Professor Albert Hopkins.

Scientist he was, and in no small degree a practical pioneer in his department, but his sense of religion was amazingly pungent, persistent, and constraining. In marrying a daughter of Dr. Payson, herself a woman of marked gifts, he might almost have been said to do so by some elective affinity with her father. Certainly the evangelical passion which had been felt in reading the memoirs, now, under the influence of this professor, deepened into the positive Christian purpose. For he was capable of presenting the theme of salvation in very vivid terms. For one example may be recalled a sermon from these words:—

“ Who is this that cometh from Edom,
With crimsoned garments from Bozrah?
This that is glorious in apparel,
Marching in the greatness of his strength?
I that speak in righteousness,
Mighty to save.”

Respecting the correctness of the exegesis, or the order of thought in unfolding the picture, little impression remains; but the picture itself, of a Redeemer who maintained, at personal cost, authority in behalf of his redeemed, never faded from my imagination. Who would put the chief problems thus raised in the forms of the clearer understanding?

In the fall of 1848, there was heard at Andover the third in the series of discourses afterwards published under the title of “God in Christ.” That was on Dogma and Spirit. The second, on Atonement, had been given to the Divinity School in Cambridge a few weeks before, and had whetted the appetite. The appetite for these topics was usually eager in that locality. Just then the eagerness was more tense. The village church—in which seven years after I

was to be ordained—was full that afternoon. You could feel pricking the ears the solicitous expectancy occasioned by the Cambridge utterance. Well might there be solitude. For the speaker's utterance was in his own mind no mere fulfillment of an academic appointment. In February previous, "the view expressed in these discourses had come to him, not as something reasoned out, but as an inspiration from the mind of God." And he spoke as one charged with such message. The impression on one hearer at least was profound, one of those exalting impressions which make a boy feel somewhat as Peter felt on the Mount—perhaps a little dazed withal. It would have been a swift impulse to offer a tabernacle for a longer sojourn on this high vista.

Hardly two years subsequent, Professor Edwards A. Park, who in 1847 had exchanged the chair of Rhetoric for that of Dogmatic, preached the Convention Sermon, entitled "The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings." It was of this sermon that Dr. George E. Ellis, the Unitarian editor, wrote: "We trust all our readers have perused that convention discourse of the Andover professor. . . . We regard it, on the score of what it boldly affirms and of what it so significantly implies, when taken in connection with its wonderful beauty of style and its marvelous subtlety of analysis, as the most noteworthy contribution which orthodoxy has made to the literature of New England for the last half century." Such an address could not fail of challenging the pen of the chief theologian at Princeton. It led to a continued and, what seemed to us youngsters at least, a matchless sword-play. Although the principal issues did not concern the Atonement, still the discourse had been specially directed to "those who admit the atoning death as the organic principle of their faith." In the first annotation appended to the published pamphlet containing it, there is a careful statement of one

of the chief defensive points in the special New England theory: "Yet the Atonement has such a relation to the whole moral government of God as to make it consistent with the honor of his legislative and retributive justice to save all men and to make it essential to the highest honor of his benevolence or general justice to renew and save some."

Ere this discussion over the Convention Sermon was fully finished there appeared on the scene another man capable of provoking earnest searching of heart. In 1853 William G. T. Shedd, who in the same year had brought out his edition of Coleridge with an appreciative introduction, came to take charge of the department of History. He was in the vigor of youth, but there was no lack of maturity. He brought from his philosophical training at Burlington the characteristic admiration of the more spiritual philosophy understood to prevail there. He did not continue closely to follow Coleridge in his theological constructions. Or, if he did in some degree, it was more and more to take the right road back to Augustine, and for him that road went through Edwards and Calvin. For when he took a road he loved the bee-line. It was he who, when the doctrine taught in the Middle lecture-room was apt to be stigmatized as Pelagian, had the boldness to publish a paper whose very title was, for that latitude, a trifle other than courageous, Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt. Nor did he qualify guilt as mere liability to punishment. In his succession as preacher, he once preached a sermon in which the Atonement was declared to be a satisfaction to the ethical nature of God and man. A paper with this title appeared in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA some time after.¹ The moral sentiment in Dr. Shedd was singularly spiritual. The divine attribute which kindled his adoration was Justice, pure and simple. If he did prefix any adjective, it

¹ Vol. xvi. (1859) pp. 723-763.

was not likely to be "public" or "rectoral." He did not disuse love, but with him it connoted holiness. He was fond of affirming that the Divine Being may be merciful; he must be just. The impression not unlikely to be made on some who heard him may be exhibited in the words used by one who afterwards became a noted lecturer in Boston, but who was at this time a pupil in the Academy. He likened this preaching to "a living, red-hot coal of God's almighty wrath." One would need to tone down this description; and wrath, as ordinarily used, would not represent the tone or the manner of the preacher. But in that early utterance in the pulpit, there would be sentences, and sometimes periods, in which there was intense heat, even if the heat were still and white. What he had to say about expiation—and that was not an unwelcome word to him—appeared to come from some deeper insight. According to that insight, sin had struck in its influence far into the being of God, and therefore the provision for its remission must come from as far. The sacrifice on Calvary did come from the infinite depth. The same ethical nature in man needed to be appeased. The cross did appease it. For He that knew no sin was made sin, and suffered accordingly for his redeemed. "Whosoever is granted this clear, crystalline vision of the Atonement will die in peace."

Meanwhile, however, the writings of the Broad-church men were passing over to America. In 1854 appeared the theological essays of Maurice. The weight of popular and ecclesiastical interest in them came to turn upon the hope of restoration for all men which was given expression. But that hope runs back to the fact of an atonement, and involves some definite conception of the nature of that provision. It will be remembered that one chief reason why our New England divines had been zealous to restate the atoning provision as they did, was to prevent the unlimited feature of it—which they were equally zealous to maintain

—being used to favor the inference of universal salvation. These essays, and other products of what might be called the Maurice circle, took the left road from Coleridge in respect to the work of the Saviour. So with Stanley and Kingsley and especially with Robertson, whose sermons just then gained a wide attention. How eagerly they were read! For he would put what he had to say in an unaffected, simple, and straight way, with no absence of a certain subdued literary charm. What was in him to say was humane, and had come there through the throes of a mind that loved truth and had borne a cross.

These were the years in which it was appointed us to be learning directly on this theme from the lectures of the Abbot professor, and from renowned discourses which were delivered by him, and from books and articles by his pen. If any of us were in danger of being beguiled in either of the directions just named, he might correct our undue admiration by his wholesome habit of closer definition and strict logic. For that consistent theory, which he had compendiously stated in a note of his Convention Sermon, he was now setting forth with minutest distinctions of thought and of terms, in order to anticipate and forefend the erroneous inferences which had been associated with less-guarded statements of the same general scheme of doctrine. It was his conviction that this discriminating view preserved and illuminated the truth which divines of diverse schools had meant to maintain. If he were thought by any to be quite willing to expose the weak and tender points in other current constructions of doctrine, if he could do it with rare facility and humor, still he was honest as well as clever in the endeavor to show that unity might be reached on his theory, as he would word it, between thinkers who were now very much at war. The very chair he held and the constitution and history of the Seminary were a continual spur to this endeavor. Was

not the institution a compromise from the beginning? Were not the very phases of the creed tender to the foot of the teachers who stood upon them? If he needed to be conciliatory, there was no small temptation to being adroit, and there has never been any doubt among those who knew him that he could be adroit.

It seemed, too, as if he were providentially raised up to complete the doctrinal edifice on which the builders of earlier generations had labored. He seemed called, as he was remarkably gifted, to be not only the theologian by eminence of the new divinity, but its historian and biographer. But there were likely to be other students of that story who might be pleasantly—possibly sometimes not quite that—surprised to see how the fathers had been able by anticipation to express themselves in the deft distinctions of our lecture-room. Yet, as you read or pondered, you kept noting how greatly this prophetic anticipation on their part was to their intellectual credit. For now the elder prophets were put in new honor among their own children. Their theory of the Atonement, being now felicitously worded, might more than ever justify the name, the Consistent Theory. The very word recalls the allusion which was made in one of the notes in the Convention Discourse to that notable contemporaneous essayist, who, when accused by a brother-clergyman of inconsistency with himself, smiled a very broad smile, as if that could be a reproach on account of which a seer need blush. Elsewhere than in Concord, and among those who loved orthodoxy too, there continued to be men to whom this particular consistency which our professor rated so high, did not seem to be the prime jewel.

Much as he made of these careful verbal definitions in stating the reconciliation of God with men, he was eminently skillful in presenting that doctrine in its large and impressive practical bearings. But that was done rather

in the pulpit than the lecture-room. Mr. Joseph Cook only states the fact when he says: "Nothing moved him so irresistibly, or with an awe and an adoration so startlingly contagious, as did the supreme topic of the Vicarious Atonement, or that revealed arrangement in the Divine Government by which the demands of Justice and Mercy are reconciled through the voluntary sacrificial sufferings of Christ substituted for the punishment righteously due to sinners against Infinite Holiness." One has only to refer to Sermons II and III in the volume of "Discourses on some Theological Doctrines" to feel the force of this declaration. In fact, as I copy this passage just as the devoted admirer had it printed, with capital letters beginning several of the great words, the feeling comes over me that the theory of the Atonement would have gained in larger degree the impressiveness which belongs to it if the fundamental ideas for which those great words stand had received more uniformly their proper and commanding emphasis. They often did receive this on those signal occasions when this master of assemblies rose to the height of his central theme. I have seldom long forgotten that anecdote of the negro who habitually attended on the ministry of one of the Edwardeans, that one, too, who was among the earliest to define the theory we are now considering. Some other minister had come in the place of the deceased. It was natural to compare the two: "Massa Bellamy, he make God so great, so great!"

This ability to magnify the elementary ideas on which any theory rests is especially necessary in such a case as this, where so much turns on the word "Government"—the governmental theory. For that word may be written with a small initial letter. The Atonement that is bound up with it will be correspondingly meager. The state may be conceived of as a convenience, an expedient simply, or even, as by the anarchist, a usurpation. To be told that

considerations analogous to reasons of state—the minimized state, too—called for the sacrifice of the Saviour does not compel awe and adoration. The sense of law must be more profound, as with Hooker,—“resident in the bosom of God.” This high ethical conception of the reign of law, borne to us in the speech of Psalmist and Prophet, was invested with more solemn meaning when fulfilled in the Messianic King. “Thou sayest I am King; to this end have I been born, and to this end am I come into the world.” Biblical theology recognizes this as the characteristic and ascendant thought in the Gospels. But it is hard for our modern democratic and socialistic mind to keep the height of it.

If such a reductive process has been growing of more recent years in any quarter, it had not impaired yet the tone of the Edwardean theology. With the masters of our New England thinking, the Divine Government was an uppermost theme. Dr. N. W. Taylor, whose work at New Haven continued down to 1858, had spent the greater part of his life in magnifying it. “It,” says President Porter, “occupied his mind more than any and every other subject.” When, therefore, he and others urged that the voluntary sacrifice of the Saviour maintained the authority of the moral government in an extraordinary way and degree, they felt sure they were very near the quick of the problem. Their confidence was apparently justified by the fruits in the revivals that followed. For, from the days of Griffin and Beecher and Finney, wherever this type of the great proclamation was presented, the kingdom of heaven suffered a violence good to see. The ground that had been lost under the old lapse to Unitarianism was surprisingly recovered at many points. Let the years 1830-31 witness. As late, too, as 1857-59, preaching after the methods of the ascendant teaching had lost none of its distinctive power. It “promised,” said Dr. Park that very

year, 1859, "to become the prevailing view of evangelical thinkers." And the solemn years that were soon to follow in the war for the government of the Union might have been expected to confirm the promise.


Nevertheless, in the very heart of Connecticut, close to the home of its more conservative school of theology, Dr. Bushnell in 1856, still more fully in 1866 and 1874, unfolded his different interpretation, laying his principal stress upon the convincible, persuasive elements in the work of the Saviour. Yet the persuasiveness with him was no mere good-naturedness. It had a tonic quality, and much of it. Forgiveness was "no plausible indifference in the guise of grace." What he himself called his "three rugged chapters" were his tribute to the historic doctrine which he was often thought to be doing away. The very "sacred altar-forms," the usual inferences from which he had ruled out, he devoted another chapter to show that "we cannot afford to lose": "for they fill an office which nothing else can fill."

This tribute was to be rendered in yet more express terms. For he was moved, after a sabbath of years, actually to displace chapters embracing three hundred and fifty pages, replacing them by others in which, as he writes, "I now assert a real propitiation of God, finding it in evidence from the propitiation which we instinctively make ourselves when we forgive." Indeed, why might he not have used himself the very same title that Dr. Shedd had employed—an ethical satisfaction to the nature of God and man? For was it not this common ethical nature which stirred those "indignations" which inhibited the free and glad outflow of mercy, which outflow was to be realized only by some overt act of sacrifice in the mission of the beloved Son? In setting forth the current theory, its advocates had been wont to make frequent use of the word "abhorrence." Punishment was intended to show the feeling in God indicated

by that word. The death of Christ was intended to show the same feeling, and even more intensely. Evidently the very word was abhorrent to Dr. Bushnell's taste. Still, the feeling indicated by it is almost precisely the one which, according to this new vision of the truth, God needed to overcome, in order to forgive. There is in God's nature an "organic recoil against sin," and he must go out in special benevolent deed to discharge his "revulsions." It need not surprise us, perhaps, that Dr. Bushnell's latest and admiring biographer should this last year have expressed the query,—to use no stronger word,—whether it would not have been quite as well to have stopped before those rugged chapters began. Still, it was here at least that the Hartford divine showed his larger appreciation of the problem with which he was dealing. There had been moral theories before his day. If he had felt their truth, he had also felt their shortcoming.

Some time before the final second part of "Vicarious Sacrifice" appeared, a very fresh, thoughtful, and spiritual monograph on the same topic had arrested local attention in Scotland. It had also received sympathetic appreciation from the Maurice circle in England. The distinguishing contribution of the author, the Rev. J. McLeod Campbell, consisted in the supposition that Christ offered in the sinful world's behalf an adequate repentance. It was a pleasure and also a confirmation in his mind, that Jonathan Edwards had long before suggested such an alternative. It might have been expected that the attitude of Bushnell would be hospitable. It was so. He characterized the book as "pure, sweet, fragrant with celestial unction." Yet the distinctive element in it was treated with hardly more cordiality by him than it was at Andover, where it received a generous, if also a briefly critical, notice. The indebtedness to Edwards which Campbell had acknowledged was itself a large recommendation there.

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George Moorar

Plainly, however, this side of the Saviour's service for sinners was winning a large place in the convictions or preferences of many. In 1850, when the ecclesiastical associations about Hartford began to be much stirred up over the divergences of the pastor of the North Church in that city, one of the *Independent* staff—and we early subscribers to that journal were wont to think that the editors spoke with no little authority in those days—wrote that there was really no need of a panic. For “he has no party,—no adherents that we know.” A quarter-century later this could not be said as to the adherents, however fit to affirm as to the panic. The Moral Influence Theory, as it had been more fully unfolded, had made its way. Not infrequently it had reconciled to the churches of the fathers some souls that otherwise might have found that atmosphere hard to breathe. In other cases in which the older forms of doctrinal statement were still dear, it had touched springs of imagination and devout feeling at some lower depth.

Despite all this, the new views must run the perils of their excellences as well as of their defects. The original title of Vicarious Sacrifice gave full place to the immediately appended words, “grounded in principles of universal obligation.” That is, for God to enter into humanity for its salvation was only common duty. If the Father so loved the world that he gave the only beloved Son, this was “no superlative—no over-good kind of goodness.” Doubtless, the controlling reason for putting this so was to avoid the notion that this sacrifice was so mysteriously unique as to be altogether unknowable; wholly unlike any experience of which ordinary beings are capable. No; the Atonement is intelligible: the love that originated it is like that which has spent itself in devotion for us by our cradle and fireside ever since we came into being. Now this representation, true, truism possibly as it is, might be over-

wrought and overworked. It may be uttered in such a mood and tone as to be an irreverent half-truth. The Master, for instance, said of the Mary who poured the ointment, She has done what she could. Nevertheless, the world would, he predicted, never cease to speak of it as an exceptional service. Nor could we so much as think comfortably of the Master addressing to her such a question as this, Doth he thank the servant because she did the things she ought to have done? Let it be supposed that in some sense this could be said by the Master concerning any or all human service and obligation, is it equally fit for men to employ the same language toward the Most High? One need not hesitate to plead, Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? but that he is now or ever has been under obligation to render the extraordinary humiliation of Calvary, is not an assertion identical. There is still room for a Paul to speak of a love which passeth knowledge. There are two aspects, even, of common duty: one in which, after the servants have done it, they say, We are unprofitable; the other, in which we who look on cannot refrain from recalling the ode:—

"Yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace,
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face."

Let us note another marked characteristic in the discussion of this theme by those who have evidently felt the influence of the Bushnell volumes. It is the disposition to go far back of the crucifixion which the Gospels make so prominent. The theologians who had gone before had been wont to magnify that event, to concentrate the value of the Redeemer's service on the hour when he said, It is finished. But the response was natural. The value was not in that hour of suffering, but in that holy obedience that went before. Why, indeed, should it be confined

even to the temporal history of the Master? The virtue lay in the Incarnation. So Campbell had laid stress on Christ's identification with the race by his birth. Articles and treatises many have followed in this vein,—such as those of Canon Gore. The title which Dr. Simon gave to one of his books is significant, "Reconciliation by Incarnation." In Scotland, Dr. Orr, in "The Christian View of the World as Centering in the Incarnation," recognizes the same trend. In our own country, Dr. A. H. Strong carries the matter still farther. For he recalls a great day in his mental life when he saw "the natural union of Christ with all men which preceded the Incarnation." This vision has stayed by him, and stirred him deeply. "The race began to be by virtue of a Kenosis of the Logos which antedated the incarnation." "Not late in human history did he vicariously take our sins upon him, but from the very instant of the Fall." But obviously thoughts may not stop at that point. Must not he have borne the sin of the race in the anticipation of it before it began to be? Bushnell had not hesitated to answer affirmatively. "So along down through the smoke of Ages, why not say the eternities, he has been joyously enduring the contradiction of sinners against himself." Let us be thankful that the adverb lights up the sentence!

Now, however interesting, fascinating, or even plausible may be such retrocession from the bare wood of the tree on which our Lord hung on a certain day of a definite year, one must feel some fresh sympathy with those mediæval disputants concerning predestination who appealed to John Scotus and were told that to God "there was nothing future, because he expects nothing, and nothing past, because to him nothing transient." Is there not danger that in placing the bearing of sin at so great a height, doubt might begin to arise whether this sin-bearing be such an out-and-out event as makes it of real meaning and power to

us creatures of time and sense? Is it not gnostic over-much? Although he came in real flesh and blood, yet it might seem, after all, as if that were only an incident. For it may be remembered that Dr. Bushnell spent a few months in California, by no means a visit unimportant. Still in the totality of his career as a thinker, few, unless they were early Californians, would give that visit a paramount place. Was the actual passion of the cross similarly immaterial in the whole of the Saviour's mission? I well recall a Scotus-like scholar, afterwards president of the University, who had been a classmate of Dr. Bushnell. He was fond of that old friend's saying, that there was a cross in the heart of God before the Son became flesh and dwelt among us. He would repeat it with due reverence, and his listener would receive it with some measure of awe. For whatever more or other that bold figure might suggest, it meant one great truth for us both; that God is eternally and essentially Love.

But does that meaning carry with it the idea of eternal atonement? That title was given—and the sound of it remained with me—in a volume of sermons once delivered by Professor Roswell D. Hitchcock. It seems to have remained with another reader, Dr. W. N. Clarke. For in the winsome pages which he devotes in his "Outlines" to this topic, "If we chose," he says, "to employ the word 'atonement,' eternal atonement was made, and is made, in the heart of God." But this author follows the current which had set in before, to disuse, and be shy of, the nomenclature of the past systems. God is placed before us as the great sin-bearer. He bears a double burden: first, in enduring what he hates; and, second, of endeavor to save. He has carried this burden all the long ages, and still carries it. The hatred of sin, and love for those who were involved in it, could not remain unexpressed. Here comes in now one technical word at least, that had played a large

part in most orthodox discussion, so-called. That word is "satisfaction." The great sin-bearing heart expresses itself in Christ, and only so is satisfied. To be sure, pains is taken to say, that God does not deal through Christ in the character of lawgiver or judge, but "in his real character as God ; as his own self in personal relations with his creatures as their very selves." But the question may well be asked, whether God can appear in his real character irrespective of his relation to the human race as its sovereign. He is not merely one spirit in a universe of spirits. That would be the dream of Pluralism without the reality of him in whom all creatures live, move, and have their being. In fact, if we must think of God as the chief sin-bearer, that must be for the very reason that the government is on his shoulders. An American philosopher of well-deserved repute, whose point of view closely resembles that which we are now noticing, and whose practice in logic can prick the infirmities of some judicial and rectoral reasoning on this topic, nevertheless, uses the following language: "It was an awful responsibility that was taken when our human race was launched with its fearful possibilities of good and evil; God thereby put himself under infinite obligation to care for his human family."¹ But this infinite obligation devolved upon him, not merely because he has a family which is large and complicated, and is a real Father, but because that Fatherhood, while it holds in its bosom all that belongs with the highest and dearest idea of home, nevertheless, is great by what it surpasses as well as by what it holds in common. If the obligation incurred was startling, the reconciliation as described in the Scriptures was startling also. If, notwithstanding the darkness of the sinful problem, we may still hear some child singing "All's well in the world," it is because God was "on the throne" in the very moment and the very act

The Atonement (Bowden P. Bowne), p. 101.

in which the beloved Son completed at Jerusalem the passion for which he was sent. Whatever may, either inadequately or transcendently, be true and treasured in the conception of a God eternally in pain over the sin and guilt of his own creatures, the succession of believing people must rest their hopes on that which was actually done in the flesh, and done therein by one who is Governor indeed. The theologian may be, and it is beautiful for him to be, at home, like St. John, in the region of pure and lofty ideas, but he reaches bed-rock in his system only as he couples close together, "That which was from the beginning," and "That which we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled."

These reminiscences, running down the course of Atonement Theory during fifty years, although personal, and, it might be alleged, provincial, are widely illustrative. In the instances cited is shown a prevailing trend. For it should seem that the century we have been closing has been able to look at this doctrine in some freshness, breadth, and variety of view. Some tendencies brought to sight in this retrospect have been iconoclastic as to cherished words and terms. There has been no small amount and stir of reassorting and rearranging the credal images to which men had before bowed down. But there has been restoration as well.

In 1883 the National Council of the Congregational churches requested the appointment of a commission of twenty-five to draw up a statement of doctrine which should, to use the phrase, be up to date. For this to be attempted in a body of believers in which discussion on points of faith had been often exceptionally tense, and which had been charged with disturbing other groups of Christians as well as its own, was risky. If the result were not the perfect and final success, it came as near being as reasonable minds could have expected. On the del-

icate point of the reconciling work of Christ, a comprehensive recognition of the main elements in the sacrifice was reached, and reached with only two or three declining voices. Those voices would have been glad if a particular word, "expiation," had been retained. That, in their conviction, was a landmark hazardous to allow removed. In immediate connection, an old danger, against which all the succession of Edwardean defenders had set guard, became very much alive again. Singularly, it became most alive on the very hill where the guard, it was supposed, had been made doubly sure. For the hypothesis of a probation after death was deduced as an unavoidable sequence of that unlimited atonement which the great teacher of theology had been most zealous to maintain. Was not this "the most unkindest cut" that teacher or theory could receive? But the best of tenets may be magnified out of the connections in which it properly stands. Sooner or later there will be reaction. Its one-sidedness will be seen to be its deformity.

In the later years over which this reminiscence lingers, two new movements of thought might be adduced as favoring the so-called moral theory. One is the evolutionary method as applied in the interpretation of the New Testament literature, and of the human history generally. The other is the Kantian philosophy of knowledge as applied by the Ritschlian school to Christian doctrine. The former was thought to displace the stout and towering conception of Moral Government with which the Edwardians were wont to reason. The latter set up a gulf-like distinction between a theoretical and a practical knowledge of God, the last being the knowledge which has the substance and value. Now our fathers, who set the pattern of so much of our thinking, had felt at home in the very field which was now shut away. They had spent nights and days in surveying and mapping it. In the theory of

the atonement they had attained no small satisfaction. But in this new atmosphere, would their definitions hold?

The actual result has not been more disastrous than was apprehended. Evolution has been in due time hospitably received and worked by those who would make it utter itself with a Christian accent. Even the Ritschlian distinction has often proved itself grateful to the Christian experience. If those who were most partial to the distinction made concessions here and there perilous to the structures of evangelical faith, yet it was wonderful how much of them was left standing, and that the dwellers therein lived in so much peace and power. The members of the last International Council, for example, were surprised to hear an English minister, generally supposed to be well versed in the Ritschlian modes of statement, speak to them of the work of the Redeemer in terms which since 1884 had become almost archaic. The seat of authority for mankind was placed by this speaker on the very cross on which the lowly Master had bowed himself to die. It is "only a deep expiatory view that invests Christ with this final moral claim." In the recently published volume by one of the chief contributors to this Review, who has himself often and lucidly discussed this topic, he has quoted the no less positive tone in which Kaftan, another thinker of this school, has expressed himself. Referring to some modern theologians who had returned to the old doctrine, but who had said, not the juridical idea of punishment, but the ethical idea of propitiation, is to be made the basis, Kaftan affirms, "On the contrary, the highest ethical idea of propitiation is just that of punishment. . . . Precisely the idea of the vicarious suffering of punishment is the idea which must in some way be brought to a full expression for the sake of the ethical consciousness."¹ Even Professor Harnack, although he might be cited as in the main inclining

¹ F. H. Foster, *Christian Life and Theology*, p. 234.

away strongly from dogmatic formula, and preferring to think of what our Lord did as the loving service which constrains, yet allows himself the following language: "There is an inner law which compels the sinner to look upon God as a wrathful judge. This conception is false, and yet it is not false. For it is a necessary consequence of his godlessness. The Holy One descends and serves and dies, and then they believe that God is Love." False, and yet not false! It often seems as if theory here, as elsewhere, is a perpetually recurrent adjustment of partial truth or a perpetually recurrent elimination of partial error. It is true that God is not a wrathful judge, that is, an unjust judge. But he is judge in the highest and broadest conception. The analogies of the ordinary court-room or of the ordinary throne may come far short of fully representing him with whom we have to do. That is no less true of other analogies, that of fatherhood and sonship, for example. They are all only approximate helpers to our better apprehension. None of them are to be set aside as of no value. At some stages of our personal or of our general human progress, they may seem outworn. But then again they may get a new depth of meaning. "The commonplace truth" in them may be "restored to its first, uncommon luster."

ARTICLE V.

THE PRESIDENCY OF THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARIES.

SHOULD THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY HAVE A PERMA-
NENT PRESIDENT; AND IF SO, WHAT SHOULD
BE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF
THE OFFICE?

BY PRESIDENT JOHN KNOX MCLEAN, D.D.

[The Conference of Congregational Seminaries (United States and Canada) is an organization in the interest of unifying and bettering, within Congregational lines, the work of ministerial training. The conference includes our seven American institutions—Andover, Bangor, Chicago, Hartford, Oakland, Oberlin, Yale—and the Congregational Divinity College at Montreal. As part of the program for its last meeting, held in St. Louis, October, 1900, the writer, by appointment, presented a paper on the topic named above. So great interest was developed in the discussion which followed and so vital did the subject appear to the minds of those present in its bearing upon Seminary administration and on the general work of ministerial training, that it has been thought wise to give it wider currency. This statement will explain the appearance and form of this article.—J. K. M.]

THE question of a permanent presidency for theological seminaries is of recent origin. Whatever has been attempted in that direction among our Congregational churches has been, with little exception, more in name than in reality. Thirteen years ago Dr. Hartranft was made, in the proper sense of the term,—and greatly to the advantage of the institution he has represented,—president of Hartford; six years ago Pacific, at Oakland, assumed a supervising head. The title has been used in case of others of our schools, but only by accommodation. The actual position of the person bearing it has usually been, by selection of his faculty,

chairman of that body; but with no substantial increase of powers or duties toward the institution as such. The same thing is true in the Presbyterian denomination. Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall was three years since made full and permanent president of Union Seminary, and he had predecessors who more or less fully discharged the proper functions of that office; Dr. George B. Stewart has been in like manner more recently installed with full powers as president of Auburn; the late lamented Dr. Henry M. Booth had been elected to the same standing, but died before the larger adjustments of the office were completed. With these exceptions, only remote approaches to an actual presidency, or deanship, have been made in either of these two denominations. A like condition exists, so far as information can be obtained, in case of the other religious bodies. The undertaking therefore of anything more than a theoretical presentation of the subject is attended by considerable difficulty. What precedents we have are of recent date, and of traditions there are none at all. Under such circumstances, two main sources of enlightenment have been resorted to, together with a supplementary third, with results now to be indicated.

I. The first of these is the *Bulletin of Professional Education in the United States*, issued by the University of the State of New York; College department, including Universities, Professional and Technical Schools, Subdivision Theology. The issue quoted from is Number Six, of date November, 1899. This publication furnishes much valuable information concerning the rise and progress of theological education in this country.

Down to the close of the eighteenth century the theological seminary as a separate institution did not exist. The nearest approach thereto was under the form of private enterprise. Dr. Bellamy of Connecticut conducted such a private school; with so much distinction that some

of his students followed his example and opened others like it. But the theological seminary proper did not appear in this country until near the very end of the century named. In England the closing of the universities against those outside of the established churches had occasioned the rise of institutions for ministerial training; but these were obliged to cover the double field of academic and theological instruction; the same method of training, together with the use of the name College, is continued, the term Seminary being, in our application of it, there unknown; the English theological school is "a substitute for the college, not a supplement," as here. Previous to the date named, the American churches, so far as they had done anything in this line, followed the example of their nonconformist brethren in the mother country by providing theological courses in the college. Indeed, the chief object had in view in founding our earliest colleges was to furnish an educated ministry. The college faculty included a professor of Hebrew and a professor of theology; whose work was supplemented by the study of theological books, either in private or under the oversight of some experienced minister. It was only among the new departures of the nineteenth century that the establishment of theological schools as separate foundations began to be undertaken. The existing colleges had by that time so far departed from the special purpose of their creation, and there were so many religious bodies which had no college of their own, that the feeling of necessity for the definite and systematic training of the theological school appears to have become universal.

The three pioneer institutions were established just before the advent of 1800: (1) that of the Reformed Dutch Church, in 1784, its work being first done in New York City, then at Flatbush, Long Island, and of later years at New Brunswick, New Jersey; (2) St. Mary's Roman Cath-

olic, at Baltimore, in 1791; (3) the Seminary of the Associate Reformed Presbyterians, now located at Xenia, Ohio, at Service, Pennsylvania, in 1794. Harvard and Yale already had professorships of divinity; the former having been created in 1721, the latter in 1755; but these did not become separate departments until many years later,—Harvard in 1819, Yale in 1822. It has been supposed by many in Congregational circles that Andover was the original seminary of the country. But if the dates given by the University of the State of New York are reliable, as doubtless they are, Andover, so far from standing first in line, arrived only as a belated fourth, its origin dating from 1808. In 1812 the Presbyterians founded Princeton; in 1815 the Lutherans, Hartwick, in Otsego County, New York; in 1817 the Episcopalians, their general Seminary in New York City; the Baptists, Hamilton, in 1820; and in 1839 the Methodists established their first divinity plant, which, after various removals, now exists as the theological department of Boston University.

There were in 1899 one hundred and sixty-five existing theological schools: of these, three were established before 1800; eighteen, between 1801 and 1825; twenty-five, between 1826 and 1850; seventy-two, between 1851 and 1875; forty-seven, between 1876 and 1900.

Of the one hundred and sixty-five institutions in 1899, forty-six were departments of colleges and universities, and thirteen others had entered into such relations with neighboring universities as to secure for their students university privileges; an arrangement which appears to be of growing tendency, and is approved by the compilers of the New York State University Bulletin.

In the publication quoted from, report is generally made as to the headship of the institutions catalogued. But the information thus given is, as a rule, and for reasons already named, inconclusive; the titles President and Dean being

evidently applied in most cases to officials who hold their positions without permanency, without appointment by the institution's governing body, and without any general administrative function. It is little more than a faculty distinction; which in instances is passed in rotation throughout the faculty membership.

The information thus far gained, while of interest as concerns the general history of theological education, has, as will be observed, no apparent bearing upon the special question of the seminary presidency.* It however possesses such a bearing; which lies in the additional item now to be pointed out—the pathetic lack of financial resources at command of these one hundred and sixty-five institutions. The total amount of property, including plant and endowment, reported by eighty-seven institutions—and it is part of the pitiful significance that no more than eighty-seven made report upon this important point—is but \$27,785,997; a sum no greater than is accredited to a single one of our universities, and nearly equaled in case of several more. This amount furnishes for the eighty-seven reporting schools the handsome sum of \$319,380 each. But nearly half of the sum total named is held by ten institutions out of the eighty-seven, making for them an average of about \$1,350,000 each. Of the balance left after those ten chief institutions have been supplied, more than half is appropriated by the next ten; leaving but \$8,898,000 to be divided among the remaining sixty-seven; which diminishes the average property of these, plant and endowment included, to the insufficient sum of \$131,300 each for carrying forward their important work.

Eighty-seven institutions have the courage to make report; but what of the seventy-eight not reporting? The unavoidable inference is, that in nearly all cases the showing would be so sorrowfully small that they spared themselves the mortification of making it. Some of those

which did report place the sum total of their possessions at \$12,000, at \$11,000, at \$10,000, and so down to \$6,000, \$3,000, \$2,000; and one of the number, in lieu of all other report, transmits the legend, "The trustees have decided to close the college." Could the actual figures be obtained from the entire enrollment of theological schools, the result would no doubt justify the remark of a leading denominational journal in summing up the gifts to educational institutions for the year 1899; to the effect that, while colleges had been favored that year with benefactions mounting up into hundreds of thousands of dollars, theological seminaries had secured only hundreds of dollars; and that in so few instances as to fairly warrant saying they had practically received nothing at all.

The bearing of all this upon the question before us is not far to seek. It is that, whatever may be true concerning other sides of seminary administration, the policy in vogue—of a compound head, a rotary head, or no head at all—falls, financially considered, far short of meeting the real requirements of the case: upon which ground, if upon no other, change seems loudly called for.

II. The second available source of intelligence we find in the college and the college presidency. It would antecedently seem that the close correspondence existing between kindred institutions, the college and seminary, were sufficiently close to afford likelihood of light from the long-tried and successful college presidency upon the newer problem of a presidency for the seminary. And this upon trial proves to be the case. In order to test the matter, communication was opened with various college presidents, soliciting their views upon the subject. Out of eleven addressed, nine—six of them heads of college, and three heads of university—made prompt and clear response. These stand among the best-known and most successful administrators of the higher education in our country, and

range territorially from New England to the Pacific Coast.

The inquiries sent out were these:—

1. In your opinion should the theological seminary have a permanent president; and if so, how far should his duties and powers correspond to those of the college president?
2. What in your judgment should be the relation of the president of an institution for the higher education toward the policy of his institution; toward its finances; its curriculums; discipline; the appointment and removal of instructors, etc.?
3. Will you kindly state in detail your own relation to these various departments?

As to Question One, the responses were, with but slightly differing degrees of emphasis, unanimous, and unanimously in the affirmative; to the effect that, wherever practicable, the theological seminary should by all means have a permanent president; and his powers and duties should in a general way correspond to those of the president of a college. The following fairly indicate the tenor of all:—

(1) "It does seem to me desirable that a theological seminary should have a president; and that in general his duties should correspond with those of the college president. When I say this I do not mean the college president who is a mere executive. For myself, I hope the time will never come when I cannot conduct classes and continue my distinct department, which gives me contact with the students, such as nothing else could do."


(2) "I do not see how any institution can be efficiently managed without some one who is at the head of it; responsible throughout all its departments and with sufficient power to make his ideals dominate the policy of the institution. I do not see how seminaries can permanently prosper until they get a more efficient method of administration than most of them now possess."

(3) "Without doubt a theological seminary should have a president. Indefiniteness, friction, and chaos are almost sure to prevail when the direction of an institution rests upon a faculty or board of trustees, or on both in conference. There needs a single competent head who can originate, and execute, and hold in constant survey all departments and all necessities."

(4) "In my opinion our theological seminaries should be under very capable and aggressive administration, and it is encouraging to know that those now chiefly responsible for the executive duties of those insti-

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tutions are endeavoring to introduce the most improved methods. I believe that most of the duties essential to the office of college president belong also to that of a president of a theological seminary."

(5) "I am very glad to know that you are taking up these questions. In general let me say that I think every theological seminary should have a president, and that he should be the wisest and best of men."

In regard to Questions Two and Three, while the replies are not in all instances categorical, they show little diversity of opinion. What the trend of this opinion is will appear in the following representative answers. Two are given in full. The first is from one of the ablest and best-known Presbyterian college presidents:—

"(a) I am a member of the board of trustees. And it is proper. Corporation and governing body with us are the same thing. I am *ex officio* president of the faculty.

"(b) My powers and duties are not well defined, and I would rather not have them. I can go a good ways if sensible, not far if a blunderer.

"(c) Finances, that is investments, are better in entirely other hands. As to curriculum, practically I am finally responsible, but must be able to carry faculty as to any changes of policy or substantial departure. This must be rational influence, not authoritative.

"(d) At last discipline comes to the president's door. He must be responsible. In a college his success or failure is staked upon genuine control.

"(e) Board of trustees appoints professors; but they would practically adopt my recommendations and not move without them. It should be so.

"Frankly, I think a college president should have a long tether, and then be hung with it if he does not do well. His tenure should always be conditioned by his efficiency."

The next reply comes from an equally able and distinguished head of a college in New England:—

"I am chairman of the board of trustees, which is the board where everything originates; and I am also a member of the board of overseers, which has chiefly a veto power.

"I have nothing to do with the investment of funds, presumably because I happen to be incompetent; but I practically determine by my recommendations, which are usually in the main adopted, how the income shall be spent. I make the nomination of candidates for the professorships; and those whom I nominate are usually, though not necessarily, elected. I think no one could be elected to whom I was decidedly opposed.

"Discipline is usually by faculty vote, though large discretion is left with me; and in clear cases requiring prompt action, I do not hesitate to act without waiting for the ratification which is sure to come as a matter of course. In a word, my idea of good government for an educational institution is autocracy tempered by assassination.

"A president should have full power to impress his policy on all the details of the institution; he should be given reasonable time to show whether his policy is a success or failure; and at the first signs of failure or inefficiency he should be summarily turned out and a better man put in his place."

Perhaps these two replies sufficiently cover all the points at issue. Some of the others, are, however, of sufficient interest to be quoted in part:—

(1) [From the president of a leading university.] "I fully believe that, inasmuch as the president of an institution is charged with great responsibility in regard to all matters referred to by you, a great deal of weight ought to be given to his judgment in respect to these matters; always presuming, of course, that he is a sagacious man. It is, however, more particularly in the sphere of the curriculum, the appointment and removal of professors, and the general policy of the institution, that I think the weight of the president's judgment should be most felt. While he ought to be intimately acquainted with the condition of the finances, that he may make intelligent representations respecting the uses of income, he will ordinarily do well not to take active part in any matters that concern the investment of funds."

(2) "The questions you ask are of serious importance, and I beg to take them up in the order of their giving. I do take the initiative in almost everything, both concerning changes in the curriculum and in the personnel of the faculty. I am a member of the board of trustees and am its president, and also I am a member of each faculty and its president. I have no immediate responsibility for the investment of funds; this is cared for altogether by a special committee of the trustees. I do hold myself to a large degree responsible for the devising and carrying out of the general policy of the institution. If this work were to fail, I should feel myself a good deal responsible for the failure; though, of course, the conditions might be such that the work might have failed, and I still feel free from responsibility."

(3) [The president of a Western college writes,] "My trustees are almost without exception business men of large affairs and with many demands upon them. Hence it has come about that a great deal of responsibility has fallen upon me for the general policy of the institution. I am always sure of the coöperation of my trustees, however, and do not fail to lay before them every matter that seems to me worthy of their consideration. They, too, prefer to leave details to me, or to committees of

their own appointment in regard to minor matters. I do not see why such a relation is not to be expected in every case where the trustees are broad-minded, intelligent men; and the president seems to them to be working for the best interests of the institution."

(4) "I believe the president of a theological seminary should have supervision over matters of discipline and general order, and should be held responsible for the same by the trustees. He should have responsible charge of the curriculum; presumably he would freely confer with the faculty on these subjects, and report all conclusions to the trustees for approval or modification. Largest liberty should also be given the president as to the selection and dismissal of members of the faculty. It may not be too much to say, that the methods of a great commercial corporation in allowing its president or manager to select his associates and subordinates, should be followed by an educational corporation."

III. Our third and supplementary contribution of intelligence concerning the matter of a seminary presidency comes from President Thwing, of Western Reserve University. In his new and extremely valuable work on *College Administration*,—a book which is to become a standard on the matters of which it treats,—Dr. Thwing, in dealing with the office of the American college president, traces its development through "three successive types: the earliest was the clerical; the second the scholastic; and the third was, and is, the executive type." This latest and prevalent type, Dr. Thwing sets forth as having grown out of the more and more exacting demands upon the president's position, qualified by the accompanying fact that these demands have come to be chiefly executive in character.

"Of course [he says] this type [the administrative] may be embodied in one who is either clergyman, or scholar, or both; but when the office is so filled the clerical or scholastic relation is not a cause, or even a condition, but only an accompanying circumstance or element. The president is not chosen to a position demanding executive ability because he is a clergyman or because he is a scholar,—he may even be chosen in spite of the fact of his being a clergyman or scholar,—but he is chosen simply because of his personal ability to do a specific work. [And he adds] When one comes to count up the number of college presidents who can justly lay claims to scholarship, he finds them a feeble host and small. The cause is evident enough; the administrator has no time for the quiet pursuit of learning. The college president is not a teacher; he is an executive. His work is to do things, not to tell about them."

These positions of the eminent educator are fully sustained by facts. Our great colleges and universities, from the oldest, Harvard in the East, to the youngest, Stanford in the West, have administrative heads,—men by no means destitute of scholarly attainment, but in whom the executive faculty predominates. “Not primarily scholars and secondarily administrators, but the reverse.” Be the institution large or little,—“a new and poor and small denominational college in a new State, or an old and rich and free and large college” in an old State; be its situation central or remote,—“a new college on the banks of the Oregon,” or old Harvard, old Yale, old Princeton, old Columbia; in either case the present-day president is, more than anything else, an executive. The emphasis upon the different sides of the position will vary according to circumstances, but in all cases the dominant function of the successful college president will be the executive function.

The combined experience and example of the college as bearing upon the problem of the seminary is therefore twofold: first, that the latter institution should have a permanent presiding head; second, that this officer should be chosen with special reference to the discharge of administrative duties, and with a view to his capability as an administrator.

We are now prepared to set down in order the considerations which favor such a change in the administration of theological seminaries as shall place them under a direction similar to that exercised by the college president; most of these having been gathered along lines of suggestion from the college and its administration.

1. The concordant opinion of college presidents as presented. This opinion is entitled to great weight. It comes from men of recognized ability and standing as educators.

They are intelligent in the matters upon which they speak. They have had large experience in college administration, and have won marked distinction therein. They are all graduates of theological seminaries, and lovers of theological seminaries. Two at least of the number have been for a term of years themselves connected with seminary instruction; one of them, and perhaps more than one, is now a seminary director. No set of men could be found better qualified to speak on this subject. Their opinion is affirmative, full, explicit, strong.

2. The results of experience in college education lie so close along the lines of seminary education as to make the two fields practically one. The experience is scarcely to be regarded therefore as borrowed. It is the same experience shedding light in two ways, in the direction of college problems and of ours.

3. But in reality seminary work is more than allied to college work, it is part of it. It is identical with it. If there be difference, it lies in the fact that the work of the seminary is the higher. It is similar, the same in kind only higher. College work is the higher education, seminary work the highest education. The seminary is a department of the university; its supreme department. Its province is to deal with the loftiest and most important of all the sciences. The training it is commissioned to impart is of not less consequence than that of any other department of education, but of more consequence. Other professions and other callings touch life upon one of its sides, or upon some of its sides; the calling of the minister touches life upon all of its sides. Of other workers who resort to college and university, some are seeking to know about nature, some seeking to know about man, some to know about both nature and man; but the minister is seeking to know about nature, about man, and about God,—the great Maker of nature, and Master of man. As, rightly

viewed, the subject of theological teaching is the loftiest and most important of the sciences, so the teaching of it is the loftiest and most important of all teachings. If then the growing experience of the world has found it to be important and necessary for the proper administration of education upon its lower planes that a single competent director should be placed over every one of its institutions; who, holding in constant survey all its departments and all its necessities, can originate, advise, and execute; how much more important and necessary should it be thought that an equally adequate direction should be provided for education upon the highest plane.

3. The importance of the last point will more fully appear when we take into consideration along with it the recent continually increasing requirements of adequate seminary training. The meaning of the term "adequate" as so applied has a constantly widening significance. Higher and higher standards of scholarly attainment are set before the would-be preacher; more numerous and heavier requirements are laid upon him. New avenues of knowledge have been opening which, if he is to be successful in his calling, he cannot avoid. Many of the old paths are being called into question, some of them are undergoing amendment, others are being abandoned. Things long considered as most solidly settled, both in doctrine and in practice, are now held as most unsettled. Revision—deep, searching, unsparing—is the order of the day. This upon the one hand. Upon the other, the church is taking on new forms of institutional and other enterprise in a way and to a degree which, if it is to go on, will make necessary still further extensions both in church administration and in the training for it.

4. These things, and others like them, are calling for no small degree of specialism in the ministry; and, by consequence, for specialization in training for the ministry.

It is claimed by well-qualified authorities that at least five forms of specialization should be at once recognized in laying out courses of seminary study: One, with reference to men with strong natural gifts in the direction of preaching; another, to prepare men of different temperament and attitude of mind for pastoral or general Christian work; a third, for such as are drawn toward the theological seminary, but presently find themselves better suited to be teachers than to be preachers or pastors; a fourth, for that class who also find their way into the seminary, and are earnest and capable, but whose adaptations are less towards study, or preaching, or teaching, than toward executive and administrative ends;—a large class, this last, with a large field before it in mission and institutional churches; in college, university, and seminary presidencies; in secretarieships and agencies for the great benevolent and missionary societies, etc.; a fifth form of special training is also thought to be called for for those who intend to be missionaries,—medical, preaching, teaching, and administrative.

These points,—which appear to be well made, and others like them,—add emphasis to the conviction, that, if, as a first necessity, adequate and accomplished administrators are required for ordinary schemes of education, such are no less needed for an educational scheme so comprehensive, so vital, and far-reaching as that which has for its purpose the training of ministers.

5. The purpose of the theological seminary is, moreover, by no means met in the training of men to preach. It has a second purpose, of magnitude coördinate with the first. The seminary should be a fountainhead and dispensing center for religious thought. It should stand as a beacon-light to the world's religious perplexities. It should be a watchtower and signal-station to beleaguered minds. A search-light for the illumination of moral problems and for guidance with reference to them. A mighty depot of salu-

tary and serviceable influences for all forms of right life; a seminary in the most positive and active sense—a *dis-seminary*. A strong crystallizing agency for the new order of things. A laboratory of all moral and spiritual forces, as the college already is of forces scientific, social, economical, and commercial. Outside of ordinary class-room work, it should provide courses—regular, special, and occasional,—calculated for the general public. It should, following the college, engage in seminary extension work; by inaugurating lectureships, local and circulatory; by laying foundations at college and university centers, from which coigns of vantage great Christian scholars, thinkers, teachers, and preachers might conduct a mighty evangelism,—an evangelism whose appeal should be not to spiritual prudence, nor to spiritual cupidity, nor to spiritual emotionality, but to the moral perception of the most educated and thoughtful of men and women.

6. It is charged by some intelligent and well-disposed people, that the seminary of to-day is, in respect of educational enterprise and development, behind the college and university; some say by a quarter of a century, some by half a century, and some say by more. They allege that the seminary is contenting itself within the first hemisphere of its proper function, preparing men for the ministry; and that even within this circumscribed field it is satisfied to merely teach its students rather than to train them; credited by these persons with the righteous ambition of desiring its students to *know* something when they leave its walls, it is claimed that this commendable desire is vitiated by an unrighteous lack of concern as to whether or no they go out fitted to *do* anything. Some go even to the extreme extent of rating the seminary as behind the college not only in work actually done; but in its conception of the work which ought to be done, and in the lack of care no less than in lack of ability to do it.

Such arraignment is no doubt overdrawn; the complaint is at some points extravagant and at others unfounded; but, making all necessary abatement, there remains an altogether too large residuum of fact; our seminaries are crossing the line of the twentieth century in the rear of the colleges. To this we shall be wise not to make ourselves blind; the fact exists, and the reason for it; that reason cannot be said to lie wholly in the defective administration of the seminary, but in great part it lies there. Among the seminary's main deficiencies is undoubtedly the want of a well-qualified head of affairs whose business it should be to give supreme attention to the institution's general development and administration.

7. Then there is that intensely vital matter of seminary finance, the crucial point in the whole seminary case. In the forefront of requirements for successful college administration, Dr. Thwing frankly locates ability to obtain money and to handle money: "As a financier, the college president is first to get funds; second, to invest funds; and third, to use funds. As he gets funds largely, invests funds safely, uses funds wisely, is his success assured." This authority also claims that "the college ought to need money, that it is not doing its duty if it does not need money"; and does not hesitate to add, "The president is to secure the endowment necessary for the proper doing and the proper enlargement and enrichment of his work."

The seminary needs money, money continually; needs it, as the college does, "for the proper doing and proper enlargement and proper enrichment of its work." In the past it has not, in measure at all commensurate with its necessities, been getting money. It is not doing so at the present time. And as a consequence, its work is not being properly done, nor properly enlarged, nor properly enriched. For this lack of funds, and therefore for the other lacks resultant from this, the seminaries are themselves chiefly

responsible. They have not, because they have not—sufficiently and efficiently—sought. It is therefore plain that a change is needed in this regard. It can come about only through a radical revolution in methods of seminary administration.

IV. We have thus found two concurrent lines of consideration favoring a greatly extended and improved administration of the theological seminary. The first of these has its origin in college opinion and practice; the second, in the purpose and relative importance of the seminary itself; and both are accentuated by the contrast, in one important particular at least, between the large success of the college under one form of administration and the comparatively small success of its sister institution under other forms of administration. It remains to raise the question more directly, which by implication has already been raised and answered, How this enlarged and improved seminary administration may be secured.

It is obvious that it cannot be furnished by the faculty as a body. For, upon the one hand, as already indicated, the work of seminary instruction, already heavy, too heavy, is every year becoming heavier; while over against this, upon the other hand, stands the lamentable fact that these increased exactions of seminary labor are unmet by any correspondent increase of seminary revenue. The heavily worked faculty of to-day must prepare itself to be still more heavily worked to-morrow. Standards for ministerial acquirement are constantly rising; the demand of the churches, and back of it the demand of the age, is for a more thoroughly trained ministry. "The pulpit will have, in coming years, the greatest power it has ever had, provided the preacher gets the requisite knowledge of men; never have there been days of profounder thinking among those to whom the minister goes than these present days; and, consequently, never days when the minister could less

afford to be untrained in scholarly ability to think for himself, if he is to make his message tell. The minister of to-day must have scholarship in its highest sense." And this means increase of inside demand upon already burdened divinity faculties. But account has also to be taken by seminary faculties of present unsettled conditions, within the church and within the pulpit no less than outside of them, with reference to creed statements, with reference to results of the higher criticism and of revised Scripture interpretation; with reference to the application of religious truth to new social and economic conditions; and with reference also to those changes in seminary curricula made needful for the adaptation to these various requirements of doctrine. The problem as to what the minister of to-day ought to know, and what part of that equipment the seminary ought to supply, and how it can be made able to supply it, is in itself a problem of prodigious seriousness. Still another class of demands upon seminary professors are likewise on the increase; churches, councils, conferences, associations, synods, assemblies, are wanting them; missionary meetings and other anniversary occasions solicit them; they are summoned to occasions denominational and interdenominational, national and international; there is also the work of representing the seminary before the churches, before other institutions, and the community in general. To these calls the seminary faculty should feel bound to make suitable response, not only for the general good, not only for the good of the causes summoning them, nor only for the good of the seminary itself; but for their own souls' good, and for their due qualification as instructors. Theological professors have few greater needs than to keep in vital touch with the great life of the church, and in touch with the great life of the world, which it is the mission of the churches to sanctify.

And then what, after all, at bottom is a seminary fac-

ulty? A body of from five to twenty men of like passions, of like felicities and infelicities, with other men. They naturally regard each his own special department as the all-important one, and each is ambitious to have its paramount interests pushed at whatever cost to other interests. In proportion as they are men of strength—and only such men should be on theological faculties—they are likely to hold conflicting opinions on matters of practical administration; not seldom are of variant temper and disposition; and possessed of those natural jealousies, incompatibilities, animosities, against which it has been found so difficult to protect even sacred inclosures. How is it likely that such a body should find itself fitted for that calm, comprehensive deliberation, that well-balanced inlook and overlook, so essential to see matters in true relation, in just proportion, in right perspective and unheated atmosphere? How can a body so composed and disposed, so pressed down with other work; so engrossed in varying interests; hope to furnish that capability, delicate but robust, sagacious but genial, resolute but patient, steadfast but considerate, which is essential to the task of devising right measures and carrying them through to right issues, in an undertaking so important as the successful administration of the highest form of human education? It is not possible. To ask the question is to answer it.

It is not possible, even leaving out the dubious question of natural ability, for an individual working member of the faculty, in addition to his other duties, to effectively administer the institution. He will naturally be modest; at least as to any strenuous self-assertion. His position is temporary; his authority, if he have any, is partial. He is conscious of lacking prestige in the eyes of students and colleagues, if not in the eyes of the directorate itself. Or should he, laying aside personal considerations, address himself to the duties of the position with that degree

of resolution and vigor necessary to success, what will most probably result? That which has under similar circumstances so often resulted; resentment on the part of fellow-professors, corporate friction, personal irritation, all-round discord, and general chaos. He is more than likely to find himself a Joseph among his brethren, his best intentions misconceived and thwarted, left alone, stripped of his garment of distinction, in a pit, and with reason to count himself fortunate if he be not given over to the Ishmaelites or other philistines. This in general, and apart from the central colossal problem of finance; but how shall he be able to meet that? He lacks adaptation for it, has no heart in it, he would quite rather be whipped, and almost rather be hung, than undertake it; the ordinary person in his situation sets out upon the venture with full anticipation of failing, and seldom finds his anticipation disappointed. He is encompassed about by college presidents in solid phalanx, who lay siege to the strongholds of benevolence and with apparent ease reduce them, while he looks on in helpless despair. The obtaining of endowment moneys is an art. And nowhere does the saying

Art is long, and Time is fleeting

prove more conspicuously true than here.

As an example of the deliberateness involved in obtaining endowment funds, take Booker Washington and his story of the rise and progress of a recent notable benefaction to Tuskegee. The initial approach resulted in the addition of two dollars to the resources of the institution. Subsequent efforts were attended by a gradual rise of interest, and correspondently gradual increase in material results. But it was only after the diligent perseverance of years that this wise husbandman found his reward in that comfortable result of a fifty-thousand-dollar donation. There is reason to believe that, except in the largeness of the final outcome, Mr. Washington's experience is not an unusual one.

We have called the gaining of benevolent funds an art. It is more than an art, it is a husbandry. This husbandman, too, must be a model of patience, he must wait for the precious fruit of his endeavor, and be patient over it until it has received the early and the latter rain; and even then there must be "first the blade, then the ear, and after that the full corn in the ear." Now, our seminaries, under the urgency of present-day demands, require a succession of fifty-thousand-dollar gifts. But what laborious professor, with a department or sub-department on his hands, can be spared for this time-consuming sort of tillage? It is said, "There's the financial agent, send him!" Reply can be made that this worthy, and all too lightly esteemed, servitor of good causes has been sent; and to his credit it is to be said, that at times and on occasions he has returned laden with much spoil. The financial agent is deserving of a seat among the highest saints; but for him many a now strong and flourishing enterprise had died of inanition. But, if the judgment of the great colleges is to be accepted, his occupation is now gone. These children of the world, wiser in their generation than the children of light, long since ceased from great dependence upon the financial agent. When college needs were measured by hundreds of dollars, or even by thousands, the financial agent was adequate to the undertaking. But now that these needs have mounted up into the hundreds of thousands, some more effective mediation is required; this means the name, the presence, the dignity, the full personal weight and magnetism, of the man in whom the spirit of the institution stands most distinctly embodied. Dr. Thwing says it is the college president who, if any one, is to "get funds largely." And if the seminary wishes to see its "work properly done, properly enriched, and properly enlarged," it must take its lesson from the college and govern itself accordingly.

Boards of trust are incompetent to the conducting of seminary administration. Many fine points have to be taken in view in constructing boards of trust; particularly in case of the schools for prophets. There are considerations of geographical location; the combination of willingness to serve with capacity to serve; extreme thoughtfulness is to be exercised as to passing or not passing the names of benefactors; balance is to be maintained between differing, and perhaps warring, schools of doctrine; very many things other than real directoral ability have to be kept in mind in executing this important and delicate task. And when all is done, it is a rare occurrence for any educational or benevolent institution to be able to gather a board of from ten to twenty men all of whom, or a majority of whom, possess that general and special intelligence, that balance of mind, that force of character, that breadth of view, that intensity of purpose, combined with strong personal interest in results sought after, forever indispensable to the devising and carrying out of a wise institutional policy. Moreover, the men best fitted to serve on seminary boards are already busy men, who have but fragments—less than fragments usually, interstices only—of time to bestow. The moments they can give are, however, often more precious than pearls, the merchandise of them better than the merchandise of silver or gold. The judgment of many a sagacious business man, formed and expressed in five minutes of time, is often more valuable to a consulting board than the all-day lucubrations and all-night incubations of other men. He speaks out of the trained judgment in affairs; out of an extraordinary keenness and inerrancy of perception, out of a disciplined ability to get at the heart of a matter and to seize upon its vital point. But he has no time for plodding over details. He is not accustomed to it. In his ordinary business all that is relegated to subordinates. He wishes to have results placed before him, not processes. Causes

which crave the judgment of such men must present themselves in prepared form, they must stand in rank like soldiers at attention. It is because of their lack of method in procedure that so many of our benevolent and educational boards find business men reluctant to accept solicitations to their membership. The work is too tedious. Its unaccustomed ways appear abnormal. They are unable to give the half-days and half-nights demanded for details. If our seminaries desire the benefit of such men's presence and wisdom on their boards, they must have as prerequisite a general administration lodged in intelligent and expert hands. And this means an executive, selected for special ability in that direction; whose affair it shall be to carry details, to have all subjects connected with the institution close upon his attention; with ability to condense and clearly present; who can with telegraphic conciseness answer questions, state reasons, present requirements, urge necessities, and summarize results.

In conclusion; the general end arrived at in this discussion cannot be so forcibly presented by other words than those of the minute adopted by the Conference of Seminaries, referred to at the opening of this article:—

"Resolutions adopted by Conference of Congregational Seminaries, St. Louis, October 10-12, 1900. The Conference includes Andover, Bangor, Chicago, Hartford, Montreal, Oberlin, Pacific, Yale. All were represented except Bangor. The resolutions received unanimous approval.

"*Resolved:*

"1. That in the judgment of this Conference every theological seminary should have a permanent president, whose powers and duties should, in a general way, correspond to those of the college president.

"In cases where a seminary stands affiliated with a university, a permanent dean should exercise, so far as the nature of the case allows, the powers and duties here suggested for a president.

"2. Specifically:

"a. The seminary president should be a member, and preferably chairman, of his board of control, and *ex-officio* member of all its standing committees.

"b. While bearing no responsibility for the investment or safe-keep-

ing of funds, he should expect to closely concern himself with the financial development of his institution, and be qualified to make intelligent recommendations as to the use of its income; which recommendations should have great weight in the financial policy of the seminary.

"c. Upon him should largely rest the responsibility and accountability for devising and successfully carrying out the general policy of the institution, including its course of study; for the creation and maintenance of its moral, spiritual, and social atmosphere; and also for representing his seminary in its relation to the other seminaries, to institutions of secular learning, before the churches and community in general.

"d. In his hands also should be the initiative in the nomination and removal of instructors.

"e. The seminary president should take such part in class-room work as will bring him into vital touch with all the students; the amount of this work, however, to be always subordinate to the duties of administration."

ARTICLE VI.

PROFESSOR PARK AS TEACHER AND
PREACHER.¹

I.

SUBSTANCE AND MANNER OF PROFESSOR PARK'S
TEACHINGS.

BY PROFESSOR ALVAH HOVEY, D.D.

WHEN asked to make, at this time, a brief address in memory of my friend and fellow-teacher of theology, Dr. Edwards A. Park, I consented to do this without hesitation, yet not without self-distrust.

I consented without hesitation, because I esteemed it a privilege to bear testimony to the surpassing ability and work and worth of the great teacher of Andover in former years;—and also, because I remembered with delight the noble tribute which he paid to my teacher and colleague, Dr. Horatio B. Hackett, at his funeral service in Newton Center. That was a tribute never to be forgotten, when a prince of teachers reviewed in golden words the finished life of one who had been no less a prince of teachers.

Nevertheless, I consented to speak with much self-distrust, because I knew that the task of characterizing Dr. Park worthily had been achieved once for all by the pen of his intimate friend, Dr. Richard S. Storrs, whose words were read at the obsequies in Andover. To us who heard them, they were "words fitly spoken, like apples of gold

¹Addresses given at the Memorial Service for Professor Edwards A. Park, held in Park Street Church, Boston, January 6, 1901.

in pictures of silver"; and we said in our hearts, It is enough; the man, the author, the preacher, the teacher, the Christian, and the theologian, has been set before us in his strength and beauty; and, looking back on his notable career, we could boldly say: "*Thus, it is, one journey to the stars!*" Well, therefore, may I cry out,

" Oh, for the touch of a vanished hand,
And the sound of a voice that is still ! "

Yet not all of you listened to that marvelous eulogy of Dr. Storrs; and to those that did not, a very imperfect tribute may be acceptable, if it only serves to recall for a moment certain features of the great personality so long connected with Andover.

Dr. Edwards A. Park was a leader of thinking men in his generation and sphere of action. His bodily presence was commanding. His stature, his bearing, his eye, and his countenance arrested the attention of strangers as well as of friends. Expectation was raised when he entered the pulpit or took the platform. The people were still while he spoke. Students devoured his words as if they were manna to their taste; and educated men were charmed by his piercing insight and cogent reasoning. His voice was clear and penetrating, his utterance distinct and refined, his diction pure and select. But it was his *thought* the clarity, the coherence, and the beauty of which, more than anything else, held his auditors entranced to the end of his discourse, however protracted.

Nor were his conversational powers at all inferior to his gifts for public speaking. To this circumstance have I been indebted for many delightful hours at home and by the way. For it was my privilege to be a member of the Board of Fellows in the Corporation of Brown University with Dr. Park more than a quarter of a century, and very often the hour of travel between Boston and Providence, going or returning, was rendered exceedingly brief to me

by the charm of his conversation. His intelligence, his curiosity, his aptness of illustration, his fund of anecdote, his pleasure in the humorous, and his sparkling wit were unailing. To be a listener for the most part was easy and inevitable. Yet it was not easy to be wholly silent by his side. For his words were often queries, calling for a response, and not, as those of Coleridge are said to have been, a monologue, forbidding interruption. But when, as sometimes happened, Dr. A. J. Gordon was with us on our way to Brown, it was possible for me to listen with silent pleasure to conversation of the finest quality between my two friends,—the one a great teacher, and the other a great pastor, while both were servants of the same Lord, drawn together by the oneness of their supreme purpose in life.

But I am expected to give some account of Dr. Park as a teacher of Theology. And this can be done most simply by referring first to the substance, and then to the manner, of his teaching. What kind of a theology did he teach? I remember the first meeting of four theological seminaries in Eastern Massachusetts, at Andover, where the oldest of them was located. Among the speakers of that meeting were Doctors Phillips Brooks, Joseph Cook, and A. J. Gordon, besides professors from several of the seminaries called together. To Dr. Park was assigned, as a theme for after-dinner remarks, "The Theology of the Future." When his name and theme were announced by the chair, Dr. Park rose to his full height, and, lifting up with both his hands a thick pile of well-worn manuscripts, held them out with a serio-comic look towards the young men before him. As the symbolism of the act flashed instantly on their minds, they greeted with enthusiasm the distinguished teacher, and listened with close attention to his wise and thoughtful address. But many of them, and especially his own pupils, anticipated, I am sure, the day when the careful work outlined in that mass of papers would be ampli-

fied by such proofs and illustrations as he was wont to add in the class-room, and then given to the world as *Park's System of Christian Theology*. But this amplification, alas, was never accomplished to the satisfaction of his own exacting judgment, and therefore we are to-day in want of a full and authoritative exposition of his religious belief in a single treatise.

But there can be no question as to what he taught concerning the central truths of our religion. This I say with confidence, because I have closely studied the whole outline of his course of instruction in theology, as copied from his lips by two of his best pupils, separated from each other by a period of years; because I have read with a fellow-teacher's interest nearly all his published writings, and have listened to a series of lectures delivered by him to our students at Newton on the vital doctrine of the Atonement; and because I have learned his views on many crucial points of divinity in the freedom of private intercourse.

The work of definition, analysis, and synthesis in his dictated Outline is everywhere thorough and exact,—so that this Outline is, in itself, without expansion, a *magnum opus*, worthy of a master-builder in the realm of highest thought. It reveals a firm grasp of the whole subject, and a keenness of discrimination simply admirable. Every doctrine is lucidly propounded, and every objection considerably weighed. It is not the periphery, the penumbra of the sacred orb of truth, which is conspicuous in all this Outline, but the orb itself,—the very gospel in its relation to the soul of man. God and his grace, as revealed in the face of Jesus Christ, may be said to pervade the entire work. And the all-embracing motive of God is found to be benevolence, in the large and true significance of that wonderful word. He is goodness itself, not chiefly operative in a low physical direction, but first of all with the highest spiritual intent, aiming to achieve, through crea-

tion and redemption, a world of beings worthy of himself and able to enjoy him forever.

That men are really capable of rising to such a life, through the grace of Jesus Christ, he steadfastly affirmed. But in order to do this, they must possess moral freedom, and must be dealt with as free agents. He therefore emphasized freedom of choice in doing right or wrong as a corner-stone in the building of God, an axiom in the moral government of the world. Apart from this ability, men could not be moral agents at all. They might be instruments, but not actors. This doctrine he fearlessly taught with all its necessary implications. Hence every sinner is a sinner by his own choice. No creative act of God, no inherited bias to evil, compels one to do wrong. The lost son is in a far country by his own act and, if he ever returns to his Father's house, it will be because he prefers to return. God uses no force in moving men to repent; for to do this, would be to ignore man's personality in the supreme crisis of his life. From this point of view, that men are to be dealt with as moral agents, Dr. Park saw that they might destroy forever their susceptibility to the beauty of holiness, and persist forever in going their own way, though its end were "the outer darkness."

But rigorously as Dr. Park insisted on the moral, as distinguished from the dynamic, character of God's government of mankind, he insisted no less strenuously on the loving-kindness and redemptive grace which pervade that government throughout. He revered both clauses of the sacred word: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is working in you both to will and to work for his good pleasure." He taught that the sacrifice of Calvary was embraced in the everlasting counsels, and was therefore as real to the heart of God before the foundations of the earth were laid as it was when Jesus hung upon the cross. He held that the sacri-

fice of the God-man "is related to the whole universe as a revelation of God's estimate of the sacredness of his law, of the value of human souls, and of his love to the children of men. It is related to sinners, a part of that universe, since it reveals to them the holiness and compassion of God, and has a powerful tendency to reconcile them to him. And it is related to God, not only as a sufficient reason for offering salvation to all who believe in Christ, but also as an appeal or prayer of the God-man to the Father in behalf of those for whom Christ died."

All this he drew from the Holy Scriptures, which, as he taught, "present the true views, and sanction no false views of religious and moral doctrine and duty, and are our ultimate and only perfect rule of faith and practice." How lucid and sweet are the following sentences from "A Declaration of Faith" composed by him: "We glorify the Redeemer, who united his Divine nature with our human nature, and is both God and man in one person. We believe that he became our great High Priest and offered himself as the vicarious sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. Our affections are gathered around him as the central object of our faith, because in him are blended the brightest manifestations of the Divine justice, the Divine wisdom, and the Divine grace; because through the ages before he came into the world he was prefigured by impressive sacrifices, and because through the ages since he left the world, he has been exalted to sit at the right hand of the majesty on high, where he reigns as Head of the church and as the one Mediator between God and men, and where he ever liveth to make intercession for his people."

In a word, the substance of Dr. Park's theological teaching was not a system of philosophy, though it was closely reasoned and profoundly philosophical; nor was it a system of ethics, though it was closely united with moral law and profoundly ethical in spirit; but it was the gospel of

Jesus Christ, lustrous and vital throughout with the living and loving personality of God, and appealing to reason, to feeling, to imagination, and to will,—that is, to the whole spiritual nature of man,—thus proving itself to be in our own day, as in Paul's, the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth.

And his manner of teaching was in perfect accord with the substance of it. His lofty message was grandly delivered. No teacher ever sought more earnestly to be understood. He aimed to set every principle in the light of noonday. Hence the logical consistency of his teaching, the fine precision of his definitions, and the transparent lucidity of his style. Some things he left undefined, but it was because either their nature or our ignorance rendered them indefinable. No teacher ever sought more honestly to point out the interdependence of all principles of reality, truth, or goodness. His mind was constructive. He saw the relations of fact to fact, of event to event, of cause to effect, in the realm of nature and of religion. I am not sure that he would say, with the poet, to a little "flower from the crannied wall,"—

"If I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is";

for he might entertain a doubt concerning the possibility of God's revealing himself in deepest reality by the life history of a tiny flower; but I am confident that he would stand side by side with Tennyson in affirming an intimate and instructive relation between every smallest part of the universe and every other part, and in learning something about God and man from every atom in the worlds of space. This wide and friendly outlook was manifest in his theological teaching. The edifice of Christian truth which he was wont to build up, as it were, in the presence of his classes, was composed of precious stones discovered in the

Bible or in nature, every one of which had been closely scrutinized by him ere it was set in its place before the eyes of his watchful pupils. Thus by means of exhaustive preparation and constructive skill, he added something daily to the height and symmetry of his work. The rising structure was one of orderly thought from base to turret, and no student could watch its progress with indifference. Dr. Park's mind was full of eyes, telescopic and microscopic, and he saw countless gems of truth, meet for his Master's use, in realms near and remote. His erudition was ample, if not surprising, and in certain fields of history and philosophy unrivaled. Of the New England Theology, as a scheme of religious thought, he knew all that was worth knowing, from the time of the elder Edwards to his own day. Of hymnology and the best poetry of our language, he was a past-master. Of biography, he knew the best specimens; and in the art of culling incidents from real life to illustrate Christian truth and human character, he was an adept. And what is of no less value to a teacher of theology, he possessed the rhetorical instinct and culture, which enabled him to make the most effective use of all his knowledge.

So it came to pass that his place behind the teacher's desk was for many years a throne, and whether he wielded sword or scepter in that exalted place, it was always, as he believed, in the interest of truth and righteousness. Of the depth and sincerity of that belief his entire life bore witness. He taught what he felt himself called of God to teach; and if there had been more chaff mixed with the wheat than there ever was, his strong conviction of its being sifted wheat, was an element of power not to be overlooked.

For, as in the case of his illustrious compeers, Francis Wayland and Mark Hopkins, the man with his character was forever back of the teacher, giving double force to his

words. Yet I have known few teachers who encouraged *greater freedom of inquiry* than Dr. Park. He charged his pupils to call for evidence, instead of assertion; and insisted upon their bowing to the authority of universal principles and well-attested facts, rather than to his own dicta, however honest or beautiful. The personal factor however, could not be eliminated wholly. The enlightened intellect could not divorce itself from the regal conscience or the glowing heart. The teacher's experience of religious truth must affect the glance of his eye, the tones of his voice, and the place of emphasis in his speech. This is as it ought to be. There is heat as well as light in the spiritual world; and no one can lead others into the deepest life of that world, until he has felt, as well as seen, the goodness of God. No reasoning of man about spiritual things will represent the fullness of the truth as it is in Jesus, unless he has known it by the touch of faith, and learned it by the life of love. A bad man cannot be a good teacher of theology, for he does not appreciate the best part of it,—the love of God which passeth knowledge. Neander was looking in the right direction when he chose for his motto: "It is the heart which makes the theologian." And in the person and life of Dr. Park, we have seen a teacher of theology whose bodily presence answered in some degree to his powerful mind and abundant knowledge; while his simple faith and ever-growing love multiplied a hundred-fold the value of his service to mankind.

Need we ask, Where is he at this hour, with his honored friend, Dr. Hamlin? Into what school have they been welcomed? Who are in the older classes of that well-ordered university above the stars? And who is their teacher of theology, as it is learned where men see as they are seen, and know as they are known?

- "There is a land mine eye hath seen
In visions of enraptured thought,
So bright that all which spreads between
Is with its radiant glories fraught.
- "Its skies are not like earthly skies,
With varying hues of shade and light;
It hath no need of suns to rise
To dissipate the gloom of night.
- "The light which shines o'er all its plains
Streams from the cross of Christ, my Lord;
With crown of thorns, in love he reigns,
Sole monarch of my heart, adored."

II.

THE TONE OF AWE AND SELF-EFFACEMENT IN
PROFESSOR PARK'S DISCOURSES.

BY JOSEPH COOK, LL.D.

Doctor Storrs and Professor Park were buried at the same hour. Since Adams and Jefferson left us together on July 4, 1826, our nation has suffered no more important binary bereavement.

The tone of awe and self-effacement which pervades Professor Park's noblest discourses reveals to history the Holy of holies of his personality, faith, and life. Every spiritually effective career contains a Holy of holies. It is rarely revealed to others except darkly and unconsciously. It is not to be discussed too openly in a man's lifetime, nor mentioned without a sacred reverence even after its possessor has been laid at rest, until the heavens are no more. We must remember that in divine things and in the highest life of the spirit there is a command to shut the closet door. He whose soul would look into the eyes of God needs to know that no other eyes are looking on. But

when a prophet has come down from the Mount and his face shines unconsciously to himself, and his voice has a tone caught only at the summits of religious and intellectual experience, we may well endeavor to measure those heights, and ask the origin of that light and that tone. This cannot be done in the pagan mood of eulogy, which worships the creature more than the Creator, but only in that of devout thanksgiving. Men are measured by their heroes, and also by the recognition of them as divine gifts to civilization.

Professor Park was two years an Evangelistic preacher in his early manhood; a year a professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy; then ten years a professor of Sacred Rhetoric; then thirty-four years professor of Systematic Theology. Meanwhile, he had been forty years editor of a learned and powerful religious Quarterly. He was an author of biographies of unmatched excellence. In all he was more than fifty years accustomed to deliver commemorative, doctrinal, and profoundly religious discourses on memorable occasions. "A sermon by him," says the church historian, Philip Schaff, "was an event." Great discourses in the pulpit often have little power to quicken men to a genuinely religious life, but Professor Park's sermons to students led to profound spiritual awakenings. Professor G. Frederick Wright says, of a series of Professor Park's Discourses which he heard at Andover: "The effect was electrifying. They arrested the attention of the careless youth, and a deep and pervading revival of religion followed comparable to those attending the preaching of Finney." Dr. Storrs, in the discourse prepared by him for a memorial of Professor Park, regards him as wholly unrivaled in the intellectual and spiritual power he possessed as a preacher to students.

His native endowments were so massive, and his training and achievements so many-sided, that only a polygo-

nal view of Professor Park can be a true view. He was a great theologian; he was a great teacher of sacred rhetoric; he was a great editor; he was an eminent author in biography; he was, in his lecture-rooms and conversations, a dazzling humorist; he was a strenuous organizer of religious enterprises; he had many of the qualities of a poet of the first rank; he was a great preacher. But the center of this spiritual octagon is the spot in which to listen for the true tone of his soul. All these endowments and achievements combined in a tone of awe and self-effacement in the highest moments of his discourses. His intellect was in his system of religious truth. His soul was in his sermons. He knew how to pronounce the word "hallowed" in the first petition of the Lord's Prayer. It is a vastly suggestive spiritual fact, that, unless the word "hallowed" is pronounced in the right tone, the words "Our Father" will not have the right intonation, nor the words "Thy kingdom," and "Thy will be done." But this keynote in the word "hallowed" has hardly yet been discovered by the heedless and noisy ages.

What was the *source* of the tone of awe and self-effacement so revelatory of the Holy of holies in Professor Park's faith and life? It must have been, among other things, the height of his upward gaze, and the comprehensiveness of his outward look in the regions of religious truth. In both directions the scope of his vision was immense by nature and by the training and study of a lifetime.

He seemed to touch the whole keyboard of biblical truth, and never merely twittered on a few keys. The resulting majesty of the music had an almost unprecedented uplifting power that was sometimes startling in its spiritual effects. He was profound enough to comprehend the truths of Natural and Revealed theology as an organized

whole. His discourses were oratorios of thought and emotion, sublime and harmonious as the symphonies of the mightiest masters of music. In his sermons to students, Professor Park was a spiritual Beethoven. Only Jonathan Edwards, among New England preachers, has equaled him in breadth, trenchancy, and spiritual value of thought, and in the tone of awe and self-effacement.

Dr. Storrs said, in one of his latest speeches in Brooklyn, that he owed to his "revered teacher, Professor Park, more of inspiration and instruction than to any other." Robert C. Winthrop called Professor Park the most impressive preacher to whom he had ever listened. Daniel Webster wrote a letter to Professor Park showing that he had elaborately read his discourse on "The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings," and thanking him for the clearness and suggestiveness of the distinction. Samuel Harris, the veteran theologian, writes that Professor Park's discourses "were certainly the most impressive and powerful that he ever heard." In acknowledging a copy of Professor Park's "Discourses," Dr. Bartol, the radical Unitarian and the most Emersonian of living Emersonians, wrote: "In no other recent volume of any school do I find logic and learning, beauty and pathos, so admirably combined. I have not skill had I will to write like you; but I were a heretic in deed as in name if I did not feel the charm of both the letter and spirit of your work." An eminent German professor has called Professor Park "the Titan" of American theological thought and speech. Professor Park, by general consent of his ablest contemporaries, was judged to be unequaled in the power of impressing thoughtful audiences with the sublimity and majesty, the tenderness and the severity, the supreme and refulgent reasonableness, the overawing, alluring, and adorable Divine Authority of the biblical system of religious truths. He was great enough to appreciate the greatness of the Bible as a self-consistent

and self-luminous whole; and it was the greatness of the Bible and not his own greatness which he profoundly and permanently impressed upon his hearers.

It was said of Edmund Burke that no man of any penetration could meet him once, even if it were only casually under a penthouse during a shower, without remembering him for life. It is affirmed of Daniel Webster, rising to address a great audience on any really momentous theme, that

"His look drew audience still as night,
Or summer's noontide air."

Something like this must be said of Professor Park in his best moments in his discourses. There was no excess of gesture and never anything studied or self-conscious in movement or intonation. The effect was produced by the wonderful voice and eyes, the changing countenance, the pose of head and form, the acuteness, weight, majesty, and rapidity of the thought, together with the unfailing lucidity, dignity, trenchancy, vividness, grace, ease, and rhythmic qualities of the style.

Quintilian says that the ideal orator must be both a strong and a good man, and that in his highest manifestations there always speaks through him something immense and infinite, *aliquid immensum infinitumque*, that is in him but not of him. Professor Park's manner in his loftiest moments impressed on his audiences far less himself than his subject; far less even his powerful personality than something immense and infinite that controlled it and was in him but not of him. This severest test of spiritual fitness for the highest work of the pulpit his ministrations at their best always met without apparent effort on his part, and therefore they created around him at the time an atmosphere of sacred aspiration and awe in the strength of which his most thoughtful hearers could go many days and years.

The origin of this tone was first in the gift of a great soul, above vanity and triviality; then in profound and clear convictions concerning biblical, evangelical truth. This man believed with his whole heart what he taught. He held no weak and superficial views as to the depth of man's spiritual necessities, the fullness of the divine provision for meeting them, the completeness of man's responsibility for his choice between the acceptance or the rejection of the divine mercy, the reality and limitations of probation, the immortality of the human spirit, the inevitableness of eternal judgment.

One of Professor Park's strategic sayings was: "The freeness of sin is essential to its guilt, and its guilt develops the need of missions." He taught most explicitly that under the natural laws of habit all human individual character, whether men have heard the gospel or not, tends to a final permanence; that in the very nature of things a final permanence can come but once; that, unless men learn to love what God loves and hate what God hates, it is ill with them, and must continue to be ill until the dissonance ceases; that on all sides of us, in both nominally Christian and non-Christian populations, men are falling into a permanent love of what God hates and a permanent hate of what God loves; that it is self-evident that until the soul is delivered from the love of sin and the guilt of sin it cannot be at peace in God's presence; that the doctrines of the New Birth and the Atonement as a remedy for the love and the guilt of sin, are messages which it is of infinite importance to teach to all responsible human beings; that all men are to be judged by the deeds done in the body; and that the Holy Scriptures teach nothing more clearly than that it is never safe for any man to die in his sins. These truths are the organizing forces of the evangelical faith which have carried the Scriptures and Christian churches and schools to all nations, and have now

brought the evangelization of the whole world within measurable distance.

As to the views held by Professor Park and evangelical teachers in general on the truths that constitute the nerve of missions, it is timely and important, not to say strategic, in view of various discussions now current, to call attention to "Professor Park's Declaration of Faith," drawn up in 1884, and now published as his in the valuable and attractive pamphlet entitled "Professor Park and his Pupils," issued in Boston in 1899. One hundred and more accordant signatures of men of unquestioned weight and influential position in the Congregational and Presbyterian churches have been added to this now historic document. The passages in it on inspiration, the Deity of our Lord, the Atonement, the Holy Spirit, the secular duties of Christians, etc., are all of great interest, when it is remembered what and how many representative men support them; but the following article of faith on judgment to come should be quoted in full as a sign of the times in responsible circles of theological and religious teachers:—

"We believe that, in His adorable wisdom, our moral Ruler has attached an inestimable importance to our life on earth; that all men who in this life repent of sin will, at their death, enter on a course of perfect and unending holiness: that all men who throughout the present life remain impenitent sinners will remain so forever; that both the just and the unjust will be raised from death at the last day, will stand before the judgment seat of Christ, and will receive from him their awards according to the deeds done in the body; so that the wicked will go away into endless punishment, but the righteous into endless life."

Among the signatures appended to this statement of faith are those of Dr. R. S. Storrs, former president of the American Board; Dr. Judson Smith, one of its chief present secretaries; Dr. Theodore L. Cuyler, Dr. T. De Witt

Talmage, Professor Herrick Johnson, Dr. F. E. Clark, Professors G. N. Boardman, G. Frederick Wright, J. K. McLean, F. W. Fisk, Daniels, Emerson; Drs. Behrends, Pentecost, Gregg, Twining, Sunderland, Little, Thompson, Webb, Stimson, Wellman, Withrow, Goodwin, Mears, Plumb, Cyrus Hamlin, John Eaton, O. O. Howard, J. E. Rankin, and scores of others.

Beginning with strictly self-evident truths, Professor Park's system of theology rises through anthropology and theism to soteriology and eschatology along an arch so stupendous that it can be appreciated only by a student who sees it as a whole and endeavors to transmute it into life. The center of the arch was always the doctrine of the Vicarious Atonement in its fullest and most overpowering biblical significance. Nothing absorbed Professor Park so profoundly, in any period of his life, as his contemplation of the scriptural plan for the deliverance of man from the guilt and the love of sin. He always spoke on this topic with the manner of one conscious of standing in the Holy of holies of the universe and looking upon incomparably the most overpowering and alluring self-revelation of God. Nothing moved him so irresistibly, or with an awe and an adoration so startlingly contagious, as did the supreme topic of the Vicarious Atonement, or that revealed arrangement in the Divine Government by which the demands of Justice and Mercy are reconciled through the voluntary sacrificial sufferings of Christ substituted for the punishment righteously due to sinners against Infinite Holiness.

On his ninetieth birthday, when asked to mention his favorite hymn and allow the company assembled at his side to sing it as a farewell, he chose at once the words which he said he oftenest repeated to himself in the night-watches, and listened with evidently almost uncontrollable emotion while his friends sang,—

"When I survey the wondrous Cross
On which the Prince of Glory died,
My richest gain I count but loss,
And pour contempt on all my pride."

No feeble creature is fit to be a theologian. Professor Park was intellectually and spiritually a giant. An Englishman of ability and culture, looking at a picture of Professor Park's bust, said to me, "That is a stronger head than Cardinal Manning's." Since Jonathan Edwards, Benjamin Franklin, and Daniel Webster, there has perhaps been no stronger head in American public life than Professor Park's. We may say this now that he has left us, and not be offensively personal. We may say it in gratitude to Providence for its gift to our times, and not be guilty of worshiping the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever.

No confused creature is fit to be a theologian. Professor Park was a prince of lucidity. He knew well that some things cannot be fully defined, but also that some other things can be. He was remarkable for the exactness and clearness of his definitions, within the ranges of thought to which definitions apply. He did not attempt to cover vagueness of thought by a claim that definitions are out of place. He had no affinity with the cloudy, evasive, cuttle-fish school in philosophy or theology. His manhood was such that he met the most exacting of the requirements of Aristotle as to clearness in definitions and coherency in argument.

No bloodless, icy creature is fit to be a theologian. Professor Park was a logician on fire. His sermons were chains of thought, but the chains were chain-lightning.

No narrow, wall-eyed creature is fit to be a theologian. Professor Park's comprehensiveness of mind and culture were sources of continual admiration among his pupils, and even among his opponents.

No extravagant, unbalanced creature is fit to be a theologian. Professor Park was powerful, comprehensive, many-sided, but absolutely without eccentricities. He was a specialist, but never a faddist. To the end of his great length of years, his heart was young. He was a friend of every up-grade new departure, like the work of Mr. Moody, whom he called a prodigy; like the Christian Endeavor Movement, international, interracial, evangelistic. He was a friend of no down-grade New Departure, and foresaw and foretold from afar the fatal perils of every such movement, and especially of the vagary that it may sometimes be safe for some men to die in their sins.

Humboldt spoke of Schleiermacher with admiration as at once a philosopher and a theologian; but, in his ripest period, Schleiermacher held, as did Professor Park, that the truths of Holy Scripture, received as an organic whole, are incomparably the highest philosophy known to man.

Schleiermacher wrote in his *best* days, and so Professor Park would have written on *any* day: "Christ is the quickening center of the church. From him comes all—to him all returns. We ought not to call ourselves Lutherans or Calvinists, but Evangelical Christians, after his name and his holy gospel."

"What would Jesus do? What I believe that he would do in my circumstances, I will do." This question and pledge constitute a whole globe of precepts, carrying all the meridians and parallels of faith and duty.

Professor Park's views of philosophy, theology, and history were as Christocentric as those of Schleiermacher and Neander; he was in full accord with the substance and spirit of Julius Müller's "Doctrine of Sin"; but he was wholly free from the occasional eccentricities of teaching that detract from the influence of so many of even distinguished theologians, and have caused Schleiermacher him-

self to be spoken of in church history as teaching as many errors as Origen.

An alert and commanding practical aim has given spiritual vitality, biblical balance, and evangelical emphasis to the teaching of the foremost American theologians. Many of them have been eminent both as preachers and as theological teachers. Systematic theology ought to be suspected of serious hidden error, if, as applied theology, it does not work well generation after generation, and century after century. It is the profoundest conviction of American evangelical churches that if a theology is true to the whole of Scripture and so deserves to be called balanced and complete, or thoroughly biblical, it will be found to be sensible and defensible and to work well—otherwise not.

Aversion to new truth is one of the worst forms of heresy, but so also is faith in fast-and-loose faddists. In the royal line of American theologians from Jonathan Edwards to Professor Park, there has been, by the blessing of heaven, no timid traditionalist or rash adventurer, no schismatic, no eccentric or dreamer, no mere barnacle, no weather-vane, no faddist. The balance and soundness of Professor Park's completed system of instruction are as undeniable as its acuteness, clearness, and depth. His philosophy is as devout as his theology, and his theology as scientific as his philosophy.

It has been my fortune to study the methods and personalities of Tholuck and Julius Müller of Halle, Delitzsch, Luthardt, and Kahnis of Leipzig, Dorner of Berlin, Christlieb of Bonn, and Ritschl of Göttingen; but in no one of these did I find as richly endowed or as impressive a theological teacher and preacher, or, according to my best judgment, as safe a guide, and certainly not as inspiring a personal force, as Professor Park. Nor have I in England, Scotland, or America, after a varied experience, found his peer. After invaluable opportunities of personal inter-

course with Professor Park as a frequent guest or host for thirty years, and after a third of a century of theological study by no means confined to New England theology, it is only when I think of Schleiermacher, Leibnitz, Kant, Edwards, Calvin, and St. Augustine that I seem to be on the intellectual and spiritual level of Professor Park.

Is it asked what the *value* of this leadership has been and may yet be? The whole range of our religious history with its misleading partisan cries, and discordant watch-words, proclaims this martial, commanding and yet tender anthem of biblical truth to be as invaluable as any note of merely human origin heard in our day. Professor Park's tone may be said, reverently, to have been, in his highest moments, an echo of the saints triumphant, an echo of the saints militant, an echo of the loftiest and wisest seers and sayers of all ages, an echo of the whole range of biblical truth, an echo of all that is audible at the foot of the Cross.

One who for thirty years had abundant opportunity to catch inspiration from his voice and countenance heard of his departure with tumultuous emotion, but in a scene of natural beauty fitted to raise the thoughts to the world into which all men haste. This bereaved pupil, passing down the west shore of the Hudson, the river on the one side and the Catskills on the other, meditated long, not only concerning the origin and the value of Professor Park's tone of awe and self-effacement, but also on its continuance in the city which hath foundations. In that student's note-books I have found a passage on this final and supreme topic, and entitled, without undue audacity:—

PROFESSOR PARK NOW.

In silver haze the Catskills lay,
Like lucent billows dashed with spray;
Above, the soundless, westering sun,
In space through which archangels run.

Stupendous with its spokes of gold,
Ezekiel's Wheel in azure rolled;
And gazed on it both land and sea,
Awe-struck with heaven's immensity.

To stand before the Eternal Throne,
Here first I heard that he had gone,
Who taught, with awe, supernal lore
In dazzling Scriptures to explore.

Dim symbols were those skies and hills:
Celestial hights, above all ills,
He now has reached, and strikes his lyre
Of praise with awe-struck angels' choir.

Stupendous with its Spokes of Gold,
Ezekiel's Wheel in Heaven rolled,
And gazed on it the Seraphim;
And in their cohorts saw I him.

ARTICLE VII.

PHYSICAL PREPARATION FOR ISRAEL IN
PALESTINE.

BY G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

I.

DURING the months of December and January last, I have been permitted to traverse the entire length of Palestine under exceptionally favorable circumstances, and have had brought to my attention several points in which the physical features of the country have had an important bearing on its history. These I will briefly summarize, leaving the fuller discussion of them for a period of greater leisure. Our route led from Beirut, across the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountains, to Damascus, thence over the south shoulder of Mount Hermon to Banias (Cæsarea Philippi) and the ancient Dan, thence south to Lake Galilee, Nazareth, Jezreel, Samaria, Shechem, Shiloh, Jerusalem, Jericho, Mar Saba, Bethlehem, Hebron, the south end of the Dead Sea, Engedi, then back to Jerusalem and down to Joppa.

I. ISOLATION IN A CENTRAL LOCALITY.

The peculiar development of Israel demanded isolation in a peculiar country. Otherwise they would have been amalgamated with the more numerous, more powerful, and more civilized heathen around them, and their exclusive religious development would have been rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, if their religion was to become universal, the theater of historical

development must be at a pivotal point of the great national movements of the world's development. Both these ends were secured in Palestine by a remarkable combination of geological and physical forces which has commanded the admiration of all profound students of the subject.

The "great fault of the Jordan Valley" was pronounced by Humboldt "the most remarkable geological feature anywhere to be found in the world"; while Karl Ritter, in his elaborate geographical publications ever returned to this cleft in the earth's surface, as the most significant fact in the natural history of the globe. This "fault," or crack in the crust of the earth, extends from Antioch on the Orontes River, in Syria, to the south end of the Gulf of Akaba, on the east side of the Sinaitic Peninsula, a distance of about one thousand miles. The Lebanon Mountains, Western Palestine, and the Desert of Sinai are on one side of it. The Anti-Lebanon Range and the elevated plains of Moab and Northern Arabia are on the other side. Along the whole dividing line the rocky strata were fractured, and the eastern edge of the western portion slipped down, while the western edge of the eastern mass was elevated.

The depression is most pronounced in the valley of the Jordan and the Dead Sea. Lake Huleh and the marshy plain extending north to Cæsarea Philippi are almost exactly at sea-level; but Lake Galilee is more than 600 feet, and the Dead Sea 1,292 feet, below the level of the Mediterranean. In its deepest place the bottom of the Dead Sea is 2,600 feet below ocean-level, and since the heights of Moab and those near Hebron are more than 3,000 feet above the Mediterranean, it follows that the bottom of the Dead Sea is depressed nearly 6,000 feet below the general land-level. The rock strata on the surface of the plains of Moab correspond to those on the western margin of the Jordan Valley and of the Dead Sea. Western Palestine is a gigantic arch

of rock strata, with Shiloh, Jerusalem, and Hebron on its summit, its eastern foot at the bottom of the Dead Sea, and its western base below the plains of Philistia on the Mediterranean.

The western arch, however, has one remarkable interruption in Palestine. This appears in the plain of Esdraelon, which occupies a "cross-fault," extending from the Jordan a little south of Lake Galilee to the Mediterranean at the north end of Mount Carmel. Nazareth lies a little to the north of this cross-fracture, while the Mount of Precipitation, over which his fellow-townsmen were on the point of casting Jesus, is a portion of the northern cliff facing Esdraelon produced by the geographical fault, or fracture. Mount Tabor, a few miles to the east, is an outlying mass of rock which did not settle down with the rest of the valley, and is still connected by a low ridge with the main mass to the north.

The summit of the valley of Esdraelon, between Mount Tabor and Jezreel, is only about 500 feet above the Mediterranean. The depression, therefore, affords the natural line of communication between the shores of this sea and the country east of the Jordan. This was the main route followed by the caravans from the valley of the Euphrates through Damascus to the Mediterranean at Acre, and thence along the shore to Egypt. It was this which made the valley of Esdraelon the great battle-field between the east and the west. Recently an English company has surveyed and partly graded a railway from Acre through this valley to the Jordan, and thence to Damascus. Thus, from first to last, it has been a great highway for the nations.

Yet, upon either side the ascent to the hills is so rapid, and the country so inaccessible, that there has been little temptation for military occupation by foreigners. When Napoleon led his expedition from Egypt to Syria, he established his headquarters for a while on the plain at Ramleh, near

Joppa, and later besieged Acre, and made his headquarters near Jezreel; while his ablest general Kléber fought an important battle at the base of Mount Tabor. Meanwhile Jerusalem was left undisturbed in its isolated position among the mountains of Judæa. When asked why he did not capture Jerusalem, Napoleon replied that it was so out of the way that it was of no general military significance. There can be no question, that the warning of the prophets against alliances with the great nations in the valleys of the Nile and Euphrates conformed to the highest principles of both military and political wisdom. There was little motive for Assyria to capture Jerusalem, except as she was an ally of Egypt. Her strength was in the natural independence of her isolation.

Next to the Caucasus, Judæa is, from a military point of view, one of the most easily defended regions in the world. The approaches from the west are through steep and circuitous mountain gorges, in which an attacking army is in constant peril from surprises. The trails from Samaria to Jerusalem are, even now, almost impassable to horses, while the desert and difficult roads protect it from the south. Joshua's march from Jericho up the valley to the summit at Ai and Bethel, a few miles north of Jerusalem, exhibited the perfection of military tactics. From this point of vantage he could sweep along the central ridge to the south, and easily occupy the main positions of importance. Providence was not altogether blind in leading the children of Israel through Moab to the head of the Dead Sea and to the passes that lead thence to the central part of the Promised Land.

North of the valley of Esdraelon the land was almost equally protected. The approach to Lake Galilee by the Jordan Valley is difficult. The entire east-and-west "fault" facing Esdraelon from the north presents a precipitous front which is easily defended. The mountains on both the east and the

west side of the valley, beginning at the south end of Lake Galilee and extending to the ancient Dan, are lofty, and inaccessible to a military force; while north of Dan the valley between Lebanon and Mount Hermon is so deeply filled with the débris of a recent volcanic eruption that it is practically impassable. The Litany River, which rises near Baalbeck and flows south through the valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, as though it would join the waters of the Jordan Valley, meets this barrier, and suddenly turns at a right angle to join the Mediterranean near Sidon. The observant traveler cannot fail to be impressed with the completeness of this barrier as he crosses its southern projection near Dan, and takes a glance at the successive steps with which the volcanic material rises across the valley to the north.

Thus, with this barrier of rough basaltic rocks to the north, the precipitous mountain walls on the east and west, and the desert on the south, Palestine was specially prepared to be the home of a "Peculiar People." At the same time the great highway between the east and the west passed through its center, but so walled in that there was little temptation for an armed force to interfere with peaceable people on either side. So that, as Origen forcibly maintained, Palestine, though insignificant in itself, was so centrally situated that it was the fittest of all places for the dissemination of Christianity to the ends of the earth.

II. THREE GREAT MIRACLES.

The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the parting of the waters of the Jordan, and the falling of the walls of Jericho, are three notable miracles upon which the physical history of Palestine sheds interesting light. These were, doubtless, what are styled "mediate miracles." That is, they are miracles in which the secondary agencies used by the Divine Will are clearly traceable. This, however, does

not in any degree detract from the divine power displayed in them. They may be compared to the explosion of a mine which has been prepared for a particular emergency, such as occurs when an enemy is directly over it. Since its explosion is not left to chance, but is brought about at a particular time to accomplish a particular purpose, it is lifted out of the category of the established order of nature, and made to conform to the definition of the immediate acts of a free will. In these cases the accomplishments are also so clearly superhuman that they are indubitably miraculous.

All these three miracles seem to be directly connected with the natural causes which have produced the "great Jordan Fault," and which render the region specially subject to earthquakes, to one of which the falling of the walls of Jericho may be directly referred for its secondary cause. But it is as easy to conceive of a direct control of the secondary causes of an earthquake by the Divine Will as it is to understand how one's arm is moved by the human will. A miracle is as natural to the Divine Will as an ordinary physical act is to a human will. The mine beneath the walls of Jericho was, however, so deeply laid that only divine power and prescience could explode it at the proper time to accomplish its spiritual purposes.

The parting of the waters of the Jordan has been thought by some to have been caused by a landslip somewhere above, which temporarily cut off the water below. Such an interruption of the waters of the Columbia River in Oregon is known to have occurred at the Cascades, where an old channel was permanently obstructed by an immense landslide, producing a lake above, whose outlet is still over the rocks which cause the cascade. Having studied this somewhat carefully several years ago, it was with it in mind that I entered the Jordan Valley at Jericho, near the ford above the Dead Sea. But on reaching the river's bank certain

phenomena instantly presented themselves, which point to another explanation.

Near the Pilgrims' Bathing-Place, the east bank of the river is so eroded by the stream as to present a perpendicular face. This consists of fine sediment, about thirty feet thick, which has been deposited by the river when standing at a higher level, and subsequently channeled by it when the land-level was relatively higher. But what was still more significant, was that there were here clear indications of three changes of level: First, there had been an elevation of about fifteen feet, during which erosion had proceeded to that extent. Then there had been a return of the water to the higher level and a re-sedimentation up to the old limit. This was followed by a re-channeling of the whole, during which the river had cut through both the later and upper sediment, and also for fifteen feet lower down.

The most natural interpretation of this succession is, that, after the channel had been cut down the first fifteen feet, there was an elevation, through subterranean forces, of the bed of the stream a mile or two below. This would dam up the water temporarily, and afford a dry crossing-place for a few hours, or even longer, and make the waters seem to pile up above, as described in Josh. iii. 16. When, however, at length, the water began to run over the obstacle to its progress, there would be opportunity to refill with sediment a part of its bed above; so that, on later re-erosion to its present level, it would present the phenomena now to be observed. I have not evidence sufficient to form an opinion as to whether the episode in the river's history brought to light by these facts relates to the same epoch with that of the miracle recorded in the Pentateuch; but it certainly gives a plausible explanation of the probable secondary causes used in accomplishing it. Here, again, was a particular use, for a moral purpose, of the subterra-

nean forces which have so long operated in producing the great depression of the Jordan Valley. If one contends that the exhibition of this force at that time was foreordained, he must still bring in prophetic, or divine, foresight to secure the presence of the hosts of Israel there at the precise juncture, and this involves all the essential elements of a miracle.

The probable secondary causes employed in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah have been so well described by Sir J. W. Dawson in his "Egypt and Syria" (pp. 127-131) that a few additional remarks are all that is necessary. The Upper Cretaceous strata which, in the great Jordan Fault, have been thrown down below the level of the Dead Sea, contain much bituminous limestone, such as naturally gives rise to pools of petroleum and inflammable gas. Familiarity with the gas and oil regions of the United States, and a recent visit to the still more remarkable oil-fields at Baku, on the Caspian Sea, make the description of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah seem exceedingly natural and lifelike.

American papers, just received, report an oil-well recently opened in Texas which sends up to a height of 200 feet a stream of oil six inches in diameter, and pours out 25,000 barrels of oil per day. The late Professor Orton told me that he had seen the pressure-gauge on a gas-well in Central New York register 2,600 pounds to the square inch. The pressure on the piston of a locomotive rarely goes much over from 130 to 180 pounds to the square inch. The oil-fields at Baku on the Caspian Sea are limited to a few square miles, yet this small area produces as much as all the American fields combined. When a well is sunk a few hundred feet to the subterranean reservoir, the oil comes up with such force that there is no possibility of controlling it. The drills are thrown out by the force of the pressure, together with such quantities of stones, that

the derricks are battered to pieces, and a cone of débris is piled up around the orifice. Meanwhile the oil is caught by dams in the open fields. The region of the Dead Sea is a somewhat similar gas and oil field, over a deep fissure in the earth leading far down towards its central fires. The description of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah reads almost exactly like that of some of the scenes known to have accompanied the burning of various petroleum wells and of the stores of inflammable substances surrounding them. The biblical story is too sober and realistic to have been invented. The whole story is told in a few words: "And the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven; and he overthrew those cities, and all the plain" (Gen. xix. 24). From the heights of Hebron, about thirty miles away, where Abraham was, the plain about the end of the Dead Sea could not be seen. Instead he saw the smoke of the catastrophe ascending "as the smoke of a furnace." Nothing pertaining to this description has the air of fiction. There is nothing fantastic or extravagant about it, except as the facts naturally entering into the history are in themselves stranger than fiction.

Nor is the fate of Lot's wife altogether anomalous. The eruptions of gas and oil are often accompanied with eruptions of salt slime such as presumably enveloped her as she lingered behind. The description of her death is certainly very sober, and unconnected with the fantastic elements which have been attached to it in many popular representations. The phrase "pillar of salt" is more definite than the original demands. Mound of salt would probably more nearly express the idea. But salt is an abundant constituent of the rocks around the Dead Sea. The lower strata of Jebel Usdum at the south end consist of solid salt 150 feet thick. The pillars left by the erosion of this stratum have given shape to the popular conception.

Again we repeat, that this explanation of the miracle, while it strongly confirms the truth of the record, does not in the least degree impair the miraculous character of the event. The use of these natural forces to accomplish the moral purposes of the catastrophe involves the direct action of the Creator as really as the aiming and firing of a gun at a mark does that of a free human agent. The conjunction of this natural catastrophe with this particular epoch in the history both of Lot and of Abraham could not have been accidental. If the divine agency was not directly involved in setting free at that instant the physical forces producing the catastrophe, it was involved in securing the relation of Lot and Abraham to it. But it is as easy to believe that the Lord directly used the forces prepared as that a huntsman directly fires a gun.

CAIRO, EGYPT, January 23, 1901.

ARTICLE VIII.

SOCIOLOGY A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY.

BY PROFESSOR WALTER E. C. WRIGHT, D.D.

SOCIOLOGY deals with human beings in their mutual relations. It investigates how men live together. Historical sociology is concerned with every detail of that which has been, and is, in the interactions of man upon man. Theoretical sociology, basing itself on history, does not refuse to consider any possible interrelation of individual men. It is interested in the individual, however, only in his relation to others. Crusoe on his island is not a subject of sociological study until joined by the man Friday. Nevertheless every characteristic of every individual is of sociological interest, for the way men will react on each other depends on what they are in themselves.

The basal forces of sociology are the instincts, sentiments, and purposes that produce and influence associated life. These activities of the soul are conditioned by the powers man possesses for attaining their various ends. These powers again are conditioned and influenced by the forces of nature outside of man. Nothing that pertains to man within or without is foreign to sociology. Sumner has happily phrased this breadth of the science in saying, "Its elementary conditions are set by the nature of human beings and the nature of the earth."¹ In this statement, "the nature of human beings" is properly put first, because it is fundamental; "the nature of the earth" is secondary, for it affects society only through its influence on human beings.

¹ Sumner's *Essays*, p. 82.

The physical conditions of the earth have set around some wide regions barriers that society has so far found impassable. There is no society within hundreds of miles of the poles. There is none in several waterless regions of considerable extent in other zones. On the edge of the uninhabitable polar regions, and near the earth's absolute deserts, a scattered population maintains only a crude society. It cannot reach high development where there is lack of numbers and of physical resources. On the other hand, tropical islands of genial climate and great fertility have seldom been the theater of a highly developed social state. Too easy physical conditions tend to depress human activity, and fail to develop self-restraint. Without industry, prudence, and foresight in individuals, society can be little more than an embryo. It does not follow that sociology is a physical science, as Buckle argued a generation ago, attempting to find almost the entire explanation of history in soil and climate.¹ Equally extreme was Dr. Draper, who made isothermal lines account for Catholicism and Protestantism, as well as for the Civil War in the United States.²

Sociology can never in this way be reduced to the simplicity of the physical sciences. The motions of the solar system come from the interaction of two constant, unchanging forces. Initial momentum and gravitation account for every movement, and are the data for predicting the future positions, of every member of the system. Nor Earth nor Mars nor Jupiter can increase nor diminish these forces. But in society the individual members by their very personality are centers of positive force. Not only does one great man often alter the face of society, but men in their combined activity change the very face of nature.³

¹ *History of Civilization in England*. Introduction, Chap. ii.

² *History of the Civil War in America*, Vol. i. pp. 89-125.

³ *Marah, Man and Nature*.

Nor can sociology be reduced to the terms of either chemistry or biology. Chemistry is far more complicated than physics, for the elements are many, and each has various affinities, so that the combinations are practically infinite. Biology is still more intricate. Plants and animals must obey gravitation and every other physical force, and have their being amid the unceasing activity of all the chemical forces; but, at the same time, by their vital power, they use all these lower forces for higher ends. The oak tree is no rebel against gravitation and capillary attraction and endosmose and exosmose, nor against chemical affinity and the sun's actinic rays, when it lifts from the earth and gathers from the air the elements it shapes into woody fiber fit for the timbers of a war-ship. Yet the oak is higher than these forces it makes use of. Physics and chemistry will not tell the whole story of the oak. It belongs in the field of biology. Its story is a chapter of life.

The whole story of human society cannot be told by physics and chemistry and biology. Man himself is higher than all these, though obedient to all their laws. He cannot sever himself from physical forces. But he can make use of these forces. He adjusts his waterwheel to the falling water, and makes the cataract grind his food corn. He turns this force of falling water into electricity, carries the electricity this way or that, and turns it back into mechanical force at the place where he wishes it, or transforms it into light for street or dwelling. He trims his sails and sets his rudder to make the north wind carry him east or west as he wills. Man cannot break away from the forces of chemistry. He uses those forces to turn brittle ore into tenacious iron and serviceable steel. He puts together the elements of gunpowder or dynamite, and uses either as he will, whether it be for beneficence or for mischief. What can he not do with chemical forces if the present rate of laboratory invention continues a little longer?

It is equally true that man while under biological forces is also able with intelligent freedom to use them for his own purposes. Man cannot by taking thought add one cubit to his stature. He can choose for perpetuation and multiplication the useful variations of plant and animal. Man not only adapts his agriculture to the soil and climate of his locality, but by intelligent selection among natural varieties he has covered his fields with choice grains, and filled his orchards with trees that bear luscious fruit. He eats now bananas and oranges unencumbered with seeds and expects a seedless grape. His domesticated animals, horses, cattle, sheep, even swine, show what use his intelligent purpose can make of the forces of biology. According to man's varying desires he breeds draft horses for strength, or racers for speed; he rears in one place herds for dairy products, in another place for beef; or one flock of sheep to meet the need of clothing, and another to supply food for the table.

In still another way man shows even more strikingly that he moves in a higher plane than that of biology. The highest type of man rules over his own instincts and impulses. His intelligence judges whether and how far they are safe guides. His will decides whether to give them at any time free rein or to curb and restrain them. Man's power of intelligent choice puts his life in a different category from the phenomena of biology. Personality is the supreme factor in men's life together. The study of sociology is a psychological study.

While the nature of man himself as a rational and moral being is thus the most important force in producing the phenomena of society, the nature of the earth is also a contributory force of no small significance. Geographical influences can so work upon men as to produce great social results. Rich mines allure a different type of men from those that are attracted by fertile soil. The difference in

the people thus drawn together insures a different social development in the mining camp from that of the farming community; or in the mild climate sought out by invalids from that in a region of frost and storm to which only the robust venture.

This attractive force of conditions and resources is not the only means by which geography influences society. External conditions affect human character by inciting some elements to higher activity, and by either lulling others into inactivity where there is little occasion for their exercise, or even suppressing some latent elements through refusing them any possibility of achievement. The good harbors on the coast of Greece were a factor in early Greek society, because of their psychological influence on the men of Greece, inciting them to venture out upon the fickle sea, and developing strenuously the qualities that are exercised in navigation.¹ The lack of thrift which so often stifles the social life of semi-tropical regions is readily accounted for by the fact that the shortness and mildness of the winter season renders it unnecessary to make any considerable provision against the cold. The genesis of the "hoodlum" in San Francisco has been explained by Professor Royce by the safety with which truant children can sleep out during the larger part of the year in that genial climate.² Of whatever sort and however great these influences from physical geography are, they never can be a social force apart from human beings to act upon. We may call them factors, but the nature of the product is determined by the nature of the multiplicand. The impor-

¹ Shaler, *Sea and Land*, p. 153 ff.

² See *International Monthly* for November, 1900, art. "The Pacific Coast: A Psychological Study of Influence," where Professor Royce sets forth, with great suggestiveness, the combined effect on both individual and social life of the geographical conditions of the Pacific Coast, and the conditions under which it was settled. Some of the influences he points out have only the force of opportunity, others are positive stimuli.

tance of physical conditions in relation to society should not be suffered to obscure the fact that the one source of society is the social nature of man.

Is not this argument simply beating down a man of straw? Do not all writers on sociology when pressed for ultimate statements recognize the forces that mold and move society as forces of the soul? It is claimed by the later apologists of Mr. Buckle, that he gives a psychological explanation of "secondary civilizations." Buckle and his school have not made that impression on most readers. They have seemed rather determined to account for all psychological phenomena as the effect of physical environment. It is sometimes difficult to know whether, by what a writer calls psychological forces, he means anything more than the resultant of environment and organization. Some that talk much of psychology, the science of the soul, do not clearly represent the soul as anything more than a succession of activities. They regard life as the result, instead of the cause, of organization. Think of a sociologist, who is psychological beyond most, using as if it were an axiom the statement "habitual activity determines human character"! Habitual passivity determines the shape and movement of inanimate things. The clay takes whatever form the potter impresses upon it; the driftwood moves wherever and at whatever rate the current carries it. But activity belongs to life. Because man is a living soul he can act. His character determines his actions. His character is a cause. The whole field of sociology is thrown into a distorting perspective, unless the activity of the individual soul is kept in the foreground, and the reactions of physical environment and human environment and of organization are relegated to their proper place in the background.

The psychological elements of sociology are not limited to either man's sensibility or his intellect or his will. All the functions of the soul play their part singly or com-

bined. It may be questioned, indeed, whether these functions are not all present in varying proportions in every act of the soul. Sociology will reach nothing conclusive if it is made a study simply of the feelings and desires. Even political economy was sadly inadequate, so long as it recognized in man nothing but the desire to buy cheap, and sell dear, and make gain.

Neither may sociology stop with the intellectual activities of the soul, as if man were an apparatus for observing and classifying phenomena, as any other sort of a logical machine. The intellect rightly claims large recognition in the study. It is evident on the very surface of history, that a great discovery or an important invention is able to transform the social life of whole nations and of the world. The last half-century has seen marvelous changes brought about by enlarging intelligence in regard to electricity. Incalculably greater was the change produced in prehistoric times by the inventors of the art of working in iron. Intelligence is a tremendous force in society, but no measure of intelligence can obliterate human emotion and desire. In fact it may be questioned whether intelligence is not secondary to feeling, compelled to do its chief work through inciting or directing the desires.

There are, also, most important ethical aspects to sociology. New religious convictions and moral purposes have many times renovated society. At the same time there is no more common popular error on this subject than to conceive of sociology as a branch of ethics. Programs for bettering the world do not make up the body of sociology. They are only devices for applying principles. The science is in the principles. The principles must deal with human feeling and knowledge as well as choice. Programs for improving society are fatally defective if they consider only what men ought to do. The wise legislator must consider what all sorts of men will do. His laws will not accom-

plish their wished-for purpose unless enacted in view of how they will affect the ignorant as well as the intelligent, the dishonest and selfish as well as the upright and patriotic. Human nature as its highest attribute possesses the power of moral choice. But wide regions of human activity are spontaneous, automatic, and these must be fully considered by sociology. They fill large spaces in the associated life of the race.

Systems of sociology must be ultimately judged, not by the skill they exhibit in observation and classification, so much as by their underlying philosophical principles. A man may be great in mathematics, or chemistry, or perhaps in biology, whether he believes in a soul or not. No one is a safe master in sociology unless he has a right apprehension of the powers and activities of the human soul. Sociology is a psychological study.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTE.

DANTE'S VISION OF SIN.

IN these days when the consciousness of sin is waning, it is an encouraging sign, that the study of Dante is becoming increasingly popular, and that the circle is rapidly widening of those who are beholding the sovereign realities of life through the clearest eyes that for ten centuries looked into the heart of man. The women of Verona whispered to one another as the lonely exile, grim, swarthy, with hair and beard black and crisp, passed along the street, "See, he has been in hell!" He had been deep in the heart of things, and there had first seen sights of woe, and then visions of unspeakable glory. What he saw he spoke in words of rarest melody, and they survive the centuries because he uttered elemental truths in forms of exquisite beauty.

It is the common opinion of those who know the great Florentine simply through Doré's illustrations of the *Inferno*, that Dante was a savage-souled mediæval poet who gloated over the grotesque, and sought to frighten timid souls into obedience to the church by vivid descriptions of the torments of the damned. Dante was to a degree the child of his time, and undoubtedly believed in a prison-house of everlasting torture; but this was not the inspiration of his poem. He considered himself a prophet sent from God to startle a frivolous world by lifting up before its eyes a commanding vision of actualities. He must show men what sin is, how to escape from it, and what is the supreme beatitude. This burden which God had laid upon his soul found imperishable expression in the "*Divine Comedy*": in an *Inferno*, which is a vision of sin; a *Purgatorio*, a description of the way of purification; and a *Paradiso*, a powerful delineation of the raptures of the redeemed.

This poet-prophet left it to theologians to define sin; he would reveal it in its monstrosity and naked hideousness. The scene must be laid in the next world, for it is there iniquity comes to its awful growth. The seed is sown in this life, the harvest ripens in eternal woe: hence he must needs go among the "truly dead" for prophetic as well as artistic purposes. What did this deep-souled, clear-visioned man tell the world that sin is?

In the architecture of the infernal region he sets forth his conception of the different degrees of iniquity. Sitting behind the great tomb of Pope Anastasius, while they were becoming accustomed to the horrible

excess of stretch which was coming up from the deep abyss of the pit, Virgil unfolds to Dante the structural plan of hell. It is constructed so that those who have sinned most heinously are the deepest down, and thus farthest from God; for sin separates from the Most High. There is a broad distinction between sins of impulse and those of settled habit. Of all the dispositions which heaven abides not, incontinence is the least offensive. Therefore the outbreaks of the turbulent and untaught passions—carnality, gluttony, anger—are punished in the upper circles; the pit of hell is reserved for sins of malice. Malice wins the hate of God, because it seeks the injury of others, either by force or fraud. Of the two, fraud is the worse; therefore, the fraudulent are in the lowest circles, and more woe assails them. Thus the great Tuscan passes judgment upon the fundamental division of wrong-doing: incontinence, violence, and fraud.

We make the same general distinctions. Sins of the flesh are less culpable than those of the spirit. Warm-blooded, impetuous faults are not so damnable as reptilian craft and sneaking deceit. The publicans and harlots go into the kingdom before the Pharisees. Dante differs from our modern thought, however, in this. We usually consider that guilt lies in the intention rather than in the act. He adopts the elemental principle of Roman jurisprudence, that punishment shall be proportional to the evil effects upon society from wrong-doing. The individual is accountable, not for the nature of the crime *per se*, but for the injury done to others. Hence treachery, being the most devastating in its consequences, is the blackest of all sins, and the arch-traitors against church and state he sees feeding the bloody maw of Lucifer himself.

Dante employs three distinct ways of revealing the nature of each sin. It is symbolized in the repulsive monster presiding over each circle; in the environment in which the sinner is punished; and in the condition and torment of the sinner himself.

For the nine circles there are nine frightful demons, each typifying the sin over which he rules. There is Minos abiding horribly; Pluto with his swollen lips, clucking his cry of alarm as Reason invades the domain of avarice; Geryon, type of fraud, with the face of a just man, a serpentine body and stinging tail. But it is Lucifer, at the very bottom of the pit, at the center of the earth, and therefore at that part of the universe farthest removed from God, who is the perfect type of sin in its essence. Huge, bloody, loathsome, grotesque, self-absorbed, every moment sending forth chilling death, making others woeful in his own woes, punishing his followers with frightful torture, and thus undoing himself; what more fitting personification could this Italian seer have devised to show evil in its real deformity and folly? The unsightly and self-centered Lucifer is a truer characterization of sin in its last analysis than either Milton's Satan or Goethe's Mephistopheles. In *Paradise Lost*, sin is audacious rebellion, challenging our admiration by its daring and

strength; Faust finds Mephistopheles a very attractive companion; but it was reserved for Dante to show sin in its true nature as hideous and foul loathsomeness, sacrificing others to its own appetite, and concentrating all its energies toward a blind self-indulgence. No one can read the *Inferno* and bear away the impression that sin contains any element of beauty or profit. It is ludicrous, sterile, detestable.

The environment in which the sinner is punished also indicates the general character of the sin. The incontinent dwell in murky darkness, signifying the condition of their minds darkened by fleshly lusts; the violent are in a zone of fire, for violence is a flame; the treacherous are in a sphere of barrenness and arctic cold, because sin at its worst is not fiery torment, but frigid and filthy deadness. The clear-seeing Tuscan prophet did not make the common mistake of representing the depth of sin as burning torture. The lowest pit of hell is a field of bloody ice.

The condition of the sufferers is perhaps the most graphic portrayal of the nature of the sin for which they are in woe. Dante believed that the penalty of sin is to dwell in it. Man is punished by his sins rather than for them. Hell is to live in the evil character one has made for himself. "Wherewithal a man sinneth, with the same also shall he be punished." Therefore, we have but to observe the appearance, the action, the feelings, of these denizens of hell, to know what the preternatural insight of the poet had discerned the sin to be. He teaches that the delights of illicit love seem sweet, but in reality they are a smiting storm, whirling and driving onward the shrieking and blaspheming spirits forever more. Violence against God is most powerfully painted. On a floor of dry and dense sand, blasphemers were lying supine; usurers, mere lumps of selfishness, were crouching; sodomites were raging about in their carnal passion, while "over all the sand, with a slow falling, were raining down dilated flakes of fire, as of snow on Alps without a wind." This indicates that that life is barren that is hostile to God, and against such God is a consuming fire. What sin is in its essential nature and its inevitable consequences, this grim painter portrays in the terrible nocturnes that make up the *Inferno*.

What did this austere prophet find out sin to be, as, following the light of reason, he penetrated to its very depths? He learned first of all that the woe of the lost is to lack a knowledge of God. When they reached the gate of hell, Virgil said to him: "We have come to the place where I have told thee that thou shalt see the woeful people, who have lost the good of the understanding." It was Dante's thought that heaven is to vividly realize that God is in all things, and that all things are in God, bound in one volume of love. To lose this sense of God and his love, not to see his justice in punishment, to be forever blind to his compassion and truth, this blackness of darkness is hell.

He found that the soul given over to evil does not seek to escape to the light. The Greek tradition placed the monster Cerberus at the gate

of the lower world, but Dante found it unguarded, for the souls who have rejected the life of God tend downward.

Sin is unreasonable. After he had once passed into the gloom of the lost, the poet carefully avoids speaking the name of Virgil, the symbol of reason, for sin is the abnegation of reason. We may fabricate innumerable excuses, but can give no valid reason for sinning.

It is thoroughly selfish. The souls on the banks of the livid marsh of Acheron blame God, their parents, the human race, and everybody but themselves, for their cruel fate. Sin is thus a denial of selfhood. It is a repudiation of responsibility and a surrender of freedom. As before indicated, the most perfect type of sin is the self-indulgent Lucifer, entirely engrossed in his own feeding.

Dante was certainly no believer in the popular modern teaching, that the rejection of God ultimates in the annihilation of the wicked. Sin demonizes, but does not destroy the strength of the will. This is taught in many lurid pictures. When Farinata rose in his burning sepulcher and "straightened himself up with breast and front as though he held hell in great scorn," and in his disdainful patrician pride first asked the poet, "Who were thy ancestors?" ere he entered into conversation, he certainly showed no abatement in the force of his imperious will. In this Dante agrees with Shakespeare and Milton. Villainy did not weaken the intellectual cunning of Iago or cripple the rebellious energy of Satan.

The vision of Sin is not a fiction, created to delight or terrify. Neither is it a nightmare dream of horror, born in an age of superstition, and fated to pass away with the creed that gave it birth. It is sober reality. We have all beheld in a lesser degree what Dante saw with his keener sight. We, too, have seen the unstable blown about "like the sand when the whirlwind breathes," stung by the pestering gadflies and wasps of petty passion and annoyances. We have seen "people of much worth" carry intellectual culture to its highest point, yet lacking Christian faith, live without hope in a limbo where "sighs made the eternal air to tremble." We have seen the slaves of anger with look of hurt smiting one another as they stand in the foul fen of the river of hate. We have seen the violent shut the gates of the city of Dis in the face of Reason, but open them at the touch of some heavenly messenger of grace. We have seen flatterers wallowing in their own filth; and many an Alberigo, whose body lives, but whose soul is shrouded in icy death. All these and much more have we seen in our own experience, and perhaps we have felt them too; for who is he who has never put his feet into the ways of death, and walked in the paths of darkness and of fire? Happy have we been, if Reason has led us out of sin to behold "those beauteous things which heaven bears," and we have come forth to see again the stars, and have humbly washed the grime from off our faces in the dews of repentance. We have all had our visions of Sin; but it was reserved for one rare and

solitary spirit, exiled from his beloved city, stripped of all deadening luxuries, kept by dolorous poverty near to the deep heart of reality, to have his sight so clarified by years of study, of wandering, and of bitter disappointment that he could comprehend the sin of the world in all its dark horror, its fiery lawlessness, and its cold monstrosity, and then with almost superhuman genius set forth the vision, burned upon his brain, is a picture so lurid and darkly magnificent that it could never fade from the thought of man.

CHARLES A. DINSMORE.

Boston, Mass.

ARTICLE X.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE EXAMPLE OF JESUS.

MR. SHELDON'S book "In His Steps" has been read by millions all through the civilized world, notwithstanding the lack of anything pronounced in the author, or brilliant in the presentation, or striking in the meaning of the book. Three suggestions may be given as a partial explanation of this wide interest :—

1. The book is in the nature of a protest, and the protestations of a man invariably attract the attention of his fellow-men. The fault-finding instinct is strong in human nature.

2. Still stronger is the book's appeal to sentimentally heroic. It is suggested by the title "In His Steps." At once is seen a far-off glory ; and, musing upon the theme, the heart burns within. How the past comes before the vision !—the shores of Gennesaret, the fields of Galilee, the valley of Judaea, the streets of Jerusalem, and the rough sides of Calvary's mountain ! To walk in his steps, what a splendid achievement ! Commonplace as the thought and language of the book are, it is well-nigh impossible to read its pages without a sentimental and mystical working of the imagination.

3. There is another appeal in the book, an appeal that is deeper and more reliable than the two mentioned, namely, the appeal to the consciousness of the Christian church on its ethical side. The man who wrote this book has a program. If by a very clear inference he criticises the church, and then appeals to the rebellious in human nature, he is clearly constructive, and offers a definite program, by which the church can reach society and redeem mankind. The program may be criticised, and cast aside as faulty or pernicious. But here is a scheme which, the author thinks, if worked, will do that which the church to-day longs to do, but has in a considerable degree heretofore failed to do. His book offers, as a test of the Christian life, the simple yet profound, the old yet new, rule, "What would Jesus do?" To walk in 'his steps' is at every turn in the road to raise the question, "What would Jesus do?"

The question now arises, whether the test of the Christian life as suggested by the author, is really a wise and workable one ; that is to say, in this simple yet profound rule, is there a program for the church, which, if carried out, would cure the evils of society and bring about the usual redemption of mankind ? If each man and woman who believes

in Jesus would take as the rule of action in the social circle, in the store, in political life, in the affairs of the home, "What would Jesus do?" would the world's redemption speedily come? This is a query of far-reaching significance, and demands a thoughtful answer, given in the spirit in which the consecrated author wrote.

1. The fact must be noticed that Christ will never again be in the world as Christians are now in the world, and so, in a sense, the query raises an impossible situation. His earthly mission is over. Never again will he be born of a Virgin, or baptized in the Jordan. Never again will he teach the multitudes, or perform marvelous miracles. The malignant hiss of the leaders, the thorny crown of the persecutors, the bloody gashes caused by the soldiers, are forever past. He is on the throne, not on the cross. He is in the heavenly world, not on this physical earth. By faith and love he is crowned King of Glory. He may come again to this earth. In the clouds of heaven he may descend, and gather unto himself the redeemed from the uttermost parts, but he will not then be as he was in the flesh. And so the question changes, from "What would Jesus do were he here?" to "What did Jesus do when he was here?"

2. When the question is thus thrown into the past tense, it is at once discovered that his relation to society during the time when he walked the earth, was so unlike the relation of the Christian to-day to society, that it is impossible to secure specific information regarding definite actions. There are certain questions that are pressing hard upon the Christian mind and conscience to-day for solution. What is the true status of the family? Shall a Christian man accumulate wealth? What shall be the exact relation of the man who employs labor to the one thus employed? What provision shall one make for his family in case of death? To what extent shall a church become a social institution in the community? Attempt a specific answer to these questions on the basis of the example of Jesus, and see where you land. The question of the family arises; but Jesus never married, and seemed for the years of his ministry to ignore the family. On one occasion his mother and brethren interrupted him to assert the family life, and his answer was, "Who-soever shall do the will of God, the same is my mother, and sister, and brethren." The Christian desires to build a home, and the question arises, How much money can he spend and not be extravagant? But Jesus never had a house,—'The birds of the air had nests, and the foxes had holes, but the Son of man had not where to lay his head.' The Christian would accumulate a fortune in a legitimate business; but how far can he go in this direction with the wants of his fellow-man staring him in the face? But Jesus never entered a business or professional life, and so of course never accumulated a fortune, and never experienced the relation of the employer to the employed. How much insurance shall a Christian man carry, and not repudiate his faith in the providential care of God? Jesus apparently died so poor that he committed the care of

his mother to a young lad, and when he was dead, his body was placed in another man's tomb, no provision having been made for a burial lot. As the question is approached from this standpoint, either of two alternatives is open. Either the specific example of Christ is to be followed in definite actions, and, if so, then Christian society down to the very foundation is false; or the specific example of Christ is not to be followed in definite actions, and, if so, his relation to society was unlike the relation expected of the Christian to-day. The true alternative is the latter. Christ's relation was unique. He came into the world and "tented among us," as an itinerant preacher, peripatetic teacher. So the rule "What would Jesus do" must be qualified by the simple truth, that one's relation to a given situation always determines the action. As the relation of Christ to society was unlike our own relation, therefore his course of action cannot always be for us an example.

3. Another qualification is also needed, the importance of which must not be underestimated, namely, he did in human life what it is utterly impossible for the Christian to do. If, when we use the rule "What would Jesus do?" we thereby imply, that whatever Jesus did, we can do also, we are entirely mistaken. A Christian man might leave his family, and sell his goods, and surrender his insurance, and become an itinerant preacher and peripatetic teacher. He might possibly perform miracles, and utter remarkable truths. He might even have a cross planted on a hill and die on it. He might in his death experience suffering to the utmost. He might bear the suffering with patience and in it all have unbounded love in his heart. But, having done all this, there would still be a gulf, too wide for human thought, separating the life of Christ and his own life. The primary significance of the life of Christ in the world was not in the deeds he performed, but in the one who performed the deeds. Changing the question to the past tense and asking "What did Jesus do?" the answer is, He did that for which he came, and that which was the culmination of his life; he died the just for the unjust. In his death he somehow (God forbid that I attempt its solution) revealed the merciful heart of the Infinite Father. But God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." The reverent believer who has experienced the forgiving grace of God, knows the distinction between the act of any man and the death of his Saviour. The difference between the two is as the difference between a hillock outside the city and Pike's Peak. And to ask a Christian to do what Christ did, is like asking a man who cuts tombstones out of marble to take his chisel and reproduce Angelo's David in stone. It is this profound distinction in the work of the Saviour that causes the church to sing:—

"In the cross of Christ I glory,
 Tow'ring o'er the wrecks of time;
 All the light of sacred story
 Gathers round its head sublime."

The Christians of the church can be Christ's but not Christs.

But having thus qualified the statement 'What would Jesus do?' by showing that he did something that the Christian ought not to do, because of his peculiar relation to society, and one thing, at least, that the Christian cannot do, because of his unique relation to God, it still remains true that in a real sense the test should be made. And this brings us to the third question, "What would Jesus have us do to-day in the circle in which we move, and with the limitations under which we labor?"

1. He would have us recognize the Christian church as the instrument chosen by himself for the regeneration of mankind. We are taught in the Gospels that Jesus came to establish the kingdom of heaven. As the teachings concerning the kingdom are studied, it is discovered, that it was to have three characteristics: (1) It was a moral kingdom,—“The kingdom is righteousness and peace and joy”; (2) It was an event, that which was established,—“The kingdom of heaven is at hand”; (3) It was a visible organization,—‘The kingdom of heaven is as a grain of mustard seed, which when planted is the least of seeds, but when grown it is as a tree with wide spreading branches.’ Now the word “church” is not a synonym for kingdom, but stands for the third aspect of the kingdom, namely, the outward, visible organization. In this sense Christ established the church; and, being established by Christ, it is the duty of the believer to identify himself with it. The church may not be all that it should be, but it is the best there is, and is doing about all that is being done either directly or indirectly for the redemption of the world.

2. As the church was founded by the Christ, so it is the duty of the Christian to keep Christ enthroned as the central and animating power of the church. The most pitiable sight in the world is a great church with Christ absent. A church thus existing would be like the great steamship *Oceanic* floating in mid-ocean without steam in the boilers. The altogether unique claim of the Christian church, a claim that differentiates it forever from all other organizations, is that it is the body of which Christ is the head. Its mission is none other than the moral redemption for time and eternity of all mankind. But the largeness of its mission demands heavenly power, and without Christ it can only fail.

3. Recognizing the divine mission of the church and the need of the divine Christ in its midst, it would make the word “salvation” so profound, and so far reaching, that a man is only saved when into his entire life there enters the spirit of the Master. He may not know all that his Master knows, he may not do what his Master once for all did, but when he secures the spirit of the Master as the animating power of his life,—a spirit that asserts itself in the complete life, even as the blood flows in the complete body,—then, and only then, is he a real Christian, walking in the footsteps of the one who loved us even unto death, yea, loved us with a power that made possible a resurrection from the dead.

R. W. McLAUGHLIN.

KALAMAZOO, MICH.

ANARCHISM AS PRACTICED BY MRS. NATION.

MANY sober-minded people have accepted the maxim, that the best governed state is the one that is least governed. Philosophical anarchism goes a step further, and maintains that the perfect state is not governed at all. Its ideal is that each have a good heart and do what is right in his own eyes. Its special object of abhorrence is that any one should be put under restraint. The attraction of anarchism lies in the fact that it seems to be the idea of local self-government carried to the logical conclusion of letting every individual govern himself. When it assumes the form of liquor saloons wide open in spite of legislation absolutely prohibiting saloons, the sober temperate people do not approve this individual self-government on the part of the saloon keepers, nor the practical anarchism of the sworn officers of the law who leave the unlawful saloon traffic unmolested. Is it safe to encourage the suppression of the lawless saloons by individual use of the hatchet? If there is a mad dog in the street any man may shoot him down without waiting for a warrant from the courts. Some of the justices in Kansas have held that Mrs. Nation in demolishing saloon furniture and spilling liquors was not maliciously destroying property, but was abating a nuisance; for the Constitution of Kansas forbids the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages, and so recognizes no right to property in saloon fixtures and supplies. Should not women, for whose husbands and children the saloon is a snare of destruction, be encouraged to defend themselves by every means in their power? To even this most seductive form of anarchism, the thoughtful sociologist must refuse approval. It is not a step toward the millennial future. It is reversion toward the barbarous state of society, when every man avenged his own wrongs, when personal prowess was one's only protection, when the passion of the individual was under no restraint of orderly government. Mrs. Nation may do an important service in calling intense attention to the evils of the liquor traffic and to the shameless incompetency or worse of officials who do not enforce the laws. Her methods cannot be followed without soon producing confusion worse confounded, and bringing on a serious reaction against the very cause she has so much at heart.

W. E. C. W.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

JAMES MARTINEAU: A Biography and Study. By A. W. JACKSON, A.M. With portraits. 8vo. Pp. x, 459. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1900. \$3.00.

This is one of the great books of its kind. The author has had a subject worthy of his best powers of representation. For more than half a century the name of James Martineau has been a familiar one in religious and critical circles. While he has easily been the most conspicuous figure among those of his own type of thought, he has occupied a prominent place among the independent thinkers of our modern period. Long before giving up his clerical service he began his teaching, and for forty-five years was a college professor in a field which brought him into touch with most of the living questions of the century. He dealt critically with such well-known types of thought as those put forth by Comte, Bentham, Mill, Whewell, Spencer, Tyndall, Bain, Mansel, Grote, Hamilton, Strauss, Renan, Parker, Newman, Lessing, Schleiermacher, Coleridge, Carlyle (p. 124). But not only was he "logical, critical, and polemical," he was also poetical, mystical, imaginative. He was a "lyrical psalmist," no less great in his spiritual insight, so that our author styles him the "English Schleiermacher with an infusion of Bossuet."

But Mr. Jackson has not only had a great subject: he has treated it in a comprehensive way;—though the method of double presentation is never wholly satisfactory. The reader has no difficulty, however, in gleaning from these pages, not only what Dr. Martineau thought and believed, but also why he thought it and believed it. For the book is not an ordinary biography, made up of letters and reminiscences; it contains a sympathetic review and an appreciative exposition of his writings. The author has also greatly increased the value of the book by the introduction of many illustrative extracts from Dr. Martineau's own books. The publishers of these books have done well to allow this free use of the originals, for not a few readers will be desirous of pursuing the subjects farther. If Mr. Jackson had held even more closely to his author in the second part of his book, it would have been no mistake. In any case it is just the book for the serious reader who wishes enough concrete information to enable him to form for himself some fair estimate of Dr. Martineau as one of the nineteenth-century forces. It is no superficial picture, therefore, which Mr. Jackson has drawn for us, but a real insight into the deepest workings of Dr. Martineau's mind and heart.

Without giving offense to the orthodox reader, Mr. Jackson has also been able to show very fully Dr. Martineau's development away from his original evangelical position. Beginning as a Presbyterian without a creed, he became first an "Arian," and then a denier of Christ's preëxistence. But still Jesus was to him no common man. Only a few years before his death, when the English Unitarians were revising the book of *Common Prayer* he wrote, "I can take no interest in any book of Common Prayer that does not recognize the unique place of Jesus Christ" (p. 198); so that, while he would strike out the references to Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, he wished to have retained "beloved Son," and "the everlasting joy and felicity to which the *glorified Son* hath led the way." Dr. Martineau's religious trend was therefore far from being a negative one. He turned from the objective supernatural revelation to the supernatural revelation in man himself. He not only spoke decisive words against Pantheism, because it believed too much; but also against Deism, because it believed too little. He became the most pronounced preacher of positive Theism, standing for the greatness and majesty of God's law and God's love, and magnifying the soul's intuitive grasp of the living God. God's voice speaking in the conscience of the spiritually minded is already in this world the foretaste of an immortality to come.

Mr. Jackson also brings out the fact that Dr. Martineau was not only a Unitarian, but the greatest of the Unitarians, in that he could find no pleasure in such a sect. When his English brethren would break away and found a distinctive and exclusive church, he wished them to be content to establish a religion. "Hold fast to the divine Unity," was his entreaty, "but rear your church to the Love of God. Let the doctrine be your personal conviction; let the Love be your public confession. In the one you hold to a theory in which a few shall agree with you, in the other to a sentiment in which Christendom is at one with you" (p. 215). Truly Dr. Martineau was greater than his denomination.

The true greatness and humility of the man were also seen in his appreciation of those from whom he differed. He was not only honest in his own convictions and loyal to the truth as he saw it, but he was honorable in his loyalty; for he had just as deep a respect for those whose loyalty to the truth led them to differ from his own views of it.

Mr. Jackson finds his most difficult task when he turns from Mr. Martineau the Man, the Preacher, and the Christian Theologian, and comes to present him definitely and concretely as the New Testament Critic. In seeking to make the negative criticism of the now long-abandoned Tübingen positions come to life again, Mr. Jackson plunges the reader into a chilling stream from which he finds it difficult to emerge again with the same warm spirit with which he pursued the earlier chapters. Of course from the point of view of the biographer this is an important part of his work, and without it he could not write the life of Dr. Martineau. It may even have more value from the Unitarian point of view than any

other chapter in the volume. But, after all, it was not the negative criticism which Martineau learned from F. Christian Baur that made him what he came to be, but rather the positive and the constructive, which gave him greatness in spite of it. It is a grave question whether the ethical vitality and the spiritual power of such truly lovely characters as those of Dr. Martineau, of England, and Professor Pfeiderer, of Germany, were really produced by the remnant of the New Testament revelation which they came to hold, and whether a new race of giants like themselves is ever likely to arise from revelation as they have left it.

The last four chapters of this notable book—on God and Cosmos; God and Conscience; The Criticism of Pantheism; and Freedom and Immortality—are valuable as giving an insight not only into the method by which Dr. Martineau was able to keep on his own feet, but by which he was also able to do his aggressive and constructive work. But to most readers the climax of the book will be reached with the author's presentation, in the earlier chapters, of James Martineau the Man, the Preacher, and the Christian Theologian.

ALBERT T. SWING.

THE APOSTOLIC AGE: Its Life, Doctrine, Worship, and Polity. By JAMES VERNON BARTLET, M. A. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1899.

This first volume in the series "Ten Epochs of Church History" appears after the others, because of the death of Bishop Coxe, to whom the work of preparing this volume had been assigned. Mr. Bartlet has certainly done his work with credit. In the first place, there is a simplicity of English style quite unusual. There is a freshness in the writing which makes one wish there could have been a fuller development of the narrative. Then, on almost all the most important literary and historical questions he has positive ideas and is willing to advance definite reasons.

For the most part the author adopts conservative positions, though he is invariably kindly in his references to critical opinions from which he differs. He adopts the earlier and older chronology rather than the later dates given by Harnack. It is therefore not a book for the latest novelties in interpretation. He does not hold to a second imprisonment of Paul, and argues that Paul's martyrdom must have occurred as early as 62-63. He does not, therefore, hold to a "partition theory" of Second Timothy. He thinks that Peter died in Rome before, or at the time of, the carnage in the summer of 64. The Epistle to the Hebrews he places about 62 rather than in the era of the Jewish war in 66. Acts was written either by Luke himself or by another eye-witness of what he recorded. He thinks Luke used earlier written sources which might have been from Mark, Philip, Titus, or Silas. The Pauline influence comes not from the Epistles, but from the apostle himself and his helpers. The writing by Luke is placed at about 75-80 A. D.

He sees in the Pastoral Epistles a broad difference in style and vocabulary, and indistinct Paulinism of thought, with differing religious and

theological emphasis. But he accounts for these by Paul's versatility in meeting the special conditions of personal letters to helpers whom he wishes to aid according to the needs of the hour. He thinks no sufficient motive can be found for the supposed introduction of secondary matter in the second century; and if it were done it has not gone nearly far enough to accomplish much of a purpose. As to the divergence in the Fourth Gospel from the synoptics, he judges that the twenty years of life in Ephesus spent in the attempt to present the truth to the Greek mind amply sufficient to clear up them any problems connected with the Gospel of John.

He places the date of "The Two Ways" as early as 50, and the present *Didaché* at from 70 to 80. Barnabas he locates between 70 and 79. First Peter he puts at the end of 63, or the beginning of 64. Parts of Second Peter he considers of as early date as 62-63; Jude, a few years before or after 70, except the apocalyptic section, which may come considerably later.

To undertake to recount in concurrent and realistic narrative the whole history of the Apostolic Age, and to do this in the compass of one volume, is no slight task. To say that it has as yet been done with absolute success would perhaps be to anticipate the possibilities of the future. But the future triumph when it comes will have been made possible by such very successful accomplishments as the present volume by Mr. Bartlet.

A. T. S.

THE REFORMATION. (Ten Epochs of Church History.) By WILLISTON WALKER. 8vo. Pp. vii, 478. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900. \$2.00 net.

In a theme so much written upon as the Reformation, it would seem next to impossible to produce a fresh and vigorous treatment of the subject; but this is exactly what Dr. Walker has given us in his recent volume. The most striking feature of the book is the sententious way in which the author sums up the significance of events, and characterizes men and movements. This may best be illustrated by a few quotations. Thus, e.g., he says, speaking of the Council of Constance: "The position of the Council—that cheerful submission of individual opinion to the judgment of the Church is a Christian duty—is the teaching of the Roman communion to-day; the assertion of Huss of responsibility to God for the full and unfettered use of personal judgment is that of Protestantism to this hour" (p. 44). Of the Spanish Reformation he says: "There was nothing of Protestantism in the theological movement just described, nothing that promised increased freedom for the human mind or new unfoldings of truth; but it was a return to what had been most worthy in the middle ages, and, as such, it represented a gain for the Church" (p. 63). In contrasting the English with the Spanish reforming movement, he tells us that "Henry VIII. was no Isabella in piety, nor was Wolsey a Ximenes either in character or understanding of the nation in which he

was the first subject, nor were the English people fanatic for mediæval orthodoxy, like those of Spain." (p. 69). He brings to our mind a vivid picture of the persistency with which indulgences must have been offered to the faithful, by telling us that the "distribution and sale—for that it practically was—of these indulgences was much like the modern trade in subscription books. Agents were given exclusive territorial rights, and appointed sub-agents; and both were paid by commissions from the gains of their labor" (p. 93). Luther is called "the pioneer of the road to spiritual freedom" (p. 77).

Dr. Walker's readers will thank him for the authoritative manner in which he has stated certain facts that are in their nature difficult of verification. Thus, e.g., he says, that, after the death of Zwingli, "Protestantism made no further advances in German Switzerland. The lines then drawn between the two confessions were permanent" (p. 180). Speaking of the persecutions in the Low Countries, he assures us: "Though the number of executions often alleged to have taken place under his rule is probably much exaggerated, there can be no question that more opponents of Rome were put to death during the reign of Charles V. in the Netherlands than in any other portion of his extensive dominions" (p. 306).

Scholars will, however, regret that the plan of the series does not include footnotes, and that consequently they must seek for themselves the sources of such statements as that made on page 325: "A careful Italian diplomat estimated the number of Lutherans immediately after the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, at seven-tenths of the population of the Empire." It would also be interesting to be told the source of the statement made on page 201, that Ferdinand, brother of Charles V., "afterward declared that he had been turned from a rapidly growing sympathy with the Protestant position" by the bigamy of Philip of Hesse.

In fact, the most serious faults of Dr. Walker's book are those of plan, rather than those of execution. The execution is, as we have pointed out above, at times brilliant. It was a mistake to attempt to crowd into one volume not only a sketch of the Reformation on the Continent, but also to include in it the Counter-Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, the Struggle in the Netherlands, the Huguenot Wars, and an account of the Invincible Armada. Dr. Walker admits in his preface that a selection was imperative, and that therefore he "has chosen to treat with relative fullness the initial and formative stages of the Reformation movement and the work of its few preëminent leaders. He has sketched but cursorily the political struggles of the later Reformation age." Such a method of treatment is unfortunate, and the lack of proportion betrays itself. Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin are painted *con amore*, while the heroic William of Orange and Gustavus Adolphus are given but scanty notice. The Counter-Reformation and the Thirty Years' War should have been reserved for a separate volume and for a different "Epoch of

Church History." The responsibility for the necessarily unsatisfactory treatment of the events occurring after 1600 must, we presume, be shared by the editor of the series.

The best chapter of the book is the first, which deals with the gradual preparation for the Reformation. It is so admirably done, that one regrets that it could not have been expanded, and that, e.g., the abuses in the Church of Rome were not dwelt upon at greater length; for it is precisely in their introductions that the average text-books on the Reformation leave so much to be desired. Where compression has been so called for, Dr. Walker might well have avoided going into the minutiae of the introduction of Lutheran views into Württemberg (p. 192), and he might have stated less at length than he has done Luther's ideas as to church organization (p. 137).

With the above limitations noted, Dr. Walker's book may be heartily recommended to persons desiring to secure a readable, interesting, and trustworthy account of the Reformation. Its excellencies will be appreciated best by those who have already some knowledge of the subject.

ALLEN DUDLEY SEVERANCE.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH, from its Foundation to the Norman Conquest, 597-1066. By WILLIAM HUNT, M. A. London: Macmillan & Co., Limited. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899.

The History of the English Church, under the general editorial direction of the Very Reverend W. R. W. Stephens and the Reverend William Hunt, to be complete in seven royal octavo volumes, bids fair to be a valuable work, not only for the English churchman, but also for the general reader.

Mr. Hunt, who has himself prepared this first volume, has given us a book packed full of historical material of great value, expressed in such a clear and interesting manner that there is no sense of overcrowding. The reader wishes the story in the various chapters had continued,—which is a mark of successful historical writing. All of the most important political, religious, educational, and social phases have been given a place in the interesting narrative, even though often it must be with great brevity. Original sources are not to any extent reproduced in the text; yet the work appears to be thoroughly done, and bears the test of critical scrutiny.

Mr. Hunt regards the English Church as beginning with the landing of Augustine on the isle of Thanet, whither he had been sent on his mission by Pope Gregory the Great. The author, however, gives an introductory sketch of the earlier introduction of Christianity into Britain between the years 176 and 208, but he does not regard this earlier type of Christianity as having any relation to the orthodox Roman Church brought directly hither by Augustine. The author speaks in a direct

historical fashion of the miracles in the early English Church, of the relics in the shrines, and of the one catholic and apostolic church.

Besides much other interesting description, a chapter is given to each of the following subjects: The Roman Mission, The Church in Kent, St. Aidan, The Whitby Conference, The Plague, Wilfrith, Early Monasticism, The Viking Invasion, King Alfred, The Church and the Nation, The Monastic Revival, The New Benedictinism.

Any one at all interested in English history will be delighted with the book. It is complete in itself as a volume, having its own index.

A. T. S.

A HISTORY OF CONGREGATIONAL INDEPENDENCY IN SCOTLAND. By JAMES ROSS, Minister of the Congregational Church, Eglinton Street, Glasgow. Glasgow: I. MacLehose & Sons, Publishers to the University. 1900.

Congregational Independency in Scotland had an origin of its own, has characteristics of its own, and has had a career of its own:—it deserves therefore a history of its own: and no man either in or out of Scotland was so competent to write its history as the author of the work named above. Mr. Ross is one of a class of strong, well-informed, deeply thoughtful men, bred by Congregationalism, especially in Scotland, who, because they lack push, remain comparatively unknown to the world, whose knowledge of men relates chiefly to those who get themselves well advertised.

Mr. Ross has been collecting the materials of his history for many long years. Part of the book is practically a reprint of articles published in *The Scottish Congregationalist* (monthly magazine) in 1892.

A good many persons entertain the idea that Congregationalism is as old in Scotland as it is in England, and had a similar origin in both countries; but this is a mistake. The attempt was made, indeed, as early as 1652, to establish an independent church in Aberdeen by Alexander Jaffray, its then Provost, who had been taken prisoner by Cromwell at the battle of Dunbar in 1650, and who, whilst a prisoner, had held "frequent conferences with the Lord General (Cromwell), Lieut.-General Fleetwood and Dr. John Owen" on the subject of Church Government, but it proved a failure. Yet, as Mr. Ross says, "The movement, though abortive as an attempt to form a church, appears to have had considerable influence on at least one of the ministers of Aberdeen, Andrew Cant," who after this "exercised greater care in the admission of persons to Lord's Table and instituted personal inquiry into their character and views of Christian truth." One wonders whether the celebrated Kant born in 1724, at Königsberg, who traced his descent to Scotch ancestors of the name of Cant,¹ could be connected with the aforementioned An-

¹ Professor Paulsen, of Berlin, in his "Immanuel Kant," etc., published 1899, throws doubt on *Kant's own statement*:—his reasons, however, seem to me to be somewhat hypercritical.

drew; and if so, whether the philosophical independence which he displayed, was a wee bit of an inheritance from Independency.

In a sense, the followers of the Rev. John Glas, who was deposed from the ministry of the Established Presbyterian Church in 1730 and in the same year formed a church at Dundee, were the first Congregationalists. The monument there erected to his memory bears the inscription, "John Glas, Minister of the Congregational Church in this place, died November, 1773, aged 78 years." Thirteen churches were formed on the lines drawn by him: one was in London and of it the celebrated Faraday was an elder. They were afterwards absorbed into the *Sandemanians*, followers of Robert Sandeman, who became first an elder, then the leader of the Glasites. He died at Danbury, U. S. A., in 1770. The last of the Sandemanian churches in America became extinct in 1890. One or two small communities of the name still exist in England.

In 1768 arose the "Old Scots Independents," who would seem to have "adopted Congregational principles after an independent investigation of the whole subject of church order." In 1814 they confederated with the "Inghamites," an English split from the Wesleyan Methodists:—twelve of the former with thirteen of the latter. At the present moment, "only one Old Scots Independent Church still exists. It meets in Oswald street, Glasgow."

Scottish Congregationalism as at present known consists of four classes of Churches:—*one* at least originated in the ministrations of a man who had no connection with any of the religious bodies of Scotland; a *second* class owes its rise to the tyrannical action of Presbyteries; a *third* class was founded by men who had arrived by independent study at the conclusion that the "Congregational way" was most in accordance with the New Testament; a *fourth* class—the most numerous—are really the accident of an Evangelistic movement, very much as Methodism was in England. How this movement arose, who were the chief movers; how it fared at the hands of the Presbyterian authorities, particularly "The Moderates," who, like many of their present-day representatives, were moderate towards everything but orthodox Evangelistic zeal; and what were the chief issues is interestingly sketched by Mr. Ross. Remembrance of the facts just referred to will help to account for certain peculiarities of Congregationalism in Scotland, which are apt to take English immigrants by surprise, and ignorance of which sometimes causes them to make mistakes.

After further describing "Progress," "Opposition," "Controversy and Division," "Resettlement," Plans for "Ministerial Education," "Difficulties and Encouragements," "Two Disruptions," Heresy Cases, etc., and "Congregational Institutions," in as many chapters, the author proceeds to tell the story, *first*, of the rise of "The Evangelical Union" as a separate body through secessions, partly from Congregationalism, partly from Presbyterianism; *then* of its existence and life as a separate denomination; and finally, of the reunion of the two sections of Congregation-

alism in 1896, under the somewhat cumbersome designation, "The Congregational Union of Scotland comprising the Evangelical Union and the Congregational Union as existing at 1896."

The book concludes with "Notes on the History," especially on its doctrinal aspects; an account of the rise of the Individual Churches; Details of their pastorates; Lists of ministers who have studied at the Theological Halls of the United Denominations; and additional Sketches of the Pioneers of Congregationalism in Scotland.

Congregationalists, not to say, members of other sections of the one catholic church, owe Mr. Ross a debt of gratitude for the self-denying toil which he has expended in producing a work which is as admirable for the tone and spirit of its judgments, as for the fullness and accuracy of its information. The get-up of the volume is worthy both of the subject and the eminent firm by which it is published.

BRADFORD, ENGLAND.

D. W. SIMON.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. (The Boston-Lowell Lectures.) By GEORGE C. LORIMER. Pp. x, 652. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. \$2.25.

The eloquent minister at Tremont Temple gives in this volume his hopeful view of Christianity at the present day. He is not perplexed by criticism, though familiar with it. He is not disheartened by the breaking up of the church into denominations, though regretting it. He is not alarmed by obstructions and opposition. He expects for the church greater triumphs in the twentieth century than ever before.

SKETCHES HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL OF THE ELIOT CHURCH AND SOCIETY, BOSTON. By A. C. THOMPSON. 8vo. Pp. viii. 503. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1900.

This sumptuous volume worthily commemorates, what is of all things best worth commemorating, the history of an active Christian church. The Eliot Church was born in the storm-and-stress period of the fourth decade of this century, and has made a noble record. Seldom has any church been blessed with a pastor who in the fifty-eighth year of his pastorate could issue such a narrative of what the great Head of the church had permitted him and those associated with him to accomplish. The story will inspire all who read it, and ought to incite many more churches to make like contributions toward perpetuating the memory of the holiest things.

THE PURITAN IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND. By EZRA HOYT BYINGTON, author of "The Puritan as Colonist and Reformer," etc. 8vo. Pp. xlii, 457. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1900. \$2.00.

The first edition of this important book was commended in our issue for April, 1897. We congratulate the author that a fourth edition is so soon called for, and congratulate the readers of this edition on the com-

prehensive, well-balanced chapter which has been inserted on the subject of Witchcraft in New England.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. (New Testament Handbooks.) By BENJAMIN WISNER BACON, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in Yale Divinity School. 12mo. Pp. xv, 285. New York: The Macmillan Co. 75 cents.

"A psychological law seems to decree that in movements of opinion, men shall group themselves into an extreme right of immovable conservatives, a right center of conservatives capable of advance, a left center of cautious progressives, and an extreme left of radicals." This classification from page 19 enables us to locate the author in the left center. If he was ever on the extreme left, he is certainly there no longer. The book condenses with consummate skill the course of thought in regard to the New Testament, and it is gratifying to find so bold a thinker holding so conservative views on the date of John, the authorship of Revelation, and many other matters now in debate.

THE HISTORY OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Being the History of the Process whereby the Word of God has Won the Right to be Understood. (New Testament Handbooks). By HENRY S. NASH, Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge. 12mo. Pp. xi, 192. New York: The MacMillan Co. 1900. 75 cents.

Professor Nash defines criticism, as an effort to understand Scripture. In common with all recent writers, he recognizes the naïve inadequacy of Strauss, the high-handed dogmatism of Baur, but regards these and other extreme critics as preparing a way for correct and helpful recognition of the human element in Scripture. He reverently believes all the course of criticism is leading to higher honor for Christ.

CHRISTIAN CHARACTER: A Study in New Testament Morality. By REV. THOMAS B. KILPATRICK, D.D., Minister of the Free Church of Scotland at Ferryhill, Aberdeen. 12mo. Pp. xi, 298. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.00.

This volume sums up the relation of the New Testament to the formation of character, as a pastor considered the theme for the benefit of his own congregation. It is a careful and comprehensive statement of New Testament morality.

THEISM: A Survey of the Paths that Lead to God. Chiefly in the Light of the History of Philosophy. By JNO. J. TIGERT, LL.D. Some time Professor of Moral Philosophy in Vanderbilt University. 12mo. Pp. xviii, 351. Nashville, Tenn.: Barbee & Smith. \$1.25.

The old problem of theism is ever new. Professor Tigert deals with it after long experience with kindred themes in the class-room. Finding his own mind unsatisfied with the arguments of Anselm and of Descartes,

and with the usual arguments from causation, he has combined the philosophy of Berkeley with that of Lotze in "idealistic realism." He escapes materialism by making mind the only cause.

THE AGE OF FAITH. By AMORY H. BRADFORD, D.D., author of "Spirit and Life," etc. 12mo. Pp. viii, 306. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.50.

Dr. Bradford commands the attention of a wide audience, whether he speaks from the pulpit or the printed page. The text of this volume is a phrase quoted in his dedication, "Interpret God by his Fatherhood." Some readers will question whether the optimism of the book does not need the addition of a sterner element from Carlyle's dictum, that "The Universe is infinite pity, yet infinite rigor of law." Many facts of science and history justify the second part of Carlyle's phrase. This generation has been more drawn to emphasis of the first part. The theme and the treatment, as well as the author, insure a cordial reception of the book at the present time.

THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION: The Crisis in Morals Occasioned by the Doctrine of Development. By JAMES THOMPSON BIXBY, Ph.D., of Leipsic. 12mo. Pp. 315. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co. \$1.25.

It is gratifying to find a second edition called for of this book, first published under the inadequate title "A Crisis in Morals." An avowed believer in evolution, the author has laid bare with unsparing hand the insufficiency of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary ethics. He shows with keen analysis and skillful illustration the fatal lack of authority in moral ideas that have no other basis than association and heredity. He rightly excludes Spencer's entire scheme from the domain of real morals in this strong sentence, "Every proper moral judgment is a judgment of a *person doing*, not of a *thing done*" (p. 42). He gives many lurid examples of the immoral conclusions to which logical disciples of Spencer have carried his conclusions. It is comforting to know that so effective a protest against the ethics of a philosophy that recognizes nothing higher than sensation and association has been translated into Japanese.

The positive side of the book is not always as satisfactory as the critical side. In defending intuitionist ethics against utilitarianism, it is not necessary to deny that happiness is the ultimate good. Every moral being intuitively knows that he ought to choose the good of sentient being. The sanction of this great law of right is not conduciveness to the general welfare, but the value of that welfare. Evolution has not made this law. Rather the law is one of the elements which evolution uses. Evolution works for survival. It may be questioned whether it necessarily works for happiness. But virtue chooses happiness,—not one's own happiness, but the good of being,—as the purpose of all morally right action. The Creator has this purpose, and is therefore holy. He may, perhaps, must, achieve this purpose through evolution. The practical conscience,

which Mr. Bixby well calls the "counsellor of conduct," "the executive department attached to the supreme court of conscience," is no doubt largely trained by evolutionary processes, but Spencer "has confounded assistance with production, and occasion with cause." With the wish that the author understood the difference between the benevolence theory of morals and utilitarianism, and the belief that our readers can make the necessary corrections, we heartily commend the book.

THE INDIVIDUAL: A Study of Life and Death. By NATHANIEL SOUTHWICK SHALER, Professor of Geology in Harvard University, and Dean of Lawrence Scientific School. Pp. xiii, 351. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1901. \$1.50.

Like all that Professor Shaler has written recently, this book is as interesting to the theologian as to the man of science. A thorough evolutionist, his studies have more and more led him to recognize the necessity of a theistic interpretation of evolution. A frequently recurring note is the insufficiency of "natural selection" to explain this or that. The *origin* of form is beyond its power. It has developed, but could not *originate*, the organic power to transmit characteristics. Even the *growth* of sympathy cannot be explained by selection, for sympathy is unprofitable. The world may be regarded as the result of continuous energy *broken by various processes of interference* at many critical points. Not chance, but method, "essential rationality," is behind nature. "In common phrase it seems miraculous that in the long chain of development leading to man no single link was broken from the Devonian period till now." While the author's altruism leads him to insist that man ought not to be eagerly anxious for personal immortality, he refutes with great skill and freshness the objections that have sometimes been made to the belief from the scientific side.

BIBLE TRAGEDIES. By GEORGE CLARKE PECK. Pp. 172. New York: Eaton & Mains. \$1.00.

A collection of eight sermonettes on some of the darker sides of human life. Preachers will read this little book with profit.

REMINISCENCES OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF EDWARD A. LAWRENCE, Jr. By his mother, MARGARET WOODS LAWRENCE. Large 8vo. Pp. xx, 519. Illustrated. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1900. \$2.00 net.

Many will be glad of this full record of a life that was all too brief, and seemed cut off just as it was opening into the widest usefulness. The narrative makes large use of letters, and touches a wide range of subjects,—from New England home life to the scenes of a world-wide tour to observe missions, from Adirondack vacations to settlement work among the city poor, from the course of theological thought to impressions of Chicago during the Columbian Exposition. To those who have been kindled by "Modern Missions in the Far East" this book will bring personal interest in the author.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFETIME. By General ROELIFF BRINKERHOFF. Pp. 448. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company. \$2.00. 1900.

This is an interesting book. There is not one dull page in the 448 pages that compose it. The "Lifetime," whose "Recollections" are here garnered and dwelt upon, has certainly been filled with memorable experiences, and marked by an extraordinary public service. On this account the writing of the book and all that is implied of personal satisfaction in the record are justified. He would be a captious critic who should accuse the author of unbecoming egotism. There is no more egotism here than is needful to give an autobiographic sketch of this kind an interesting personal flavor, like that given to conversation by a person of wide experience, who takes us into his confidence and talks with us freely of the notable people he has met, the important events he has witnessed, the impressive scenes and places he has visited, and the enterprises of public concern he has had a hand in promoting. This is, in substance, what General Brinkerhoff does in his book.

As an editor he was associated for a time in business with David R. Locke, afterwards famous as the author of the "Nasby Letters." During the Civil War, and after it, Mr. Brinkerhoff was associated with men of national reputation, and he gives in the "Recollections" interesting reminiscences, brief sketches, shrewd characterizations, and carefully drawn portraits of General Scott, John C. Fremont, Lincoln, Seward, Blaine, Garfield, Horace Greeley, Hayes, Tilden, Stanton, Chase, and others.

Among the important events he witnessed and describes were the Pittsburgh Convention of February 22, 1856, at which the Republican party, previously existing only in a few States, became national in extent. He was present likewise at the National Republican Convention in Philadelphia, June 17, 1856, where Fremont was nominated for the Presidency. He was present in Washington at the inauguration of Lincoln in 1860. He was present, four years later, at Ford's Theater when Lincoln was assassinated—heard Booth's pistol shot, saw the assassin scramble over the front rail of the President's box on to the stage, run across it and disappear, and felt the horror and dread that thrilled the audience as the truth gradually dawned upon them of what had occurred.

Few men have traveled so much with such open-eyed intelligence as he. We have interesting accounts here of cities and states, East and West, North and South, and over the sea.

He confesses that he has been a man of "hobbies,"—using the word "hobby" as signifying "a favorite theme of thought and study outside of regular business pursuits." Into these avocations his mental power and public spirit have overflowed, or found congenial employment. In them, moreover, he has manifested, not simply a brief superficial interest like that of most men in such things, who take them up to gratify a transient curiosity or passing whim, but an interest so deep and thorough-

going that he has achieved in each a notable success, which has made him through them a great public benefactor.

The most interesting and valuable part of the "Recollections" is that in which General Brinkerhoff describes his "Career as a Philanthropist." It is appropriately so in view of his prominence as a writer in recent years upon topics of philanthropy. He has come to be widely known as one of the foremost authorities of our country and times upon the subjects of Charity Organization, Penology and Prison Reform. The fact that he was selected to write the article on "Prison Discipline," in the American Supplement to the ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, is proof of this. "The Recollections" show how he gained his reputation as an expert in these subjects.

It affords a clear and interesting history of the progress of scientific charity and penology, in the United States during the last twenty years, in its careful record of its author's attendance upon the annual meetings of the National Prison Association and the National Conference of Charities and Corrections and his report of their proceedings. In this account he speaks of every important paper, discussion, and address that has marked those proceedings, and of their effect upon legislation and public institutions.

The book contains an interesting account of the eminent English penologist, Barwick Baker, of whom the author says, "My inspiration in prison work came from him more than from any other man." The character and the services of Baker were worthy of all praise; his book entitled "War with Crime" presents with convincing force the various phases of the problem of crime, in dealing with which England, under the lead of Maconochie, Crofton, Ducane, Tollack, and Baker, has had great success. But we have the conviction, derived not merely from his "Recollections," but also from an examination of the volumes of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, that General Brinkerhoff has equaled his master, Baker, in the magnitude of his public service in the same line of effort and in the value of his contributions to the literature of the subject.

The book, we hope, will be widely read. There is great need at the present time that the problems of poverty, and especially of crime, should be deeply studied by men of intelligence and public spirit, such as compose the National Conference of Charities and Corrections. A flood of crime seems now to have spread over the land, creating a general feeling of alarm and insecurity. Statistics show that this flood has been steadily rising in the last generation. Where are we coming to? In England that flood has been decreasing the last generation. This problem of crime is evidently more wisely studied and treated there. We need to take hold of it more earnestly, and adopt for its better solution the English method. What those methods are, General Brinkerhoff has shown in his book, and in the papers and addresses delivered before the national organizations

devoted to the consideration of these subjects, of which the book makes mention.

A. H. CURRIER.

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO. By BOOKER T. WASHINGTON. 12mo. Pp. x, 244. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co. 1900.

Many are saying, that never since the close of the Civil War were the prospects of the American negro so discouraging. He is disfranchised in the larger part of the South, denied equal railroad accommodations, and given diminishing chances in public schools. Opportunities in the North are becoming fewer year by year. The expansion of national power to tropical islands has lessened attention to his needs, and apparently diminished the interest of his friends. It is gratifying that, in the face of these conditions, an American negro can publish so hopeful and virile a book. That such a man as Booker T. Washington has risen among them, and become perhaps the most notable man in the Southern States, is of itself enough to keep the American negroes from despair.

THE SLAVERY OF OUR TIMES. By LEO TOLSTOY. With portrait. Pp. xxxi, 186. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1900. \$1.25.

The extremest positions of anarchism are here presented with as much coolness and positiveness as one could use in repeating the multiplication table. Every one is called a slave who is forced to do work, even if the force is nothing but the fear of hunger. All legislation is styled "organized violence." All governments are compared to "the Calabrian robber chief who collected a regular tax from all who wished to travel in safety along the highway." The great question raised is, "How can governments be abolished?" There is much to be learned from the book of the folly of socialism. There is no reprobation of any wrongs except those committed by holders of property and government officials. There is no recognition of the need of elevating the character and intelligence of the people. Tolstoy's powers of expression are unsurpassed, but his expectation of saving the world by the mechanical devise of abolishing government is as wild as any of Mr. Herron's recent utterances.

EXPANSION UNDER NEW WORLD-CONDITIONS. By JOSIAH STRONG. 8vo. Pp. 310. New York: The Baker & Taylor Co. 1900.

Dr. Strong is sure of a wide reading for his interpretation of the new duties taught by the new occasions of the present time. The vogue of his previous books has given him a large constituency, and he has the gift of making pages of statistics interesting. One may question his inference at many points, and often may wish for more definiteness of statement. As an example of both, a quotation may be made from page 174: "Evidently Australia is capable of supporting a large proportion of the world's population, and is therefore destined to do so." A glance at such fertile regions as Sicily and North Africa shows that what a

country will do in supporting population is dependent more on the character of the people than on the capabilities of the soil. This is doubtless the moral intended by the book as a whole, but hasty readers will be in some danger of stopping with the impression that the author is not afraid of war and considers a large army and a strong navy good things.

THE LIQUOR PROBLEM IN ITS LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS. By FREDERICK H. WINES and JOHN KOREN. An Investigation made under the Direction of Charles W. Eliot, Seth Low, and James C. Carter, Sub-committee of the Committee of Fifty to investigate the Liquor Problem. Second edition. 8vo. Pp. viii, 425. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.25.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE LIQUOR PROBLEM. By JOHN KOREN. An Investigation made for the Committee of Fifty under the Direction of Henry W. Farnham, Secretary of the Economic Sub-committee. 8vo. Pp. xi, 327. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.25.

These volumes call for high commendation. No more weighty and serious attempt has been made to get at and present the real facts of the liquor business and of the attempts to suppress or restrict it. Not committed to the advocacy of any method of dealing with the liquor problem, these reports are a thesaurus of weapons for every kind of warfare upon this worst of all of the enemies of society. The first volume gives the results of the various methods that have been tried—from prohibition in Maine and Iowa to taxation in New York and Ohio, the dispensary system of South Carolina, and different forms of local option. Almost every device ever tried is here depicted, except the limitation of the saloon territory so fully described in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for last July.

The second volume deals in a similar manner with the relation of the liquor problem to poverty, to pauperism, to neglect of children, to crime, to the negroes, and to the Indians. A chapter is added on the social aspects of the saloon, and sixty pages of statistical tables are put into the appendix.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY, Philadelphia, Pa.

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BAPTIST MISSIONS. By EDMUND F. MERRIAM, Editor of *The Baptist Missionary Magazine*, author of "The American Baptist Missionary Union and its Missions," etc. 12mo. Pp. xxix, 261. 1900. \$1.25.

AN UPWARD LOOK FOR MOTHERS. By ISLA MAY MULLINS. Pp. 32. 1900. 25 cents.

A PRISONER IN BUFF. By EVERETT T. TOMLINSON, author of "Ward Hill at Weston," "Ward Hill the Senior," and "Ward Hill at College," etc. 12mo. Pp. 267. 1900. \$1.25.

L'HASA AT LAST. By J. MACDONALD OXLEY, author of "On the World's Roof," "In the Swing of the Sea," "The Hero of Start Point," "The Good Ship 'Gryphon,'" "Fergus McTavish," etc. 12mo. Pp. 269. 1900. \$1.25.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN ALBERT BROADUS. By ARCHIBALD THOMAS ROBERTSON, Professor of the Interpretation of the New Testament in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. 12mo. Pp. xiv, 462. 1901. \$1.50.

PUBLIC WORSHIP. By T. HARWOOD PATTISON, D.D. 12mo. Pp. 281. \$1.25.

THE LADY OF THE LILY FEET, and other Stories of Chinatown. By HELEN F. CLARK. 12mo. Pp. 125. 1900. 50 cents.

THE TRAINING OF RACHEL HALLER. By the author of "The Family of the Black Forest," etc. 12mo. Pp. 448. \$1.50.

A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON, New York.

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THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE SONG OF THE WELL.

SOME NOTES ON NUMBERS XXI. 16-18.

BY PROFESSOR MILTON S. TERRY, D.D.

THE entire twenty-first chapter of Numbers is, on the face of it, a compilation from various sources, and three separate fragments from the ancient national songs of Israel are incorporated in the narrative. One of these is said to have been written in "The Book of the Wars of Jehovah" (ver. 14), and another is credited to "those who speak in proverbs" (עֲלֵמֵי מִשְׁלֵי, ver. 27). The other purports to be part of a song sung by Israel at Beer, or at "the well whereof Jehovah said to Moses, Gather the people together, and I will give them water" (ver. 16). Four lines of this song are given, and they are thus rendered in the Revised Version:—

"Spring up, O well; sing ye unto it:
The well which the princes digged,
Which the nobles of the people delved,
With the scepter and with their staves."

1. Our first difficulty with this passage is to adjust it to the context. In the preceding narrative we are told that the Israelites had journeyed northward and encamped

beyond the Arnon, which is the northern boundary of Moab, and the southern border of the territory of the Amorites (ver. 13). "From thence," we are told in verse 16, they marched on "to Beer," which is identified as "the well whereof Jehovah said to Moses, Gather the people together, and I will give them water." The natural meaning of these words is that of a simple reference to a celebrated place, which called for no further description, but which had been the occasion of a familiar song in Israel. But for its position in the context, which describes the later journeys of Israel as they neared Canaan and took possession of the east-Jordanic region, no one would think of referring it to any other event than that which is described at length in the preceding chapter (Num. xx. 1-13) as having occurred at Kadesh. There we are told how the people *strove* (סָרָו) with Moses because there was no water, and how Jehovah commanded Moses to assemble the congregation, and "speak unto the rock before their eyes, that it give forth its water." But Moses and Aaron gathered the people, and Moses smote the rock with his rod, "and water came forth abundantly." In celebrating such an event a poet might well say:—

"The princes digged a well;
The nobles of the people delved it,
With their scepter and their staves."

But something in the words or manner of these "nobles of the people" offended Jehovah, and the waters were called *Meribah* (מֵרִיבָה), "because the children of Israel strove with Jehovah, and he was sanctified in them."

2. Additional difficulty presents itself in comparing the narrative of Ex. xvii. 1-7, where the same or a like miracle is wrought "upon the rock in Horeb," when the Israelites were "encamped in Rephidim," and the place was called "*Massah* and *Meribah*, because of the *striving* of

the children of Israel, and because of their *tempting* ~~and~~ Jehovah."

3. Both Massah and Meribah are mentioned in the Blessing of Moses (Deut. xxxiii. 8), where Levi is called "thy godly one, whom thou didst prove at Massah, with whom thou didst strive at the waters of Meribah." These two names also appear together in Psalm xcv. 8:—

"Harden not your heart, as at Meribah,
As in the day of Massah in the wilderness:
When your fathers tempted me,
Proved me and saw my work."

4. The event of Meribah in Kadesh is mentioned (without allusion to Massah) in Num. xxvii. 14; Deut. xxxii. 51; Ps. lxxx. 7; cvi. 32; and in each instance (except Ps. lxxx. 7) specific mention is made of the offense of Moses and Aaron in failing "to sanctify Jehovah in the eyes of the children of Israel." The temptation and provocation at Massah are mentioned (without allusion to Meribah) in Deut. vi. 16; ix. 22.

5. In many other scriptures (Deut. viii. 15; Ps. lxxviii. 15, 20; cv. 41; cxiv. 8; Isa. xlviii. 21) allusion is made to the miraculous supply of waters in the desert without any specific designation of time and place; as, for example:—

"He clave rocks in the wilderness,
And gave them drink abundantly as out of the depths."
"Behold, he smote the rock that waters gushed out,
And streams overflowed."
"He turned the rock into a pool of water,
The flint into a fountain of waters."

6. From these later scriptural references we must not omit the New Testament passage in 1 Cor. x. 1-4, where it is said that "our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea; and did all eat the same spiritual meat; and did all drink the same spiritual

drink; for they drank of a spiritual rock that followed them: and the rock was Christ."

Turning back, now, to Num. xxi. 16, the passage with which we started, we note the statement that Beer, or the well at which the Israelites arrived after leaving the border of Moab, "is the well (בְּאֵר, *the Beer*) whereof Jehovah said to Moses, Gather the people together, and I will give them water"; on which occasion they sang the song beginning, "Spring up, O well!" Our first inquiry touches the relation of this passage to the event in Horeb, as narrated in Ex. xvii. 1-7, and to the like event in Kadesh, as told in Num. xx. 1-13. Were there three distinct events of this kind during the exodus journeys of Israel? For aught that we have any right to presuppose or assume to the contrary, there might have been a score of events of like character during the period of the journeys through the desert. The question is not one of possibilities in the abstract, but of the most rational and satisfactory manner of explaining these different passages of the scripture. If it were clearly stated that one smiting of a rock occurred at Rephidim or at Horeb, and the name of the place was thence called Massah, and that another smiting of a rock took place in Kadesh and gave rise to the name Meribah, there would be no difficulty in the record; but the name Meribah is given both to the place in Horeb and to that in Kadesh. The one event is assigned to the beginning, the other to near the close, of the forty years' wandering in the desert. But the arrival at Beer, and the origin of the song "Spring up, O well!" are described as something that occurred after Israel had crossed the Arnon and entered the territory of the Amorites, on the east of the Jordan. They are also mentioned as a well-known event that connected with the history of Moses, when that great leader assembled the people, and God gave them water, and they sang of it as a well which the chief leaders of the people

digged with scepter and staff. This digging or delving with a staff is most naturally explained as the language of a poet in describing the smiting of the rock with the rod of Moses, and the immediate gushing forth of waters in abundance.

If now this event at Beer, on the north of the river Arnon, be a third instance of Moses' smiting a rock, and thus supplying waters for the people and their cattle, it is inexplicably strange that a writer of history should mention it as the one well-known event of the kind in the life of Moses. The difficulty is not removed, nor the language of the scripture fairly explained, by the statement of Keil, "that here God gave the people water, not as before by a miraculous supply from a rock, but by commanding wells to be dug." If we had no other accounts on record of Moses' gathering of the people, and God's supplying them with water when Moses smote the rock with his staff, such a supposition as Keil offers might be admissible, but not in the face of two different narratives which tell us how Moses did gather the people and cause waters to come forth abundantly for the people and their flocks.

We inquire, next, whether all these narratives and references may be traceable to one and the same event. The language of Num. xxi. 16 implies one well-known event of Jehovah's supplying Israel with water. May we suppose that the narratives of Ex. xvii. 1-7, and Num. xx. 1-13, are two divergent traditions of one such great and memorable fact in the early history of Israel? We may say of this, as we said of the hypothesis of three different events of the kind already noticed, that it is certainly possible. Several different legends, starting from the basis of one event in the history of a people, but afterwards becoming confused and somewhat inconsistent with each other, are not only possible, but, as matter of fact, have in many instances thus developed themselves. The famous fount-

ain Hippocrène on Mount Helicon, and also that of Pirene on the Acro-Corinthus in Greece, are said to have sprung forth at a blow from the hoof of the winged Pegasus, and both these springs have sometimes been confounded in the legends of the Muses with the Pierian spring at the base of Mount Olympus in Thessaly. Any famous story of a fountain or a hero naturally becomes attached in the course of time to different places.

"Seven Grecian cities boasted Homer dead,
Through which the living Homer begged his bread."

The hypothesis of modern criticism in its analysis of the Hexateuch supposes the blending and editorial redaction of the three sources known as J, E, and P. The narrative in Ex. xvii. is mainly from E (3-6), but verses 16 and parts of verses 2 and 7 are from J. The narrative of Num. xx. 1-13 is, on the other hand, mainly from P, blended, however, with fragments of J and E (1b, 3a, 5, 8b). In his notes on this passage, Addis observes, that "here we have one of the few instances in which the documents of the 'oldest book of Hebrew history' have been inextricably entangled, not, as is often the case, with each other, but with the narrative of the 'Priestly writer.' Both narratives have suffered in the process, and we can only guess at their full meaning."¹ In a very thorough discussion of these two passages, Cornill² follows Nöldeke and Kayser in construing the words of Num. xx. 10b—"Hear now [Sept. = *hear me*] ye rebels,"—as if they were addressed by Jehovah to Moses and Aaron, and not by Moses to the people. It is confessedly difficult to determine from this passage, or from any other allusions to the strife at Meribah, just what the great offense of Moses was. It seems to have been some matter of unbelief on the part of Moses and Aaron, and a conse-

¹ The Documents of the Hexateuch, Translated and Arranged in Chronological Order, with Introduction and Notes, Part i. p. 169.

² Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1891, pp. 20-34.

quent failure to sanctify Jehovah in the eyes of the congregation. It has been suggested that in the processes of combining documents and of editorial revision some things have been omitted in order to soften the offense and to place Moses and Aaron in a better light. But without further attention to these more disputable points of criticism, it is quite sufficient for our purpose to note that the current analysis of the Pentateuch finds characteristic elements of the documents J, E, and P worked together in the present form of these narratives. The passage in Ex. xvii. is principally from E, and the passage in Num. xx. principally from P; but the Massah story, with its name and references to temptation and provocation of Jehovah, belongs mainly to J, as does also Num. xxi. 16-20. But this analysis does not explain how the divergent traditions came to connect, one with the beginning, and the other with the end, of the journey through the desert. If we could so adjust the narratives as to connect the Massah story with Horeb or Rephidim, and the Meribah with Kadesh, it would relieve the difficulties somewhat, and help toward showing that there were really two distinct events of like character, one in the first year, and the other in the last year, of Israel's wanderings. But we have seen that the narrative in Ex. xvii. 7 ascribes both names, Massah and Meribah, to the event of the first year at the rock in Horeb. The two poetical passages (Deut. xxxiii. 8 and Ps. xcv. 8) in which both names occur together, may, however, be explained as synonymous parallelisms, each name referring to the same event, as in Ex. xvii. 7. Thus:—

“Whom thou didst prove at Massah,
With whom thou didst strive at the waters of Meribah.”
“Harden not your heart, as at Meribah,
As in the day of Massah in the wilderness.”

The narrative in Num. xx. 1-13 conveys the idea that the strife at Meribah occurred soon after the arrival of the

Israelites at Kadesh in the wilderness of Zin. The first verse, which shows a mark of P's care for exact dates, is peculiar in naming "the first month," but omitting the year. But the preceding narrative of journeys in the desert and Deut. i. 19 ff. represent Kadesh as the place to which the Israelites came at an early period of their journeys, and whence the spies were sent out to explore the land of promise. It would seem, therefore, that the compiler of this narrative saw the inconsistency of placing the event of Meribah at the end of Israel's wanderings, and so omitted the year from P's narrative, which he was using as one of the sources of his composite history.

Apart from the matter of time and place, the language of the two narratives now found in Ex. xvii. 1-7 and Num. xx. 1-13 might without difficulty be explained as referring to one and the same event. Though varying in details, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent or irreconcilable in the two accounts. The writer or editor who applies both names, Massah and Meribah, in Ex. xvii. 7, to the event in Horeb evidently felt that the ideas of *temptation* and *strife* with Jehovah were both compatible with one and the same event. And, as we have observed above, the passage in Num. xxi. 16 obviously implies one well-known fact of Moses' gathering the people together, and God's supplying them with water in such a marvelous manner that Israel sang a song commemorative of the well which the princes digged with scepter and staff. It is also worthy of note, that in Ex. xvi. 35 it is said that "the children of Israel did eat manna forty years . . . until they came unto the borders of the land of Canaan." Also, in Josh. v. 12, "The manna ceased on the morrow after they had eaten the produce of the land of Canaan." The idea is that all through the forty years the bread from heaven was miraculously supplied. The later writers refer to the manna from heaven and the water from the rock as cor-

relative facts, illustrative of God's marvelous care for his people during their exodus from Egypt to Canaan. Thus, in Neh. ix. 15, "Thou gavest them bread from heaven for their hunger, and broughtest forth water for them out of the rock for their thirst." So, again, in Ps. lxxviii. 15-25 (e.g. 20 and 24):—"He smote the rock, and waters gushed out, and streams overflowed. . . . He rained down manna upon them to eat,¹ and gave them of the grain of heaven." Comp. Ps. cv. 40, 41: "He satisfied them with the bread of heaven; he opened the rock, and waters gushed out."

We must next notice the remarkable translation of Num. xxi. 18-20, as found in the different Jewish Targums. The Targum of Onkelos reads thus: "And from the wilderness it [the well] was given to them. And from the time it was given to them it went down with them to the rivers, and from the rivers it went up with them to the height, and from the height to the valleys which are in the fields of Moab, at the head of the height which looks over the face of Beth-jeshimon." It is easy for the critical reader to see that this translation is due in part to a mistaking of proper names in the Hebrew text for the more common words of cognate signification.² The Targum of the Pseudo-Jonathan is quite similar, but has some peculiarities of its own: "From thence it was given to them

¹ Verse 27 of this psalm also says that—

"He rained flesh also upon them as the dust,
And winged fowl as the sand of the sea."

So manna and quails were alike "rained from heaven"; but Ex. xvi. explains that the manna was like a small seed found on the ground, and Num. xi. says that the quails were driven into the camp by a wind from the sea.

² Thus the Hebrew מַתָּן is not taken as a proper name, but in the sense of a gift, and is translated by the Aramaic מַתָּן, from יָתַן. The name נַחֲלֵי is resolved in the Aramaic נַחֲלֵי, emphatic plural of נַחַל; and so on with other words.

for a gift. Going about, it went up with them to the high mountains, and from the high mountains it went down with them to the valleys, going round about all the camp of Israel, and giving them drink each one at the door of his dwelling. And from the high mountains it went down with them to the deep valleys, and it was hidden from them in the borders of Moab, . . . because they set at nought the words of the law." The Targum of Jerusalem reads: "And from thence was given to them the well as a gift, going about until it became strong flowing streams. Going about it went up with them to the top of the mountains, and it went down with them to the ancient valleys. The well was hidden from them at the borders of Moab." This Aramaic translation of Num. xxi. 18-20 certainly embodies and so witnesses, if it did not indeed originate, the Jewish tradition that the miraculous stream of water, that gushed from the smitten rock in the desert, followed or accompanied the Israelites during all their journeys.¹ To this same legend Paul seems to refer in 1 Cor. x. 4, where it is noticeable that he, like the Old Testament psalmists, associated the manna and the rock: "Our fathers . . . did all eat the same spiritual food, and did all drink the same spiritual drink; for they drank of a spiritual rock that followed them: and the rock was Christ." We may call his exegesis rabbinical, allegorical, or symbolical; but whatever we call it, or whatever else we may say about it, Paul discerned in the story of the manna and of the rock, after the manner of Jesus in John's Gospel (vi. 32-51), a profound spiritual significance which he saw fit to emphasize without any apparent regard for the historicity of the letter of the Old Testament narratives.

On the basis of what we have now presented in connection with "the song of the well" in Num. xxi. 16-20, we

¹ The various forms of this tradition may be read in Schoettgen's *Horae Hebraicae*, Vol. i. pp. 623-624.

may submit the following statements as parts of a tentative hypothesis of the true scriptural significance of such Hebrew traditions and songs:—

1. According to the first impression one receives on reading the different records concerning the smitten rock as so many accurate historical statements, there were at least three distinct instances of miraculous water supply during the forty years' wanderings,—one in Horeb, one at Kadesh, and one at Beer, on the east of the Jordan, somewhere north of the river Arnon.

2. Critical analysis finds these records composite and divergent, and resolves them into different versions of one and the same memorable event in the history of Israel.

3. This event, whatever its real nature and particulars as actual fact, became a favorite theme of the poets in Israel, and was thus magnified and embellished in the national songs.

4. Its intimate and very natural association with the miraculous supply of food called manna, which is said to have been continuous from the beginning to the end of the desert journey, led annalists and poets to connect the memorable supply of water also with the beginning, middle, and end of the sojourn in the wilderness.¹

5. The real significance and truth of this unfailing supply of food and drink is suggested in the later story of the rock that followed the people in all their journeys, going about the whole camp, and supplying every one in his own

¹ May it not be that many a time, during the years of their desert journeys, Israel in great distress for want of water or of food suddenly discovered springs of water, and other natural supplies, when they least looked for them? Such glad surprises were naturally and truly recognized as the interposition of Divine Providence, and the poets of the nation celebrated them in sacred song. Such songs and traditions would thereafter be very readily connected with different events of the kind, whether at the beginning, middle, or end of the journeys of the forty years. Manna and quails, as well as springs of water, would thus in popular thought become supernatural gifts of Jehovah to his people.

tent. This was construed by Paul as a figurative and typical method (*τυπικῶς*, 1 Cor. x. 11) of portraying the living presence of God with the Hebrew fathers in all the journeys of the exodus. He was truly, as the poets sung, "the Stone of Israel," "the Rock of his salvation," the Rock whose ways are all judgment (Gen. xlix. 24; Deut. xxxii. 4, 15, 18; Ps. xviii. 2, 31, 46, etc.). Most naturally, therefore, might Paul identify this living spiritual rock with Christ, the Rock of Ages.

6. From all this we may learn that the real value of this class of Holy Scriptures "for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness," consists not, as we have been so much wont to assume, in the letter of its narrative, and not in thus attempting to shoulder a burden which neither we nor our fathers have been able to bear, nor in a persistent life-and-death struggle to maintain the historicity of ancient traditions against the critical methods and widely accepted results of modern research. Shall we not rather imitate the method of Jesus in his interpretation of the manna as "the true bread out of heaven which giveth life unto the world" (John vi. 32-51), and note how he "read in the Book of Moses, in the Bush," a lesson which the superficial Sadducee had never learned, namely, that God is not the God of the dead, but of the living? Let us also follow Paul, who saw in the story of the smitten rock the doctrine of the ever-living Christ. Following this method, we find the Sacred Scriptures an inexhaustible fountain of religious teaching, containing manifold revelations and illustrations of the goodness and severity of God. Incidentally they connect with many facts of human history, and are true to the human experiences of all times and peoples; but their chief purpose is not to acquaint us with details of history, but rather to inculcate and enhance the reality of spiritual food and drink, —the bread and water of eternal life.

ARTICLE II.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND THEISM.

BY THE REV. JAMES LINDSAY, D. D.

THIS is a phrase that might very properly lead us to expect some treatment of the attitude of present-day theology to theistic problems, and of the interest and importance which theistic discussion has for such theology. We should have to consider the position of those who contend for no more than a system of theistic philosophy, as well as that of those who are not alive to the profound and far-reaching significance of the philosophic bases of theistic belief. So might we prefer to treat it. But as the phrase has been chosen, none too happily, as title for a work by Dr. R. M. Wenley, of Michigan, professing to deal with Speculative Theology, the Ritschlian Theology, and the Theistic Problem, it may serve some purpose to refer to this threefold aspect. Not that the work in question merits any detailed attention,—under which, indeed, it would too readily fall to theological powder—but merely that it affords occasion to point a needed moral to the theological student, and to rectify some baleful theological impressions. Dr. Wenley leaves us with all the problems, to use words of his own, “problems as much as ever.” No fruitful principle inspires the book: it is bound by no unity, but presents a pointed example of that “piecing” of its parts into a book which is a favorite conception of its author (pp. 116 and 22). No better aid could be desired towards that unfortunate decay of theological interest which Dr. Wenley has elsewhere declared to be so characteristic of the Established Church in Scotland at the present day.

There is no lack of justice to "Hegel's epoch-making incentive to theological progress," but a strange and inexcusable silence as to Schelling's services to speculative method. Schelling's doctrine of potencies, in whatsoever respects defective, gave so great an impulse to theological speculation as ought not to remain unknown and unrecognized. But Schelling is not the only great speculative name to which Dr. Wenley knows not to do justice.

SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY.

Proceeding to state the general principles of the Speculative School, Dr. Wenley's dependence on Pfeiderer is of a kind that reminds us of some who sought to imitate the oratory of Chalmers, and of whom it was said that they had all the contortions, with none of the inspiration! For we have all the movements of Pfeiderer's exposition reproduced without any of his lucidity and charm. The same buttressing of F. C. Baur in both; the same disposition towards questions like that of the Fourth Gospel. Dr. Wenley invokes the Ritschlian School to "preserve the conclusions" of Baur. In an untranslated¹ volume, Wendt, he says, does so "*passim*"! Has Wendt nothing to say of the Fourth Gospel as not well able to have arisen earlier than towards the close of the first Christian century, and has he nothing to put forward, in distinct opposition to the ideal view of Baur, in justification of the real historic supplementing of the earlier source or document? Has Wendt nothing to urge as to the Fourth Gospel's being in source and substance apostolic, and in feature different from all known marks of the second century? Does Dr. Wenley really pretend that such like insinuations are of a kind to warrant his slipshod statement that they "preserve the conclusions" of Baur?

¹ Die Lehre Jesu. Erster Theil. Göttingen, 1886. See pp. 334-342.

Dr. Wenley gives what he calls a "somewhat bald" statement of the special results of this school. "Bald" enough his Cairdian reminiscence is, as "bald" as his New Testament "authorities" are astounding. Dr. Wenley loves to speak of a "peddling rationalism" (pp. 40 and 188), but the most "peddling" criticism, saved "as by fire" from underlying rationalistic tendency, is all that his own pages afford, with a lacquer of philosophical phrase. "Theology is not a matter of faith, but of intellectual grasp and careful scholarship." What could be cruder than such a mode of putting the case? No wonder Dr. Wenley thinks that ability to "overcome half-truths is denied to all but a select few," when he is unable to "overcome" the superficiality of such a "half-truth." Any criticism of this school "had far better come from within" (p. 45), says Dr. Wenley, upon whom it has dawned that this school has "run to extremes." Why this resort to feeble partisanship or hothouse protectionism, rather than a fearless welcoming of light from any quarter? His treatment of great questions like the Personality of God, can only be branded as utter shallowness, the question being shirked altogether as "difficult" (p. 27) and "not so pressing" (p. 47). The significance of the question for speculative theology not being in the slightest degree grasped, a "defensible discretion" leaves it alone. There is no thoroughness in Dr. Wenley's method: he has neither skill nor boldness to defend the positions of the school, nor to criticise them. Hence he can only mildly modify extremer presentations with pithless result. The religious problem "gives place" to the philosophical, but "theology should not," he says, "too mildly acquiesce" in this "reduction" to a "subordinate" place. Contemporary theology had, five years before his vague and languid utterance, found it said,—"Recent times have even witnessed tendencies in philosophy to dominate theology, or bring it at undue sacrifice into har-

mony with itself, of which examples may be seen in the uses to which have been put the positions of Kant, of Hegel, and of Hartmann. It were the acme of folly for theology to yield to this tendency, as though unable to find for itself any more stable basis, or footing more in accord with the essential nature of Christianity itself."¹ Then Dr. Wenley curiously recalls personality, which he had dismissed, that it may "put in a claim for reconsideration"! Such is the method of his speculative theology! This dismissed category, Dr. Wenley at length perceives, is, after all, the "highest" known to us! Not the faintest notion is there, on Dr. Wenley's part, that, besides finding the Absolute to be personal and self-conscious, we must even seek some more adequate comprehension of his real relations to the world. Then we are left with a criticism of the Cairdian scheme of religious development which is made up of admissions rendered inevitable before urgings that came not "from within." Anything more lame and halting in the way of critical result it would be hard to conceive, for there is to be merely a "rethinking the entire scheme for ourselves." Anything more characterless, philosophically, than such evasive floundering among subjects like the primal unity and the problem of personality, it would be difficult to imagine. Anything more uninspiring and impotent, religiously, could not be devised than the involved suppression of individuality in man with "a bare minimum of personal religion." The straits of the school again appear when Dr. Wenley feels compelled to admit that the facts of Christian experience, incarnation, atonement, and resurrection, must be eviscerated of all real—not merely intellectual and abstract—significance, in order to the carrying out of its method. But Dr. Wenley's critical admissions win no respect, for they are part of the mental furniture of a man who—whether in philosophy or

¹Lindsay, *The Progressiveness of Modern Christian Thought*, p. 49.

in theology—is unable to “overcome” half-truths, and who only half believes even these.

Are we then to despair of speculative theology? As Dr. Wenley expounds it, yes; but far otherwise is it with a true speculative theology, which commands our highest enthusiasm and interest. Very possible is it to enter into all that is best in the fine speculative impulse and tendency of a Pfleiderer, and to conjoin these with more positive elements, more substantial grounds, more constructive tendencies, than those on which Dr. Wenley dilates. This—a true speculative theology—is to Dr. Wenley’s speculative product as is day to dawn. It has far more philosophical self-consistency, far more scientific thoroughness, incomparably more spiritual depth, and indefinitely more fairness to history. It has no need to shirk the testimony of the spiritual experience of the centuries, whose irrefragable testimony it welcomes; no need to eviscerate the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection, of all which it retains the fact wherewith to support, enrich, and confirm the idea; no need under the exigencies of a preconceived scheme, to denude Deity of Personality, Christ of Divinity, man of individuality, the soul of personal religion, the church of supernatural revelation, history of what is real but not to the historian’s liking. The method and main results of Dr. Wenley’s speculative school are quite discredited, as must be plainly said, since the perception comes not “from within.” A true speculative theology does not “have a sketch-plan ready to hand,” that it may “proceed to fill in” the details according to its own arbitrary dialectical method in disregard of fact. The vice even of a Pfleiderer—though Dr. Wenley has scarcely a perception of the fact—is just the tendency to set speculation always more over against history. There is no speculative theology (p. 19) known to Dr. Wenley save that which has “an untrammelled theory of the Universe”! As if speculative

method bore no relation to experience! No reflection on *fact*! The facts of the religious consciousness—empirically and historically presented—have no binding power for “untrammeled” speculation. But of what worth is the theory of these airy philosophers when it is of a “Universe” other than the real one—the one of fact? If we are going to make thought absolutely the last thing, it must be as an ultimate reached only by proceeding along an analytical path that sets out from an empirical foundation. From these empirical elements thought must, by means of self-analysis, raise itself until, in fact, thought of an absolute sort be brought forth. But we know no reason why, in transcending or leaving behind—as Kant did, in fact, insist, and as Hegel really repeated—what is of merely accidental character, thought should be content without pressing beyond empirical researches to a truly objective knowledge of divine truth as such. For the inwardness of the spiritual subject is not an abstract inwardness that concerns not itself with objective truth or principle. Dr. Wenley’s exclusive assumption of the term “speculative” is itself one of the many “half-truths” which he has been unable to “overcome.” But a true speculative theology will live notwithstanding, and will find in Truth the highest objective principle of its speculative activity. It will find its highest aim in trying to give scientific presentation to the ethical conception of God brought to us by the Christian religion, as that conception finds expression in a consciousness of God always more progressively ethicized. God must be set forth as the absolutely ethical Personality, working in freedom, since without freedom there is no love. This deepening of our ethical consciousness is, of course, something far in advance of making Christianity a mere religious ethic. It is not to be conceived as involving any *sacrificio dell’ intelletto*, calling, as it does, for the fuller and deeper activity of speculative intellect.

THE RITSCHLIAN THEOLOGY.

Dr. Wenley claims to be "as fair as human weakness permits" in his dealings with the Ritschlian theology, but the limits are all too soon reached. His criticism is far too slight and imperfect. His treatment of the Ritschlian value-judgments merely affirms that these "depend upon judgments of reality." But he has nothing to say of the Ritschlian claim that these value-judgments are meant to be set over against the theoretic judgments of science, and not put in contrast with real or essential judgments. Nor does he display any proper sense of the attractiveness which Ritschlianism wears in its claim to make Christianity a wholly practical thing, without theoretic or philosophical admixture—an attractiveness constituted, without doubt, by its suitability to the ideas of a scientific and positivist age. Though he deals with the Ritschlian dualism between theoretic and practical knowledge, he does not bring out the necessity, for mind and its energies, that such dualism be transcended, and the unity of the philosophical and Christian world-views grasped. Nor does he, in any adequate manner, realize the greatness of Ritschl's work of theological construction, pursued as it was in an age of agnosticism and destructive criticism. It had been better if Dr. Wenley, instead of turning a great personality like Ritschl into sport for the Philistines, had aspired to some share in Ritschl's noble independence as a thinker, however differing from his methods and results. It seems rather "peddling" criticism to say that "God need have no personality" in the Ritschlian theology, "nor need he have any attribute save love," for the love obviously involves the personality, and is meant to define the quality of his Personality, in pursuance of Ritschl's practical aim. True, Ritschl does not wish the notion of personality to go before that of love, but it is not just or fair to represent him as meaning to deny personality to God. If personality be

but the form in which the revelation comes, his failure to see that personality is the prior conception would only be one of the proofs that philosophy was not a strong point with him. What God is *for us* is his concern, not what God is in himself.

Dr. Wenley's talk of Ritschlianism and "its eviscerated Christ, its pliant view of sin, its comfortable deity, and its secluding agnosticism," sounds strange on the lips of one who has a soft partiality for his own speculative school far removed from this sort of pungency. This we say, although Ritschl, in our view, made a grave mistake in extruding, under recoil from mysticism, elements of spirituality so essential that, wherever there is virile development of the spiritual life, these will lead to a bursting of the swaddling-clothes of Ritschlianism. But this aspect of its historical positivism, with its consequences for living and spiritual Christianity, Dr. Wenley leaves untouched. Yet the Ritschlian denial of direct intercourse with God is one of its most serious defects, one, too, which no weakly sensitive fear of pietistic and mystical extravagances is sufficient to justify. With all its historic positivism, Ritschlianism remains a prey to subjectivism, and comes not forth as a system of objective truth for all, through its dependence on personal intuitions or impressions of value. Its basis is really a subjective idealism far enough removed from giving us the firm ground promised. Such empirical needs as its does satisfy are not final and exhaustive. Its "pliant view of sin" is a grave defect which it shares, in its own way, with the idealism of Dr. Wenley's school, shattered as this latter is through setting sin in relation to an "eviscerated" Deity. The defective view of Ritschlianism as to Christ and sin really constitute an historical rationalism not so far removed from the speculative rationalism of Dr. Wenley's school. But the most vital parts of the whole question are left untouched by Dr. Wenley, who

has nothing to say of Ritschlianism's lack of revelation-value for the Scriptures, or of its divergence from the apostolic faith about Christ. But, Dr. Wenley's defect has been supplied by Ecke, who, in his highly interesting work, declares the Ritschlians to be defective or wavering in attitude towards apostolical witness—that witness which must remain as basis and norm for the life and knowledge of the Christian community.¹ Before speaking of its "eviscerated Christ," Dr. Wenley had better have done a little more to show wherein He is "eviscerated," for there is nothing really adduced by him to show that the Deity of Christ is, in Ritschlianism, meant in a merely moral or religious sense, nothing to mark the fact that the Deity of Christ is, with Ritschl, expressive of the value of his historic work for the mind of the church, but is not on that account held as, in really objective sense, attributable. Christ is, on the Ritschlian theory, only the embodiment of the Divine Revelation, the Founder of the Divine Kingdom, into whose nature or substance as Person we are, however, forbidden to inquire. It should also be made to appear how its homage to Christ—its mode of finding God and salvation only in Christ—is yet one of the sources of the power of Ritschlianism. A passing mention of "its exaltation of Christ" cannot suffice to bring out the stress of Ritschl on the activity of Christ, on his uniqueness as Founder of the Kingdom, and on his peculiar oneness with God. This divineness of Jesus is not meant to mark him off in any absolute way from others. Touching Christ as the source of revelation, it should be observed how strangely Ritschl refrains from staying to inquire into the source and validity of the revelation so summed for him in Christ. Ritschl simply takes it as ultimate: its value is for him final, and found in its fruits. It is really the worth that

¹Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls und die evangelische Kirche der Gegenwart. Berlin, 1897. See pp. 314-316.

Jesus carries for the single soul that is determinative of the divine aspect in which we come to behold him, and it should not be left out of view how strangely unconcerned Ritschl is with the grounds on which we so come to believe in Christ at all. No doubt, it is well to have the Ritschlian stress on the absolute character of revelation, and well, too, to have its emphasis on Christ as positive principle of that revelation, but this absoluteness of revelation is so ill-defined when defined at all, and the way in which Christ comes to be its positive principle is so shirked, that less real ground for satisfaction remains. There is a continual taking refuge in mystery which is far from satisfying to our instinctive craving for light. "Eviscerated" enough the Ritschlian Christ of the present certainly is; nor has it any great future for the Christ; and if none for him, what wonder that it has so little of real world to come for us? And, besides, what right to make us lose the individuality of the believer in the unity of the Kingdom? The oscillation between too radically inharmonious principles—that of an individualistic freedom, based on the Kantian moral autonomy, on the one hand, and a strong churchly socialism on the other, makes it fail of satisfying result. The truth is that Ritschlianism is far more valuable as a fermenting power or influence than it is as a reasoned and coherent system.

THE THEISTIC PROBLEM.

Dr. Wenley sees the problem involved in God's remaining God, and still being for man "a construction derived from experience," and is not without a sense that his speculative school have need to do better by Personality in God and by the single life of man. Now, there has been no lack of conceiving God through the world of finite experience, and such knowledge or conception of him is real, so far as it goes. For, though he be for us the Absolute

Being, and, as such, a self-evident principle of reason, our knowledge of him arises only on occasion of our experientially knowing him in his objective reality. This is not to say that there may not be advantage, such as Biedermann suggests, in beginning with the logico-metaphysical idea of the absoluteness of God's being, rather than with the empirical idea of man.¹ Professor Andrew Seth, in dealing with Theism, seems to us to lose sight of the point as to God's remaining God, while we take experience to be "the only accessible and authentic revelation" of the Absolute. "Without the assumption of the infinite value and significance of human life," he says, "argument about God is simply waste of time."² But, if we are not to argue about God till we get the infinite significance of life, may we not be pardoned for asking whence its significance may be infinitely derived if not from him? Is he not before all our thought and argument about him, and goes he not before our every impulse to seek him? Is "human life" a thing so weighted with significance that it must give all point and value to thought about God? Does not the thought of God much more give force and value to "human life"? Is it quite wise to make "duty" a more "basal certainty" than "God"?³ Is "God" nor base nor sanction of "duty"? May we not still prefer, with the poet, to regard duty as "stern daughter of the voice of God" rather than reduce God to an outcome of duty? Are we really to refuse consideration in our thought to God, save in so far as he is of value for "human life," and not in and for himself alone? Is not the problem really *what*, rather than *whether*, God is? Is it of no consequence for the Universe—a mere "waste of time" to consider—whether there is a God or not, if man's life has not infinite worth? No doubt, where the stress on the moral life is small, argu-

¹ Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, § 699, pp. 620-621.

² A. Seth, *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 63. ³*Ibid.*, p. 64.

ment may mean "waste of time" if regarded as argument and nothing more. But we do not set out to seek God from any such assumption as that of Professor Seth, but sheerly from the impulse wrought in us of nature's revelations and those interior revelations that come through feeling and reflection. Being and worth in and for himself we must certainly postulate for God, and not make him of worth only for man or man's life. There is no occasion to deny—if we defer—the "infinite value and significance" of "human life," as seen in creation's having been made for man as its crown. But is there any reason in the world why our thought should never proceed after God, save only on basis of this assumption? Does not the absoluteness of his being and self-revelation exceed our experience, so that experience cannot simply be made its measure? What eternal significance and worth could be held for "human life," should God prove to be blind Fate, as indeed he might eventually prove to be, if we are to determine life's worth before we argue about him? Professor Seth's "assumption" implies that God is of no practical account for man, unless man finds himself to be of "infinite" account in the eyes of God. But what a subjective criterion this involves! The "assumption" certainly *is* an assumption, for we have no direct knowledge of "human life" as of "infinite" worth, and we see our suicides, therefore, lightly throw it away. But whether we must argue for God only by using it is another matter. We hold that man is bound to know, no less than to make moral estimate. The infinite value and significance of "human life" is an assumption based on life which is really phenomenal, inexplicable, and transitory. To assume God without making this explicit assumption may for us be far more rational and easy. True as it is that only as we value life do we reach out to a Higher than we, we yet cannot narrowly reason to God from the sentiments and verdicts of the moral life alone.

We must get our God first, before the "infinite value and significance" can be ours that spring from our being consciously related to him. Then do we see the added worth and significance that have come to our lives from the Universe-serving man, according to the purpose of God. We deny the right to proscribe the speculative impulse in man—on whom rests an imperious obligation to seek truth for its own sake, whether it ministers to the magnifying of man's own life or not—in the interests of the ethical impulse to obey. Professor Seth rightly objects to Hegel's making everything give way before thought or the intellectual interest, and we, with equal right, object to Professor Seth's own one-sided tendency to sacrifice thought and all else before a purely moral interest and human valuation. It ought never to be doubted that an intellectual interest has here its own power to deepen moral earnestness and ought never to be regarded as "waste of time."

But now, just here we must note, with Dr. Wenley's admission of the need to "rate personality at its proper worth" (p. 175), the strange helplessness with which he regards personality, once more introduced. On page 176 we have "personality re-imported as it were"; on page 177, we are told it "may be made subject of hopeful appeal"; on it (p. 179) one "cannot choose but lean"; on page 185, it "points the way, and, to this extent, may assist toward a solution"; and so we are left by Dr. Wenley with another of those "half-truths" in which alone he seems to live and have any philosophic being. What force or impact can belong to work marked by an abortiveness or elusiveness of this sort? Rationalism, "in the guise of a socialized reason," constitutes "the ægis of a satisfactory theology" (p. 188). What, then, does his "socialized reason" mean? We are left to gather it from his telling us that "the average man of the day" reaches results that can hardly be said to be helpful (p. 135), and that he has "leaders on

whom he must perforce rely"! So we are driven to hold by something much more definite and scientific than his vague "socialized reason." We prefer still to trust to religion coming to scientific self-consciousness in the theological subject. For such subject shall scientifically grasp and present the God-consciousness of mankind in all its possibility, necessity, actuality, and fullness of reality. Had Dr. Wenley seriously devoted himself to a competent knowledge of any one of the three subjects he has chosen to treat, he would thereby have escaped the disservice he has rendered to theology. As it is, he has supplied a signal warning of the dangers and shallows that beset such methods of theological study.

The theistic problem, however, is of paramount importance for contemporary theology. The vitality of the universe, the immanence of the life of Deity, are truths which have been much more vividly realized, but faith in the Personality of God has thereby been quickened, not quenched. There is no reason why the vitality of the Divine Life should be a segregated thing, as in some Deistic sort, instead of the Divine Personality being for us renewed or rejuvenated in the life universal. No disclaimer of impersonality could be more complete than that of the newer theism. But no solution of the theistic problem can be satisfactory which shall shrink from the positive assertion and exposition of Personality in Deity, though, of course, we do not by this latter phrase meditate a psychology of the eternal. If those who have approached the subject from the scientific, no less than those from the philosophical, side, have sometimes even timidity and hesitation in speaking of the Infinite Personality or the Infinite Self-Consciousness, that can hardly be wondered at by any one who has deeply pondered those aspects of Deity with which the scientific habit of thought has most to do. Yet God as the Absolute Personal Spirit must be clearly affirmed. From

him the physical universe as objective reality must still be distinguished. A like distinctness of existence must be postulated for ourselves, though made in his likeness. The fundamental reality of the Universe can only be spirit: its highest energy can be no other than that of spirit: the Absolute Being can be no less than personal spirit: the personal and self-conscious alone can love. These considerations should guide and affect us in conceiving the religious relation, so that we view it as involving recognition, on our part, of a real relationship between God and man. We find Professor Seth asking, "What is religion, if not an attitude of the subjective spirit of man"?¹ To which it must be answered, that the religious relation, theistically conceived, is, while involving this, very much more than this.

It is not bare subjectivity, though subjectivity there must be. On its human side it is not mere attitude, but, on any adequate view, action as well. God need not exist at all, in order to religion, so far as Professor Seth's definition is concerned. Religion is not made by him to consist of any relation to God. Can any true and adequate conception of religion be formed, so long as man communes with no one outside of himself, and has no need to postulate a God? There is something *to* which religion binds or ties us when it relates us to God. Religion involves a subjective attitude, but is not constituted by that alone, for it has an objective basis and wears an objective character as related to a Higher than we. Religion presupposes an object, and though we in religion may look at the relation from man's side, yet we cannot overlook that there is an Object, and, what is more, an object with attitude such as properly corresponds with that found in man. But Professor Seth's mode of defining religion ignores the possibility, which is God's, of drawing near to man. I can more eagerly seek after him, but it is also true that he may make fuller or

¹ Two Lectures on Theism, p. 36.

clearer revelation of himself to me. Without an Object or Being worthy to be worshiped, *plus* the subjective attitude of man's spirit, the idea of religion is not adequately realized. For the purely subjective view obviously explains only part of the relation subsisting between man and God. In all spheres of relation, there is the thing perceived as well as the perceiving subject, and to leave the reality of the object perceived out of account is manifestly one-sided.

Man worships not himself, nor his own ideas, but the God in whom he has his being. Vital as the subjective self-affirmation of our spiritual consciousness may be, it is very unsatisfactory to represent religion otherwise than as a personal relation importing a communion with God—a reciprocal fellowship—of the most real character. Religion is thus more than a subjective attitude, and involves a participation, a taking possession, of God in this mutual commerce of spirit with spirit, person with person. When the self-relation of man has so met the self-revelation of God, then is religion, by such union of factors, completely realized. The subjectivism of which we have been speaking, has, in its extreme forms, too many affinities with the pure illusion into which German materialism and French positivism have been prone to resolve religion. Such stress on the subjective attitude of man in religion is in danger of becoming too closely allied with the tendency to make God an idea developed by our own thinking, not a Being known through real revealing on his part. Then might we become a prey to agnosticism or to ideal pantheism, and our theism would have perished. But theism still maintains its doctrine of God as the Absolute Spirit, actively revealing himself in the Universe while yet transcending it, and it is careful how it conceives of individual personality in man, which Professor Seth is not without anxiety to conserve, though he has thus spoken. Theism does so because it is wise enough to know that, however

individuals may escape, all such tendencies of thought are inexorably driven to their legitimate conclusion, and so should be firmly adjusted.

Dr. Wenley says that "the priceless treasure of idealism, the rehabilitation of experience," cannot be given up, because some have resolved Deity into nothing more than "the process of ideas." But how can Dr. Wenley delude himself into the belief that he has been rehabilitating experience? It would be nearer truth to say he has been dissolving it before a shadowy Hegelian Universal, and diluting it till it becomes a weak "socialized" solution. We are idealist, and content to be so in a true fashion. But we are not content to make man, in his individual being and experience, the unsubstantial and unessential thing he appears on Dr. Wenley's "untrammelled" theory. Man is more than an aspect of the Absolute Idea, more than a mode of the Absolute Experience, and we need not hoodwink ourselves as to a "final idealism" which means no more than that integration of human existence described as "the experience of the race" (p. 191) or "socialized reason," in which is found the ægis of a "theology" that would be "satisfactory" to Dr. Wenley. Whether the "final idealism" be upon us or not, we are content with the necessary insights of reason in the present, with its permissible hopes for the eternal future, with the actualities of experience, and with the suggestions of conscience. But all this does not imply that, though we know even God in and through our finite experience, we make God only an element *in* experience, or evolve him *out of* experience, or fail to realize how small a part we know of him—his absolute being and working.

ARTICLE III.

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EARLY LIFE AND MILITARY SERVICES OF
GENERAL JACOB DOLSON COX.¹

BY WILLIAM C. COCHRAN.

BECAUSE we do not know on what meat our Cæsars feed, we often fail to derive the inspiration we should from the lives of ancient heroes and statesmen. If we do not know the exact conditions under which their lives were wrought out and success achieved, or if such conditions differ essentially from those of to-day, we are not apt to look to them for guiding principles by which to shape our own lives. If we find that a successful man had great advantages in early life, such as wealth, noble birth, or the commanding influence of family, we are apt to say, "*That* explains his success," and to look no further. Washington, whose natal day we celebrate, was of distinguished lineage, inherited a large estate, and was indebted to the influence of his family for a major's commission at the age of nineteen, and his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces at the age of twenty-three. How can a young man without wealth or influence hope to emulate the life of Washington? He is apt to overlook the sterling qualities and marked individuality of the man, as developed in after life, to which alone he owes the greatest title ever conferred on mortal man, "First in War, First in Peace, and First in the Hearts of his Countrymen." On the other hand, no boy born of honest parents ever had a poorer "start in life" than Abraham Lincoln. Not one of us can say, "I could be as great as he was, *if I had his advantages.*"

¹ A patriotic address delivered at Oberlin, Ohio, February 22, 1901.

The subject of this sketch is another man, who, without any advantages of birth or fortune, without any exceptional opportunities, achieved distinction in half a dozen walks of life, wholly unrelated to each other, and served his country well in its greatest hour of need. His career suggests the following questions: How did it happen that a man who had no professional training and no aspirations for military glory, became a Major-General and the most illustrious volunteer officer that the war produced? How did it happen that a man who had not been in the State of Ohio for eighteen months, and did not know so much as the names of party "bosses," was nominated for Governor of Ohio by acclamation in June, 1865? How did it happen that a man who had voluntarily turned his back on politics and devoted himself to the practice of his profession was appointed Secretary of the Interior in 1869? How did it happen that a man who had no previous railway experience and no capital, was elected President of one of the great trunk lines of railway in the fall of 1873? How did it happen that a man who had not made teaching his profession, was tendered the presidency of five different colleges, and became President of the University of Cincinnati in 1885? How did it happen that a man who was not a professional scientist, put to shame German professors, and won the gold medal of honor for excellence in micro-photography at the Antwerp Exposition in 1891? How did it happen that a man who had retired from public life for more than eighteen years was tendered the Spanish Mission on the eve of the Spanish-American war, and was almost forced, against his will, to accept that responsible position? These are interesting questions. I shall not be able to answer them in detail. The very diversity of his employments and achievements makes it difficult to review them in a single address. I can, however, bring out some of the facts and guiding principles of

his early life which throw light on his subsequent career, and tend to explain his success.

Jacob Dolson Cox was born in Montreal, Canada, October 27, 1828. His parents were both native-born citizens of the United States. His mother traced her ancestry back to Elder William Brewster, of "Mayflower" importation, and many strains of early New England blood were mingled in her veins. His father, Jacob Dolson Cox, the first of that name, was of German descent, though born in New York. He was a carpenter and builder of great industry and ingenuity, and had achieved a reputation for his skill in building churches and warehouses, and in roofing great areas without using internal columns of support. This reputation led to his selection, at the age of thirty-three, to superintend the roof construction and carpenter work on the great church of Notre Dame, at Montreal. His integrity, and sense of honor, equaled his skill.

The subject of this sketch inherited from the Coxes his personal appearance, his thoughtfulness, his gentleness, his inflexible integrity, and his unassuming bearing, save when some important work required driving. He inherited from his mother¹ a puritan conscience and religious sentiment, combined with neatness and refinement, a love of art and music, and that sprightliness of temperament which enabled him to converse with ease and to speak and write with fluency and power. We justly attach much importance to heredity and environment in estimating a man's life and character, but they, alone, fail to explain any great man. A man is quite as apt to waste his inheritance of good traits and character as he is to squander a money inheritance. On the other hand, every great man develops qualities which are peculiarly his own. I have searched the family records with great care, but am bound to report that I am unable to find in any of his ancestors,

¹Thedia Redelia Kenyon.

since William Brewster, professional attainments, scholarship, statesmanship, military genius, executive ability, or scientific research, such as distinguished General Cox above most of his fellow-men. There was not a bad citizen among all his ancestors; but the virtues were chiefly negative.

His father returned to New York City in December, 1829, and entered on a prosperous career as a builder and contractor. Dolson's early education was rather desultory and incomplete. A few terms at a private school,¹—where he was taught French as an extra,—a year of study under a classically educated minister, and private reading and study, under the partial direction of a Columbia College student, constitute the whole of his preparation for college. He never thought the world owed him a living, and on his fourteenth birthday entered a law office in New York City as an articled clerk.² Here he became familiar with legal forms, and studied law. Two years later he entered the office of a Wall Street broker,³ and became versed in book-keeping and the methods of business. He was, moreover, gaining almost unconsciously a broad education in all that relates to the affairs of men by his daily walks up and down Broadway and along the wharves, then crowded with shipping from all parts of the world, and by listening to the talk of lawyers and prominent business men. He had for a long time a passionate desire to become a sailor, and finally got permission to go on a voyage with a captain of good reputation. He packed his "kit," stowed it on board, and then, as the Captain said he would not sail for several hours, he went down to Staten Island to take a last farewell of his family. When he returned—all in good time—the

¹ This school was kept by Rufus Lockwood.

² The office of Gouverneur M. Ogden, a reputable attorney, whose father was then Surrogate of New York.

³ Anthony Lane.

vessel was gone, the Captain having decided to take advantage of a favoring breeze and to leave at an earlier hour. It was a great blow; but, when he reflected on the grief his mother had shown at their parting, and the steady disapproval of his father, he accepted the event as a providential indication, and renounced forever his intention to follow the sea.

In the spring of 1842, Rev. Samuel D. Cochran, a graduate of Oberlin College (class of '39) and Seminary (class of '42), was, on the recommendation of Charles G. Finney, invited by Lewis Tappan and others to go to New York City and establish a Congregational church. He met with great opposition from the local clergy, who regarded Oberlin theology as rank heresy, but succeeded, in spite of them, in attracting large congregations and building up a church. He was a man of positive convictions; his logic was flawless; and he had a great warm heart and tender emotions. He began holding meetings in the hall of a medical college in Crosby Street, above Prince, and, as this was near by, the Coxes attended his services, and the mother and two oldest daughters joined his church soon after.

In the winter of 1842-43, Mr. Cochran arranged for a series of revival meetings at Niblo's Theater, in which he was assisted by Mr. Finney. One evening after an impressive sermon by Mr. Finney, all who wished to give their hearts to God were asked to come forward. A tall stripling arose in the rear of the theater and, finding the aisles blocked by the people, came leaping down to the front, using the backs of the seats as stepping-stones. His emotion was so great when he got there that he could not speak, nor even give his name. It was Jacob D. Cox. To all outward appearance this speechless emotion was the only immediate result of Mr. Finney's preaching; but, under the preaching and influence of Mr. Cochran, he was

baptized, and joined the church the following fall, when there was no special religious excitement, and, after his failure to go to sea, resolved to study for the ministry.

A full classical education was, at that time, regarded as an essential qualification. No short-cut, such as an "English Course in Theology," was conceived of as possible. It was still thought that the minister should be the most learned man in his community, as he had been, for the most part, during more than two centuries of New England history. So, in the spring of 1846, he and his younger brother, Kenyon, started for Oberlin College. How came they to this place? Oberlin had no glee club, no football team, no baseball team, alumni associations, endowment, or fine buildings, at that time; and yet the attendance was nearly as large in 1846, thirteen years after it was founded, as it was in 1900. The great attractions were the moral earnestness of the student body, the cheapness of living, the opportunities for self-support in whole or in part,—a prime consideration with Dolson,—and it was the place where Mr. Finney preached and taught.¹ When the boys arrived, after a long and wearisome journey, and were assigned to a room in Colonial Hall, the dismal downpour of rain, the crude aspect of the place, and their utter loneliness overcame them, as they were unpacking, and both broke down and wept. It seemed as though neither had been so wretchedly unhappy before. Kenyon went to bed, sick: but Dolson went to the Treasurer's office and applied for *work*. In an hour's time he was regaining his composure at the bottom of a cistern, which he had been hired to clean out. *Similia similibus curantur!* When letters of introduction they had brought from their pastor to Mr. Finney and to Mrs. Elizabeth Cole had been presented and they had been warmly welcomed, and when the regu-

¹ So great was Mrs. Cox's love and regard for Mr. Finney that she named her youngest son, born January 16, 1846, Charles Finney Cox.

lar routine of study and recitation began, their wonted cheerfulness returned. Owing to incomplete preparation, Dolson entered the Junior Preparatory class. He was, however, so far ahead of his class in many things, and so apt in learning, that he could give more time than his fellows to outside reading, music, and debate.

He inherited from his mother a love of music, and he studied violin and harmony with Professor George N. Allen.¹ He had a rich baritone voice of wide compass, and joined the noble choir. He was soon made assistant conductor, and often led the choir, violin in hand.

All his work as a student was stamped with the one word *thorough*. He shirked nothing. He went to the root of every matter that was discussed, and mastered every subject that was taught. The value of his "picked-up education" was most apparent in his society work. He early joined Phi Delta and, from the first, became its leading and most active member. His fund of general information was superior to that of most of his fellows, and he was an insatiable reader. He could throw additional light on almost every subject that was discussed, and he spoke readily and fluently. He was a keen debater, logical and forcible in presenting his side of a question, and quick to see and expose the weak points in his opponent's argument. But ready as he was, he always strove to improve. Many fail in the art of *expressing* themselves; others, in the duty of *repressing* themselves. He studied both.

I find two letters written by him during his college days. In the first, dated September, 1846, we see clearly the influence of the Oberlin spirit—of that day. He announces that he has engaged a school for the winter, and adds:—"In the district where I am going they have no church, nor any church meeting that I know of; and, as I cannot

¹ Professor of Sacred Music, as well as of Geology and Natural History, and the founder of Oberlin's Department of Music.

of course be sure that I will have any other opportunities of doing good than those which I may have here (for you know I cannot be sure of living even to complete my course), I feel as though this is all for the best, for in it I shall be about my Father's business. So for the winter you may just consider me as at work in a little missionary field, and I pray God I may be enabled to do my duty."

In this boy, eighteen years of age, we find the *sense of duty* which actuated the man in all his after life.

In the second, addressed to his father, September 18, 1848, he says, in answer to a pressing invitation to spend the winter at home:—

"I hardly dare trust myself to think of home, for fear I shall not be contented where I am.¹ As to my health, the state of the case is simply this. I used myself up in teaching last winter. I was tired by study when I commenced, and the care of one hundred scholars was by no means calculated to rest either mind or body. I came back exhausted and have not been strong since. . . . In my anxiety to pay my way here, I consented to take charge of the bread-baking for the boarding-hall, and this I think has done me no good; the heat, added to the labor, which is the hardest I ever did, has been too much for me. I have now, however, determined to give it up immediately. . . . I dread to think of being any more of a burden to you than I have been. Nor can I think of giving up my course of study. It is with me both choice and duty to continue it, and that here—for I am well convinced that it can be done here much cheaper, and in some respects with much better results to both mind and body, than in almost any other place."

In answer to some doubts expressed by his father as to the wholesomeness of Mr. Finney's preaching, he says:—

"Yesterday [Sabbath] and also a week ago, Professor Finney preached the most impressive sermons I ever heard in my life. I never so fully realized the power of eloquence

¹ His brother Kenyon had gone home the winter before, and never returned. He went into a broker's office, and worked his way up to the head of one of the most prominent banking houses on Wall Street.

before. No description could give any idea of it. I wish you were personally acquainted with him. If you could see him around every day and mark his entire consistency and childlike simplicity of character, combined with such a powerful intellect, you could not think for a moment of comparing him with those who are deluding and leading astray the people.¹ He lives what he preaches, and there is nothing like austerity about him. In his family he is all pleasantness—sings and plays with his children and is as one of them. Some of the pleasantest hours I ever spent have been passed with him in his family. He is passionately fond of music, and we can at any time make up a choir in the family.”

The letter suggests a growing intimacy with the family, and the pleasant hours were not all spent with Mr. Finney. The oldest daughter of Mr. Finney, who would have graduated at the age of seventeen if she had not given up her course to marry Professor William Cochran and go with him to New York City, had returned to her father's house—a widow at the age of nineteen. She had a little son who was six months old at the time this letter was written. Some of the “pleasantest hours” of his life were spent in her society, and even the baby proved a strong attraction to the young man, who had not seen his own home and his baby brother for more than two years. There were doubtless wise people in Oberlin in those days—as there have been since—who noted the signs of the times and foretold just what these young people were coming to; but *they* did not know it, until the end of the fall term, 1848, when Dolson came to bid Helen good-by, on the eve of his journey home, and the emotions of both, at parting, were too strong to be concealed. He went home an engaged man—engaged at the age of twenty, to a widow with one child. This insured his return in the spring.

Dolson kept with his class until the fall of 1849. He then felt that he must either go faster, or abandon his

¹ The allusion is to Miller and the Second Adventists.

course and seek employment. One of the reasons for this feeling was the fact that his father, whose business had been falling off owing to the great panic of 1847, had gone to California in a desperate attempt to retrieve his fortunes, and the outcome of this venture no one could foresee. Mr. Finney came to the rescue; and it was agreed that, at the end of the fall term, 1849, he should be married and make his home at the Finney house, study during the winter, take the last two years of his course in one, and begin the study of theology in the fall of 1850. Mr. Finney then started for England, to labor as an evangelist for two or three years. On Thanksgiving Day, 1849, Dolson took upon himself the cares of a husband and father in the presence of two thousand people, who assembled in the First Church to see him married. Dr. John Morgan performed the ceremony. Recitations ceased; but study went on apace. At the end of the vacation and at the end of each term he was examined in the studies pursued by the Senior class and his own class, and passed. He began the study of Theology, and had made satisfactory progress in Greek and Hebrew Exegesis, Harmony, etc., and was deep in the intricacies of Systematic Theology, when Mr. Finney returned in May, 1851. Mr. Finney had had a wonderful series of revivals in England, and converts were made by tens of thousands. Coming back, worn out by his labors, he was disturbed to find a young man in his own family digging deep about the very foundations of religion. Dolson was studying those problems,

"Of Providence, foreknowledge, will and fate—
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,"

which every man who essays to be the religious guide of others should work out, at some time and in some way, for himself. He was debating these questions with himself and with others with intense earnestness. His whole future depended upon his finding sure ground on which to

stand. It is possible that there was more of the *debater*, than the *seeker after truth*, in his manner, and that when he was *testing* doctrines he seemed rather to wish to *overthrow* them. Be that as it may, there came a day, late in the summer, when Mr. Finney said to him, after a particularly warm discussion, "Dolson, you are not *honest*. You do not *want* to see the truth." If he had stabbed the young man, he could not have hurt him more. In that awful moment he saw all his hopes and ambition dashed to earth. If theology was not a science permitting of free inquiry and intellectual apprehension, he could go no further. Whether it was or not, the word spoken had made it impossible for him to continue studying in Oberlin, or to remain in his father's house. No man, then, or thereafter, in all his long and useful life, had the right to call Jacob D. Cox *dishonest*. Dependence upon a man who could think him so, was intolerable. Dr. Morgan, who was present and saw the deadly effect of the words uttered, said, with trembling voice, "Brother Finney, Brother Finney, you must not say that. I believe Dolson is honest"; and for these kind words uttered in the hour of greatest anguish he had ever known, General Cox held Dr. Morgan in loving remembrance ever after. But the blow had fallen. Dolson applied immediately for the position of Superintendent of Public Schools in Warren, Ohio, of which he chanced to hear, secured it, and left Oberlin with his wife, his adopted son, and a little girl of his own, then about a year old.¹

¹ In justice to Mr. Finney, it must be said that he probably never realized what a wound he had inflicted. He always manifested a fatherly solicitude for the young man and his family, called on him frequently when passing to and fro on his journeys East, tendered financial assistance when the pinch of poverty was felt, left his daughter, Julia, in their care for a year or more at a time, and expressed an ever-growing regard for his son-in-law. They discussed freely professional ethics, politics, the practical affairs of life; but Theology was never again the subject of their conversation.

If there had been more patience on one side, or less sensitiveness on the other, matters might not have reached this crisis; he might have solved *his* doubts as many another honest man has done, as Mr. Finney himself did after three years of anxious questioning, during which *he* was regarded as a dangerous infidel, and Jacob D. Cox might have been one of the most polished, cultured, and able preachers of his generation. But preaching is not the only service God calls man to do for his fellow-men. It is not certain even that it is the *highest* service. At any rate, God reserved this man for other service, which no preacher would have had a chance to render, in the great conflict which was near at hand.

Warren was a pleasant village of about two thousand inhabitants, and boasted, in good New England fashion, of its ancestry, culture, and refinement. While teaching, he studied law, and in the summer of 1853 he began its practice. The bar of Warren was at this time quite noted for ability and high professional standing. It included such men as Matthew Birchard and Rufus P. Ranney, ex-judges of the Supreme Court of Ohio; Milton Sutliff, elected Supreme Court judge under the new constitution; John Hutchins and E. B. Taylor, afterward members of Congress; and a number of others who would have taken high rank at any bar in the State. The struggle of the young man to acquire a practice against such odds was severe and protracted, and he felt the pinch of poverty for three years, before he was cheered with the prospect of professional success. In one of his letters he writes:—

“It’s slow business working into a practice which will enable me to live comfortably. . . . Our profession seems to be a practical exemplification of the old saw that ‘one shouldn’t go into the water till he knows how to swim.’ A lawyer cannot get business till he is doing a great deal of it. . . . To do a great deal of business without having it to do; to show people that you can do it, although you

have none of it to do the showing with; and thus to obtain a practice, which nevertheless you must have before people will give it to you! There! Do you comprehend that?"

He had, however, no thought of giving up, or turning aside from his profession, and in 1856 the tide set in, which, for five years, bore him steadily on toward fortune and professional eminence.

His energy was never limited to the bread-and-butter work of the day. As he said, in one of his letters,—

"My life of business and public activity is a thing by itself, and I have another life of thought, study, feeling, which I keep apart from the first jealously."

If he had allowed his duties as teacher to absorb all his time and strength, he would not have become a lawyer. If he had idled away his time while waiting for practice, or had allowed his law practice, when it came, to monopolize his time, he would never have become a scholar, a writer, a general, or a statesman. He led the chorus choir of twelve or fifteen voices in the Presbyterian Church. He organized and led for years the Choral Union. He found an old-school physician who could play the flute, and a homeopathic physician who played the violin, and he accomplished the seeming impossibility of making them dwell together in harmony several hours each week. They met usually at his house; he took down his own violin; and together they played such trios as they could find, or adapt for their instruments.

His fullness of information, readiness of speech, and enthusiasm for everything that tended to the public good were so well known that he was frequently called on for public addresses on all sorts of occasions, and he rarely refused to respond. In the year 1853, alone, he delivered an address on "Music" before a Band Convention held at Warren; an address on "Fairs" before the Trumbull Ag-

ricultural Society, at the opening of their new fair grounds, and a lecture on the "Emancipation of Science" before the Columbiana County Teachers' Association, at Salem. These were all carefully prepared, packed with information, abounding in philosophical reflections, and perfect in their literary finish.

He studied the Pitman system of shorthand and became an expert reporter, taking down the testimony of witnesses, the charge of the Court, etc., in cases where he was not formally retained and his name did not appear as "of counsel."¹ His readiness to serve "without rank or emoluments" gained him many friends, and led to fuller opportunity later on. In the spring of 1854 he organized the "Home Literary Union," composed of six or seven married men and their wives, and eight or ten unmarried people of both sexes. The "Union" met, fortnightly, during the fall and winter, at the homes of the members, and the programs consisted of music, essays, poems, discussions, games, and an "Anonymous Box," to which, under the seal of secrecy as to authorship, the members contributed such little squibs as did not deserve the formal title of essays. Not all of the members were writers. Generous appreciation is ever the complement of genuine effort. There must be ears to hear, as well as words to speak, and responsive applause, if such a society is to be stimulating. Mr. Cox was the leading spirit, and he contributed several articles each year. In response to inquiries, fourteen manuscripts in his handwriting have been sent to me by those

¹ In 1855 he attended and reported a debate on "Spiritualism" between J. Tiffany and Rev. Isaac Errett of the Disciples Church, which attracted much attention at the time. The debate lasted ten days, and there were two sessions of two and a half hours each, every day. He reported the whole, wrote it all out, and published it in a volume of 417 closely printed pages (octavo) within three months. It is an interesting book for the student of the spiritualistic movement; but its chief value to us is as a monument to the patience, skill, and unflagging industry of Jacob D. Cox.

who have treasured them for more than forty years. How many more were written and lost will never be known. The "Union" lasted from the spring of 1854 to the fall of 1860, when the shadow that overhung the greater "Union" blotted out the lesser.

In all this life there is not a suggestion of war, or preparation for strife. The men were cultivating the graces and refinements of life in the society of cultured and amiable women. They were neither hazing nor being hazed. They were not making brutes of themselves, or of others. Yet when the shock of battle came, this little "Union" at Warren furnished four splendid officers, whose records will compare favorably with those of any four turned out of West Point during the same period. One became a major-general, commanded the Ninth and Twenty-third Army Corps, and demonstrated his ability to command an army of any size on any field; two became brigadier-generals and brevet major-generals;¹ one was a colonel of cavalry and brevet brigadier-general.² Of the others, one served four years in Congress as the immediate successor of Joshua R. Giddings;³ one has served for fifteen years in the Supreme Court of Ohio;⁴ one became Chancellor of the University of Kansas;⁵ one became general counsel of the Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad, and moved to Cleveland;⁶ and another became the head of a wholesale dry-goods house in Cleveland.⁷ Was it merely a happy chance that so many of this little club rose to eminence in after life, or was there something in their training and associations that fitted them for grave crises, high responsibilities, and the everlasting struggle between right and wrong?

Mr. Cox took an active part in politics. He assisted in organizing the Republican party in Warren, and stumped

¹ General M. D. Leggett and General Emerson Opdycke.

² General Robert W. Ratliff. ³ John Hutchins. ⁴ William T. Spear.

⁵ James Marvin. ⁶ Henry C. Ranney. ⁷ Comfort Adams.

Trumbull and the adjoining counties in the Presidential campaign of 1856. In 1859 he was nominated for the Ohio Senate, in spite of his earnest protest. He was forced to run, and was duly elected. Among his associates were James Monroe and James A. Garfield. These three were known as the "Radical Triumvirate," and took a leading part in shaping legislation and in the exciting debates that marked the session just preceding the Civil War.

We may glance at his personal appearance as he crossed the threshold of public life and became an object of interest to others than his fellow-townsmen. He was just six feet in height—very erect and very slender—his weight about one hundred and forty-five pounds. His hair was fine, dark brown, worn rather long, and always brushed with scrupulous care. His beard was full and, when allowed to grow long, became wavy. His complexion¹ was clear, and quite pale, the veins showing at the temple. His features were clear-cut and refined. His prominent brow betokened deep thought. The searching, deep-set eye was that of a man who saw everything, and saw clearly. The acuteness of his perception was remarkable. If a picture was hung slightly out of plumb, an ornament misplaced, or the order of his books changed on a shelf, he saw it the moment he entered the room. He was active in his habits, and quick and graceful in his movements. He never lounged, except when seriously ill, and never dawdled along the street. He walked from his home in the suburbs to his office at a four-mile gait, and covered great distances in his Saturday and Sunday afternoon walks through the woods. Even then there was an air of distinction about the man,—an air which grows upon every man

¹ Fullness of habit and the too florid complexion came with old age and exposure to wind and sun, in his summer cruises along the New England coast.

whose thoughts go beyond his immediate surroundings, and rise above the level of mere bread-winning.

At Columbus he met Governor William Dennison, one of the most courteous and refined gentlemen that ever entered public life. Between these kindred spirits it was a case of "love at first sight," and the warmth of their friendship never diminished.¹ In the spring of 1860, Governor Dennison appointed Mr. Cox Brigadier-General of the Ohio Militia. It was intended by the Governor as a compliment, and regarded by his friends at home as a good joke. On his return to Warren, after the first session of the Legislature, they planned a little reception for him at the house of John Hutchins, M. C., and made witty speeches of congratulation, in which the "battle of Quimby Hill," the "crossing of the Mahoning," and the "capture of Stevens Point" were enumerated as achievements of the "future Napoleon." They had ransacked the book-stores and found some old books which they presented him,—*"Army Regulations,"* Muller's *"Field Engineer,"* published at London in 1760, and *"Forbes' Volunteer's Manual."* He accepted their badinage in good part, replied in a humorous vein; then, suddenly changing his tone, he spoke with deep earnestness about the possibility of coming war, foreshadowed by the troubles in "bleeding Kansas," the Wellington Rescue, the John Brown raid, the determination of the South to extend slavery, and their growing arrogance in the Halls of Congress. He made a serious study of these books, presented to him in jest. He read Napier's *Peninsular War* and other military histories. Not finding all he wanted, he purchased Hardee's *"Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics"* and Jomini's great works on *"Grand Military Operations"* and *"Napoleon,"* with their valuable maps and plans of battle. He studied these, as

¹ In honor of this friend, General Cox named his youngest son, born at Columbus, December 8, 1867, Dennison Cox.

he did everything else he undertook, with a determination to master the science. The very landscape took on for him a new interest, as presenting a possible field of conflict. He and Garfield got out their war books and maps, and studied military problems together, during the session of 1860-61.

After the firing on Sumter and the call for troops, he devoted himself day and night to assisting the Governor to enroll and equip the volunteers for service. He was commissioned "Brigadier-General of Ohio State Volunteers," April 23, 1861. If any man had good excuses for not going to war, he was one. His friend Garfield urged him not to go. He had a family, consisting of a wife and six children, the oldest thirteen years, and the youngest three months old. They lived in a house which was mortgaged to secure the payment of a large part of the purchase money. He was delicate in appearance and, two years before, had been for days at the point of death, from quinsy, due to exposure on one of his professional journeys in an open sleigh. He had a serious attack of diphtheria in January, 1861. How long could such a man stand the rigors of camp life and service in the open field?

He was not carried away by enthusiasm. He indulged in no illusions as to the nature of war's perils. He felt that a bullet might find him in the first skirmish and lay him low. What then would become of his family? Nevertheless, some one must go, and who, if not a leader of the Republican party? He resolved to do his duty, and leave all the consequences to his Heavenly Father. He just as truly gave up his life for his country, the day he accepted his commission, as any man who died on the field of battle. He gave it, once for all, and was never troubled, or in doubt about it, afterwards. This was the secret of his steadfast courage and unshrinking performance of duty on many bloody fields and in many perilous situations. His

courage was not whiskey-fed; nor did he work himself up into a frenzy, and go charging about with the "light of battle" in his eye, as many did, who perhaps would have gone to the rear, if they had allowed themselves to think. He felt that the lives and the honor of his men were committed to his care; he must keep a cool head at all times; think quickly; act intelligently; and if the messenger of death came, as it might at any moment, it would find him doing his full duty. His constant study for the welfare of his men and their proper conduct on the march, in camp and on the battle-field, doubtless steadied his nerves. He could not worry about himself, when there were so many others to worry about. It is marvelous how his life was spared. He never received a scratch. He never had a horse killed under him, although at South Mountain, Antietam, Resaca, Franklin, and Kinston officers, men, and horses were killed all around him.¹ A bullet cut off the

¹ At the battle of South Mountain he directed the movements of the Ninth Army Corps from early morning until five o'clock in the afternoon, when General Reno, its commander, came on the field. He spoke a few words to General Cox, rode a little to one side, and was brought back in fifteen minutes—dead. At Resaca, he was conferring with Generals Manson and Harker when a shell exploded in their midst, wounding Harker, and so injuring Manson that he was compelled to retire from the service. In the Atlanta Campaign he was riding with one of his aides through a densely wooded country when they suddenly came out on a rebel rifle pit and were welcomed by a discharge of musketry. His aide fell dead and he heard the scream of bullets all about him, but not one touched him. In the battle of Franklin he rode to the center just as the break occurred. His horse plunged violently and trembled all over with fear. One of his aides was killed at his side. General Stanley came riding up, and in an instant his horse was shot down and Stanley himself received a wound in the neck which bled profusely, compelled him to retire, and practically disabled him for the rest of the war. At the second battle of Kinston, the firing seemed to be concentrated for a time on the General. General Greene, of his staff, had his horse shot under him, one orderly had an arm taken off by a shell, two others were wounded, and several horses were killed. Yet, when it was all over, General Cox sat uninjured and unmoved, peering through his field-glass to see what extra force was needed, if any, to repel the assault.

lower half of his scabbard at Antietam,¹ and that was the only missile of death that ever left its mark on his personal outfit.

The juvenile impression of a general, as one who goes charging about, waving a bloody sword and roaring out commands and oaths learned in Flanders, was also the popular one for a time; and even the soldiers were long in learning that an ounce of quiet thought is worth a pound of swagger and pretense. General Cox was a quiet man and, except in great emergencies, like the crisis at Franklin, issued his orders in writing, and sent them through his aides. There was nothing of the theatrical in his make-up. Transferred from one command to another many times, he had difficulties with both men and officers, who at first misunderstood his manner, distrusted his ability, and supposed they could take liberties. They soon learned that this quiet man had mastered his profession, knew what was due to his position, and was nearly as respectful of *self* as he was of *others*, and, when it became necessary to check presumption, they felt the grip of the iron hand beneath the velvet glove. There were some good officers who were loud and showy, and made splendid figures in battle. Hooker, Hancock, Logan, are types; but as the war progressed, men learned to rely more and more on the quiet men, who applied their hearts unto wisdom and vaunted not themselves—the silent Grant, the modest, unassuming McPherson, the dignified Thomas, the Christian gentleman, Oliver O. Howard. The noisy, fussy “dogs of war” were kept in the backyard. The modest, thoughtful men could be relied on to do their duty; the haughty and vainglorious were apt to wreck the enterprises committed to their care, while puffing themselves, and seeking their personal aggrandizement at the expense of others, chiefly men in the ranks.

¹ In this action his corps lost 2,349 men out of 13,819.

A brief outline of General Cox's more important military services is all that is possible in the space at my disposal. In July, 1861, he was sent to the Kanawha Valley with only 3,400 men, to drive out Wise with 4,000 men. McClellan ordered him to detach one of his regiments to Ripley and another to Guyandotte, places one hundred miles apart by the river, thus reducing his column of attack to about 2,000. Either McClellan had unbounded confidence in General Cox, or he designed that he should be defeated, in order to add lustre to his own achievements. He himself had taken 20,000 troops, the picked regiments of Ohio and Indiana, to oppose an army no larger than Wise's. General Cox advanced as far as Tyler Mountain, where he found the enemy entrenched, and was obliged to wait until his detached regiments could join him. He then flanked Wise out of his position, drove him up the valley, occupied Charleston and Gauley Bridge, and captured 1,500 stand of arms and large stores of munitions of war. Wise was reënforced by Floyd with 4,000 more men. General Cox's force was weakened by the withdrawal of the Twelfth and Twenty-first Ohio. He fortified Gauley Bridge, established advanced posts, kept scouting parties moving in all directions, and by his activity deceived the enemy and kept 7,800 at bay for more than a month with only 1,800. In September General Rosecrans came with additional troops and took command, and, not long after, Floyd occupied Cotton Mountain, on the opposite side of the New River, from which his cannon commanded Gauley Bridge and the road from Charleston by which all the supplies were hauled to the Union Army. Rosecrans sent two large columns to intercept Floyd's retreat and, later, ordered General Cox to attack in front. He ferried his troops across, and with the Eleventh Ohio and First and Second Kentucky scaled the almost perpendicular cliffs, and drove Floyd off—a most remarkable feat of arms—but the other commanders

did not put in an appearance, and Floyd got away. In his official report of this campaign General Rosecrans said:—

“It is a great pleasure to say to the commanding General, that I have found General Cox prudent, brave, and soldierly, and I especially commend his prudence and firmness in occupying Cotton Hill.”

During the winter he was left in charge of the District, with headquarters at Charleston. The time was spent in perfecting the drill and discipline of his troops. At one time he was ordered to take his three oldest Ohio regiments and join Buell in Kentucky, and would have been glad to go; but Rosecrans protested vigorously, saying, among other things, “General Cox is the only reliable man here,” and the order was countermanded, so far as General Cox was concerned. This is one of those circumstances that speak louder than words. No one of his commanders was ever willing to have General Cox leave him.¹

In the spring General Rosecrans was relieved, and General Cox was left in supreme command of the Kanawha district. He reported to General Fremont, in April, that he had 8,500 seasoned troops, fit for any service.

After McClellan's defeat in the Seven Days' Battles, General Cox was ordered to join Pope with one division of 3,500 men, known in the east as the “Kanawha Division.” They marched ninety miles over rough mountain roads with all their baggage and arms, in three days and a half, took steamer down the Kanawha and up the Ohio to Parkersburg, and went thence by rail to Washington, where General Cox was stationed in the forts on Upton's and Munson's hills, the key to the defenses of Washington.

After the defeat of Pope, Lee invaded Maryland, and the Army of the Potomac set out in pursuit—the Kanawha

¹ They all recognized that here was a man of intelligence and high character who would do his duty at all times and places, and do it fearlessly and well.

Division leading the advance. The stalwart appearance of the men on the march, their endurance, their promptness in starting and their freedom from straggling, excited much admiring comment, and this reflected honor on their commander. They encountered the enemy's rear-guard at the Monocacy, and drove it back through Frederick.

On the second day after, they charged and carried the heights of South Mountain at Fox's Gap, about nine o'clock in the morning, and held their ground against repeated attacks, until the rest of the Ninth Corps came up to their support in the afternoon. It was five hours from the time of the first charge, until the first supports reached them, and they had carried the heights and held them against more than double their own force.¹ This habit of taking advanced positions and holding on against all odds, until supports arrived, became characteristic of General Cox. After the death of General Reno,² the command of the Ninth Corps devolved on General Cox, and he retained it until after the battle of Antietam, and directed all its movements on that bloody field. After the so-called "Burnside bridge" had been carried by a gallant charge and the corps placed in battle array on the opposite side of the Antietam, he advanced steadily, driving the enemy before him, and had reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg, when he was attacked in left and rear by A. P. Hill's fresh division coming up from Harper's Ferry, clad in new Federal uniforms and well supplied with Federal guns and ammunition.

The Ninth Corps changed front and held its ground, but the advance on Sharpsburg was checked. General Couch, who had been instructed to "observe" A. P. Hill, neither prevented Hill's coming nor came himself; McClellan would not send any of the 26,000 troops held in reserve to

¹ The losses of the Kanawha Division in this action were 442 killed and wounded. Colonel (afterwards President) Hayes was among the wounded.

² See *ante*, page 454, note.

the support of General Cox, and the opportunity for then and there destroying Lee's army was lost. On the recommendations of Generals Burnside and McClellan, General Cox was appointed Major-General of United States Volunteers "for gallant and meritorious services in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam," October 6, 1862.

The promotion had been fully earned. He had successfully stood every test that could be applied. As an independent commander in the field he had advanced and held his own against heavy odds. He had brought the army in West Virginia to a high state of discipline and efficiency. He had commanded a corps at South Mountain and Antietam with conspicuous ability. His fitness to command was emphasized by what had happened in West Virginia during his absence and by what he accomplished on his return, for he was sent back to West Virginia immediately after his promotion. Colonel Lightburn, a loyal West Virginia officer, was left in command of the district with 5,000 troops, when General Cox was summoned to Washington. The Confederate General Loring moved against him with an equal force, and Colonel Lightburn, instead of holding his ground—as General Cox had done the year before, with barely a third of his forces—beat a hasty retreat, burning bridges, and destroying large quantities of stores at Gauley Bridge and Charleston.

When General Cox was sent back to West Virginia, his Kanawha Division was detached to go with him, but was stopped at Hancock, ordered on other service, and never reached him. General Cox retook Charleston and Gauley Bridge, and reoccupied all his former positions, with the very troops that had retreated, and against the very troops that had driven them out. He remained in command of the district during the winter. Considering the means at his disposal, no army officer, east or west, had made a better record. He rested easy in the assurance that his ap-

pointment as Major-General thus earned, would be promptly confirmed, and that he would again be placed in command of a corps. But the Senate claimed that Lincoln had exceeded his authority in appointing nine new major-generals. Lincoln claimed that the law authorizing an increase of the army was authority enough for appointing additional officers to command the new troops. The controversy was carried on all the winter, and just before adjournment Congress authorized the appointment of thirty major-generals, twenty-one more than the President had already appointed. Surely General Cox would be confirmed! But no! some understanding was reached by which the President withdrew his appointments, and sent in a new list, satisfactory to members of Congress, and General Cox's name was not on the list!

The reasons—such as they were—may be briefly stated. (1) General McClellan had been relieved of his command under such circumstances as made *his* recommendation a detriment, instead of a help. (2) General Cox had disappeared from the Army of the Potomac, and was doing his duty in the comparative obscurity of West Virginia. (3) He was not a West-Pointer, and the natural jealousy of this class, who had practical control of the War Department, was against him. (4) As a politician, he was not known beyond the borders of Ohio, and there was no one to urge his appointment on political grounds. Vacancies occurred frequently thereafter, but there was always some one on hand to fill them, who had friends in the War Department or in Congress.¹

¹General Cox was twenty-fourth on the list of brigadiers when first appointed. All but seven of his ranking officers had been promoted, and four of the remaining seven resigned. Eighty-three of his juniors were promoted over his head, many of whom held rank below that of colonel, while he was commanding a corps. It was General Cox's fortune to serve during the war under no less than ten officers who were his own juniors in 1861. There were no sound military reasons why, at the time

It was a great disappointment, and all the more discouraging from the fact, which now became evident, that no volunteer officer could attain high rank, no matter what his services, unless he had a "political pull." The question has sometimes been tauntingly asked, "What volunteer officer ever won great distinction as commander of an army in the field? Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, and Schofield were all West-Pointers." So also were some of the greatest failures of the war. The question may be answered by another, "What volunteer, who was not a prominent politician like Banks, or Butler, was ever given a chance to command a great army in the field?" But General Cox did not enter the army for rank or glory, and, discouraging as his treatment was, he continued to render distinguished service in his old rank of brigadier-general for nearly two years more before he was finally promoted, on the urgent and oft-repeated recommendations of Generals Schofield, Sherman, and Thomas. From April to December, 1863, he was in command of the military district of Ohio. During that time he directed the movements that resulted in the capture of John Morgan and his raiders, and defeated a plot to release the Confederate prisoners on Johnson's Island, Sandusky Bay. In December, 1863, he went to East Tennessee, at the request of Burnside, to take command of the Twenty-third Army Corps. In the spring, the Twenty-third Corps joined Sherman for the Atlanta Campaign, and the part assigned it was a most important one. While Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, held the center strongly, it executed flanking movements first on one side, and then on the other. General Cox, as ranking brigadier, was in actual command of the corps much of the time, and his work in this campaign alone of their appointment, any of these, except Thomas and Burnside, should have had the preference over General Cox, and if I were to name most of the others, few would be able to recall what they had done to deserve such promotion.

would stamp him as the peer of any officer in that army, except possibly Sherman himself. Troops engaged in flanking operations must be able to make long and rapid marches, to intrench quickly, and hold on tenaciously when they reach their goal. There must be mutual trust and confidence between them and their commander. He must feel that they will do all that he asks them to do, and they must feel that he will call upon them to endure no unnecessary hardships and encounter no needless perils. He must be alert, quick to see and occupy a position which not only enfilades the enemy's line or threatens his communications, but is capable of being defended against heavy odds until supports can be brought up. The work requires independent judgment, courage, intelligence, self-reliance, and reliance upon the commander-in-chief. "Hold the fort, for I am coming," is always understood. During the Atlanta Campaign his command became so expert in the matter of field entrenchments that it could cover its whole front with earthworks in fifteen minutes.

Before Dalton he held a position on the extreme left flank, cut off from the rest of the army by a high and rocky ridge. His opponent in the trenches was that fierce fighter, John B. Hood. When the movement on Resaca commenced, he was directed to withdraw from his perilous position, and did so, in the face of the enemy and in broad daylight, marching his second line to the rear, making it lie down and, when it was in position, retiring his first line to its rear, and so on until the movement was completed. It was so well ordered that the enemy did not dare to attack. Both Schofield and Sherman were enthusiastic. In his official report, Schofield said, the movement was "a delicate and difficult one, owing to the character of the ground, the position and strength of the enemy, and our comparative isolation from the main army," and added, "I regarded it as a complete test of the quality of my

troops, which I had not before had opportunity of seeing manœuvre in the presence of the enemy." Sherman sent his congratulations, saying, "It was described to me by Captain Poe, as seen from the mountain, as very handsome."

At Resaca, General Cox with his division carried and held a very important salient on the right of the rebel lines. In that action his division lost 562 men. At Cassville, General Johnston had drawn up the rebel army in line of battle, and issued orders for a general engagement. General Cox appeared in a threatening position on the right flank of his army, Hood and Polk sent word that their position was untenable, and Johnston retreated, instead of fighting. While the battle of Kennesaw was raging, General Cox on the extreme right of the army made a "demonstration," as it was called, to attract the enemy's attention, and draw off troops from the center. As a matter of fact, he seized and held a commanding eminence, three miles from the Union lines, threatening Johnston's communications, and forced him to retreat across the Chatahoochee after having won the battle of Kennesaw. At the close of the Atlanta Campaign, General Schofield earnestly recommended General Cox's promotion, saying, among other things,—

"I have no hesitation in saying I have never seen a more able and efficient division commander. General Cox is possessed of a very high order of talent and superior education. As a commander he is discreet, energetic, and brave. As a just reward for long, faithful, and efficient service, and as an act of justice to the army and the country, I earnestly recommend that Brigadier-General J. D. Cox be appointed Major-General of Volunteers."

General Sherman forwarded this recommendation to General Hallock, indorsing General Cox as an "actual divi-

sion commander," "of marked courage, capacity, and merit," "qualified to separate command."

General Cox commanded the Twenty-third Corps throughout the Franklin and Nashville campaign. After Hood had crossed the Duck River above Columbia, and was pushing for the rear of the Union army, General Cox held the crossing at Columbia until after nightfall, when he withdrew and marched to Spring Hill, eleven miles north of Columbia. Near that place they found the advance of Hood's army encamped so near the road along which they had to march, that our men could see their camp-fires and hear their voices. When asked what he would have done, if the rebels had attacked him in flank as he was passing by, General Cox said, quietly, "We were all prepared; our men would have faced to the right; our flank would have become our front; and the rebels would have had a fight." Reaching Spring Hill at midnight, General Cox was directed to go on to Franklin, twelve miles farther, and entrench a position so as to protect the crossing of the Harpeth River at that point. So, after fighting all day on November 29th and marching all night, the Twenty-third Corps took up a position at daybreak, just south of the town of Franklin, fortified a line about a mile long, and then lay down in the trenches to sleep. The trains and their own artillery came in and passed north through the town. The artillery of the Fourth Corps was placed in the line of defense, and Opdycke's Brigade was held in reserve, just back of the center.¹ Two brigades of the Fourth Corps remained in an exposed position in front, until overrun and driven in by the charge of the Confederates. Our men reserved their fire at the center, so as not to kill their own comrades, and the Confederates charged up to and carried the breastworks and one battery of artillery, before any effect-

¹ Opdycke was a graduate of the "Home Literary Union" at Warren.

ive resistance could be offered. The little army in the trenches was threatened with destruction. General Cox rode to the center, shouting, waving his hat, and encouraging his men. The rebel yelling and the crash of musketry at short range was appalling.¹ He never expected to come out of the *melée* alive. Then Opdycke charged. The men who had been driven from the breastworks rallied; a new line was entrenched, slightly in rear of the other, and that line was held steadily against all assaults of the enemy. There was not a sign of wavering in any other part of the line, and the firing was so well sustained that the rebels who lived to think, thought all our men were armed with repeating rifles. The attack began about four o'clock, and in less than two hours the fighting was practically over. Twenty-four thousand Confederates had attacked ten thousand Union men, and been repulsed with a loss of six thousand three hundred, twenty-six per cent of their whole number. Their losses included six generals killed, six wounded, and one captured; six colonels killed, fifteen wounded, and two missing. In fact, in many brigades every officer above the grade of captain was disabled. Thirty-three battle-flags were captured. The percentage of the killed was unusually large, the actual number being greater than Grant's at Shiloh, McClellan's in the Seven Days' Battles, Burnside's at Fredericksburg, Hooker's at Chancellorsville, Rosecrans's at Stone's River or Chickamauga, or Wellington's at Waterloo. This was the supreme test of General Cox and his command. To borrow the language of Cromwell, it was his "crowning mercy." The spirit of Hood's army was broken and, at the battle of Nashville, when *they* held the trenches and *our men* did the assaulting, they were driven from the field in disorder.

¹ See *ante*, page 454, note.

Again, on December 19, 1864, Schofield pressed for the promotion of General Cox in a letter addressed to Halleck, in which he said:—

“It is unnecessary to recite, in detail, the service of so distinguished an officer. He has merited promotion scores of times by skillful and heroic conduct in as many battles. He is one of the very best division commanders I have ever seen, and has often shown himself qualified for a higher command. . . . An officer cannot exercise for three years a command which he is universally admitted to be eminently qualified for and yet be denied the corresponding rank while his juniors, notoriously less deserving, are promoted, without feeling such mortification and chagrin as must drive him from the army. Excuse, General, the earnestness with which I refer to this matter. I do not exaggerate the merits of the case; on the contrary I do not half state it.”

On December 20th, General Thomas forwarded this with his own recommendation, stating that,

“his services in the Atlanta campaign entitle him to the promotion asked for, and at the battle of Franklin he was eminently distinguished for personal courage as well as for the skillful management of his command.”

At last the War Department was moved to act, and General Cox was commissioned Major-General as of December 7, 1864.

Not long after the battle of Nashville, the Twenty-third Corps was transferred to North Carolina. General Cox commanded an expedition up the right bank of the Cape Fear River, captured Fort Anderson, with many cannon, and a fortified post at Town Creek, with two cannon and four hundred prisoners, and flanked the rebels out of Wilmington. He was then sent to Beaufort and put in charge of troops he had never met before, with instructions to move on Kinston and Goldsborough, rebuilding the railroad as he went. At Kinston he fought and won two bat-

ties against General Bragg, with superior forces, among whom were found a large part of Hood's old army, and after that, so far as General Cox was concerned, the fighting was over. While he was engaged in the performance of his duties as district commander at Greensborough, and winning the confidence and regard of his late enemies by his uniform fairness and courtesy, he was nominated for Governor of Ohio, by acclamation, at the "Union" Convention held in Columbus, June 21, 1865. At a ratification meeting held that evening Senator Sherman said, speaking of the ticket,—

"It is headed by a gentleman who is not only a soldier, but a statesman and scholar—a man of the highest and purest character—a man who, in all the walks of life, will be a model for us all. I thank you for that nomination—although I believe the people made it before the convention met."

Time will not permit a review of his subsequent career. I will mention but one circumstance. Just before leaving Oberlin, on the trip from which he never returned, he handed the College librarian a list of books he had read and reviewed for the *Nation* and some historical magazines since January 1, 1898, which he wished to add to the library he had already given to the college. They numbered eighty-three volumes. And this was the recreation of a man who had retired from active work! The great lesson of his life is the importance of doing one's whole duty, in whatever circumstances one is placed, and leaving rewards and other consequences to Him who is Lord over all. This involves honesty, energy, self-denial, and unflinching courage. Another lesson is the importance of reserving some time for "thought, study, and feeling" apart from the routine of daily business. The man who suffers himself to "get into a rut" will never be fit for anything outside of that rut. The last to which I will call

attention is the importance of unremitting industry. If one cannot accustom himself to do more work than other men, he cannot rise above other men. If one is able and willing to work more hours than his neighbor, or to work faster or to better advantage while he does work, he will outstrip him in the race of life. Nothing came to General Cox as a matter of mere fortune. He was *fit* for everything he undertook to do, and he was called *because he was fit*.

ARTICLE IV.

SOURCES OF DANGER FROM MORMONISM. ✓

BY THE REV. ROBERT W. BEERS.

THAT there is any real danger to the church from Mormonism is not recognized by the great mass of Christian people in a way so as to take fast hold of their minds and hearts and urge them to aggressive, vigorous action against it. That it is a vile, degrading, blasphemous system they believe without knowing very much about it. Charles W. Penrose, one of the ablest men in the Mormon Church, the editor of their official church paper, in the introduction of his little book entitled "Mormon Doctrine," has truly said: "There is no subject of popular comment on which there is so little general information as that called Mormonism."

That it is not a weak, empty, insignificant thing, which will fall to pieces of its own accord, and never make much headway, must be quite obvious to any one who sets himself seriously to account for its origin, its growth, and its present position and influence. There must be more in the system than is popularly supposed; otherwise the organization would never have grown to be what is, nor could it now stand up so persistently and even prosperously in the presence of such universal opposition. In ten years from its origin its devotees numbered thousands, and its founder predicted that it was to be the religious faith of the western continent. And to-day its membership numbers its hundreds of thousands, having more than doubled in the last decade. In numbers, in wealth, in influence, and in

aggressiveness the Mormon Church is far greater to-day than ever before in its history.

HISTORY OF THE BELIEF.

I have no space to dwell upon its marvelous history. I shall assume that all my readers are sufficiently well informed in regard to its unique character. I merely need to say that it not only affords to non-Mormons clear evidence of inherent strength in the Mormon system, but by Mormons it is regarded as incontestable evidence of its divine origin. Long ago this was referred to by the leaders of the Mormon people. Parley P. Pratt, in the preface to his book, "A Voice of Warning," first published about ten years after the church was organized, referring to its rapid progress amid great opposition, wrote: "What but the arm of Omnipotence could have moved it forward amid the rage of mobs, having to contend with the prejudice of the ignorant and the pen of the learned; at war with every creed and craft of Christendom, while the combined powers of earth and hell were hurling a storm of persecution unparalleled in the history of our country." And that statement has been emphasized tenfold by the subsequent history of the Mormon people. Their entire history certainly shows that there must have been elements of strength in the system—that in some way it must have met the needs or desires of the people. And its danger to the Christian Church cannot be comprehended, or the right remedy applied, until its inherent strength is recognized, and its outbranching evils are dealt with at their roots.

WRONG IMPRESSIONS.

There are many mistakes afloat to-day concerning Mormonism. One which is held by many is that polygamy and Mormonism are synonymous. Some Christian missionaries even write as if polygamy was the fundamental

tenet, about which and upon which the whole theological and practical system of Mormonism is constructed. But the history of the Mormon Church shows conclusively that polygamy is not fundamental. For ten years after the church was founded it was not heard of, and it was not openly taught for twenty years. If polygamy could be absolutely stamped out by law and supposed revelation, Mormonism, with its preposterous claims, its absorption of things political in things ecclesiastical, its theological ideas, some of them intensely heathenish, its intensely secular spirit, its standard of morality lamentably low—Mormonism, in some of its worst phases and in which it is most damaging to souls and fullest of peril to our republic—would still stand unscathed.

And then in strict accord with that false notion is the idea that the Mormons are "a mere horde of sensualized barbarians," who should be dealt with in the most severe manner imaginable; whereas, the fact is, that the great mass of Mormons do not practice polygamy and never have done so. It is true that as a people they are chargeable with the gravest crimes, among which the Mountain Meadows massacre stands out prominently as a foul blot upon their name. And yet these crimes have been perpetrated by the few, while the many have been and are devoted to what they believe to be the true and the right. They are a devoted, industrious, thrifty class of people. Their industry has been made manifest wherever they have gone. And while it is true that they are an ignorant and superstitious people in the main, yet many of the same class can be found in every State in the Union, and in some States they are far greater in number than in Utah. The fact is that very few of the States of the Union show as small a proportion of illiteracy as Utah.

Another mistaken idea concerning Mormonism is that it is an exotic—an importation from the Old World, and es-

pecially that the pollutions of polygamy may justly be charged to the English, Swedes, and Danes. This is not true. Facts compel a conclusion far less flattering. Joseph Smith and his system are essentially a New World product. Mormonism had its rise in a region lying between the birthplace of the Rochester Rappings, from which modern Spiritualism sprang, and the seat of the Oneida Community. It had much in common, too, with the great Campbellite movement, which antedated it only five or ten years, and from which it received a large number of important accessions. Millerism and Shakerism were also near relatives and neighbors. We must go even farther and say that in Mormonism, like its antipodal heresy, Christian Science, we have an obnoxious plant which sprang from Puritan seed (according to the flesh), though it first took root in New York. Joseph Smith, its founder, and Brigham Young, its greatest leader, were both born in Vermont. At least ninety per cent of the converts gathered during the first ten years (1830-40) were of New England descent. In 1860, out of a population in Utah of some 70,000, it is affirmed that 10,000 were born in New York and 20,000 in New England; while in the Legislature consisting of thirty-six members, thirteen were born in New York, six in Massachusetts, and five in Vermont. And in an editorial written as late as 1883, the official Mormon Church paper stated that "of twenty-eight men constituting the general authorities of the church, twenty-four were born in the United States, and eighteen were of New England birth or origin. Of twenty-seven stakes of Zion, twenty have presidents born under the Stars and Stripes, and a large majority are of New England parentage. The founders were mostly descendants of the Pilgrim fathers; the leading minds are nearly all of Puritan blood." It is, however, some comfort to know that since polygamy was accepted and proclaimed, recruiting from among the sons

of the Pilgrims has not been as successful as formerly; and yet it is well for us, who are so boastful of what Puritan thought and energy have accomplished for America, to remember that this great abomination of our land is also a product of the thought and energy of the descendants of the Pilgrims—an institution, therefore, essentially American, though utterly lacking the true American spirit.

It is also commonly supposed that about nine-tenths of the Mormons are foreigners rather than Americans. But this has not been true at any time of their history. In their early history the great majority were Americans, and this was true of the greater part of their history. The census of 1880 gave Utah a foreign-born population of 43,933 and a native-born population of 99,974. And the census of 1890 showed that there was a native-born population of 154,841 and a foreign-born population of 53,064, just about the same proportion as in Massachusetts and New York. The foreign-born population in Utah in 1890 was not nearly so large proportionately as that of Wisconsin or Minnesota or California. The data on this point in connection with the last census have not yet been formulated by the Census Bureau, but it is probable that the proportion will be about the same as in 1890. Making due allowance for the probable preponderance of the native element among the Gentile population, and allowing for the thousands of children born of foreign parentage in Utah, it would still be likely that the native population is at least equal to the foreign in the general aggregate. It is certainly true that so far as personal prominence goes, if not in numbers, the native element has always been, and is now, predominant.

CHRISTIAN IDEAS INCORPORATED.

Our minds need to be disabused of all these mistaken ideas concerning Mormonism before we can see clearly its

sources of danger to the church. Perhaps they may be summed up under five different heads:—

1. The large number of Christian ideas which have been incorporated into this system of error and blasphemy. The Mormons claim to be the only true Christians. All others are at fault. They claim to accept the Bible and to believe in its literal interpretation, asserting that the various Christian denominations have wrested the Scriptures from their true meaning. The last chapter of the little book by Parley P. Pratt, to which I have already referred, is entitled "The Contrast between the Doctrine of Christ and the Doctrines of the Nineteenth Century." The contrast is shown in parallel columns, by which it is made to appear that the Christian denominations of to-day have departed widely from the doctrine of the New Testament. Thus, wishing to inculcate the doctrine of miracles still, he quotes from the New Testament as follows: "These signs shall follow them that believe." "In my name they shall cast out devils. They shall speak with new tongues." And then in a parallel column he gives the "doctrine of men" as follows: "These signs shall not follow them that believe, for they are done away and no longer needed. In his name they shall not cast out devils. The gift of tongues is no longer needed." And, again, in order to establish the doctrine of continuous revelation, he quotes from the doctrine of Christ: "There is nothing secret that shall not be revealed, neither hid that shall not be known." And then in a parallel column he sets forth "the doctrine of men": "There is no more revelation, for all things necessary are already revealed." Wishing to set forth the necessary unity of the church, he quotes from the New Testament: "By one spirit are ye all baptized into one body." And then in a parallel column he gives "the doctrine of men": "By many spirits are we all torn asunder into different bodies." And thus through a whole

chapter of the book the disparity between the teaching and the practices of the various Christian denominations and New Testament literalism is strikingly set forth. It is calculated to mislead many and to captivate those who are discontented with their denomination, or who look at the various Christian denominations through blue spectacles to discover only their faults.

But not only do the Mormons catch the unwary by this ruse of literal scriptural interpretation. In addition they deceive people by setting forth in a smooth way the doctrines which they hold, or pretend to hold, in common with the various Christian denominations. In the thirteen Articles of Faith which the Mormons promulgate as their creed, there is very little but what could be subscribed to by some Christian denomination. And people are thus led to suppose that the religion of "the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints" is true Christianity. Their missionaries, as a rule, do not mention their peculiar anti-Christian doctrines about God as an exalted polygamist, about celestial marriage, about the divine authority of their priesthood, about the necessity of sin as a step toward exaltation, about baptismal regeneration, about baptism for the dead, about the divine claims of Joseph Smith, and many other doctrines. They first use Christian bait to allure the people, and then, when they have them in their net, they feed them upon the errors which they have incorporated into their system, and even pervert the Christian doctrines by their false interpretations. A more deceptive system than the Mormon system can hardly be imagined. They talk of "God" and "love" and "faith" and "charity," but they do not mean by those terms what we do. By "God" they mean Adam, for they say that he is the only god that has anything to do with this world. By "love" they mean devotion to Mormonism. By "faith" they mean faith in the priesthood, and by "charity" they mean

charity for the conduct of the Mormons. The scriptural statement "The last shall be first and the first last," is interpreted by them to mean that the Mormons are the last to whom the eternal truths are revealed, and that they only can enter into the kingdom of heaven. "Mary hath chosen the good part" they interpret to mean that she chose to become a polygamous wife, which is the better part, as the polygamous wives only attain to celestial glory. "There be gods many and lords many" is interpreted to mean that every Mormon is to be a god and to create as many worlds as he has wives, who will reign over these creations as goddesses.

Thus this nineteenth-century heresy bears much the same relation to Christianity to-day that Gnosticism and Manicheism did to that of the early centuries. On the true foundation of the Old and New Testaments it has built a structure of wood, hay, and stubble. Their arguments are based almost entirely upon the Bible. Proof-texts are quoted by the thousand. It is the Christian element in the system, which it holds out as bait to its would-be converts, that is its chief source of strength. If its strength came from its heathenish doctrines it would naturally follow that its converts would be gathered mainly from heathenism, whereas ninety-nine proselytes in every hundred have been obtained from Christian churches. A little less than fifty years ago swarms of Mormon missionaries were sent to China, Japan, India, Australia, South America, and the Society and Sandwich Islands; and they fondly hoped that many converts would be obtained. But in less than five years they had all returned, completely baffled and disgusted. They reported that the devil was far too lively in these lands, and that among the Hindus especially, stupidity and awful depravity were universal. Since then we have heard of no more attempts to evangelize the pagan world until a few months ago it was decided

at a meeting of the Mormon hierarchy in Salt Lake City to open a mission at an early day in Japan.

From this it seems clear that it is the Christian element in the Mormon system which, though mingled with a vast deal of error, gives it its real strength. And this fact not only furnishes a decided clew to the vitality and persistency of the system, but may also open our eyes to the remedy to be applied. Hundreds of the Mormon people have not thoroughly accepted all of the grosser doctrines of the Mormon system, but are far better than the system. And, therefore, it is manifestly unfair to denounce the entire Mormon people as vile heathen. Perhaps some of our missionaries in the past have made this mistake and have not attempted to meet the Mormon people on common Christian ground, as they might have done with many, using their "Articles of Faith" as the basis of their intellectual, if not their ecclesiastical, fellowship.

CONVERSION OF MORMONS.

The question is, How to get rid of the erroneous doctrines of Mormonism? If only the truth can have a fair chance at error it will ultimately prevail, but in the past it has not had a fair chance. The Mormons have been angered and welded together by the wholesale denunciations of some of the Christian missionaries. In consequence a very small number of converts from Mormonism has been obtained. Rev. Dr. R. G. McNiece, of Salt Lake City, in a personal letter to me fifteen years ago, said, that three hundred would be a large estimate of the total number of adult converts. And in a letter received recently he says that the number of converts from Mormonism to Christianity in the last thirty-five years is about one thousand. That number includes both children and adults. Perhaps a change of method from open and direct antagonism to the whole Mormon system to a more generous

recognition of the Christian elements in the system, and an attempt to reform it—to purge the gold from the dross—might be more successful. There has been for years a younger and more liberal element in the church in favor of reforms. If the Christian missionaries should strive to increase the power of that party, as well as to secure proselytes, much good might be effected. In this way one of two results might follow, viz., either the church would be reformed, or it would be split into pieces by divisions in its ranks.

And, in addition to this change of method, another change might be made, so that all the Mormon people would be reached with gospel truth regularly. In the past a large portion of the Mormon people have not been reached. The Mormon priesthood have endeavored to isolate their people from Christian civilization. More than three-fourths of the Utah settlements have never had any stated gospel privileges at all. It is claimed there are more than two hundred thousand unreached Mormons in the inter-mountain region. These should be reached by the truth. And the Utah Gospel Mission, with headquarters at Cleveland, has undertaken this great work. It is to be an interdenominational work, which of itself would be a striking object-lesson to the Mormons. The plan is a combination of colporteur and evangelistic work, carried on by trained workers, who would live in gospel wagons and travel wherever Mormon families could be found. The colporteurs would do personal Christian work and leave specially prepared literature in every Mormon home. It is estimated that twelve such workers could in this way reach every Mormon home once a year from Canada to Mexico. And then about a month after the colporteurs had visited any town, and the truth had time to take hold of the people, the evangelistic workers would visit it, and hold a series of outdoor or school house meetings, preaching and

singing the true gospel straight at the hearts of the people. Doubtless large numbers would attend such services who could not be induced to enter a church. It is believed that a few years of such work, supplementary to the regular missionary work, if it were prosecuted thoroughly and judiciously, so that every Mormon home would be reached with the proper kind of literature each year, and every considerable Mormon settlement be reached by a series of evangelistic meetings each year, would be fruitful in large results. It is certainly full of hope, and could be carried on with very little additional expense.

THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS.

2. Another source of danger to the church from Mormonism is its appeal to the self-conceit of ignorant people. It tells them that they have the very latest and best revelation that God has given to man. The Mormons believe that they are the Latter-Day Saints—the only saints on earth at the present time. They believe that what is good in Christianity they have, but they have far more. They have the Book of Mormon and the Book of Doctrine and Covenants. And these last, being later revelations, they regard as superior to the Bible. They believe that they have an enlarged and expanded Christianity.

The evangelists Moody and Sankey held a series of meetings in Salt Lake City some years ago, and the official Mormon paper said in an editorial on Mr. Moody's preaching: "There is not a man among the whole fraternity of evangelists who can present anything of any value to the Latter-Day Saints which they have not already received; and there is no preacher of them all who, if he were desirous of learning the truth as it is in Jesus, but could learn very many valuable lessons in the things of God from the members of our Young People's Improvement Associations, and even from our Sunday-school children. 'Believe in

the Lord Jesus Christ' is a saying the full meaning of which is appreciated by the Latter-Day Saints. To exhort them to faith in Christ is the work of supererogation." And shortly after the same paper said: "So far as the institutions of modern Christendom are concerned, we candidly confess our lack of confidence in their power to do anything for us. We have got so far beyond them through the revelations of the Almighty vouchsafed in these latter days, that we look upon their teachings as a man reverts to the alphabet of his school days, and we remember their powerless forms and spiritless ceremonies as mere playthings compared with the higher things of the kingdom to which the system they call Mormonism has introduced us."

This idea is quite captivating to the more ignorant mind, and leads their people to give up gradually the old Christian ideas, which served as bait to lure them into the Mormon fold, for the newer ideas which have come through later revelations. Thus are they led to place the Bible and Christianity on a back shelf, so that, if they find that the Bible conflicts with any of the later revelations of the church, the later revelations are to be their guide. They, therefore, regard themselves as superior to all other Christians.

Consequently, when the missionary talks to the Mormon about the Bible, he will be apt to say that he has a later revelation better calculated to suit his case, and so the missionary has not been much more successful in winning the Mormon people away from their belief than the Mohammedan people, who have a similar idea that the Koran is later, and therefore superior to the Bible.

What is the remedy to apply here? I know of no remedy effective except to bring before the minds of the Mormon people the falsity of these so-called later revelations, and to show them the superiority of Bible Christianity over their own as set forth in actual life. To this end the isola-

tion of Mormon settlements should be broken up by a system of Christian colonization. If a Utah Christian colonization society should be founded, and be efficiently worked, Christian families might be placed in sufficient numbers for this object-lesson in every Mormon town.

AGGRESSIVE WORKERS.

3. A third danger from Mormonism lies in its aggressiveness. One of its doctrines is that the latter-day gospel must be preached to all men. Until it is accepted no one can be saved. And so from the earliest days zeal for propagandism has been a marked feature of this sect. Indeed, the marvels of their missionary efforts cannot be surpassed anywhere in the history of missions. Obeying the Saviour's injunction literally, for many years they went forth, two by two, without scrip or purse, working or begging their way. And yet they penetrated nearly every country on our globe. In later years they have not entirely depended on their own resources while engaged in mission work, their system of compulsory tithing giving the church officials a large amount of money, some of which has been used for establishing and operating a tremendous propaganda. But the missionary is never given more than is absolutely necessary for his expenses after he has exhausted his other resources.

The Mormon zeal in missionary effort should put to shame our Christian denominations. They have now about two thousand missionaries in the field, or one to every one hundred and fifty of their communicants. How does that compare with our Presbyterian Church or our Methodist Church? It is because of this missionary zeal that the Mormons gained so rapidly in their early history. And it is because of an increase in missionary zeal, due to the admission of Utah as a State, that they have been making such great headway in the last few years. They

have sent forth hundreds of missionaries in all parts of our country, who have worked with great zeal and with great deceptiveness to capture unwary Christians, and they have met with remarkable success. The census of 1890 showed that they had 1,396 communicants in California, 1,762 in Colorado, 1,058 in Nebraska, 1,540 in Michigan, 1,336 in Wyoming, 1,106 in Kansas, 5,303 in Iowa, 14,972 in Idaho, and 6,500 in Arizona. And in the last decade, especially since 1896, when they obtained statehood for Utah, they have been more aggressive than ever, invading the States east of the Rocky Mountains with hundreds of missionaries, getting their converts to go West if they could, and if not, organizing them into local churches. They now have congregations and centers of influence in many of the Eastern and Southern cities. The Mormon Church paper in March, 1899, reported 147 missionaries laboring in the Eastern States Mission, with headquarters in Brooklyn, and 443 laboring in the Southern States, with headquarters at Chattanooga. During the previous year the missionaries in the Southern States Mission were reported to have walked 146,080 miles, visited 287,716 families, held 69,190 meetings, and distributed 778,350 tracts and books. They also established ten new branches of the mission, organized forty-six new Sunday-schools, and baptized 1,228, more than in Great Britain, Scandinavia, and Switzerland combined. That surely is a remarkable showing for one year in the Southern States alone. There are now more than seven thousand Mormons living in that section. How many converts they have succeeded in obtaining from the work in the Eastern States Mission I do not know, but they have met with considerable success in New Jersey and in Maine. They have recently been very active in New York, where Mormonism had its origin. In Troy and Cohoes they have been disseminating their literature, and endeavoring by house-to-house visitation to find some discontented

ones ready to listen to their plausible setting forth of the superior merits of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. If they only told "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," the danger would not be great. They could not then obtain converts among respectable people. But, as I have already stated, the so-called Articles of Faith which they circulate are deceptive, hardly touching upon any of the distinctive doctrines of Mormonism, and leading one to suppose that it is thoroughly Christian. Thus do these deceivers lure innocent souls into the toils of the Mormon priesthood, who have no more idea of advancing the cause of Christianity than has Satan himself. By this deceptive method the Mormon missionaries have succeeded in increasing their church-membership during the last decade more than a hundred per cent. Their membership is now estimated at the least calculation to be three hundred thousand.

LITERATURE SHOULD BE CIRCULATED.

What is to be done? Is the Christian Church going to sit idly by and just send missionaries to Utah to try and convert the Mormons after they have been gathered together into the very stronghold of the Mormon priesthood, where they can bring all their power to bear upon apostates with telling effect? No; as prevention is far better than cure, the Christian Church should put forth definite coöperative efforts to nullify the efforts of the Mormon missionaries who furnish the new recruits each year. It could, and should, be ascertained where the Mormon missionaries are laboring, and either precede or follow their deceptions with the truth. Literature should be circulated by house-to-house visitation, setting forth the real nature of Mormonism.

There are two tracts which seem specially adapted to this end. One was prepared by the Presbytery of Utah,

entitled, "Ten Reasons why Christians Cannot Fellowship the Mormon Church." Rev. Dr. McNiece, of Salt Lake City, wrote me in regard to it as follows: "It has been found that a few copies of that tract circulated in any community where the Mormon missionaries are operating completely paralyzes their efforts. It serves as complete moral dynamite, for it quotes directly from their books and is unanswerable." The other tract, which seems at least equally good, was prepared by the Secretary of the Utah Gospel Mission, and is called "The True Mormon Doctrine." This tract takes up one by one the professed Mormon "Articles of Faith" and explains them according to the Mormon ideas by means of literal quotations from Mormon publications. If these two tracts, which can be obtained for \$2.50 per thousand, were left in every home where the Mormon missionaries were operating, or were likely to operate, they would doubtless render their efforts futile.

THE MORMON PRIESTHOOD.

4. Another source of danger from Mormonism lies in its appeal to man's earthly, selfish nature. I cannot dwell upon this point, but the Mormon system is permeated with these appeals, both in its doctrines, its organization, and the social and industrial life of the people. I have said that the Mormon people are, in the main, sincere, religious enthusiasts, to be dealt with tenderly. I cannot say the same in behalf of the Mormon priesthood. The best I can say of them is that they are exceedingly shrewd, and have concocted a vast organization for their selfish purposes, which they hold together by a combination of religion and worldliness. And its worldly elements give it great strength when it is opposed only by purely spiritual organizations working along spiritual lines.

Its scheme of salvation is not based upon regeneration

and a life of holiness and purity. It is a system of legalism, which has always been more in accord with human nature. It allows a person to "work out salvation" by complying with various forms and ordinances. If a Mormon is baptized and has the hands of the priesthood laid upon his head, and pays his tithes and obeys the priesthood, he will be saved. The doctrine of polygamy is a part of this system of legalism. If it is practiced, a person **thereby attains a greater height of exaltation**, both in the church here on earth and in the world to come. This is the reason why women (and some men too) have practiced it, and will continue to do so, either openly or secretly, for some time to come at least. It is because of this belief that women in Utah have been, and are now, stifling the finer sentiments of womanhood and enduring domestic martyrdom. They believe they will thereby work out their eternal salvation and attain a high degree of exaltation.

Then, again, in its organization Mormonism appeals to human nature. There is probably no system on earth which has a more cunning and complete organization than the Mormon Church. And one of the most cunning things about it is the large number of its officeholders. There is about one officer to every three men. In this way the leaders are constantly kept acquainted with the affairs of every member of their church. And each of these thousands of officers is kept faithful to his superiors by the hope of promotion. If any one of them is disposed to criticise or become dissatisfied with the system, the prospect of future promotions, as well as the office which he holds, acts as a bribe to his submission and acquiescence. Thus the hope of earthly reward is one of the great sources of strength to the Mormon system, holding it intact.

Then, again, in the everyday life of the people it appeals to selfish human nature. The fact is that the Mormon

Church is a great business corporation, a great industrial enterprise, which has given large dividends to the directors of it; and the Mormon people share to some extent in the surplus earnings of the business. Brigham Young was the real leader in this great business corporation. It is a large system of coöperative colonization. The Mormon leaders have bought up large tracts of land for farming purposes, not only in Utah and the surrounding States and Territories, but also in Canada and Mexico, which they intend to colonize and develop through their converts, to their own material advantage and also to ~~the~~ worldly advantage of their converts. This expectation of bettering their worldly condition is what has drawn most of their converts away from their homes. It is a very rare occurrence for a person in good worldly circumstances to attach himself to the Mormon Church and emigrate to Utah or to some other Mormon settlement. Nearly all the converts are from the poorer classes of society. The Mormon Church holds out to them the bait of betterment of their earthly condition, and all it asks in return is obedience to the priesthood.

And then, having allured their converts by this bait of earthly advantage, they keep them from loneliness by having them go in colonies having a common fellowship of religious and industrial feeling. And they keep them from discontent by catering to their social instincts, supplying them with all kinds of entertainments. The church and the dance hall are sometimes the same building. Dances are a regular weekly amusement, often led by the Bishop. And dramatic and musical entertainments are often given in the Sunday-school room.

Thus does the Mormon Church shrewdly appeal to the various worldly elements in human nature and secure a firm hold thereby upon its people. How can this be counteracted by the Christian Church? Certainly it cannot descend to the position of a worldly institution, but it can do

much by showing more of the spirit of brotherhood and helpfulness—by striving to better the condition of its members in temporal things as well as spiritual, and by realizing and endeavoring to fulfill its mission to the social world. Robert E. Speer, at a recent reception held at the Young Women's Settlement in New York City, said: "The way in which people are looking elsewhere for what the Christian Church ought to provide is the saddest sight of the day." The Christian Church has much to do with the solution of the social problems of the present day. Why could not a scheme of Christian coöperative colonization be carried on (not by the Christian Church, but by Christian business men) as successfully as the Mormon Church? Could not Christian people furnish the capital and efficient business management? The Mormon Church has found that their scheme has paid large dividends. It is the source of their immense wealth. Why would not a similar scheme by Christian business men net them as large returns, and at the same time offer the poor and discontented element of society the same opportunity that the Mormon Church does, without its attendant evils?

THE CHIEF DANGER.

5. And now, finally, the great source of danger from Mormonism lies in its central doctrine—the divine authority of the priesthood, and compulsory obedience to its commands. All the evils in the Mormon system emanate from that doctrine. They teach that persons who disobey the priesthood will be damned, and that the authority of the priesthood extends to all matters, temporal as well as spiritual. Its authority is absolutely unlimited, and has the right to direct the political, social, industrial, and domestic life of the Mormon people, as well as their religious life. Brigham Young claimed that his people could do nothing without his approval, "even to the ribbons a

woman should wear." It must be plain to any one what an absolute despotism the Mormon system is, and what a source of evil a corrupt and selfish priesthood might be. Under the penalty of eternal punishment, the people must surrender, at the dictation of the priesthood, their own private judgment, and even their moral sense, and implicitly obey them. They are absolutely infallible. Why was it that the Mountain Meadows massacre was perpetrated? Because it was commanded by the priesthood. Why were blood atoners formerly active? Because they were commanded by the priesthood. Why was, and is, polygamy practiced? Because it is commanded by the priesthood. Why did witnesses perjure themselves in the trials of the Mormons? Because commanded by the priesthood. It is this doctrine which makes the Mormon Church anti-American as well as anti-Christian. From its very beginning it has shown its opposition to American principles, and has more than once been forced into subjection by United States troops. And it is as anti-American to-day as it ever was, constantly dictating in civil affairs as in all others. Its political power to-day is greater than ever before. It absolutely controls Utah, and has more or less control of Nevada, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico, so that the Senators and Representatives from those States and Territories do not feel free to oppose Mormonism lest it might interfere with their election. Its spirit toward our government was made clearly manifest by the fraudulent way in which it secured statehood for Utah. The Mormon Church through its infallible priesthood entered into a solemn compact with the American Government never to teach or practice polygamy. But no sooner was statehood obtained than polygamy was openly practiced; and they even had a polygamist elected to be sent to Congress to represent them. Even the President of the Mormon Church, though he declared on his oath that the manifesto

of 1890 prohibited unlawful cohabitation with polygamous wives, as well as the ceremony of taking additional wives, is to-day living with his ninth wife, whom he married when he was sixty years old and she a girl of fifteen. When a complaint was made against him in 1899, charging him with adultery, the District Attorney refused to prosecute. And nearly all the church officials, either by example or precept, or both, are urging upon the people of Utah the rightfulness of polygamy as a divine institution. I have in my possession a little book on "Mormon Doctrine," by the editor of the Mormon official paper, in which the doctrine is very clearly set forth, though the imprint of the book bears the date 1897, the year after statehood was obtained. Their teaching of the doctrine, therefore, is not only private, but open and public, in direct violation of the solemn compact which the Mormon Church made with our government. They even went so far, a few months ago, as to pass a law by the Legislature of Utah practically legalizing polygamy by preventing prosecution for it. But the Governor vetoed the bill and it could not be passed over his veto. But why was it vetoed? Because the Governor feared that its passage would so rouse the country that Congress would be compelled to pass a constitutional amendment forbidding polygamy in all its possible forms anywhere within the United States.

A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

This gives us a hint of the true remedy to apply. Nothing short of such a constitutional amendment will effectually stop the practice of polygamy, with its attendant debasement both of manhood and womanhood. No theoretical ideas in regard to state rights should be allowed to stand in the way of a speedy passage of such an amendment, which the vast majority of our people would heartily indorse. Even this might not immediately remove the

abominable practice. But if the law were vigorously enforced it would speedily prevent its open practice, and by sending the leaders of the church who practice it either into prison or into hiding (as was the case some years ago under the Edmunds law) the power of the priesthood would be materially weakened. In addition to this the liberal party in the Mormon Church would thereby be greatly strengthened, and with the other remedies applied, which have been already mentioned, and a much more vigorous prosecution of mission work in Utah, both along the line of Christian education and gospel evangelization, we might hope that ere many years the despotism of the Mormon Church would be broken, and that truth would win the victory over error.

ARTICLE V.

THE FINAL CONFLICT OF THE PAPACY AND
THE MEDIÆVAL EMPIRE.

BY PROFESSOR DAVID S. SCHAFF, D. D.

To the men of to-day the half-century just passed seems to be one of the most wonderful eras in the world's history. Men of former generations have had this same feeling as they looked back over the events of their age. Writing of the first fifty years of the thirteenth century, Matthew Paris, a contemporary, says: "All these remarkable and strange events, the like of which have never been seen or heard of, nor are found in any writings of our fathers in times past, occurred during this last half-century." In this list of wonderful events, not a single invention or mechanical discovery is adduced, and from the realm of nature only a few portents are mentioned. But, for all that, those fifty years do constitute a remarkable period. It was still the age of the Crusades, whose energies were, however, fast waning. It was the age of Francis d'Assisi and Dominic, and the rise of the Mendicant Orders. It was the age of some of the greater Schoolmen. It was the age of Innocent III., whose eminence no occupant of the papal chair has ever surpassed, and few have equaled. It was the age of Runnymede and the Great Charter.

Of the period, taken as a whole, the central figure was that very extraordinary personage, Frederick II., King of Sicily and Emperor of Germany. As the last great representative of the House of Hohenstaufen, he attracts attention. His personality is one of the most many-sided of the Middle Ages. There is also a certain mysteriousness about

his ultimate designs and ideals which was even felt by the Chroniclers. His political system, for originality and boldness, has not been excelled from Charlemagne to modern times. Above all, that for which his name stands, is the last struggle between the mediæval papacy and the empire; a struggle of gigantic proportions, engaging the attention of all Europe, and waged with all the weapons within the reach of both parties,—a desperate struggle, which ended in the humiliation of the empire, and also in the resort by the papacy to measures which shook the supreme confidence that the popular opinion of Christendom had reposed in it.

Carolo piissimo Augusto, a Deo coronato, magno, pacifico imperatori, vita et victoria. "To Charles, most religious sovereign, crowned of God, the great and pacific Emperor, be life and victory." These words, acclaiming Charlemagne emperor immediately after his coronation by Pope Leo III., make that Christmas Day of the year 800 the most significant of all but the first. It proved to be the most far-reaching epoch of mediæval history, as 1517 is of modern history. An empire, universal in theory, was again established in the West, a continuation of the Roman Empire, whose crown the pope had withheld for centuries. For emperors and popes regarded Charlemagne and his successors, not as members of a new line, but as the direct heirs of Theodosius, Valentinian, and Constantine.

Had a seer stood at that point of time and looked down into the future, he would have discerned this imperial idea making its way as one of the mighty forces of the Middle Ages for five hundred years. He would have beheld Otto the Great descending upon Rome to save the papacy, and crowned in St. Peter's; Henry III. watching at Sutri the passing away of three popes and the installment of a fourth; Henry IV. waiting at the Porta Penitenza for the absolution of the offended and unyielding Gregory VII.; Frederick

Barbarossa, now refusing to hold the pope's stirrup, now making his peace with him at Venice, now proceeding in his old age to Jerusalem and dying in the waters of the Syrian River. He would have seen Frederick II., with his armor on, appealing to Christendom against the supreme pontiff; Charles V. hesitating what course to take with Luther, and listening to theological confessions at imperial diets; and, last of all, Francis II., inheriting the name and the memories without the power of the empire, resigning the empty title in 1806, and confining himself to his Austrian dignities. All the while it was the emperor from the North, recognized by the papacy and supported by the papacy as a necessity; all the while a rival, and part of the time a deadly foe, of what the papacy deemed to be its God-given prerogative, and yet, each the successor of that great Charles, on whose tomb in Aachen are inscribed the words—*Magnus atque orthodoxus imperator.*

When Frederick II. was crowned emperor at Aachen in 1215, the papacy was at the height of its power as a ruling force in human affairs. Innocent III. was then in the last year of his vigorous pontificate, and embodied in himself the high pretensions stated in the Isidorean Decretals and set forth in the policy of Hildebrand. The papal theory was a theocracy in which the Pope exercised supreme authority. In all questions of right and wrong he was the supreme arbiter on earth. He himself was subject to no tribunal but God. He is above all princes and sovereigns and may set up and depose. The comparison had become familiar whereby the two estates of government, spiritual and civil, were likened to sun and moon, to heaven and earth, to soul and body. The papal power, so the popes contended, was instituted of God; the power of princes was the product of fraud and perfidy and other crimes, beginning with Nimrod. And as all things in heaven and on earth and in hell obey Christ, so all things on earth should

obey his vicar. The priest anoints the king. The king does not anoint the priest. Princes have authority in separate lands, the pope's authority is undivided and extends over all lands. The Cistercian Cæsar Heisterbach of Cologne elaborated these figures and expressed the popular idea, when he compared the church to the firmament, the pope to the sun, the emperor to the moon, the clergy to the day, the laity to the night, and the abbots and bishops to the stars. The culminating expression of these pretensions was given in Innocent's letter to John of England, when he wrote, "As in the ark of God, the rod and the manna lay at the side of the tables of the law, so the terrible power of destruction and the sweet mildness of grace are lodged in the heart of the pope at the side of the knowledge of the law." The two swords were in his hand, the secular and the spiritual.

Such was the realm of ecclesiastical ideas in which Frederick found himself placed. And yet a different view prevailed in some circles, of which the *Sachsenspiegel*, composed about 1230, was the exponent. According to it, the empire is held from God alone, and not from the pope. Emperor and pope are supreme, each in his own sphere. This was the view expounded at the Diet of Roncaglia, under the influence of Barbarossa. But the *Schwabenspiegel*, the code of law for Southern Germany, compiled somewhat later, adopts the papal view, and declares that the temporal sword of judgment is entrusted by the pope to the emperor.

Scarcely was Innocent laid in his grave, when Frederick II. began to play his distinguished rôle, coming to be, as Döllinger has said, "the greatest and most dangerous foe the papacy has ever had to contend with."¹ The struggle in which he was the most conspicuous figure kept Europe

¹Akademische Vorträge, ii. 203. Edward A. Freeman expresses the same judgment, *Hist. Essays*, i. 288.

in turmoil and unrest for nearly forty years, and was waged with three popes. It was a dispute in which not only diplomacy and arms contended, after the usual fashion. It was a dispute in the court of European opinion, where both parties, by appeals to Scripture and precedent, sought to secure the moral support of Christendom.

Frederick II. was born near Ancona, Italy, in 1194. His father, Henry VI., had joined Sicily to the empire by his marriage with the Norman princess, Constance. Through his mother, Frederick inherited the warm blood of the South. Although he wore the crown of the German empire, and was of the stock of the Hohenstaufen, he was through and through a Sicilian. In Sicily his childhood was passed, and there was his court. He spent only time enough in Germany to assert his right to the crown and to put down the rebellion of his son.

His father died when he was three, his mother, a year later. Constance had been willing to receive the kingdom of Sicily for her son, upon the pledge of its remaining a fief of Rome, in accordance with the previous Norman tenure. At her death she confided him to the guardian care of Innocent III. Thus this helpless "child of Apulia," who was king of Sicily, king-elect of the Romans, and by precedent, heir to the crown of the empire, was the ward of the papacy, against which his ancestors had waged war, and against which he was destined to engage in mortal conflict.

The policy of Innocent, followed out by his successors, to keep the crown of Sicily or Southern Italy separate from the crown of the empire, seemed destined to be successful. Their union threatened the very existence of the State of the Church. It was in the interest of this policy that, as umpire of the imperial election, he passed by Frederick's claims, and gave the imperial crown to "his dearest son in Christ," Otto IV., the Guelf, whose house was by tradition

the friend of the papacy. But, forgetting the stipulations of Neuss, whereby he had renounced all claim upon Sicily and Naples, and pledged himself to withhold his hand from the territory of the apostolic see, Otto invaded Italy and trespassed upon papal land. Then Innocent justly wrote that he whom he had raised to be the head of the corner, had become a rock of offense. Innocent excommunicated and deposed him. Philip of Swabia, the rival emperor, was murdered. Otto's star set at the battle of Bouvines (1214).

It was now Frederick's turn and, with Innocent's consent, he was crowned emperor at Aachen a year later, and thus the very union was again effected which it was the pope's policy to prevent, and which nature seemed to have raised an eternal protest against in the separating walls of the Alps.

Before setting out for Germany, Frederick had ratified the claims of the pope as feudal lord of Sicily, and pledged himself not to touch the State of the Church. At his coronation he took the cross. These two promises,—not to lay hands on papal territory, and to lead a crusade,—were the centers around which the conflict between the papacy and Frederick waged for many years.

The conflict began with Innocent's successor, Honorius. His ruling passion was the recovery of the Holy Land. In vain he strove by solemn and repeated appeals to induce the emperor to keep his vow and start on a crusade. At his coronation in Rome in 1220, he involved himself anew by promises to support the policy of the papal see. He ratified the privileges of the church, announced it as his purpose to suppress heresy, excepted churches from taxation, and promised Sicily should remain a papal fief. He also again took the cross. The concessions were announced, it is said, in St. Peter's. The coronation festivities passed off with marked evidences of mutual good-will.

Such occasions were almost invariably marked by violent disturbances. The only exception to the peaceful progress of the celebration in this case was that dispute over a dog between the ambassadors of Pisa and Florence, which subsequently became the occasion of hostilities between the cities.

But Frederick's enthusiasm for the crusade was not consuming. He had set 1221 as the time for starting. The news of the fall of Damietta that year was adapted to arouse a true crusader's zeal. But, as the time approached, Frederick pled excuses for delay. His marriage with Iolanthe, daughter of John of Brienne, titular king of Jerusalem, promoted by the pope, seemed adapted to hasten his departure. Claiming his wife had inherited the title through her mother, Frederick forthwith adopted the title King of Jerusalem. But still he urged reasons for delay. Finally, moved by the threats of Honorius, he solemnly agreed, in the Treaty of St. Germano of 1225, to start in August, 1227, on pain of incurring excommunication. Honorius died the March before the appointed time without seeing his controlling desire fulfilled.

What the exact causes for Frederick's delay were, can only be surmised. The encyclicals of Gregory IX. charge it to the seductive luxuriousness of his court. It may be that he was unwilling to leave his kingdom in its half-organized state. It may be that he had no heart in the recovery of the Holy Land, and declined to risk his life in a cause for which his grandfather, Barbarossa, had found a grave, far away from his kingdom.

Honorius was a man of mild and conciliatory spirit, and sought to keep the peace. In his successor, Gregory IX., Frederick had an antagonist of different metal. Gregory, in spite of his great age,¹ brought rare vigor, unbending resolution, and dauntless bravery to his high office. The

¹ Matthew Paris says he was one hundred years old when he died.

nephew of Innocent III., that pontiff seemed to have risen again from the tomb. With the utmost tenacity he insisted upon all the temporal prerogatives of his predecessors, and apparently in the full assurance of their divine authority. For the greater part of his reign of fourteen years (1227-41) the combat between him and the empire was at its height. While the principle involved in Innocent's duel with John of England was substantially the same, the Angevin John was a stubborn, mean, and narrow-minded antagonist compared with Frederick, the Hohenstaufen.

The promised crusade continued to be the cause of dispute. It was from Gregory, then Cardinal Ugolino, that Frederick had taken the cross at his coronation in Rome. Setting aside the emperor's specious pretexts, Gregory summoned him to fulfill his double pledge, and the matter seemed to be settled when Frederick, accompanied with the papal blessing, actually set sail from Brindisi. But on the third day, driven back by an epidemic, as he asserted, or by the love of pleasure, as Gregory declared, he returned to port. Gregory's disappointment could not remain concealed. He hurled the threatened anathema at the recalcitrant son of the church, the clergy in the church at Anagni dashing their lighted tapers to the floor.

In the letter of excommunication, that he "might not seem to be like a dumb dog unable to bark," the pope spoke of Frederick "as one whom the Holy See had educated with much care, whom it had suckled at its breast, carried on its shoulders, and brought up to manhood at much trouble and expense, and exalted to the imperial station as the wand of its defense, the staff of our old age." He charged him with evading his promises and severing the bonds with which he was bound, casting aside all fear of God, and paying no reverence to Jesus Christ; and, unmindful of the threatened censure of the church, abandoning the Christian army, leaving the Holy Land exposed to

the infidel, and being, to the disgrace of himself and Christianity, enticed away to the usual pleasures of his kingdom.

Frederick did not remain silent, but also made a vigorous appeal to Christendom in reply. He protested against the papal claim to supreme authority in civil matters, and pointed to the humiliation of John of England as a warning to all princes. He condemned the secularization of the church, and called upon the clergy and bishops to return to the ideals of the early Christians, and to practice their self-denial. "She who calls herself my mother," he wrote, "treats me like a step-mother." The English chronicler closes the document with the couplet:—

"Give heed when neighbors' houses burn,
For next perhaps may be your turn."

The ban was pronounced against Frederick the second time in 1228, and all places put under interdict where the emperor might be. But, as if to show his independence of papal authority, and his disdain of papal interference, Frederick suddenly set forth in earnest on a crusade. Hearing the news, Gregory again launched the anathema, and inhibited the patriarch of Jerusalem and the Military Orders from giving him assistance. With the threefold ban resting upon him, Frederick entered Jerusalem, and in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher put the crown with his own hands upon his head. Thus we have the singular spectacle of a monarch conducting a crusade in fulfillment of a vow to two popes and burdened with the solemn ban of a third pope. Yea, the second and last crusader to enter the Holy City with his sword unsheathed and to go out of it as a conqueror, he was not only resting under the ban, thrice repeated, but was actually excommunicated the fourth time as he was returning to Europe. He was excommunicated for not going to Jerusalem; he was excommunicated for going; and he was excommunicated for coming back a conqueror. The testy old pope wanted things done in his own way, or

not at all, even if it was such a holy enterprise as the recovery of Jerusalem which was at stake.

Freeman, perhaps justly, calls Frederick an unwilling crusader, but it is hardly in accordance with the facts for him to call the fifth crusade "a grotesque episode in his life." His treaty with Saladin was afterwards made the cause of papal charges. He was accused of having given away Christian interests in the East. Frederick, with his freedom of thought, recognized the Saracen as a worthy foe, rather than a hated infidel, and treated with him in the spirit of religious tolerance. But whatever he might have gained by a resort to a prolonged campaign, he alone of all the crusaders, except Godfrey, did not fail. The concessions he secured were valuable.

Returning to Italy, Frederick's victorious army, with the cross inscribed on its banners, found itself confronted with the papal army bearing the device of the keys. The imperial troops were victorious, and the pope and emperor met in 1230 at Anagni, and arranged a treaty.

For four years Gregory was engaged in controversy with the Romans. Part of the time he spent in exile, but was able with Frederick's help to secure from the Romans the acknowledgment of his claims to jurisdiction over the Patrimony of Peter and clerical exemption from the secular tribunals of Rome. Again he called Frederick "his beloved Son in Christ," and called upon Christendom to enter upon a new crusade.

Now the conflict broke out again: this time over the Lombard cities over which Frederick had resolved to assert his authority. The imperial claims he had revived the year before the death of Honorius. Frederick was also encroaching upon the State of the Church. It was his policy to extend his dominion over all Italy. After crushing the rebellion of his son Henry in Germany, he marched into Lombardy. At this time took place his third marriage,

with Isabella, sister of the English King Henry III., the event which explains his frequent appeals to the English. The victory of Cortenuova, in 1237, seemed to make Frederick's arms completely successful. "Italy," he wrote to Gregory, "is my heritage, as all the world knows."

Before the struggle of Guelf and Ghibelline, Gregory fled from Rome. But Gregory arrayed against the emperor the massive artillery of the church's pretensions, and the traditions, which, false though they were, exercised so vast an influence over the mind of Europe.

It was a clear and notable fact, Gregory wrote, 'that Constantine, with the consent of the senate and people of Rome and the whole Roman Empire, deemed it proper that, as the vicar of Christ ruled over the whole empire of souls and priestly things, so also he should have the government of their bodies and material things. For this reason, he committed to the pope in perpetuity the Roman scepter and the imperial insignia, together with Rome and its territory and the empire itself, thinking it infamous that a terrestrial sovereign should exercise power where the heavenly ruler had established the head of religion. Thus Constantine chose Constantinople for his new abode, and later the church imposed the yoke on Charlemagne and transferred the seat of the empire to Germany. Priests are fathers and masters of kings. Is it not a wicked insanity for the son to seek to coerce the father? Christian emperors are bound to submit their acts to the Roman pontiff. The right to sit in judgment upon the Holy See, the Lord has reserved to himself.'¹

No other pontiff traced with more clearness the chief features of the famous transfer or translation of the empire. The issue was clearly understood. Frederick Barbarossa had fought against the principle that the crown inhered in the pope's power. The juridical decision of Roncaglia had

¹ Huillard-Bréholles, iv. 914-923.

declared that he held the empire by independent right. But Gregory was learned in canonical law, as well as the jurists of Bologna, who had pronounced in favor of the imperial view. And Gregory was a worthy successor of Alexander III. and the great Innocent.

Again, in 1239, and for the fifth time, the ban was fulminated against the emperor, on the occasion of his son's marriage to Adalesia, the heiress of Sardinia, which the pope claimed as his fief. The marriage had been consummated without consulting him. Frederick was charged with sowing seeds of sedition in Rome, seizing upon territory belonging to the apostolic see, and doing violence to the rights of prelates and benefices. The conflict with the pen which followed between emperor and pope has a unique place in the annals of the papacy. Both parties made an appeal to the judgment of Christendom as represented by its princes and prelates.

Gregory compared¹ the emperor to the beast in the book of Revelation which rose out of the sea, full of words of blasphemy, having the feet of a bear, the mouth of a lion, and its other parts like a leopard, which opens its mouth in blasphemies against God's name, his dwelling-place, and the saints in heaven. This beast desires to grind everything to pieces with its claws and teeth of iron, and to trample with his feet on the universal world. Frederick is called the "son of lies, heaping up falsehood on falsehood, robber, blasphemer, a wolf in sheep's clothing, and the dragon emitting waters of persecution from his mouth like a river." The pope charged Frederick with having made treaties in Jerusalem hurtful to the Christian interests, with allowing heresy to spread, and with annexing the territory of the church. Further he made the famous accusation, that, "as the king of pestilence, the emperor had openly asserted that the world had been deceived by

¹ Matthew Paris, Anno 1239. Bréholles, v. 527-540.

three impostors, Jesus, Moses, and Mohammed, two of these having died in glory, and Jesus having been suspended on the cross." Moreover he had denied the possibility of God's being incarnate of a virgin.

This extensive document belongs to the list of the most vehement fulminations ever sent forth by a pope. Epithets could scarcely further go. It is proof of the great influence of Frederick's personality, and the growing spirit of democracy in the Italian cities, that the emperor was not shunned by all men, and crushed under the dead weight of such fearful pronouncements.

In his retort, not to be behind his antagonist in the use of Scripture, Frederick compared Gregory to the rider on the red horse who destroyed peace from the earth, and charged him with being the author of discord and desolation. Nevertheless, recognizing the supremacy of the pope in his own sphere, he even declared that, as God had set two lights in the heavens, and the greater was set to give light to the inferior, so he had placed the *sacerdotium* and the *imperium* on the earth. But he charged the pope with attempting to put the second light into eclipse "by denying the purity of our faith (*nostrae fidei puritatem*), and comparing us to the beast rising out of the sea." He called Gregory "Christ's false vicar." The charge of the three impostors he indignantly denied,¹ and laid down his confession of "the only son of God coeternal and coequal with the Father, our Lord Jesus Christ, begotten from the beginning and before the ages." He declared that Mohammed's body was suspended in the air, and his soul given over to the torments of hell.

The struggle did not exhaust itself with epithets and criminations of the pen. As Innocent had declared John

¹*Inseruit nos Christianæ fidei religionem recte non colere ac dixisse tribus seductoribus mundum esse deceptura quod abiit de nostris labiis processisse.*

dethroned, and called the King of France to take his realm, so now Gregory summoned the Count of Artois, brother of the King of France, to receive Frederick's crown. The emperor retorted by driving the papal troops within the walls of Rome. The Leonine city had been an uncertain place for Gregory, from which more than once he was obliged to seek refuge in flight. But now, with undaunted courage, the aged pontiff went through the streets in procession, with priests carrying the heads of St. Peter and St. Paul, and, as if by a miracle, Frederick retired, as, eighty years before, the troops of Barbarossa had retreated on being suddenly stricken with the pestilence as they besieged the Colosseum, where Alexander III. had entrenched himself.

Excommunication proving ineffective to bring Frederick to terms, the call to the Count of Artois being met by refusal, and the papal arms unsuccessful, one resort was yet open to Gregory,—the decision of a general council. And to a council he made appeal, summoning it to meet in Rome (1241). This assembly has among the councils an amusing side. The seizure of the Genoese fleet conveying the prelates by Frederick's son Enzo, and their confinement in Naples, constituted a most unexpected and almost ludicrous turn of affairs.¹ The pope seemed to be checkmated.

Frederick, no doubt, had grounds for his charge that it was a picked council; for the bishops, with perhaps one or two exceptions, came from Southern Europe. Abbots, bishops, archbishops, cardinals, and apostolic legates composed the imperial booty. It was a brilliant *coup de main*, but destined to return to trouble the inventor.

At that moment, this remarkable old man died, older by years than his successor, Leo XIII. He died with his

¹G. C. Macaulay in Eng. Hist. Rev., 1891, pp. 1-17, gives a lively account of the event.

armor on, and with his face towards his enemy, whose army lay encamped within two miles of Rome. A few weeks before his death, and with confidence unshaken, he wrote "that the faithful have trust in God, and bear his dispensation with patience. The ship of Peter would for a time be driven through the storm and between rocks, but soon, and at a time unexpected, it would rise again above the surging billows, and sail on unharmed over the placid waters."

Gregory's successor, the last pope with whom Frederick had to do, a Genoese, was a match for Frederick and his counselors in shrewdness in planning, and quickness in action. He outwitted Frederick by calling the council to Lyons, as Frederick by preventing its assembly at Rome had outwitted Gregory.

When the papal interregnum of nearly two years which followed Gregory's death was closed by the election of Cardinal Sinibald, it was evident that vigorous measures were not to be abandoned. Frederick, on hearing of the election, is reported to have exclaimed, that among the cardinals he had lost a friend, and in the pope he had gained an enemy. All the weapons within the reach of the papal see were brought by Innocent IV. into requisition in rapid succession,—excommunication, the decree of a general council, the election of a rival emperor, and the active fomenting of rebellion in the emperor's dominions.

The negotiations, looking to peace between the two parties, began well. They were sworn to by Frederick's ambassadors in the presence of Baldwin, Emperor of Constantinople. The pope was to lift the sentence of excommunication; Frederick, to evacuate the papal territory, to restore the property of the prelates imprisoned in Naples, and, as in the case of the conditions placed upon John in regard to the exiled bishops, to make such reparation as the pope might appoint, and to build hospitals and churches.

But Frederick, less politic than his grandfather, abruptly annulled the compact by demanding release from the ban as a prior condition to any agreement.

Innocent's next move was a master stroke. To put himself beyond the reach of violence, he fled from Rome in the disguise of a knight, took ship at Civita Vecchia, and sailed for Genoa. There he was among friends, who received him with the ringing of bells and the acclaim, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord." The response was given—"We are escaped as the bird from the snare of the fowler." Joined by cardinals, whose numbers increased as the journey advanced, he proceeded to Lyons, which lightly acknowledged the authority of the empire, and was at the borders of the French king's territory, from whom aid in time of distress might be expected. The precedent was followed which Alexander III. had set in his flight. A deep impression was made upon Christendom by the spectacle of a pope in exile from Italian soil.

The way was now open for a fresh appeal to a general council, which assembled in Lyons in 1245. Matthew Paris' sympathies, which had been with Frederick up to this juncture, now wavered. The feeling must have been exceedingly intense. "I have never heard of such bitter hatred," wrote Matthew, "as that between Innocent and Frederick. All Christendom was disturbed, and the Universal Church exposed to danger growing out of the discord and hatred." The cause of the crusade was languishing, and measures to stem the invasion of the Mongols were held in abeyance.

How men's minds were divided between the two contestants is evident from the politic action of the Paris priest. Called upon to publish in his church the renewed papal excommunication of the emperor, he announced in the church, "I am not ignorant of the serious controversy and the unquenchable hatred between the emperor and the

pope. I also know that the one has done harm against the other. But which is the offender I do not know. Him, however, who has done the wrong, be it the one or the other, and as far as my authority goes, I denounce and excommunicate, and I absolve the one who suffers under the injury which is so hurtful to the Christian cause."

The objects included in the summons of the first Council of Lyons, were the relief of the Holy Land, measures for the resistance of the Mongols, whose ravages had extended to Hungary, and the settlement of the matters in dispute between the pope and the emperor. The attendance was respectable. Among the one hundred and forty prelates¹ present were the patriarchs of Constantinople and Antioch. At least two bishops from the German Empire were present. The Archbishop of Palermo appeared as the representative of the emperor.

Frederick was officially represented by his eloquent and learned chancellor, Thaddeus of Suessa. His promise that the emperor would restore territory unjustly taken from the Holy See, and set forth on a crusade, was rejected. When he offered the kings of France and England as Frederick's sureties, the offer was again rejected. The shrewd pope was right in taking the ground that Frederick was simply trying to gain time, and that, if he accepted the promises and they were not fulfilled, he would have three sovereigns as his antagonists instead of one. He was justified in thinking that "the ax was laid at the root of the tree, and the stroke was meant simply to be delayed."

Innocent was plainly master of the situation. A council was at his right hand. Many of its members were burning with resentment at the indignity and loss put upon their relations and friends by Frederick on their way to

¹ The number given by Matthew Paris. The papal document includes several English prelates. Catholic historians have been concerned to increase the number from the North.

Gregory's shipwrecked council. Locally, Innocent was safe from the arms of his antagonist.

The pope's address, opening the council, appealed to the sympathies of Christendom. "See ye who pass by this way, was ever sorrow like unto my sorrow," were the words of the text. One of the five sorrows or wounds affirmed of the church was Frederick's persecution. The specific charges against the emperor were sacrilege and heresy. He was on terms of intimacy with the Saracens, mingled with their women, and was guilty of repeated perjury. The seizure of the prelates was gone into at length. The charge of heresy, Thaddeus declared, could only be answered by the emperor in person. Two weeks were given him to appear. As he did not appear, claiming that the council was made up of partisans, pledged against him, Innocent pronounced the ban upon him, and declared him deposed.

The deliverance set forth four heavy offenses,—perjury in violating his oath to keep peace with the church; sacrilege in seizing the prelates on their way to the council; heresy; and arbitrary treatment of Sicily, which was the pope's fief. Among the grounds for the charge of heresy were the denial of the pope's right of the keys, and Frederick's collusion with the sultan, allowing the name of Mohammed to be publicly proclaimed day and night in the temple, keeping eunuchs over his women, and giving his daughter in marriage to an excommunicated prince.

The fell sentence ran, "Seeing that we, unworthy as we are, hold on earth the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, who said to us in the person of St. Peter, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, etc., do hereby declare Frederick, who has rendered himself unworthy of the honors of sovereignty, and for his crime has been deposed from his throne by God, to be bound by his sins, and cast off by the Lord." His subjects were absolved

from their allegiance, and authority was given for the election of a new emperor. "We decree that any one who shall henceforth give him assistance or advice, or show favor to him as emperor or king, shall for this act be excommunicated, and those in the empire on whom the election of an emperor devolves, may freely elect a successor in his place."

Gregorovius has declared this pronouncement one of the most ominous events of universal history. It was the assertion of the absolute authority of the church in all matters whatsoever.

The sentence was not a *brutum fulmen*. The council made a profound impression in Europe, and presented the church as a united organism. Frederick's reception of the news, by calling for his crown and putting it firmly upon his head, was bold enough. But he was at war with a pope who followed the council up with energetic action. Matthew Paris expresses, at least, his own opinion when he says that Louis of France, who made a plea for the emperor at Clugny, "found in Innocent little of the humility which he had a right to expect from the servant of the servants of God."

Frederick's manifesto, addressed to the King of England and other princes, struck the chords of great truth, as we understand truth, although the mediæval theory of the papacy could not tolerate it. He denied the pope's right to touch his temporal authority, and warned the princes again that his cause was theirs. He was not the first civil ruler on whom the abuse of the priestly power bore heavily, nor would he be the last. He announced it as his purpose to continue war against his oppressors as it had been his aim to recall the priesthood from the profession of arms and worldliness and luxury to the simplicity of apostolic times.

The following year, in another address to the prelates

and nobles of England, he declared it as his belief that full authority in spiritual matters was conferred by the Lord upon the apostolic see, but that we nowhere read that divine or human power was given to him, either by divine or human law, to transfer the empire at his pleasure, or to decide the temporal punishments of kings and princes by depriving them of their territories. The prerogative of consecrating the emperor belongs to the pope by original right, and by the custom of his own predecessors, but the prerogative of disposition does not belong to him.

Frederick was in advance of his age. He had some of the spirit of the Reformation which started in Germany three centuries later. But too much credit must not be given to him for far-seeing and enlightened policy. The rights of individual conscience he nowhere hints at, and probably did not dream of. He was actuated by the conception of his own supreme imperial authority.

Innocent met Frederick's manifestoes with all the most extravagant reassertions of authority claimed by his predecessors as vicars of Christ. As Gregory VII. had adduced the case of Samuel and Saul as a precedent for his treatment of Henry IV., so Innocent declared that if, under the Old Testament, the priests deposed unworthy kings, how much more right had the vicar of Christ to exercise that prerogative! To words were added vigorous measures. The Mendicant Orders were on his side, and stirred up the flame of discontent in Germany. The archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, Treves, and Bremen took the initiative in electing the rival emperor Heinrich Raspe, Landgrave of Thuringia, and at his death, in 1247, William of Holland. In Italy civil war reigned.

Frederick met the opposition in the far South, and then turned to Northern Italy. Here he was utterly defeated in the siege of Parma, and lost his crown. His minister, Peter della Vigna, had left him, and is followed by an un-

certain fame. Theodore of Suessa perished in battle. His Saracen troops could not save him. The emperor's career was at an end. In the midst of his troubles he died, December 13, 1250, near Lucera, in Apulia, the town he had built for his Saracen subjects, on the old Samnite site. The pope was master of the field. Frederick lies buried at the side of his parents in the Cathedral of Palermo. According to contemporary chronicles, he died absolved by the hand of the Archbishop of Palermo, and clothed in the habit of the Cistercians.

Stupor mundi—"the Wonder of the World"—that is the epithet which the great English chronicler and contemporary, Matthew Paris, applies to Frederick II. of the House of Hohenstaufen. The splendid title which Frederick often used, ran,—“Frederick, Emperor of the Romans and always Augustus, King of Jerusalem and Sicily.” And he was entitled to it. Europe had not seen his equal as a ruler since Charlemagne. For the wide outlook of his genius, the diversity of his gifts, and the vigor and versatility of his statescraft, he is justly compared to the great rulers. Morally the inferior of his grandfather, Barbarossa, he surpassed him in intellectual power. He is the most conspicuous political figure of his own age and the most cosmopolitan of the Middle Ages. He was warrior, legislator, statesman, man of letters. He brought order out of the great confusion in which he found Southern Italy, and in the Sicilian Constitutions he substituted a uniform civil code for the irresponsible jurisdiction of ecclesiastic and baron.

It has been said he founded the principle of centralized government.¹ Such a view is not discredited by the decentralizing tendency of the charters he gave to German cities upon which the last writer on the Mediæval Empire

¹Gregorovius, v. 271.

lays so much stress.¹ He was a thorough Sicilian, and ruled Germany neither by his presence nor from affection. He struck out a new path by appealing again and again to the judgment of Christendom through its princes, sovereigns and prelates.

In his conflict with the pope he was governed, not by hatred of the spiritual power, but by the determination to keep it to its own realm. In genuine ideal opposition to the hierarchy he went further than any of his predecessors.² Gregory and Innocent called him "the great dragon," and declared him worthy of the fate of Absalom. He did not resort to the measure of his grandfather and set up an anti-pope, but he scoffed at the principle announced by Gregory VII., and repeated by Innocent and Gregory IX., that while the papacy was founded of God, the civil power is a result of robbery, pride, perfidy, and other crimes, and for that reason to enjoy only relative authority.

It has been surmised that Frederick was not a Christian. The encyclical of Gregory declared that the charge of the three impostors was susceptible of proof. The professor of theology in Paris, Simon Tornacensis, had made the assertion before him. The book on the subject is ascribed to different authors. If Frederick said what is charged against him, he must have said it in a mood. He was in the midst of a burning conflict. The prelatical power which he was opposing with charges of simony and worldliness, might easily mistake a rumor for a fact, or exaggerate an offhand statement into the settled hostility of an unchristian purpose. The denials of Frederick's letters are so emphatic as to leave no room for believing the charge, unless we deny to him all truthfulness. It is noteworthy that Innocent IV. did not make reference to the accusation in his

¹ Herbert Fisher, *The Mediæval Empire*. He has a good chapter (XI.) on "Imperial Legislation in Italy."

² Ranke, viii. 369 *sqq.*

list of heretical offenses at the Council of Lyons. It does not seem likely that the emperor was burdened with an oversupply of piety. His toleration of Mohammedan and Jew at the moment he was persecuting the Christian dissidents, indicates a readiness to serve a political policy at the expense of mental consistency.

Neander expresses the opinion that Frederick denied revealed religion. Schlosser withholds from him all religious and moral faith. Ranke and Freeman leave the question of his religious views unsettled. Both lay stress upon his freedom of thought. Hergenröther makes the distinction, that as a man Frederick was an unbeliever, and as a monarch a strict Catholic; Gregorovius holds that he cherished religious convictions as sincerely Catholic as those professed by the Ghibelline Dante. Fisher¹ emphasizes "his singular detachment from the current superstitions of the day." Huillard-Bréholles saw in his movement an attempt to usurp the sovereign pontificate, and to found a lay papacy, combining in himself royalty and papal functions, an opinion no one has shared with him. Amari, the historian of the Mohammedan tenure of Sicily, calls him a baptized sultan.

Frederick retained the friendship of the Archbishop of Palermo. And in spite of his rude treatment of church institutions and territory, the attempt to restrict the pope to his own sphere and to recall the clergy to some conformity to apostolic precedents, was quite consistent with religion. The Mendicant Orders were against him, but their faces were, from the first, set against mental freedom in religious matters, and in favor of drastic methods with dissenters.

Of moral crimes there were not a few; but the crime of crimes was that Frederick had supported the independent dignity of the imperial power by the boldest defiance.

¹The Mediæval Empire, ii. 168.

And, as Peter the Lombard said, the Roman Church used all its power against the empire as represented by him, and for his destruction. The high conception of modern sovereignty, Frederick shows no traces of having had. Free and tolerant as he was towards races and religions, he was still the representative of imperial absolutism. He anticipated the appeal of later times to public opinion in the appeal he made to the judgment of Christendom, and yet his idea of the ruler did not include the rights of private judgment. He represented with manly vigor the claims of the state, against the astounding claims built up through centuries for the papacy. This was his merit.

Frederick's court in Palermo, which, in addressing his letters, he often called the "Happy City," he made at once the scene of oriental luxury and of literary culture. He imitated the habit of the Saracens in keeping a harem. He was a precursor of the Renaissance, and was himself given to rhyming. He was familiar with Greek, Latin, German, French, Italian, and Arabic. His book on falconry, Ranke pronounced one of the best treatments of its subject in the Middle Ages. He established the University of Naples, and ordained that no one should practice medicine in Southern Italy without a license from Salerno. Michael Scott was his favorite astrologer, but in the practice of astrology he had popes of a more enlightened age for his companions. It was characteristic of the man that, while he was besieging Milan in 1239, he was concerned about the minute details of forest and household management in Sicily and was sending orders in regard to it.

Freeman's remark that "in mere genius, in mere accomplishments, Frederick was surely the greatest prince who ever wore a crown," will meet with dissent; but when¹ he

¹ Hist. Essays, i. 283. Again the same great historian says, "It is probable that there never lived a human being endowed with greater natural gifts."

finds in Frederick's career some of the most wonderful chapters of European history, all will agree with him. Bryce pronounces him one of the most extraordinary personages in history. Gregorovius expresses the judgment, "that, with all his faults and virtues, he was the most complete and gifted character of his century and the representative of its culture." Dante, a half-century after his death, puts the great emperor among the heresiarchs in hell. When the news of his death was brought to Innocent, that pope wrote to the Sicilians that heaven and hell rejoiced at it, for the emperor had crushed the church with the hammer of persecution. The *Freiburger Chronicle* expressed a juster feeling when it said, "If he had loved his soul, who would have been his equal?"

With Frederick II. the greatness and the rôle of the Hohenstaufen was at an end. The sympathy of later generations goes out to the father on account of the tragic fate of his gifted sons. Against the remaining male members of the house, the papacy declared irreconcilable feud. The decree against the house was humiliation and, if necessary, extirpation. The pope called its representatives "the viperous brood," the "poisonous brood as of a dragon of poisonous race." The family moved on to its relentless fate. Enzo languished to his death in his prison at Bologna. Conrad, Frederick's successor on the imperial throne and the throne of Sicily, died four years after his father, at the age of twenty-six. For his only son, Conradin, two years old at his father's death, a tragic end was waiting. Manfred, Frederick's illegitimate son,¹ the brilliant representative of chivalry, had inherited his father's spirit, and for a time was master of Southern Italy, and wore the Sicilian crown, but was killed at Benevento (1266).

In the meantime, Innocent had returned to Rome (1253),

¹ He was born out of wedlock, whatever reparation Frederick may have made later to his mother.

and called Charles of Anjou, brother of the King of France, to aid in destroying the Hohenstaufen, and establishing the perpetual independence of the crown of Naples and Sicily from the empire. He was willing to hold it as a fief of the papal see. Charles introduced a new order of things, became the dictator of the papal policy, controlling the elections of the popes in the interest of the French, and preparing the way for the Avignon captivity.

Conradin, the last male scion of his race, on reaching the age of fourteen, crossed the Alps to make good his claim to his ancestral patrimony in Southern Italy. The papal ban, so often hurled against his ancestors, was once more pronounced against him. A fitful outburst of enthusiasm greeted him in Rome and other parts of Italy, but, no match for the tried skill of Charles, he lost all in the battle of Tagliacozzo. Betrayed and captured, he was put on trial for his life. In vain did Guido of Suzarra, the Bolognese master of law, plead that the young prince had come to Italy, not as a robber but to assert his lawful rights. Charles had determined upon his death, and Conradin was executed at Naples, October 29, 1268. His last words, as he kneeled to receive the fatal blow, were, "O mother, what pain of heart do I make for you!" As he wrote to the pope, Charles accorded to the young prince military honors at his burial, but not religious rites.

The hill on which the proud castle of the Hohenstaufen stood, continues to look down upon the peaceful fields of Württemberg, and preaches with tender eloquence the sermon, that all flesh is grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. Italian soil and politics had been fatal to German unification and development, as well as to the Swabian house. Italy had been laid waste by sword and rapine and urbane strife for a half-century and more. Europe was weary of the conflict between the two great powers. The Latin Empire of Constantinople succumbed

in 1261. Antioch, the last relic of the crusaders in Syria, fell in 1268. The Minnesänger gave expression to the discontent with the old conflicts. A new era was not far distant.

The papacy was triumphant, triumphant by the defeat of the imperial house; and yet in that defeat it received itself a severe blow. The measures to which it had to resort in calling in Charles were the source of subservience to France in the line of French popes seated in Rome, and the papal captivity in France. Rudolf of Hapsburg, elected by papal support to the imperial throne in 1273, surrendered all claim to Italian soil. Peace between empire and papacy followed.

Dann geendigt nach langem verderblichen Streit
War die kaiserlose, die schreckliche Zeit.

Then was ended the long and direful strife,
The time of terror without an emperor's rule.¹

But the theory of the empire wearisomely built up by the papacy was forever discredited, and the monarchies of Europe emerged out of the struggle of Frederick. As if in mockery of human calculations, Frederick's granddaughter, and Manfred's daughter, came to the Sicilian throne as the consort of Peter of Aragon, and by the expulsion of the French from Sicilian soil.

The Roman Empire, so far as any real power or mission was concerned, had finished its course with Frederick II. But his Sicilian legislation in all its main features survives in Sicily. And it was a principle of vast importance that he stood champion for. His struggle had a meaning beyond his age, and was more than a memory at the time of the Reformation, when Luther in his Call to the German Nation, appealed to him and his fate; and the execution of Conradin was reproduced in prints.

The great Frederick occupied a lonely eminence. He was

¹ Schiller in his poem, "Rudolf of Hapsburg."

probably a free-thinker in theology; and yet in his own age, the age of Francis and Dominic, the forces of religious enthusiasm were ardent. He was King of Jerusalem, and its last Christian king, and yet the aims and superstition of the crusaders were foreign to him. He was a German emperor, and yet least of all a German. He contended against the domination of the apostolic see outside of the spiritual sphere, and yet he had most sympathy with Eastern despotism.

Ideas survive long after the dynasties have become extinct, and the men have perished who have battled for them. So it is with the ideas represented in the duel between the empire and the papacy. It filled the Middle Ages and connected them together. It has even been called, by the last great historian of Rome, "the grandest spectacle of all ages." The ideas the contending parties stood for are wonderfully imposing; and, though they are fictitious, they still exercise a spell even where the principles of modern liberty obtain.

For boldness of conception, for consequential unity, the mediæval papal idea still has supreme attraction for many minds who would gladly have the spectacle of its glory renewed, and who are blind to the ambitious self-assumption of the system, the worldly motives and unreligious lives of many of the popes, and the antagonism of the papal fabric to the temper and letter of the New Testament, which declares, that the powers that be are ordained of God, and tribute should be rendered unto Cæsar.

But the mediæval idea is even more than a memory. It was reasserted by Pius IX. in the Syllabus, and by Leo XIII. in his Encyclical *Immortale Dei*, November 1, 1885.

On the other hand, it is not unfair, in the light of events to surmise that the view of the prerogative of the imperial ruler as held by the mediæval emperors is more than a memory with the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs who sit on

thrones of empires to-day and insist on claims which antagonize the ideas of popular sovereignty and the separation of church and state which rule the judgment and command the assent of these American shores.

The memories of history are one of the misfortunes of the study of the past. For the ambitious, they become a pretext; for the blind, refusing to see the ideal of the future, they may become a snare. But the study of church history, not to be discarded because of its abuse, becomes the instructor of those who are willing to learn, and who, with their faith in God, are looking forward to better realizations of the words and spirit of Christ in the affairs of men. And, as in the crusades, the student sees a pulpit turned towards Jerusalem, and publishing the mighty sermon, "He is not here, he is risen from the dead"; so, as he sits down on the battle-field where papacy and empire met, and contended for power, and watches the procession of pope and emperor through a thousand years,—Constantine and Sylvester, Charlemagne and Leo III., Hildebrand and Henry IV., Alexander and Barbarossa, Innocent and John of England, Gregory IX. and Frederick II., Lewis the Bavarian and John XXII.,—he seems to hear the everlasting words, "My kingdom is not of this world; my kingdom is within you."

ARTICLE VI.

THE CHILD-SAVING MOVEMENT.

BY THE REV. HASTINGS H. HART, LL. D.

THERE is in progress in the United States an organic Child-Saving Movement. It is not a plan devised and put in execution by some wise individual or society. It is an evolution, developed by inward and unseen forces; but certain principles are now clearly defined and generally accepted.

THE STATE RESPONSIBLE.

The first principle underlying the child-saving movement is this: The great mother state is responsible for the welfare of the dependent and neglected child. When the natural protectors of the child fail to meet their obligation, either through death, misfortune, incapacity, or depravity, then the community, collectively or individually, must assume the burden: first, because the child has a natural right to an opportunity for normal and healthy development; second, because the care of such children is essential to the preservation of the community. The hopelessness of stemming the tide of pauperism, vice, and crime by remedies applied to adult dependents and delinquents has long been recognized, while experience has demonstrated the efficacy of wisely directed efforts for the rescue of children. It is true that even these efforts do not go to the roots of the social problem: they do not remedy the social conditions from which these children spring. Nevertheless, they offer the most immediate and practical means yet devised for the prevention of pauperism, vice, and crime.

IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENT.

The second principle underlying the child-saving movement is this: Environment, rather than heredity, controls the destiny of the normal child. There is a fraction of the children in the community which includes children who inherit feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, syphilis, etc., condemned by hereditary conditions to dependency. There is a very small fraction which includes children who are "moral imbeciles"—children born without the sense of right and wrong; whose viciousness is apparently inherent, and unaffected by their environment. It has been fashionable to ascribe to heredity all of the vices and virtues of the community; but within the past few years there has been a remarkable change in the tone of medical writers and students of sociology alike. Physicians are much more cautious in their claims as to hereditary diseases. Consumption, for example, is no longer recognized as a hereditary disease. The effort of certain sociologists who demonstrate the existence of a criminal type has not been successful.

Heredity must be recognized as a powerful force in the making of human character; but experience has demonstrated, that, in the case of the great majority of children of unfortunate antecedents, if taken in time, a good environment will overcome a bad heredity. This fact has been abundantly shown by the experience of the children's aid societies of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, and other similar organizations, which for many years have followed the plan of changing the environment of young children. The testimony of these organizations is, that children of unfavorable heredity, if placed in a favorable environment before the age of four or five years, turn out fully as well as the average children of the community. The disadvantage of the unfavorable heredity is overbalanced by the great advantage of being able to select choice homes with

people of character, wisdom, and patience. The homes secured by a careful society are far above the average homes in a community, in these respects.

However strongly people may believe theoretically in the power of heredity to control the destiny of the child, in practice, nineteen parents out of twenty believe in the controlling power of environment. How many parents have sufficient confidence in the good heredity of their own children so that they would be willing to expose their young children, for even a fortnight, to the influences and the vicissitudes of the slums? It is unanimously recognized among wise people, that the contagion of vice is so dangerous that it is utterly inexcusable to expose a child of tender years to it. It is instinctively recognized that a bad environment will infallibly overcome a good heredity if continued for only a brief time. But the converse is almost equally true, namely, that a good environment, if continued for a sufficient time, will infallibly overcome a bad heredity, if the child be young enough.

It must be borne in mind that there is a tendency to ascribe to heredity many influences which really belong to environment. Even the prenatal influences which affect the welfare of a child, belong in part to environment. For example, malnutrition of the mother, and efforts to produce abortion, may handicap the child from its birth. In like manner, neglect of a child by an inexperienced or vicious mother, exposure in a baby farm, or a foundling hospital, or an orphan asylum, may start the child in life with an unfavorable bias which is to be ascribed, properly, not to heredity, but to environment.

Thousands of cases have clearly established the fact that children of questionable parentage often develop into as beautiful, wholesome, and useful members of the community as their more favored competitors.

LARGE INSTITUTIONS UNDESIRABLE.

The third principle underlying the child-saving movement is this: The family home—the ordinary family home of virtuous, industrious people—is the best institution under the sun for the care of homeless, orphaned, and neglected children. This principle is by no means self-evident. For fifty years an earnest and sometimes bitter discussion was carried on between the advocates of the institutional plan of bringing up dependent children and the plan of placing such children in family homes. The abuses of the apprenticing system and the wrongs suffered by bound boys and girls were vividly set forth. It was shown that in many cases the societies and individuals engaged in the placing-out plan had placed children in homes with little discrimination, and that the foster parents often sought either to gratify their personal pleasure; or, in the case of older children, took them with a view to financial gain, by securing unpaid servants. On the other hand, the advantages of the institutional plan were set forth. It was formerly believed by many that institutions could be created which would be superior to the ordinary family home. There was present at the meeting of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, several years ago, a delegate from Kansas. She said: "We are engaged in the State of Kansas in building up a new institution for girls. We have a large tract of land where we expect to provide accommodations for five thousand girls, and we shall create a new race of women to become the mothers of the next generation." She said: "The ordinary mother is unfit to bring up a child. Mothers do not understand the principles of child-study, child-nurture, child-training, and all that sort of thing. We shall employ as matrons, caretakers, and teachers, choice, selected women, who shall be free from the foibles and weaknesses of the ordinary mother, and we shall achieve results that will astonish the

world." Some time ago the writer received a letter from this same woman, who was then engaged in carrying on a home for old people in the State of Indiana. That ideal institution for girls which was to be so much superior to the ordinary family home did not materialize.

It is not the purpose of this article to decry institutions; they have their place and their work to do. Institutional care is needed for defective children, the deaf, the blind, the feeble-minded, the epileptics, the crippled, the diseased, and the moral imbeciles. Experience has demonstrated that a large proportion of these children can be more wisely and tenderly provided for in institutions built with reference to their special needs and directed by trained superintendents and employees. Institutional care is needed, temporarily, for many delinquent children; those who have become so far perverted that they cannot be successfully redeemed by such training as they can receive in the ordinary home. It has come to be seen, however, that institutional care for such children is needed in only the minority of cases, and that it is not necessary to protract it. As a rule, not more than a year or two of temporary institutional care is required. Institutional care is needed for many children whose parents are in temporary distress. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the orphan asylums and children's homes have become, largely, children's boarding-houses, where parents who are in temporary distress can pay a small sum, from fifty cents to two dollars per week, to have their children cared for until such time as they themselves may be able to resume their charge. It has come to be recognized that children who have good parents ought not to be ruthlessly separated from them, if there is a fair probability that the parents will be able to resume their care within a reasonable time; and some of the most useful and helpful work of institutions is done along this line.

On the other hand, it has come to be recognized by wise observers, and especially by those who have themselves been engaged in institutional work, that there are grave dangers involved in the institutional care of children. Hon. William P. Letchworth, of New York, and Bishop George D. Gillespie, of Michigan, pointed out many years ago the evil tendency of institutionalism—that the children of the institution lead an artificial life; that the tendency of institutional life is to repress individuality, to destroy initiative, and to render the child permanently dependent.

One of the best examples of modern institutions is the New York Catholic Protectory. The Protectory is located on a large farm at Westchester, in the suburbs of New York. The buildings are arranged to accommodate three thousand children. The institution is admirably organized and administered; the brothers and sisters in charge are apparently devoted and consecrated men and women. The industrial departments are efficiently organized with practical instruction in carpentry, metal working, printing, bookbinding, sewing, cooking, dressmaking, etc. The children appear clean, wholesome, and well-trained.

In visiting this magnificent institution one was painfully impressed with the necessary thoroughness of the organization. Three hundred boys were marched out on the parade ground, and performed a beautiful military drill. Of these boys perhaps one hundred were old enough to do military service. These boys were lodged in immense barracks, resembling in outward appearance summer hotels. One open dormitory for girls contained two hundred and forty-six beds. The playgrounds were thronged with children so crowded together as to restrict free and spontaneous action. The playroom for little boys, supplied with toys, appeared a sad and dreary place. The little children of the kindergarten age were kept in suitable buildings surrounded by beautiful grounds. When the visitors ap-

proached, the little ones came thronging about them, clung to their knees, and begged to be taken up. It was apparent that each one of them was heart-hungry for personal attention and individual care. The impression received was that, notwithstanding the best efforts of the administrators, there was a lack of that personal and individual care and supervision which is essential to the normal development of a child.

The writer visited some years ago a "soldiers' orphans' home" (it is remarkable that after thirty-five years several States are still providing special institutions for the care of the orphans of soldiers of the War of the Rebellion). In this institution there was a recognition of the evils of institutionalism, and the children were not massed in immense dormitories. They were grouped in "cottages," accommodating fifty children, each cottage being under the special care of a house-father and a house-mother. Notwithstanding these efforts, there was an unavoidable massing of the children. They were marched to school, eight hundred strong, in platoons, twelve abreast; they ate their meals in immense dining-rooms; the management and care was largely on the wholesale plan. It was stated that, at the age of thirteen or fourteen years, children were placed in the industrial department, where they were trained to such industries as would enable them to support themselves or to perform successfully the domestic duties of the home. The girls' sewing department was accommodated in a large airy room, about thirty by forty feet. The room was supplied with modern sewing-machines run by electricity. At one side of the room was a table with a large knife fixed above it. It was explained that this was a machine for cutting out boys' clothing. The material was laid upon the table in twelve or fifteen thicknesses, the patterns were marked, and all of the garments cut at one time. Probably each of these girls upon setting up housekeeping, would

immediately obtain one of these convenient machines. There was a machine for making buttonholes and a machine for sewing on buttons. In answer to inquiry, the superintendent explained that it was necessary to have these machines, in order to get through the great mass of work necessary to provide clothing for eight hundred children; but the department had become practically a factory.

There is no more helpless member of the community than the boy or girl sent out from the best of such institutions into the country at the age of fifteen or sixteen years. In the institution the cooking was done by steam, the washing was done by steam, the house was heated by steam. The bell rang for the child to rise in the morning, to say his prayers, to go to his meals, to return from his meals, to go to his studies and his play; all day long the bell, the bell! What does that mean? It means that some one else is doing his thinking for him; some one else is planning his life for him. He is practically without a will of his own. Take a girl of sixteen who has been brought up from childhood in a large institution, place her in a family home in the country. She arrives at night, and is given an unheated room. She wakes on a cold winter morning. She is accustomed to a steam-heated building; she gets out shivering, breaks the ice in her pitcher, washes herself, and goes down to the kitchen. She looks about for the range which runs day and night in the institution; she sees a cooking-stove, but the fire is out, and the boy forgot to bring in the kindling. She goes out, picks the wood from under the snow, kindles the fire with difficulty, and looks about for the hot-and-cold-water faucet, but there are no faucets. She takes the bucket, goes to the well or spring at the foot of the hill, comes back, slipping and stumbling, and spills the water in her shoe. Before the breakfast is ready, she is homesick, heartsick, and discouraged. Had

the child been introduced into the same family at the age of five or six years she would have grown up naturally in these surroundings, and would have thought nothing of these inconveniences.

The controversy which raged for fifty years between the advocates of the institutional plan of caring for dependent children, and the plan of placing such children in family homes, was finally closed in 1899. The National Conference of Charities and Correction met that year at Cincinnati. The committee on the "Care of Destitute and Neglected Children" was a very representative one. The chairman of the committee was Hon. Thomas M. Mulry, President of the St. Vincent de Paul Society of the City of New York. The committee included representatives of state institutions for children, child-saving societies, state boards of charities, orphan asylums, etc. A very careful report was prepared by the chairman, and was submitted to each member of the committee in advance. After careful revision, the report was brought in signed by every member of the committee. It was perhaps the first time in the history of the conference that a unanimous report was presented by this committee. In this report the committee said: "The finding of family homes for children has been taken up enthusiastically and with excellent success in many localities. . . . All workers agree that the home is the natural place to properly develop the child. . . . The earlier they are placed in such families the better it is for the child, as the motive which induces one to take a child of tender years is apt to be more disinterested than when they are old enough to be utilized. . . . The placing-out system needs the most careful supervision. . . . The main difficulty is to find homes for children from seven to eleven years of age and, in large communities, it will be found difficult to secure desirable homes for all dependent children. This does not, however, mean that any effort should

be spared to place as many children as possible in good homes; and this committee is strongly in favor of renewed activity in this direction. . . . There are homes in abundance throughout our cities, our towns, our farming sections, for every orphan child, if the people will but open their hearts, and brighten their homes by studying in what way they may best show their love for their less fortunate fellow-beings."

This is a most significant declaration, for the reason that it represents the complete agreement of those who were formerly at variance with reference to the care of dependent and neglected children. The report recognized the value of the institution as a means of preparing children for family homes, but it recognized, also, that the mission of the institution for children of sound mind and body is temporary, and that such children should not be kept too long under institutional care. Nearly all of those who are engaged in placing children in family homes utilize institutions for the temporary care of children pending placement in homes. The only important exceptions to this rule, I believe, are the Pennsylvania Children's Aid Society of Philadelphia, and the Wisconsin Children's Home Society, which make use of family homes for that purpose.

THE WORK OF CHARLES LORING BRACE.

The great prophet of the child-placing system in the United States was Mr. Charles Loring Brace, the founder of the New York Children's Aid Society, who took issue with the managers of the institutions fifty years ago, declaring that the best place for the children of the slums was on farms. Mr. Brace began very early sending companies of children to the West. The records of the society (report of 1900) show 22,121 children placed in permanent family homes, of whom there were sent to Ohio 1,631, Indiana 2,827, Michigan 1,352, Illinois 1,541, Iowa 2,606,

Missouri 1,726, Kansas 1,510, Minnesota 1,352, and Virginia 1,067. In the early years of this work, children were sent out in large companies, from twenty to fifty in each party, and were placed without careful discrimination. In his book on the "Dangerous Classes of New York," Mr. Brace said: "The children are not indentured, but are free to leave if ill-treated or dissatisfied, and the farmers can dismiss them if they find them useless or otherwise unsuitable. This apparently loose arrangement," he adds, "has worked well." Mr. Brace said before the National Conference of Charities and Correction in 1876,¹ "The employers agree to send the children to school, and, of course, to treat them kindly. Beyond this there is no agreement, and no indenture is made out; the relation is left much to the good feeling of both parties."

In recent years the methods of the New York Children's Aid Society have been materially modified. Children are sent out in small companies, homes are more carefully and deliberately selected, and a more efficient supervision is maintained. Admirable records are kept.

The New York Juvenile Asylum has maintained an Illinois agency for placing children in homes. Their work has been quietly done. The children have been placed with care, and comparatively little criticism has arisen. Other institutions in the Eastern cities have done somewhat similar work. Recently some of the Catholic institutions of New York City have been sending children to the West.

In 1880 there was organized in Chicago the Visitation and Aid Society, under Catholic auspices. This society acts as a clearing-house for a number of Catholic institutions for children, and also places a considerable number of children in homes. In the City of New York in 1898, there was organized a similar society, known as the Cath-

¹ Proceedings, p. 139.

olic Home Bureau for dependent children, the object of which is to provide homes in families for destitute Catholic children. The two societies are a distinct departure from the policy of bringing up children in institutions, which has been followed for many years by the Roman Catholic organizations. The most efficient orphan asylums and children's homes throughout the United States have greatly extended the plan of placing children in homes; as a result there has been a sharp check in the building of orphan asylums and children's homes, and there has been a steady diminution in the average of the children found in such institutions. For example, about the year 1875, the Cleveland Protestant Orphan Asylum adopted a new policy. Instead of retaining children to the age of fifteen or sixteen, the managers began to advertise in the religious papers of the Central States for homes for children. In a single year they received 1,200 applications; homes were selected with great care, after thorough correspondence; and ever since that time, the asylum, with a capacity of less than one hundred children, has been placing in homes about one hundred children per year. As a result of this policy, the institution has been able to care for four or five times as many children with the same investment as it was able to care for under the old plan. A similar policy is pursued by such institutions as the Rose Orphan Home at Terre Haute, Indiana, the Chicago Orphan Asylum, the Washburn Memorial Orphan Asylum in Minneapolis, and many like institutions.

STATE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

An era in the child-saving movement was marked by the opening in Michigan, in 1874, of the "State Public School." The suggestion for this school was received from the State Primary School established in Massachusetts in 1860. The State Primary School, however, was de-

signed to receive both delinquent and dependent children for temporary care until they could be placed in family homes. The Michigan State Public School was restricted to the care of dependent children—those who would otherwise be sent to a county poorhouse. An efficient state agency was established for placing and supervising the children; the state agency was supplemented by a system of county agents, who coöperated with the school in the selection of homes and in the supervision of children, and who also served as probation officers in the cases of children brought before the courts. The law establishing the Michigan State Public School was framed by Hon. C. D. Randall, of Coldwater, Michigan. It expressly provided that the school should not be a permanent home for children, but simply a temporary resting-place until they could be placed in family homes. When the State Public School was established, there were five hundred children in the almshouses of Michigan. In three or four years, the almshouses were emptied of children, and in two or three years more the State Public School had shrunk from a population of three hundred to a population of two hundred children. The results of this work found general approval, and similar schools have since been established in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Colorado.

In the States of Ohio and Indiana the same results were aimed at by the establishment of county homes, which were expected to facilitate the work of placing children in homes; but the results were not equally satisfactory. The county homes showed an irresistible tendency to increase in size. The county officials did not show the expected disposition to place the children in homes, and the counties did not prove to be sufficiently large, territorially, for placing-out work. Many children need to be placed at a greater distance from their birthplaces, in order to escape proximity to unworthy relatives. Several thousand chil-

dren accumulated in the county homes, and for several years a vigorous effort has been on foot in both States to get the children out of the county homes, and into family homes. In Indiana, this result has been sought by the establishment of a state agency under the control of the State Board of Charities, which is doing admirable work. The work of the State Board of Charities is further supplemented by the establishment of county boards of guardians, whose purpose is similar to that of the Board of Children's Guardians of the District of Columbia, and the New Jersey State Board of Children's Guardians. A similar effort is being made in the State of New York by the State Charities Aid Association under state authority.

THE CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETIES.

In 1883 Rev. M. V. B. Van Arsdale, of Bloomington, Illinois, organized the "American Educational Aid Association," which subsequently became the "Children's Home Society." From a very small beginning this society has had a surprising growth, having extended into twenty States. This society was similar in its purposes to the children's aid societies of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, but it was unique in some of its features: first, it was devoted, originally, almost exclusively to the placing of children in family homes; second, it dealt with children individually, and not in the mass; third, it was not a local organization, but was organized on a comprehensive basis to cover whole States. The State was divided into districts, with district superintendents and a system of local advisory boards, one in each important town, composed of representative citizens.

The children's home societies are not sectarian, but they keep in close touch with the Protestant churches of all denominations. The district superintendents find ready access to most of the churches. Their financial support

comes largely from the churches, and the local advisory boards are usually appointed from the churches. These societies usually require that the persons receiving children shall be church-going and Sabbath-keeping people; they do not insist that they shall be members of churches, but in practice the great majority of the children are placed in the homes of church-members. In the early years of this work it was regarded with some suspicion by the most judicious and careful charity workers. The societies were new, and were meagerly supported. The workers received very inadequate compensation. The demand for money placed some of the societies under temptation to receive children for a consideration, without too careful scrutiny. This fact placed some of the societies under the suspicion of being used to cover up immorality. The poverty of the societies led to the adoption of the commission system of compensating district superintendents, who were given a percentage of their collections (usually fifty per cent), out of which they were required to defray their personal traveling expenses. This was a convenient system for the societies, since it threw the risk upon the worker; but it was an undesirable system, for the reason that it established a false criterion, the work being judged by the amount of money raised rather than by the efficiency of the work done in behalf of the children. The system tended to create prejudice among the contributors, many of whom objected decidedly to an assessment of fifty per cent upon their contributions for the benefit of the collectors. The poverty of the societies made it necessary to push the financial part of the work at the expense of the visitation and supervision of children.

As these societies have grown older and stronger, their methods have improved; the commission plan is being discarded, and regular salaries are being established. Children are received with more discrimination; homes are

more carefully investigated, and a more thorough supervision of the children is maintained. For example, the Wisconsin Children's Home Society employs four district superintendents, who receive salaries of \$1,500 per year each. They are competent men of first-rate ability, who earn their salaries. The work of the society commands the respect and confidence of the community.

In the eighteen years since the first children's home society was organized, the work has attained large proportions. Last year the twenty societies expended about \$100,000, received about two thousand children for the first time, and did considerable work in replacing children for whom change became necessary. These societies hold an annual convention for the study of their work, and most of the people engaged in the work show an earnest disposition to improve it.

Several of the children's home societies have enlarged their scope so as to include the general work of aiding unfortunate children as well as placing children in homes. They make temporary provision for children whose parents are in temporary distress; provide hospital care, surgical treatment, etc. The Illinois Society furnishes probation officers for the Juvenile Court; the Wisconsin society is undertaking similar work.

The several state societies are federated in the National Children's Home Society, of which Professor Charles R. Henderson, of the Chicago University, is president. The National Society holds an annual convention, but does no executive work. The children's home society movement has enlisted the coöperation of such men as President William McKinley, who is president of the Ohio Society; Hon. A. O. Wright, President of the Wisconsin Society; Hon. Lyman J. Gage, who was formerly vice-president of the Illinois Society; Joseph P. Byers, who is secretary of the Ohio Society; and many other prominent and careful people.

The children's home societies are still very young, but their work is steadily improving in quality and increasing in quantity. The societies of Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Michigan, Indiana, and West Virginia maintain receiving homes for their children, with a capacity of from fifteen to forty children. The Iowa Society has a receiving home with a capacity of about seventy-five children. Most of the other societies provide care for their wards in family homes until they can be permanently located. The children's home societies practically command the field in the States of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri, and are rapidly gaining ground in several other States. Their plan of organization is simple, but comprehensive, and its efficiency has been demonstrated by the readiness with which it has adapted itself to the needs of many different States.

THE BOARDING-OUT PLAN.

As communities grow older and richer, and their social conditions become more artificial, it becomes increasingly difficult to find suitable homes for dependent children. This difficulty was formerly overcome by sending the surplus dependent children into the younger sections of the country. This method is pursued in the immense work of Dr. Barnardo's Society in London, which has sent many thousands of children to Canada, Australia, etc. This plan has become less and less practicable in the United States in recent years, partly because the Central and Western States have themselves become older and richer; partly because of the prejudice which has arisen in the younger States in consequence of careless methods of work. In recent years, the difficulty has been relieved by paying board of children, temporarily, in private families. This method is employed in the State of Massachusetts, both by the Commonwealth in dealing with public wards, and by

the Boston Children's Aid Society. A similar plan has been practiced extensively by the Pennsylvania Children's Aid Society of Philadelphia. A considerable number of children of the delinquent class have been boarded out in families, instead of being sent to reformatories, with very encouraging results. A great many children, after being boarded for a time, are accepted by their foster parents without further payment. In the State of Massachusetts, the results of this plan have been to greatly diminish the number of dependent and delinquent children cared for in institutions. The official reports of the Massachusetts State Board of Charities for 1900, with reference to the children who are wards of the State of Massachusetts, show that there were, in the custody of the State, September 30, 1866, 2,065 children, of whom 1,437, or seventy per cent, were in institutions, and 628, or thirty per cent, were in family homes. There were, in the custody of the State, September 30, 1900, 3,742 children, of whom 556, or fifteen per cent, were in institutions, and 3,184, or eighty-five per cent, were being boarded in family homes at state expense. This report includes dependent and neglected children and juvenile offenders.

THE OUTLOOK.

The plan of placing children in family homes is no longer an experiment. It is recognized as the best plan by students of sociology. It is embedded in the constitution of the State of New York, notwithstanding the great institutions still in operation there. It is recognized by the statutes of the United States, the States of Massachusetts, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Colorado, and numerous others.¹

¹ The Illinois children's law of 1899, commonly called the Juvenile Court Law, is summarized in its last section as follows: "Sec. 21.—This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may be car-

This policy has been definitely adopted by nearly all of the great interior States, and is already producing valuable results. In those States, orphan asylums and children's homes are no longer used as permanent homes in which to bring up children to adult years, but simply as training-schools, hospitals, and temporary refuges. The interior cities contain a much smaller number of institutions for children, relatively, than are found in the older cities, whose policy was established before this system came into general use. For example, the city of New York has about 24,000 children in institutions of various kinds, while the city of Chicago has only about 4,000 in institutions.

From an economic point of view, the placing-out system has very great advantages; for example, the Illinois Children's Home and Aid Society, only eighteen years old, has 2,100 wards under its care in family homes, children under eighteen years of age. This society has three small receiving homes with a joint capacity of about ninety children. There is invested in these three homes about \$20,000. The entire expenditures of the society for all purposes for last year were \$36,000; but should the society decide to return to the old plan of bringing up children in institutions, it must first build for the accommodation of these children at a cost of not less than \$300 per bed, or \$630,000.¹ Provision must then be made for the maintenance of these children at an annual cost of not less than \$100 per child, or \$210,000 per year. The economic advantage of the child-saving plan is apparent.

ried out, to-wit: That the care, custody, and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and in all cases where it can be properly done, the child shall be placed in an *approved family home*, and become a member of the family by legal adoption, or otherwise."

¹ Such institutions as the Cleveland Orphan Asylum, the Chicago Orphan Asylum, and the Minnesota State Public School have plants costing from \$700 to \$1,000 per bed.

No cost is too great if necessary in order to save neglected children, but the children who can be placed and kept successfully in carefully selected family homes are better off than they can be in even the best institutions. The outlook for the homeless child was never so full of hope as at the beginning of the twentieth century. Great social betterment is coming from the wiser care society is learning to give its waifs.

ARTICLE VII.

PROFESSOR PARK AS A THEOLOGICAL
PREACHER.

BY THE REV. GEORGE NYE BOARDMAN, D.D.

PROFESSOR PARK has been designated "The great professor." But his sermons sometimes indicated a range of thought and subtlety of speculation that have not appeared in his other published works, probably not in his lectures. As a teacher of theology, he would not be under obligation to go beyond the creeds of the denomination to which he belonged. Theology is a fairly well-rounded science, and may be taught from a text-book as well as arithmetic or geology. A system of lectures need not necessarily contain private, original speculations of the lecturer. He may encourage his pupils to make excursions into adjacent fields of thought, while he confines his positive instructions to the well-established doctrines of the Christian faith.

Professor Park as a lecturer presented his views with great clearness, discriminated point from point in Christian doctrine with great acuteness, conducted an argument with remarkable logical skill, and left the impression that his conclusions could be avoided only by beginning with new premises. But he was not ambitious to develop a theology of his own: his aim was to establish, with accuracy and definiteness, his positions on ground already traversed. He was, however, very positive in his views, and might almost be called a partisan theologian. Early in his occupancy of his theological professorship, he avowed himself a high Hopkinsian, and probably would at any time have accepted that designation. His controversy with Dr. Hodge showed that he

was a most determined advocate of the New England view of sin and human ability. He accepted, also, the Hopkinsian doctrines concerning the means of grace and "unregenerate doings." Of the composite scheme which is now called the *new theology*, he did not, so far as I know, publicly express an opinion. That part of it which is really new has come into notice since he retired from official labor. That part of it which consists of the doctrines rejected by Edwards and Hopkins met with his opposition from first to last. The rejection of the authority of the Bible, the rejection of the doctrine of divine revelations evidenced by accompanying supernatural interpositions, the adoption of a rationalistic view of inspiration, the acceptance of the doctrine that human nature is a development from brute nature, the acceptance of the doctrine that the human species has existed for countless ages on the earth, must inevitably modify the traditional orthodox theology. Professor Park never adjusted his scheme of teaching to these views. A scheme of theology, often called by its adherents new, now somewhat widely adopted under the name of liberalism, which, perhaps, vaguely admits more or less of the above-noticed sentiments, but consists substantially of Pelagianism and Arminianism with tolerance at least of Sabellian speculations, and reliance for final salvation on the attribute of divine benevolence,—*this* new theology is the simple opposite of Professor Park's lifelong teaching. He is reported to have said, humorously of course, "It is not respectable not to be a Calvinist"; he certainly answered the question "What in one word is Arminianism?" with the one word "Folly."

While it may be said, then, that he made no attempt to excite attention by novelties or by peculiar opinions, it is true that in his sermons he gave free play to his intellect, and disclosed his personal feelings and his tendencies of mind more fully than he did in his more scholastic argu-

mentations. Whatever his works may show when published in a body, we look now to his sermons for the exhibition of his personal peculiarities. In them he lingers at times over profound and moving themes in a way that indicates a kinship of mind with the deep things of the spiritual life. He seems to have been fascinated by the truths that lie half-hidden from human vision, and to have had pleasure in the thought that there is a reserve of knowledge for the future. It is the purpose of this article to notice a few of Professor Park's sentiments which lie outside the system which he officially represented.

First, we notice some things that indicate the drift of his thoughts as religious rather than theological. Though a partisan, he recognized the substantial truthfulness of all the Christian creeds. He was accustomed to say, that with explanations he and his opponents would agree. Whatever words of criticism he might apply to the beliefs of others, whatever epithets like *absurd* and *impossible* he might apply to their statements, he was persuaded that belief itself, belief in God and his revelation, is the chief thing; that the one faith delivered to the saints may be firmly held by those who differ widely as to the minor details of doctrine. Those who have seen him at the communion-table or at devotional meetings, or have heard his address to the divine throne on occasions of special interest, have felt sure that he stood upon the eternal bedrock—the Rock of Ages—and was unconscious, for the time, of the superficial contentions that might be going on around him. His attitude toward that which is mysterious in life and in the divine government is indicative of character through its contrast with other marked qualities. One of the most prominent traits of his mind was clearness. He insisted on exactness of view and of statement. One who had been his pupil in the department of homiletics, said, on his transfer to the chair of theology, "I would rather have

his instruction in theology than that of any other man in the country. His mind is as clear as daylight." Yet he knew when to stop as well as when to go forward. He paused before the mysterious as calmly and contentedly as he rested on revealed truths. He knew that the ways of God transcend those of men, and he found assurance that he was embracing a divine truth in this, that the thing which he was called to contemplate surpassed his comprehension. He had no disposition to force his way into that which is reserved for Deity. He well knew the weakness of humanity, and saw that its highest attainment is to wonder, love, and adore. His vision was as far-reaching as that of most men; his glances were as penetrating as those of other inquirers after truth; but the distinctness of his apprehensions gave him the fuller assurance that an impenetrable wall limits our earthly knowledge. He not only submitted to this truth, he welcomed it, considered it an important part of the lot of man on earth, he held it to be wise for the children of God to wait, to expect, to adjust their sentiments to the things already known, and not to be impatient to force an entrance into the secret chamber of the Most High. His language was, "The mind was made for mysteries," and he believed it accomplished its mission better in accepting the divine overrulings than in restless and feverish questionings.

As to the unity of the human race, his sentiment partook more of feeling than of definitely enunciated theory. He believed in a moral unity. The Hopkinsian doctrine that the individuals of the race are not born in sin and guilt has been criticised by strict Calvinists. But that doctrine does not really change the practical estimate of human sinfulness. It does, however, transfer its origin from the physical to the moral world. It makes the fall of Adam, not the fall of the race, but the determining fact in accord with which the moral constitution of the race was fixed.

Adam was in the image of God, and lost that image by disobedience; whereupon his posterity are born in the image of their apostate parent. This view Professor Park inculcated in his class-room, but he has set forth the inherent forces of humanity which lead to sin, in a sermon entitled "The System of Moral Influences in which Men are Placed," with such expositions as should go far towards vindicating for him (a vindication not at all needed) a Calvinistic standing. He speaks of influences and counter-influences which pervade nature and control human conduct, with a fullness of illustration that makes all nature seem one living creature. His view of the reciprocity of all the elements of creation might almost satisfy a Hegelian. Especially throughout the human race are mutual influences at work. "No man liveth to himself. A single word of a friend may transform for good or ill the character of a sympathetic circle." "For two thousand years there has been a school of philosophers so intimately connected with each other that they have been called a scholastic body, and Aristotle has been its vital head, and both truths and errors have flowed from that head through all the members of that body." The diffusive power of evil is as manifest as the diffusive power of good. "To taste the forbidden fruit was the act of a moment, but the disasters that followed that brief rebellion have diffused themselves through all the race through all time."

This system of mutual and reciprocal influences, Professor Park believed, illustrates the sovereignty and the justice and the mercy of God. It enables us to hold that all sin is actual individual transgression; it does not deny that parents and children may be swept away together in their guilt by a penal judgment; it admits that innocent children may suffer with guilty parents, the children being taken to rest with Him who on earth took little children in his arms; it allows that guilty parents may for a time

be spared because God would not afflict with them their innocent offspring, would not afflict even unoffending domestic animals; it permits us to hope that children may bring their parents to penitence and salvation, as in innumerable instances parent have brought their children. Thus the moral world is a system of influences radiating in many directions, issuing in good and evil. With special interest are to be noticed the manifestations of kindness, the exercise of mercy, in the divine overruling. "And all the instances in which his unoffending creatures have interposed between his justice and its erring victims are symbols—for the earth is full of symbols, and the history of our race is a history of symbols—of that illustrious mediation whereby the Lamb of God took away the sins of the world. He so connected himself with all who believe in him, that, if punitive justice alight upon them, it must cover him also. He steps between the uplifted sword and its predestined object, and, if it strike them, it must first pierce him. Therefore is the sword returned into the scabbard, and peace cometh unto the elect of God."

The remarks thus far made relate to the natural tendencies of Professor Park's mind in his contemplation of religious themes, but he made his individuality felt also in the popular presentations of topics that came within the range of his professional work. The perdition of the race and the scheme of salvation furnished subjects for independent thought. He had *his own* views of sin, justice, and punishment; atonement and grace called forth his profoundest contemplations.

On the doctrines relating to condemnation, he did not limit himself to the New England theology, though he adhered to that scheme in a general way. His views were more comprehensive than that scheme required, and he did not permit himself to be bound by its philosophical statements. Some parts of his variation from its merely doc-

trinal positions may be accounted for by the distinction which he so eloquently set forth in his famous sermon on the Theology of the Intellect, and that of the Feelings; but at times he introduced new considerations which that system did not contain. The New England scheme, as held by those who would give it its simplest form, permits a somewhat attenuated conception of sin, justice, and punishment. It teaches, all sin consists in sinning, sinning is voluntary transgression of law, and the law is, 'Thou shalt prefer the greater good to the less; sin is, therefore, the choice of the less good. It was not possible for Professor Park to confine himself within this range of thought. He did not measure sin by the difference between the actual good of a choice and the possible good, but he looked upon it as loathsome, debasing, defiling. He cherished a sympathy with those who look upon sin with abhorrence. He used to speak reverentially of President Edwards, as, of all men, the one to whom sin was the most repulsive. His conception of the divine view of it was, not that it is a matter for which excuses are to be made, but a matter to be promptly and utterly condemned. It was not the theoretically partial good of sin that attracted his attention, but its destructiveness, its hostility to God and humanity, the disintegrating corruption that it works in nature. He also took a comprehensive view of justice, did not drop distributive justice from his theology. Dr. N. W. Taylor maintained that the disposition to promote the general good is the only attribute of justice required of a divine Ruler and Judge. Park believed that this attribute is directly manifested in retribution. It is true that he accepted the distinction between distributive and general justice, found aid in explaining the efficacy of the atonement by means of the distinction. Still he did not define justice as benevolence, but made it a particular manifestation of benevolence. The attribute, contemplated by itself, was to

him a majestic force working out the retributions of the moral world; it marked and signalized the immutable distinction between right and wrong; it acted out its nature and fulfilled its aim in rewarding righteousness, and especially in punishing iniquity as ill-deserving. As the righteous Lord loveth judgment, so his justice, of its own force, follows the judgment and gives reality to its decisions. A scheme of salvation may indeed modify the award for guilt, but it cannot modify the nature of justice or make void its distributive demands.

His doctrine of punishment was in harmony with that of justice. He did not incline to the doctrine that punishment is to be justified only as a means of reform or as a deterrent from crime. He had no thought that the decisions of justice were futile, or that threats accomplished their aim by their moral influence. He believed, if threats were necessary, their fulfillment was necessary—that God does not work through false impressions. He believed that the elements of punishment are embodied in our nature. The physical sufferings that follow sin are punitive, and in the conscience God has laid the foundation of retribution. He has made man his own tormentor. The inevitable remorse that follows guilt shows that God has not aimed at reform simply, but has ordained a requital for ill-desert. The question is not, Shall remorse be let loose as an avenging demon to prey upon guilt? but the question is, How shall it be induced to cease from its ravages? In consonance with this view he had no hesitation in affirming the doctrine of eternal punishment. He felt that the eternity of punishment is in harmony with the nature of things. What can limit it? How shall it cease? Distress and woe is the state into which the sinning man falls, and he can escape only by entering another state. But when can the guilty say, I am guilty no longer? How shall punishment work out a consciousness of innocence?

Anthropological theology might be divided into these two parts: *Theologia de Morte* and *Theologia de Salute*. Professor Park's views of the former we have briefly noticed, but he was specially attracted to the latter. Atonement was the theme that awakened his profoundest interest. He gave it a large place in his lectures, and reverted to it often in sermons and essays. It is evident that he meditated upon it, and presented it before his own mind, in all the forms in which it is capable of being expressed. In his speculations he reached out quite beyond the bounds which New England theology has set. He undoubtedly considered that view a truthful one and, practically, an adequate doctrinal statement, but his feelings concerning the atonement and his conceptions of it carried him quite beyond the limits of that theory. That school of theologians teaches that the atonement makes it safe for God, under certain conditions, to forgive sin. They do not teach that it is in any way an offset to sin, but that it produces such an effect upon the minds of moral beings that God can, with safety to his government, exercise his sovereignty in its pardon and in the remission of its penalty. But Professor Park made very free use of the words sacrifice, substitution, propitiation, expiation, and kindred terms. If it should be said that he simply intended to teach that the objects thus designated were the means by which God manifested his disapprobation of wrong-doing, then the means of the atonement, rather than the end, attracted his attention, and the forgiveness of sin would consequently be ascribed to the expiation, rather than to mere divine sovereignty. But without attempting to explain his relation to any theory, we may notice, separately, some of the ideas which he connected with the doctrine.

In the first place, he removed the atonement from among those things that are expedients, or convenient resorts, or means to ends, by making it the ultimate aim of the divine

dealings with men. He accepted the doctrine that the purpose of God's work in the entire range of the universe is the manifestation of his own glory. The part which human history contributes to this end is concentrated in, and issues from, the atonement. Human affairs are so ordered that their interworkings and their trend make progress toward, and reach forward to, God's glory; and the ultimate object in the current of human affairs, that which on the farther side of all earthly operations touches the divine glory, in which all forces in the current of events concentrate, is the atonement. Hence the atonement is that for which men were created, and is a greater work than creation. The dark mysteries of evil, the destructive realities of sin, are overbalanced by it, and are wisely permitted, because of its rectifying energy and its adaptation to display the divine skill. The wisdom that is competent to educe good from evil is beyond our comprehension; but we know that God is wise, and that he has set sin and redemption over against each other, and that he preferred the counterworking of the two to the absence of the two from his system of government. Hence it is that in the atonement we find the explanation of the divine works; the converging lines of the divine government center in it. The hidden things into which the angels desire to look are embraced in it, and even many of the enigmas of the natural world, it is believed, will find their solution here. But we turn to notice some of the special items that entered into his view of the doctrine.

He made much of the idea of sacrifice. He thought there were corresponding deeds between the parties made at one in the scheme of reconciliation. The mercy of the Father calls forth the gratitude of the erring child; the rebellious subject expresses the desire to make compensation for the injury he has done. He expresses by symbol a willingness to make cost to himself in reparation of

wrong. It is not the office of the Ruler to forget, but to rectify, the disgrace put upon his authority. Hence sacrifice is in place. The Levitical sacrifices, so Professor Park held, were typical of the one great sacrifice by which God and man are brought into harmony. As the slain lamb expiated the guilt of him for whom it was offered, so he who was nailed to the cross expiated the guilt of a sinning world. He believed that the divine sacrifice proved to the world the justice of God in justifying men, because it was a propitiation in response to which wrath against sin might be turned away. A favorite hymn, which he often read in public, was that of Cowper, beginning, "There is a fountain filled with blood." Congregations have been awed by it as his voice interpreted the depth of its sentiment. He did not believe that salvation comes to man through admiration of Christ or through imitation of him, but through faith in his blood. He did not believe that Christ's mission was designed to convince men of the goodness of God, but to open the way of access to him.

Still more did the professor present in varied lights the idea of substitution;—and the term was not to be explained as figurative. His teaching was that Christ took the sinner's place in suffering the penalty of a broken law, and in being made subject to the inflictions of the Ruler who executes the law. He did not, indeed, hold that Christ was personally punished, but that he endured the penalty due to the sinner, and that his sufferings were an exponent of the wrath of God. He opposed any exposition of the Twenty-second Psalm which made it other than the Son's cry of agony when he was forsaken by the Father. One of the most eloquent of his utterances is in consonance with what he termed a most remarkable expression: "It pleased the Lord to bruise him." No one who heard from the pulpit these words will ever forget them: "We long to know whether there was no check to the anthems of the

angels when they heard the sound of the drawing of the sword of God in heaven, and he lifted it up against the man that was his fellow, and said, 'I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered.'" Professor Park did not hesitate to accept the doctrine that the earth was cursed for man's sake, and that the race is under a curse because of transgression, and that Christ became a curse for us, and that by his stripes we are healed. Nor did Christ take our place simply to bear our penalty: he is our representative to plead our cause and keep open for us the way of life. "The vicarious chastisement was not merely piacular, it was propitiatory likewise." He did not rest with affirming that Christ's sufferings were an adequate expression of God's disapproval of sin: he saw that they presented new motives for its pardon,—they not only satisfied justice, they prompted to the exercise of grace. Some have held that the atonement was addressed to men, but the theological preacher says: "The atonement addresses not men only, not the created universe only, but the Creator." "The atonement is a prayer from the Son to the Father." "In the efficacy of his death he is an Intercessor for us. The atonement is a plea in our behalf; the eloquence is continued even yet, and in its importunity our Redeemer is our Advocate, rehearsing the argument of his death for our salvation."

In his contemplations upon the atonement, Professor Park made much of the mysterious pains of Christ. Our Lord was not sustained by a Stoic philosophy, or by the consciousness of innocence, when he was on the cross or when he contemplated his approaching death. His agonies were inexplicable by human considerations, and were beyond the range of human sympathy. Their efficacy was not, therefore, in their moral influence upon men, nor was it by the demonstration of any doctrinal truth. Their power in the scheme of redemption could be known only

to the Divine Mind. Their effect upon us could be known only as effect not traceable to its source through a causal efficiency. The pains of our Lord are thus known to us through themselves alone; their hidden springs are beyond our range of vision. The atonement is as much unknown to us in its primal energies as are the forces of nature. Professor Park loved to linger over considerations like these. They had a fascination for him, an attraction like that which the scientist feels in studying the forces of nature at once known and unknown. He gazed upon the redeeming forces, and traced them to God, as the naturalist traces electricity and life to what he calls the Unknown. He accepted the fact that the working out of our redemption produced, as one of its elements, suffering of an innocent being, the grounds of which elude our research.

He also saw the cross to be the basis of a kingdom. He speaks of Christ as going from the cross to a throne. The school of theologians to which he belonged has considered the atonement an expedient by which obstacles to the pardon of sin are removed, and has held that God takes advantage of this result for the exercise of mercy towards the guilty. He accepted all this, but did not stop here. He took cognizance of the retroactive effect of the atonement upon him who accomplished it. He considered this a part of the scheme of a perfected salvation. Our Lord's sufferings made him perfect as the Captain of our salvation. His redemptive work made it fit that he should receive glory and honor and power and dominion through all the Universe; especially that those saved by his blood should worship at his feet. Accordingly there is a Mediatorial throne, and he who sits upon it not only gathers under his sway, as loving subjects, those whom he has ransomed, but his word fixes the destiny of mankind. "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory; and

before him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth the sheep from the goats." The theological *preacher* has given abundant evidence that he considered all this embraced in the redemptive scheme.

There is one effect which he attributed to the atonement, on which he dwelt with special emphasis, which he considered not only inexplicable, but almost contrary to nature. He held that it delivers a man from himself, that is, from remorse of conscience. How this should be possible he did not profess to know; yet it must be true, if one is to be happy in heaven. Conscience is not under the control of the will. It is God's representative, he accuses us through it, he threatens and executes punishment by it; so the guilty are the victims of a torture inflicted by a power within them,—a power whose workings they cannot modify. How, then, can even a penitent sinner be at rest? If he is penitent, he remembers his sin; if he remembers his sin, he is oppressed with his guilt; his sense of guilt is a sense of ill-desert. How, then, can he find release from self-condemnation and woe? Professor Park held that, in some mysterious way, the atonement will be found to appease the conscience and quench its remorse. In some way the redemptive work of Christ will so bring us into communion with him, so make us partakers of his merits, that we shall triumph over our iniquities, and find our blessedness in the grace that has made them instruments of the divine glory.

Professor Park looked upon grace as a scheme or system forming a constituent part of the divine government. He often uses the term as the equivalent of mercy, as setting forth a form in which love manifests itself; but he also speaks of it as a stupendous system of which the death of Christ is the keystone. It becomes, therefore, a force in the moral world as steady as the force of gravity in the

natural world. It works, self-moved, in accord with its own laws, towards the salvation of men. Of itself, unmodified in its operations, it would effect the salvation of men, as the unmodified operation of the law embodying the penalty for sin would result in their destruction. As the salvation of men is the chief means of the glory of God, grace is the most exalted of the forces that appear in the divine works. Viewed by itself, it is the gem, the pearl, of the divine attributes; judged by its results, it is peerless in its majesty and glory. The elements of power which it combines in its development, the atonement through Christ, the influences of the Holy Spirit, make it the crowning, the supreme, divine force of the world. That it fails to save all men is due, not to its lack of competence, but to the failure among men to comply with the conditions of its operation. Humanity itself, in a world of grace, is not a race in ruins, but in triumph; and the lost fragments incur their destruction by their failure to merge themselves in that body of humanity of which Christ is the Head.

This fragmentary article does not claim to have presented Professor Park with any degree of fullness. To describe his learning, his logical acumen, his mastery of language, his power in systematizing thought, his eloquence, his wit, his humor, would require a volume from the hand of an intimate acquaintance. But one who has seen something of his personal work, and read his published sermons, may notice some of the manifestations of his outreaching energy, some of the disclosures of internal force that result from purely spontaneous action. He was a man of genius. His instincts moved him on occasions of special animation and interest; then the logical processes of his mind gave way to insight. His glances at truth shot out beyond the limits of the system of thought which he had set himself to construct. His tendencies of mind were towards theology, and he had a most wonderful ca-

capacity to diffuse his own sentiments through the minds of an audience. There were certain themes with which his mind seemed to have a special kinship. Virtue, the satisfaction of law, mediation in a moral system, and equivalents in the awards of justice were themes on which his mind dwelt lingeringly, to which it returned again and again, and which unfolded themselves as a scroll written over by the divine hand. Hence it was not strange that in preparing his sermons, with an audience before him in imagination, he should give his mind free play, and give expression to sentiments, to convictions not involved in his systematic teachings. It is not to be inferred that the theology which he preached was inconsistent with that of the lecture-room, but that it was more widely applied, that it brought to light heart-yearnings, and forms of faith that were not subject to logical inference.

The volume of sermons published in 1885 may be adduced in evidence of these statements. They are sermons that need the speaker's voice if their hidden powers are to be disclosed; but a careful, prolonged, and sympathetic study will bring to view something of the man, and some of the more subtle elements of his theology.

ARTICLE VIII.

A STUDY OF CONSCIENCE.

BY THE REV. CHARLES CAVERNO.

I USE the term "conscience" as equivalent to moral nature. I mean by conscience, man's total capacity for moral action or passion—moral function or affection. I want it understood, at the outset, that I do not limit the term "conscience" to moral sentiment or sensibility. It will cover a much wider range than that in this discussion. Conscience is sometimes treated as a sentiment merely, and then it is said that there is no light in it. Now to say that, as a sentiment, conscience has little or no light for man, is to say something with which I should not violently disagree. No receptivity or sensibility fills itself. If it be said that it is best to confine the term "conscience" to the province of sentiment in morals I would not be a pugnacious objector. Only let us understand ourselves. I think, however, such limitation of the term would be unfortunate, for in customary use, I am persuaded, the word "conscience" is understood as covering the whole moral capacity of man. To use the term as simply equivalent to moral sentiment or emotion, without conveying the idea that such treatment does not exhaust the moral nature of man, does not even treat the most significant parts of that nature, is, in my judgment, a grave and sad mistake.

The psychologists say that man has certain leading faculties which they denominate intellect, sensibility, and will,—or the power to perceive, to feel, to choose. There are certain departments open to man in which he may give these faculties exercise. There are departments in

which he may give them all exercise—departments broad enough to call for the employment of perception, sensibility or affection, and choice. Take, for instance, the department of knowledge. Man has capacity to perceive things that may be known, i.e., power to grasp, to comprehend them. He has a certain passion intellectually, or appetite or affection or sensibility, for things in this department. We speak of this sensibility sometimes as a thirst for knowledge. Then man has the capacity of will to determine his attitude toward the department, i. e., to say, to determine, whether he will employ his perceptive powers in it—whether he will gratify the appetite or misus or longing of his nature for the things of this department, and power to make selective choices in the department. Now it would be a poor elaboration of this department, and of man's capacities in it, to seize on the intellectual appetite or sensibility toward knowledge and to say that there is no light in it. The affection standing by itself, of course, would be barren. But put perception and put will along with affection, and you get light in the department of knowledge. Daniel Webster put intellect, sensibility, and will into the subdepartment of knowledge which we call law, and the general judgment is that he had some light in it. Louis Agassiz and Darwin put intellect, sensibility, and will into the subdepartment of knowledge which we call biology, and the general judgment is that they had some light in it. Now what would you think of the discussion of the powers of these men which should treat the emotion which they had toward knowledge as exhaustive of their powers? which should say there was no light in emotion on knowledge, and leave you hanging there without any hint that, if you put perception and will with the emotion, you would get light?

Here is the department of æsthetics or of beauty. Man has a certain capacity for that department. He has

the capacity to see the beautiful, his sensibilities can be affected by and towards the beautiful, and his will make choice of and out of the beautiful. It is said the sentiment of the beautiful conveys no information. Precisely so. But will you leave us there without intimation, that the sentiment of the beautiful does not cover the ground of man's capacity for the beautiful? That is a miserably inadequate treatment of æsthetics which would lead us to dwell on the sentiment as exhaustive of man's powers in the department. It would not account for Michaelangelo and Da Vinci. Put intellect and will with sensibility, and we gain information and light in æsthetics. Instead of saying that the sentiment of the beautiful conveys no information (which indeed is strictly true, and yet it is the truth that men do not need), it is better to say that men will find no information in respect to the beautiful if they do not *follow* the sentiment or affection or nisus of their being toward the beautiful, and that if they do so follow the leadings of this sentiment they will find the beautiful.

"Not from a vain or shallow thought
His awful Jove young Phidias brought.
The hand that rounded Peter's dome,
And groined the aisles of Christian Rome,
Wrought in a sad sincerity."

And the Jove of Phidias, and Peter's dome, and the groined aisles of Christian Rome, are witnesses what light men can get in æsthetics who bring to the department the devotion of the sum of human powers,—intellect, sensibility, and will.

Now just as there is a department of knowledge or science, and man has capacity for it, and as there is a department of æsthetics, and man has a capacity for it; so there is a department of ethics, and man has a capacity for it. The question comes, What capacity? I reply, The same capacity he has for the other two departments I have dis-

cussed. He has the capacity to turn all his powers into this department—intellect, sensibility, and will. And when he brings his powers to bear, he gets and gives light just as he does in the other departments. Now if the term “conscience” is used to designate the sum total of the moral capacity of man, then to say that conscience is no source of light is to state the matter exactly wrong; the correct statement being, man has no other means of acquiring light than by conscience. Think a moment: if here is a department, ethics—or the department of moral possibility, and man has a capacity for the department, how do you expect he is going to find light in the department except by employing his powers therein? If, when he employs his powers, things are found so inherently and essentially jumbled in the department that he can make nothing out of them, then, if there is a good God, we may have a reasonably certain conviction that he will not hold him responsible for what he could not find out. But things do not appear to be so confused; for we see results wrought out in this department that compare favorably in success with those wrought in other departments. The phenomenon of good men is as well known as that of great men. In fact, if there is one department more than others in which men have carried up success to high-water mark, it is this. I do not know but we can conceive of men greater than Daniel Webster or Louis Agassiz or Charles Darwin, but it is hard to conceive of a man better than St. Paul. At any rate there has been no such success exhibited in science or æsthetics as Jesus exhibited in ethics. It is the one department of all departments where success may be found. The same man may find success in various departments. John G. Whittier has our respect for his mental acquisitions, he was a learned man; also for the conquests he made in poetic conception and expression out of the realm of beauty; but is not all this subordinate to the tribute we

pay him for his conquests in the realm of morals, in the conviction we unhesitatingly award him of being a good man? Now these results are possible just because there is light to men when they employ their powers on and in the ethical department or the department of distinction between right and wrong, and of the pursuit of right and not of wrong. To say that a man will not get light if he uses only a third of his capacity, and that particular third that is least lumeniferous, is not to say much. To treat conscience as a mere sentiment, and leave it there, is not to do much toward illuminating the scope of man's moral capacity. If you limit the term "conscience" to the ethical sensibility merely, then you should go on, and show how men can get light on the moral situation by joining to the activity of the sentiment conscience, the activity of intellect and will—show how, when the whole man is turned to moral considerations, he finds moral light.

The one department of our nature out of which we may most unhesitatingly trust to bring correct results is the conscience or ethical department. The one capacity that may give light and no darkness at all, is the moral capacity. Immanuel Kant, searching for some "fixed state" in "the maddening maze of things," settled on the moral faculty as the one reliable, the one trustworthy, thing in the nature of man. What Kant arrived at metaphysically we shall also arrive at by tracing the matter historically, on the principle of evolution. The moral faculty in the history of life on the globe appears last among the ruling principles of life, appears in the highest example of life—man—and in him it is the crowning faculty. Kant called this faculty the "Categorical Imperative," i. e., the one, sole, absolute, commander of the being. After all other considerations have been taken into account, man, if he is true to himself, must turn to this department, and accept such conclusions as come upon him here. What-

ever he meets here overrules and overrides every other consideration. Ethics says to intelligence, You shall execute my behests. Ethics says to æsthetics, You must chisel and paint as I direct. The necessity of putting æsthetics under the tuition of ethics is set forth by Tennyson in the following vigorous, and, as Matthew Arnold would say, rigorous, way—

“ Art for Art’s sake ”

(instead of Art for Art—and—Man’s sake)

“ Art for Art’s sake! Hail, truest Lord of hell!

Hail, Genius, Master of the moral will!

‘ The filthiest of all paintings, painted well,

Is mightier than the purest painted ill.’

Yes, mightier than the purest painted well;

So prone are we toward the broad way to hell.”

Life, Vol. ii. p. 92.

There is nothing that can annul the force of ought—o-u-g-h-t—of a moral *must*. Ought is light—absolute light, the last revelation of moral light possible to man.

Now whoever has taken any question and put it for analysis into the moral department, and has brought to the consideration of its moral qualities all the faculties of his being,—intellect, sensibility, and choice,—has done all that the Maker of his being requires of him, and he has in that exercise *executed the right*. The exercise *is* his light, and the judgment-day will not be able to find a moral flaw in his action. Even if men in another day, and because of another horizon in the moral department, should come to another conclusion, that would not convict him of sin. But there is not much probability of the reversal of any man’s decisions that are arrived at in this way. There is no such unanimity in the judgments of men on any other subject as on just this—the good—the right. As a matter of fact, the “Categorical Imperative” asserts its power among men, when unhindered in its action, in the production of identity of decision.

"For see the universal race endowed
With the same upright form—the sun is fixed,
And the infinite magnificence of heaven,
Within the reach of every human eye;
The sleepless ocean murmurs for all ears;
The vernal field infuses fresh delight
Into all hearts Throughout the world of sense,
Even as an object is sublime or fair,
That object is laid open to the view
Without reserve or veil; and as a power
Is salutary, or an influence sweet,
Are each and all enabled to perceive
That power, that influence, by impartial law.
Gifts nobler are vouchsafed alike to all;
Reason, and, with that reason, smiles and tears;
Imagination, freedom in the will;
Conscience to guide and check; and death to be
Foretasted, immortality to be presumed.
Strange, then, nor less than monstrous might be deemed
The failure, if the Almighty, to this point
Liberal and undistinguishing, should hide
The excellence of moral qualities
From common understanding; leaving truth
And virtue, difficult, abstruse, and dark,
Hard to be won, and only by a few!
Strange, should He deal herein with nice respects,
And frustrate all the rest! Believe it not;
The primal duties shine aloft—like stars;
The charities that soothe, and heal, and bless,
Are scattered at the feet of man—like flowers.
The generous inclination, the just rule,
Kind wishes, and good actions, and pure thoughts—
No mystery is here; no special boon
For high, and not for low; for proudly graced—
And not for meek of heart."

Wordsworth, *Discourse of the Wanderer.*

But why have we had such contrary decisions and actions by men where moral matters were concerned? Men once persecuted in religion. Persecution is now discarded. The Hindu mother throws her child into the Ganges—the Christian mother thinks this the sum of sin. Do not such contradictions show that there is no light in the moral fac-

ulty? That its decisions are not reliable? Now let us be a little patient and careful. Will you look at the force of that argument? It is just this: Men have done so and so, as matter of fact in history; therefore, they did so and so in obedience to the dictates of the moral faculty. That is one of the most tremendous *non sequiturs* of which the human mind can be guilty, and yet almost everybody stumbles into it. Why, it is said, men have done so and so in *religion*; therefore they were acting according to conscience. That is *non sequitur*—that will not hold water. If one tries to bail the ocean of moral phenomena with that sieve, he ought not to be surprised if he does not make much headway. Religion ought to coincide with the moral faculty. But who does not know that historically it has meddled with everything else, sometimes to the complete dismissal of moral considerations from view. Father Sherman has lately said that Porto Rico is a Catholic country without a religion; i.e., it is all church and no morals. You can come to the same end with the Bible as with the church. It is only necessary to press on the word "rule," in "the only *rule* of faith and practice," to secure the same result. There is a difference between law and life. Conscience is individual moral vitality in motion—*Zōē*. Under law or rule you can have a result correct in form, but of unethical or non-ethical spirit,—a pseudo-morph. Because a thing was done in the church, therefore it is said, it was conscientiously done, therefore there is no light in the moral faculty. One ought to see the holes in that skimmer. What is the significance of the claim of the head of the Roman Church to temporal power? Is that a survival of ethical considerations reigning in the bosoms of the popes of the middle ages? Who does not know that it is a remnant of as gigantic and petty a selfishness as ever dominated the mind of man? Revenues, state alliances, poms, parades, pas-

sions, envies, greeds, spites, malice,—therefore the moral faculty is not to be trusted.

Philip of Spain, the Duke of Alva, the Inquisition, dungeons, tortures, autos-da-fé, in the interest of the Catholic faith, in the interest of religion; therefore, what? Who does not know that religion was simply the politics of the Spanish state, and that Spanish politics dismissed ethics from its purview? It was as base as the Tweed régime in New York or the career of bulldozers in Mississippi. Is it to be supposed that Philip of Spain ever called a council of state to get from his counselors their unbiased judgment on matters of state, or of religion either, in the forum of the Categorical Imperative? Then why charge up such results to conscience, and plead them as destructive of trust in the ethical faculty? Oh, but Philip of Spain was pious and wore a hair shirt! Why did he wear a hair shirt? Because he thought if he wore a hair shirt in this world he would not be damned in the world to come. Was that an ethical consideration? The ethical form of thought would have been this:—I will seek what is good and right, I will do what is good and right when I have found it, though I am damned in the world to come. For the same reason that he wore a hair shirt, Philip the Second burned the bodies of recusants—to save his own soul. They were the purchase price of his salvation. If you can strike any lower exhibition of human selfishness, anything further divorced from the domination of the moral faculty, it is difficult to imagine what it is. I can find no evidence that Philip the Second sought out what was right in the premises; he simply sought to make sure his own personal weal!

But Calvin burned Servetus, and surely Calvin was a conscientious man! On the face of history, Calvin was mixed up in politics, and it is difficult to disentangle his problem. Calvin was probably not beyond the influence

of non-ethical considerations. Then the claim is made that the execution of Servetus was just on governmental grounds. You may ask if that would not lay foundation to acquit Philip the Second. Certainly, if you can show that his problem of state called for his action, i.e., that there was no other moral way out of it. But when you have shown that, you have taken away all force from the indictment you bring against the unreliability of the moral faculty derived from Philip's case. But take Calvin's case. You have to prove, (1) that the execution of Servetus was not justifiable, and (2) that Calvin had exhausted the powers of intellect, sensibility, and will in the forum of ethics, before you can prove the unreliability of the moral powers. If any one wants to load himself with that burden, I suppose there is liberty for him to do so. It is not impossible for Calvin to have been a sinner, i.e., to have violated the light which he did have. That does not indict the moral faculty, it indicts Calvin.

And now here is the Hindu mother, that has been traveling to throw her baby into the Ganges for conscience' sake ever since I have had recollection. I wish I could stop that Hindu mother, for she has been the cause of unutterable confusion, not only in heathen, but in Christian lands. But I am powerless:—

"So 't will be when I am gone";
The Hindu mother will still plod on,

in argument, if not in fact. The astonishing thing at the outset is, the unhesitating assumption, which everybody seems to make, that the woman is going to the Ganges in the interest of conscience, in the interest of the "Categorical Imperative," in the interest of the ethical department of her being, when intellect, sensibility, and will have been determined to that department without complication from other considerations. I would like a little more proof and a little less assumption on that point, before I allow the

case of the Hindu mother to show that the moral faculty of man is not a light that may be trusted. That the Hindu mother's action was pursuant to religion—such religion as prevails about her, we have seen does not prove the action to be dictated by conscience. A great many motives and practices in the historic religions of the world, Christianity included, have not been founded in ethics.

You take out of religion what you put in.
From pot-pourri, pot-pourri comes.

The Greeks put calisthenics into religion. I do not think that would make gymnastics a part of ethics; so that when a man was tightening up his muscle, I should be obliged to say that it was an ethical process—a way of giving utterance to the sense of right. What a procession of saints—Yankee Sullivan, Morrissey, Heenan, Sayers, John L. Sullivan, Corbett, Fitzsimmons, Sharkey! If the result in the Hindu mother's case—to-wit, the murder of her offspring—were not enough to startle one into the conviction that ethical considerations in her case could not have had a supreme control, that they must have been ignored entirely or smothered by a multitude of other motives, there are some other considerations that suggest themselves. Where, in the world of moral development, is this Hindu mother? What has she been made up by? To what height has moral culture in its various applications been carried in society about her? Is she a child of ethical influences? Besides being a child of ignorance and degradation, is she not a child of superstition? And what is superstition usually but the substitution of selfishness for ethics in religion? Superstition does not seek what is right, but what will protect. Everything but moral considerations—fear, favor, and the hope of reward—comes to the front in superstition. It is begging the question, when you see a certain action done by this Hindu mother, to assume that it was ethically done. Tried by the results we

observe when we are convinced that the moral capacity has been exerted, her action gives no indication of being an outcome of the moral nature at all. Over all this realm of confusion the proper inference is the non-employment and not the non-luminousness or non-reliability of the ethical faculty. The Hindu mother is sincere. Certainly. So is everybody who gets out of a carriage to pick up a horse-shoe, sincere, not that it is right, but that it will bring good luck.

Man's moral faculty not only gives him light in moral matters, but the department in which it finds action is the crowning department of his nature. He has an order from his Maker to consult this light as he has in reference to no other. Whether we have knowledge or whether we compass beauty, we *must be right*. That is the order stamped in our nature. And we can be right, too. When we follow our light with a single intent, it is an infallible guide. The man who has followed his conscience has never sinned. But then it does not do to have a decision made up part of conscience, and part of passion, prejudice, conceit, and willfulness. That is not to take the testimony of the moral nature at all. The moral capacity dominates all other powers, and is imperative. It permits no divided allegiance of the soul. "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness."

"The unpardonable sin
Is to deny the word of God within."

Whittier.

Inquiry will be made, What do you do with the Bible? Is it not a light separate and apart from the conscience, over and above the conscience? The Bible has no light except as its truth is perceived, seized, and appropriated by an alert moral nature. Then experience proves it a light giver supreme in its class. But the light a man gets from

it comes to him through his conscience. There are a great many people who know all about the Bible who yet do not get light from it. The difficulty is, that its truth does not have the freedom of their moral nature. Here is when will comes to the front. Paul says there are those who "hold down" the truth. How influences, as from Scripture, or word, or act of men, come into the field of moral vision, we may imperfectly understand. But I think this the simplest lore, the ultimate truth in the matter: wherever and whenever there is moral motion in the soul, there is communication from the Holy Spirit, suasive, minatory, or illuminant.

"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and
Spirit with spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer
Than hands and feet."

Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism*.

Mr. Webster, in the argument to the jury in the White murder case, has put the rightful regality and perpetual presence in us of moral obligation in form that cannot easily be amended:—

"There is no evil that we cannot either face or fly from, but the consciousness of duty disregarded. A sense of duty pursues us ever. It is omnipresent like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed or duty violated, is still with us for our happiness or our misery. If we say the darkness shall cover us, in the darkness as in the light our obligations are yet with us. We cannot escape their power, nor fly from their presence. They are with us in this life, will be with us at its close; and in that scene of inconceivable solemnity, which lies yet further onward, we shall still find ourselves surrounded by the consciousness of duty, to pain us whenever it has been violated, and to console us so far as God may have given us grace to perform it."

"Stern daughter of the voice of God!
O Duty! if that name thou love
Who art a light to guide, a rod
To check the erring, and reprove;

Thou who art victory and law
When empty terrors overawe;
From vain temptations dost set free;
And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity."

"To humbler functions, awful power !
I call thee: I myself commend
Unto thy guidance from this hour;
Oh! let my weakness have an end !
Give unto me, made lowly wise,
The spirit of self-sacrifice;
The confidence of reason give;
And, in the light of truth, thy bondman let me live !"
Wordsworth.

ARTICLE IX.

THE CROSSING OF THE RED SEA.

BY G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

IN its very form the account of the crossing of the Red Sea by the Children of Israel invites criticism, and lays itself open to rigorous cross-examination. The geographical references are numerous and minute, while emphasis is laid upon the secondary causes which are made to contribute to the result. The miraculous elements in the events are sufficiently prominent without our embarrassing ourselves with difficulties which are not necessarily involved in the biblical story, but are clearly excluded by it. In Ex. xiv. 21 it is expressly said, that "the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided." The same appears also twice in the Song of Moses. In chapter xv. 8 we read, "With the blast of thy nostrils the waters were piled up," and in the tenth verse, speaking of the return of the waters and of the destruction of Pharaoh's host, it is said, "Thou didst blow with thy wind, the sea covered them." We are not at liberty to interpret this account without giving due weight to this express and repeated mention of the secondary cause said to be employed by the Creator in the production of the phenomenon. The Lord opened the sea before the children of Israel, but he used the wind as his instrument. That is expressly said. It is none the less his work, however, upon that account. Whatever a person does through use of an instrument, he does himself. When we say that a man used an ax to fell a tree,

we do not throw any doubt on the fact that it was the man who felled the tree.

One of the first writers to give prominence to the secondary agencies employed in connection with this miracle was Dr. Edward Robinson, who in 1838 made a careful study of the conditions about Suez, and propounded the theory that the children of Israel crossed to the east side of the Gulf over a bar which is still, at times, fordable, but from which, upon this occasion, the wind had blown the water entirely off. He fixed upon this point, because the conditions here seem to fit the account so perfectly. In the first place, Jebel Attaka rises precipitously to the height of several thousand feet a short distance back of Suez; while the desert extends for fifty or sixty miles to the west and north-west. These, with the narrow point of the Gulf of Suez upon the east, exactly fit the situation; so that Pharaoh would "say of the children of Israel, They are entangled in the land, the wilderness has shut them in." It was impossible for them to go much farther south between the mountains and the sea. Furthermore, south of Suez the sea is so wide that two million of people could not have crossed in a single night, as they are represented to have done in the account. But, even at Suez, Dr. Robinson is forced to admit a serious difficulty in the narrowness of the bar which would be available; for he confesses that half a mile in width is all that could be supposed. There would be room for a column of only a thousand abreast, which to include the two and one-half million must stretch out to more than two miles in length, even if packed together in the closest possible manner. The movement of such a column across the bar would be well-nigh impossible in the time at command.

Since the construction of the Suez Canal, however, and the light which has been shed on this whole region by explorations of the ruins in Lower Egypt, and by the work of the English hydraulic engineers who have

recently had charge of the irrigating canals, the whole transaction is better understood than it could be in Robinson's day. Robinson (and until the construction of the canal nearly all travelers) reached Suez by a direct route from Cairo across the desert, a distance of about sixty miles. Hence they did not have the advantages which the modern traveler has of passing over the ancient route leading along an old branch of the Nile extending from Rameses to Lake Timsah, and then south to the Bitter Lakes (Yam Suph).

The recent observations I have been permitted to make along this route do little but to confirm the views of the late Sir J. W. Dawson, whose map we reproduce.¹ It is well settled now that Rameses, from which the children of Israel started, is situated at the head of the Wady Tumilat, through which an early branch of the Nile flowed to Lake Timsah (Crocodile Lake), and thence southward, entering into the Bitter Lakes, which were then connected with the Red Sea. When this Nile branch ceased to flow of itself, a canal was dug to conduct the fresh water. Indeed, it is clear from the Egyptian monuments that this artificial channel was built some time before the date of the Exodus. The location of Pithom, where, as well as at Rameses, the children of Israel builded store-cities for Pharaoh (Ex. i. 12), is now definitely fixed at Tell el-Maskhûta, ten or twelve miles east of Rameses. From the vicinity of Pithom one can distinctly see the blue summit of Jebel At-taka, about twenty-five miles to the south, but he cannot also fail to notice that there is an intervening minor mountain elevation of considerable importance. This is called upon the maps Jebel Geneffeh, and runs northwest and southeast, terminating not far from the middle of the Bitter Lakes. The range consists of limestone strata dipping

¹ See *Egypt in Syria: their Physical Features in Relation to Bible History*, third edition, p. 50 *et seq.*


to the west, and presenting a precipitous face to the east about a thousand feet in perpendicular height. As they are approached from the north, they increase in relative prominence, so as to shut off the view of Jebel Attaka, making, on the supposition that the sea then extended to the Bitter Lakes, the situation exactly that which was described by Pharaoh. An army marching in that direction would seem, as Pharaoh expressed it, to be entangled in the land, and to be where the wilderness has shut them in. It would be utterly impracticable for him, however, with his chariots to approach them on either flank; for on the west they were protected by the mountains, and on the east by the sea. All that was left for him to do was to follow in the rear. The encampment at Pihahiroth (Ex. xiv. 2) is described as being "between Migdol and the sea before Baal-zephon." In the absence of precise information concerning these places, they may as well be near the Bitter Lakes as near Suez. A precipitous mountain mass of rock about five hundred feet high (Jebel Shebremet) there stands out very prominently, and fits the general conception suggested by the name Migdol (tower); while Baal-zephon may as well have been on the low eminences plainly in sight east of the Bitter Lakes as anywhere else, but there is no direct evidence bearing on its location, except what is in the text.


With the host encamped south of this pass between Jebel Geneffeh and the Bitter Lakes, the natural place of crossing would be somewhere between them and Suez.

The evidence that the gulf may have at that time extended up to Lake Timsah is both general and specific. A subsidence of the land, amounting to only twenty-five or thirty feet, would now permit the waters in the Gulf of Suez to extend through a narrow valley as far north as Lake Timsah, and would provide the exact conditions that are described in Exodus. That the land in all this region has been slowly rising is established by the clearest geolog-

ical evidence. All around the southeastern shore of the Mediterranean and the northern part of Egypt, gravels and imperfectly consolidated rocks are found, from two hundred to two hundred and fifty feet above the present sea-level, containing the shells that are now living in the Mediterranean. These exist in abundance at Beirut, at Jaffa, in the vicinity of Suez, and upon both sides of the Nile near Cairo. They are of peculiar interest near the great pyramids, where there is an elevated beach containing gravel and numerous large pebbles, with oyster and other recent shells intermingled and attached to the crevices of the adjoining rocks. This makes it evident that the whole region is slowly rising.

This is in analogy with what is going on in many other parts of the world. Probably there are few portions of the earth's crust that have been absolutely stable during the historic period. The coasts of Norway and Greenland are rising at the rate of a few feet in a century; while the coast of New Jersey is sinking at a little slower rate. The eastern half of the basin of the Great Lakes in America is slowly rising; so that, after a few thousand years, the water will be turned from Niagara over the Chicago Drainage Canal into the Mississippi Valley. It is against all geological probabilities to assume that the land level at Suez was the same three thousand years ago that it is now. On the contrary, from the land movements which we know to be going on in that region, it is altogether probable that at the date of the Exodus the level was such that the Red Sea extended as far as Lake Timsah. At an earlier period Africa was entirely separated from Asia, but the highest point of land north of Lake Timsah is now about one hundred feet above the sea, or about four times the elevation of the neck between the Bitter Lakes and Suez. This land route from Egypt to Palestine was in existence, therefore, long before the land between Suez and the Bitter Lakes was





Map of the probable route of the children of Israel as delineated by Sir William Dawson. What is here called Yam Suph is the Bitter Lakes. The only change which I would suggest is to place the crossing somewhat farther south. The ancient Pelusium is near the upper right-hand corner of the land area shown. The changes of level are evident from the discontinuance of the old Pelusic branch of the Nile.

dry. In addition to this indirect evidence of the former extension of the sea to the Bitter Lakes, is the fact that the deposits along the narrow valley all contain modern Red Sea shells. The depression is also indicated by the extensive amount of Nile mud deposited along Wady Tumilat, showing that, at a former time, the gradient was such as to draw from the Nile a pretty large body of water into the Bitter Lakes.

Supposing now the children of Israel to have been encamped near the south end of the Bitter Lakes, with Pharaoh and his six hundred chariots in their rear, the situation would seem to be hopeless but for the divine intervention described in the sacred record. The strong east wind, however, which the Lord sent at this time would open the way of escape, and account for all the phenomena that are described; for this would press the water against the west side of the Red Sea, causing a resultant current to the south, and thus raise the water in the south end of the Red Sea and lower it at the north end. The extent of the effects produced by such a wind are amply illustrated in modern experience. For example, Lake Erie is 250 miles long, with its major axis lying nearly in the direction of the strongest winds. It is no unusual thing for a west wind to lower the water at Toledo seven feet below the average level, and at the same time to raise it seven feet above the level at Buffalo; while a change in the wind will exactly reverse the conditions, producing in a comparatively short time a difference of fourteen feet in the water levels at those two places.

An experienced lake captain tells me, that at one time, when he was anchored off the mouth of Saginaw River, which empties into a westerly projection of Lake Huron, a strong wind lowered the lake level so much that large areas of the shallow bay were made dry, and even the bottom of the river was exposed, so that visitors came in great crowds

to witness the spectacle. Similar phenomena are occasionally reported from Lake Menzales and the upper part of the Gulf of Suez.

Supposing, therefore, the water to have been seven feet deep over the low land now separating Suez from the Bitter Lakes, the wind would easily open a passage several miles wide, across which the children of Israel could easily get in one night; while the returning current, on the cessation of the wind, would be amply sufficient to overwhelm the tardy chariots of Pharaoh in their reckless pursuit.

Nor is this explanation at all derogatory to the miraculous character of the event. It simply brings the miracle into conformity with the natural conditions implied in the narrative. If the wind was one which had been foreordained from eternity, and originally involved in the mechanical operation of the meteorological forces of the world, it still would have been a miracle of foreknowledge which brought the children of Israel into such a position that they could avail themselves of the opportunity afforded. There was then no weather bureau to foretell storms; and, if there had been, it would not have ventured to foretell one more than a few hours in advance, while the children of Israel had turned to the south two days previously. Besides, the weather bureau even now does not expect more than seventy-five per cent of its prophecies to be correct. No uninspired sane leader would have conducted an army into such a pocket as that which Moses found himself in on the eve of that momentous event.

In reference to the expression "and the waters were a wall unto them on their right hand, and on their left" (Ex. xiv. 22), it is sufficient to say, that the word "wall" may here naturally be taken to mean a wall of protection. The Bitter Lakes on their left flank would prevent any adverse movement by Pharaoh from that direction. This figurative use of the word "wall" is frequent. For example, in

Prov. xviii. 11, "The rich man's wealth is his strong city, and as a high wall in his own imagination"; in Isa. xxvi. 1 we read that God will "appoint salvation for walls and bulwarks"; and in Nahum iii. 8 Egypt is described as she "that was situate among the rivers [^{marg.} canals], that had the waters round about her; whose rampart was the sea [^{marg.} the Nile], and her wall was of the sea." So the passages in the Song of Moses must be interpreted in accordance with the highly rhetorical nature of the whole composition. Where we read in Ex. xv. 8, "And with the blast of thy nostrils the waters were piled up, the floods stood upright as an heap; the deeps were congealed in the heart of the sea," it should be noticed that this is represented as accomplished by the "blast of his nostrils," which "congealed the deeps," while later, in the twelfth verse, it is said, in reference to the same scene, that not the water, but the earth, swallowed them. Such rhetorical phrases ought not to be pressed literally.

An objection to this theory of the extension of the Gulf of Suez to Lake Timsah within the historical period has been urged with much plausibility by Professor Sayce, who maintains that the canal would never have been excavated through a waterless desert by the side of the Gulf as far as Suez if the Gulf then extended up to Lake Timsah. But there is clear evidence that even before the time of the Exodus such a canal had been built. This objection has been satisfactorily answered by Major R. H. Brown, the English engineer who has been inspector-general of irrigation in Lower Egypt for many years,¹ who points out that a sheet of water from Suez to the Bitter Lakes so shallow that the wind would occasionally blow the bottom completely bare would not be favorable to navigation; so that any considerable commerce would demand a more reliable

¹ See *Land of Goshen and the Exodus*, London, 1890, p. 39.

channel; and, as they did not have dredging machines in the early days, they could not, as the Suez Canal Company has done, dig a canal through the shallows, but must dig it through the dry land along the sides. The necessity, also, of getting fresh water to Suez would have been as great in former times as now. But even now "it has been found necessary to make fresh-water canals (in connection with the Nile by the Ismailiyah canal) from Ismailiyah to Port Said and Suez parallel with the salt-water ship canal; and what is more, to adapt the fresh-water canal to Suez for navigation with locks at both ends and at intermediate points. . . . Future professors might argue that the Suez ship canal could not have existed at the end of the nineteenth century, because there is clear evidence that, at that time, a fresh-water canal from the Nile flowed past Ismailiyeh to Suez."¹

Upon going over the ground along the route which is now opened by the railroad from Ismailiyeh (Etham) to Suez, one cannot but be impressed with the remarkable conformity of the conditions to those described in the book of Exodus. There is, however, no necessity for locating the place of crossing so far north as is done upon Mr. Dawson's map. The opening made by the wind would more naturally be over the portion that is between the Bitter Lakes and the Red Sea. Naville and some others have placed it north of Lake Timsah; while others place it just south of Lake Timsah. But those routes lack the necessary bordering mountains on the west which are found about half way to Suez, and also would bring the children of Israel to the east side of the sea at points more than three days' journey from Marah. The geologists who have visited the region seem to be unanimous in support of the general views here presented.²

¹ Land of Goshen and the Exodus, p. 40.

² See Edward Hull, Mount Seir, Sinai, and West Palestine, p. 37, 185.

In conclusion, it is proper to emphasize the fact that the prominence which is here given to the secondary causes through which these events were brought about does not dispense with the miraculous element connected with them, but only recognizes the prominence given to the secondary causes in the narrative itself, and brings us back to the question of the nature of the determining cause which produced the wind at that opportune time. The complications of the situation are such that no reasonable person can regard them as accidental, and we have no objection to the view that the wind was caused as directly for that purpose as is the case when a mechanic shifts a pulley which sets in motion a rotary fan to increase the draft in a furnace. It is absurd to affirm that the Creator is shut off from directly influencing the forces of nature, when we have constant illustrations of the fact that the free-will of man so uses them. This discussion, however, does show that the narrative in Exodus so conforms to the physical conditions existing in the neighborhood, and is so free from the grotesqueness and indefiniteness of myths and legends, that it can but be looked upon as a piece of genuine history.

Carl Ritter and Mr. Reginald Poole of the British Museum had also at an earlier period advocated this general view.

ARTICLE X.

CALDERWOOD THE CRITIC OF AGNOSTICISM.

BY PROFESSOR GABRIEL CAMPBELL, S. T. D.

THE report just issued by our Commissioner of Education announces the decease of Dr. Henry Calderwood, Professor of Philosophy in Edinburgh University, successor of the well-known Christopher North. Of the remarkable thinkers of the nineteenth century, Professor Calderwood ranks among the strongest and finest. Although called to lecture in leading institutions in this country, and by Yale honored as a guest, as Harvard honored the celebrated Professor Jebb of England, Dr. Calderwood exercised an influence over the thought of the day which has far surpassed its popular recognition. A man of the sturdy build and simple demeanor of our General Grant, not lacking also in Grant's matter-of-fact intuition and persistency, it may appear that, in his field, he was as truly great. Nay, when the decisive battles for right reason are critically weighed in the light of coming years, Calderwood may be found the greater leader of the two.

My tribute to Dr. Calderwood is inspired by the fact that it was my good fortune to be associated with him for a time during my student days, and to experience somewhat fully the depth of his diviner life and of his friendship, and especially of his power to master not a few of the profoundest problems of the time. Professor Calderwood was some ten years my senior. Most of this period he had spent in the pulpit. His ability as a philosopher, however, displaying itself more and more, he was called to his rightful task as leader of thought in the University of the Athens

of Scotland, three and thirty years ago. My own appointment to the chair of philosophy in this country was so near the same time that when, in 1870, I was on my way to Germany to better my preparation, I found Professor Calderwood in Edinburgh giving his newly devised lectures, and planning likewise to take studies on the Continent; and the following year he joined me in Berlin. The import of our mutual endeavor, particularly of Dr. Calderwood's career, will be interpreted more clearly by a reference to attending circumstances.

Contemporary with Christopher North, and occupying the coördinate chair of philosophy, was Sir William Hamilton, the greatest of Scotland's metaphysicians. In philosophy he was the culmination of the Scottish school. A man surpassingly brilliant and learned, his intellectual sons inherit his wealth. One of the honor men of the class of '53 was Henry Calderwood; and his preëminent capacity displays itself at once. The first year after graduation he published the "Philosophy of the Infinite." With a critical vision trained under the master, the pupil detects the vulnerable point in his master's system; and with marvelous logic, which won the praise of Sir William himself, he proceeds to show that Hamilton's reasoning fails where it reaches the all-important fact, our knowledge of a Divine Being; Hamilton claiming that the existence of God is for us a matter not of knowledge, but only of belief—irresistible indeed. In his "Philosophy of the Infinite" Calderwood compasses the whole question as to our intelligence of the unconditioned, the absolute, the infinite, maintaining that man's belief in God is recognized as irresistible because it involves elements of knowledge, quoting Sir William himself in support of his position.

Forsooth a formidable champion of Hamilton's cause comes to the front. It is no less a personage than Dean Mansel, of St. Paul's, professor at Oxford, the particular

star of English theology, a scholar of rare logical acumen. In his Bampton lectures he marshals an imposing array of authorities, mainly German, to prove that human intelligence brings no relief to theology. "The Limits of Religious Thought" enable us only to believe, not to know. The book proved to be a signal reënforcement of agnosticism from an unexpected quarter; and, having at first a rapid sale, injured lamentably the cause it sought to aid.

Another notable circumstance was the appearance of Stirling's "Secret of Hegel." The author was a writer of unmistakable versatility. Attracted by the genius of Hegel, he had spent a considerable time in Germany studying and translating. He appears to have been the first English scholar who had made an independent survey of Hegel's teachings in the original; the earliest, as his work proclaimed, to reach the *secret* of Hegel's thought. His countrymen heretofore had gotten, he intimates, only scraps at second hand, even Hamilton being uninformed or misinformed; Mansel, of course, coming in the same category. It was in certain respects a most suggestive, not to say sensational book; a trumpet call certainly to an intelligent judgment. Stirling claimed not only that Hegel had answered the skepticism of Hume, but, as an impartial critic, had elevated the Gospel histories to a superior credibility.

One other fact of supreme moment was the incoming afresh of the teachings of Immanuel Kant. Although Calderwood in his references to Kant formally rejects sundry statements, it is virtually under the inspiration of Kant, the most influential of all Germany's thinkers, that he carries forward so successfully his critique of Sir William Hamilton. The fact of the Divine existence, according to Kant, far from being a mere belief, far even from depending on the probabilities of science, is rather an original element, insurmountable, of man's practical reason.

Sir William Hamilton wrote a short response to Calderwood's criticism. He was, however, cut down somewhat suddenly, and never produced a complete reply. Professor Calderwood's book met a want so pronounced that in a little time a second edition, much enlarged, was issued. This was a powerful rejoinder as well to Mansel as to Hamilton; and it was Dorner's letter from Berlin commending the book that turned the scale in Calderwood's favor, and gave him his election to the chair in Edinburgh University; a voice from Germany decided the patrons of the University to enthrone the critic of their own greatest philosophic thinker. Meanwhile, at Glasgow University, a similar event comes to pass. Dr. Edward Caird is called to the corresponding chair. He proves to be the most noted representative, outside of Germany, of German critical thinking.

Such was the change in the spirit of the dream in Philosophy. Even Scotland no longer admonishes her sons to accept only home production. At Oxford, Jowett and Max Müller, concur in advising me to continue my journey across the Rhine. "Oxford," says Professor Müller, "knows little of German philosophy. You must hear Trendelenburg. He is the most eminent thinker in Germany." So I continue my pilgrimage to the shrine of Teutonic lore, and pitch my tent in the German capital, taking, among other courses, Hegel's Logic; the first American student, I was told, who had chosen it.

In due time comes on my colaborer, Calderwood; and discussion became the order of the day. Bonitz was expounding Plato; Trendelenburg, Aristotle; Cohen, Kant in private lessons; Dorner filling the largest auditorium. When Dr. Calderwood related to Dorner the result of his letter, the latter expressed his gratification, complimenting Calderwood's book in emphatic terms, as one that "unmasks the fallacy of an unknowable God"; and we were ever welcome guests at Dorner's house.

Harms was then Germany's most renowned psychologist; and well I recall his lecture answering Bain. Alexander Bain he referred to as the admiration of the English universities; and being, he said, a son of Scotland and a professor there, represented a land for whose thinking Germany had profound respect. Harms proceeds to criticise Bain's claim that we can scientifically connect the physical and the mental. On the blackboard he has a representation of the structure of the brain; and with a transcendent clearness and precision, simply and deliberately, he shows point after point where Bain's logic fails, ending with the words, "Bain's claim, you see, is a tissue of assumptions." A major-general would not have shown more power in carrying a fortress. Indeed, Bain being the ablest English writer on psychology in the half-century, the critique had the inspiration of an international contest. At the suggestion of Dr. Calderwood, we went back later in the day to examine again Harms' diagram and to review his demonstration. Calderwood's own reply to Bain appears soon after in his "Handbook of Moral Philosophy," more fully, however, in his later work, "Relations of Mind and Brain," where the spirit of Harms is clearly visible. Indeed, what work meets more satisfactorily the contentions just now in the air?

But I cannot enter upon the details of our experiences—our prolonged walks, beauties of Thiergarten, Platz, and suburb adding an enchantment to philosophical inquiry. My companion was at his best in debate; here indeed he showed his true nobility. Scarcely can we find in literature a contest at once so incisive and affectionate as that between Hamilton and Calderwood; and our arguments were to me personally, not more a rigorous discipline, than a pleasure ever to be remembered.

Dr. Calderwood was lacking somewhat in acquaintance with the German tongue. He, however, would gain the

appreciation of the professors by his facile use of the Latin. Still, in the handling of the German he was, as a rule, remarkably successful. Of course upon occasions would come a touch of the humorous. One evening before leaving the city, he entertained a few of his fellow-professors with a collation at his room. In order that we might be undisturbed, he directed the hostess to provide in advance an extra pitcher with hot water so that we could at will replenish the pot of tea. What was our astonishment, on coming to the table, to find the teapot sitting as sweetly as a swan in the center of an immense bowl of steaming water. No one was more hearty in the laugh that followed than Dr. Calderwood; he quickly summons the hostess, who, blushing at our confusion, says with the finest courtesy, "It is as ordered." A suggestion or two, and the matter was righted; and a happy evening ensued.

Professor Calderwood was present, as a guest of honor, at the dedication of the Hegel monument, which immediately followed the return of the victorious emperor from the siege of Paris. Several times he was similarly the guest of the Philosophical Society, and would have been further honored by membership but for the solitary slight want of facility just mentioned.

The conspicuous charm of Dr. Calderwood was the sincerity of his faith. In all the struggles with questions that human wisdom cannot resolve, his religious convictions remained clear and strong. He never ran to vagaries. Of his religion, rationality must ever be the handmaid. He saw that Hamilton's philosophy was serving the skeptic, the atheist even; and it became his mission to save genuine thinking from such an abyss. Hamilton, however masterful, loses his leadership; Mansel, too, who pleads for belief in a God he claims we cannot know, is early recognized as a wandering star.

Professor Calderwood has been umpire in large measure

of the developing thought of his country. A guide of youth in the university, and a referee in case of book reviews, he has preserved confidence, meeting the iconoclastic tides as has no other. Tennyson used to remark upon the reviews by Christopher North, who well may be considered a literary genius, but, in philosophic endowment and attainment, scarcely to be compared with his successor, whose opinion in issues of grave import exerted a control by far more deep and wide.

Dr. Henry Calderwood "stood foursquare to all the winds that blew." If he won and prized the sympathy of the churches, in the social or moral world he could brave public sentiment and calmly meet the attacks of conventionalism, ostracized, it might be, by his own colleagues. An incident is suggestive. A few friends were invited to dine, including the erudite but eccentric Professor Blackie. As Dr. Blackie enters the dining-room he peers scrutinizingly across the table. "I see you have no wine. Did you think I couldn't restrain myself? I consider this a personal insult." Moving hastily for hat and cane, he takes his leave—a program he had, no doubt, planned in advance.

Calderwood's masterpiece met an emergency and was a positive advance upon the thought of the day. Representative of a stage of progress—not the overthrow but the rightful development of Hamilton—it is one of the most remarkable books Scotland has produced. Why did not the errors of such commanding thinkers as Bain and Mansel and Hamilton lead a generation astray? The student of the history of philosophy will answer, Because Henry Calderwood lived.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A HISTORY OF BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA. By ROBERT WILLIAM ROGERS, PH.D. (Leipzig), D.D., LL.D., F.R.G.S., Professor in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey. In two volumes. Vols. I and II. 8vo. Pp. xx, 429, xv, 418. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye. \$5.00.

Two hundred and fifty-three pages, or nearly one-third of these volumes, are devoted to a history, not of the country itself, but of modern explorations. Though this seems rather of a long introduction, it is justified by the inherent interest of the subject. But it might well have been published in a volume by itself. Nothing seems to have been omitted in this portion of the work, and abundant praise is bestowed upon all who have contributed even in the smallest degree to the discovery and deciphering of the cuneiform inscriptions. This leads in some degree to a loss of the true perspective, more honor being bestowed upon some than they relatively deserve. This is notably the case in respect to Grotefend in comparison with Sir Henry Rawlinson. However interesting Grotefend's youthful work may have been in 1802 and onward, the results which he obtained were trifling; whereas Rawlinson's translation in 1846 of the long inscription at Behistun, published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, is truly monumental, and was the result of independent work and thought. In this inscription there were more than a hundred lines, and from it he was able almost completely to make out the ancient Persian alphabet.

It is difficult to appreciate the amount of labor required in this deciphering of an unknown tongue in an unknown alphabet with little aid except that of conjecture. At the same time it is one of the best of all illustrations of the real character of inductive reasoning. With the very slightest of clues a series of skillful guesses lead to conclusions which are irresistible. The lock is so intricate that, when a key is found to open it, it is certain to be the key which was made to fit it. All doubt of the correctness of the principles of interpretation adopted by the leading students of the cuneiform alphabet was dissipated in 1855 by a bold plan proposed by Mr. H. Fox Talbot, and accepted by Sir Henry Rawlinson. Sir Henry Rawlinson, Rev. Edward Hincks, and Monsieur Jules Oppert were requested to send to the Royal Asiatic Society, under sealed covers, translations of an inscription which M. Oppert had recently brought from Babylonia, and which Mr. Talbot himself had translated and sent in a sealed package to the society. These translations were then opened

and compared in the presence of Dean Milman, Dr. Whewell, Sir Gardner Wilkinson, Mr. Grote, Rev. W. Cureton, and Professor H. H. Wilson. "The versions were found to be in the closest correspondence and the committee reported that:

"The coincidences between the translations, both as to the general sense and verbal rendering, were very remarkable. In most parts there was a strong correspondence in the meaning assigned, and occasionally a curious identity of expression as to particular words. Where the versions differed very materially each translator had in many cases marked the passage as one of doubtful or unascertained signification. In the interpretation of numbers there was throughout a singular correspondence'" (vol. i. p. 196).

Dr. Rogers accepts with little question the theory that the Sumerian language is a reality, and that it implies the existence of a prehistoric race of Sumerians, who were either mongrels or Indo-Europeans, but who were subsequently conquered by the Semitic Babylonians, with much the result which followed in Europe when the civilized Latins were conquered by the barbarians; the barbarians in each case being conquered by the civilization of their subjects. This was some time previous to 4000 B. C. "About the beginning of the fourth millennium before Christ the Sumerian people, who had already attained a high civilization, found their land invaded by a vast horde of barbarians, for so these must have appeared to them. These were Semites, closely related in blood to the Arabs who once overran Spain, and the Hebrews who once came pouring across the Jordan into Canaan" (vol. i. p. 305). Our author accepts the view that the original home of these Semites was in Arabia. "During the long course of their history they remained as unchanged and unchangeable as the Egyptians. They were powerful in warfare at first, but gradually cast aside the warlike spirit and became so devoted to the arts of peace as to be unable to defend their country from invasion, which happened again and again during their long history. Yet so great was their vitality, and so marked their racial individuality, that they always triumphed in the end, and absorbed their conquerors. . . . The Babylonians were devoted chiefly to religion and to literature, as their remains would seem to indicate. It was they who erected the largest temples that the world has ever seen, and as the materials used were perishable, ever re-erected and restored them. It was they who provided these temples with books, liturgies, hymns, and prayers, and heaped up thousands of tablets recording all these building operations and giving glory and honor to the gods who had inspired the work.

"Out of the Babylonian people sprang the Assyrians, for Assyria was colonized from Babylonia. Though of the same blood, the Assyrians gradually became a very different people" (vol. i. pp. 307, 308). They retained a purer Semitic blood. They attained a more purely military and commercial character, and displayed peculiar savagery in warfare.

As traders they invaded the whole East and were unscrupulous in their methods. Still they always looked with longing upon the superior civilization of the Babylonians, and imitated them in founding libraries and promoting literature.

At a later period there was another irruption from the heart of Arabia. These were the Chaldeans, who finally became heirs both of the Babylonian civilization and the Babylonian empire.

Though in the text discrediting the statement of Nabonidus that he had found an inscription which carried back the date of Sargon I. to 3800 B. C., our author accepts it in his chronological table, and gives a connected list of royal names from that time to the capture of Babylon by Cyrus (B.C. 539). The reader, however, should be warned, and perhaps is duly warned by the author, that his lists and the dates given are only provisional.

The history properly begins with page 349, and, as our author believes, in the reign of En-shag-kush-ana, Lord of Kengi, a name for Babylonia, signifying "Land of Canals and Reeds." The date assigned to this reign is previous to 4500 B. C. The facts concerning this period have been recently brought to light by the wonderful explorations of Professor Hilprecht for the University of Pennsylvania, together with much concerning the four or five succeeding centuries. So little, however, is already known that we wait with impatience the further exploration of the buried storehouses of information which dot the whole region of Mesopotamia.

Nothing very definite concerning biblical history is attained until a much later date, and our author thinks that there is an exaggerated estimate concerning the extent to which the Scriptures are confirmed by the explorations in Babylonia which have so far been made. It is, however, interesting to note that in the case of the existence and position of Belshazzar the Bible account is amply confirmed. Everything indicates that Nabonidus, the last king in Babylon, neglected the duties of state to devote himself to his favorite pastime of archæology.

"... Imagination conceives him not as busied with concerns of state in the capital or at the head of an army seeking new territory or defending old, but rather as going about his lands watching the progress of work upon a temple, or stepping down into excavations to look upon the inscribed name of some old king which no eye had seen for thousands of years. Though there is no clear statement in his records to this effect, it seems almost certain that the great concerns of state were left to his son, Bel-shar-usur ('Bel protect the king,' the biblical Belshazzar), who was a sort of regent during probably a large part of the reign. That the position of Bel-shar-usur was unusual appears quite clearly from the manner of the allusions to him in Nabonidus's inscriptions. At the end of some of them his name is coupled in the prayers with that of Nabonidus, and blessings are especially invoked upon him. No such usage as this appears in any other text, and there must be a specific reason for it, which

it is simplest to find in his regency. This is supported, likewise, by the otherwise inexplicable conduct of Nabonidus during the most threatening situation in all the history of Babylon. When the army of Cyrus, as will be shown later, was approaching the city, he remained in retirement at Tema, and gave over the control and leadership completely to Bel-shar-usur. By this regency of Belahazzar is also explained the origin of the Jewish tradition preserved in the book of Daniel, which makes Belshazzar, and not Nabonidus, the last king of Babylon. That it had a historic basis there is no reason to doubt" (vol. ii. pp. 362-363).

The volumes are attractively gotten up with good paper, clear type, and handsome binding, and are provided with an ample index and with abundant literary references. Altogether they are a great credit to American scholarship, and furnish the best summary of knowledge upon the subject which is at present attainable to English scholars.

BIBLE STUDIES: Contributions, Chiefly from Papyri and Inscriptions, to the History of the Language, the Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic Judaism and Primitive Christianity. By Dr. G. ADOLF DREISSMANN, Professor of Theology in the University of Heidelberg. Pp xv, 384. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00 net.

This book is a combination of "Bibel Studien" and "Neue Bibel Studien," which appeared in German in 1895 and 1897, respectively, together with some additional matter that appears for the first time in this English edition. The value of these books became apparent as soon as they appeared in German, and has necessitated this comparatively prompt translation. The "Studies" are all concerned with the Greek Bible, and discuss a variety of problems in the light of recently discovered inscriptions and papyri. The value of the inscriptions and papyri is becoming increasingly evident, and the appearance of some such volume as this one, summarizing results of current study, will be frequently necessary. To be sure, the results attained in this way must often be accepted tentatively, for further discoveries may demand a revision of previous conclusions. It is an exceedingly happy circumstance that the results of such special study can so speedily be put into the hands of general New Testament scholars.

The main purpose of the book is to contribute something to the reproduction of the linguistic environment of the Greek Bible, as far as that environment is revealed by inscriptions and papyri, and about one hundred and fifty-five pages are devoted to the study of individual words. These word-studies, which are both lexical and syntactic, are exceedingly interesting. They often touch important topics in the field of Biblical Theology; as, for instance, the study of the word *ἀναφέρω*, which in 1 Peter ii. 24 the author considers to mean that Christ "bears up to the cross the sins of men. The expression thus signifies quite generally that Christ took away our sins by His death; there is no suggestion whatever of the special ideas of substitution or sacrifice."

There are interesting notes on the significance of the name Barnabas; on the explanation of the double name Saulus Paulus; and on the relation of Manaen to Herod the Tetrarch. About twenty pages are occupied with a discussion of the Greek transcriptions of the sacred four letters of the Hebrew name of God.

In addition to individual word-studies, there is a long discussion, covering some sixty pages, of the development of the art of letter-writing, with illustrations from the Oxyrhyncus papyri, intended to show in what mental attitude and with what method an exegete should approach the so-called "Epistles" of the New Testament.

Among the "gleanings" in the last forty pages of the volume is an interpretation, at first sight somewhat fanciful, of the "large letters" and "marks of Jesus" mentioned in the last chapter of Galatians; a suggestive note on the "white robes and palms" of Rev. vii. 9; and a note on the literary history of Second Peter, in which the author finds indication that the writer of Second Peter had read a Carian inscription.

This brief survey of the contents of the volume is sufficient to show its scope and the important contribution made by its discussions to the study of a wide range of New Testament topics.

THE LIFE AND LITERATURE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS. By LYMAN ABBOTT. Crown 8vo. Pp. xiii, 408. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1901. \$2.00.

At the outset Dr. Abbott announces himself as belonging to a certain "school of biblical interpretation." This school he considers scientific, because it "assumes nothing"; that is, if we understand him, he would interpret the Old Testament as if there had been no New Testament to throw back upon it its light, and create assumptions concerning its meaning. He calls it literary, because he applies to Hebrew literature the same canons as to all other world-literature, which would compel him to overlook the providential preparatory elements of Hebrew history relating to Christianity. He characterizes his school as "evolutionary, because it assumes that the laws, institutions, etc., were a gradual development in the life of the nation" (p. iv). How this last comports with his first principle, that he is going to assume nothing, is more than we can see. But it is a specimen of the calm way in which this writer proceeds throughout in total disregard of all logic, that being one of the subjects which he especially eschews.

But the volume itself is better than one would suppose it could be from this self-contradictory statement of principles. The most recent authorities upon both sides are fully referred to in the footnotes, and the author's general good sense leads him to take positions that are far behind those of the radical members of the "school" to which he belongs. His argument for the general truthfulness of the story of the Exodus is in general very good. In reference to Deuteronomy, he maintains that the book

was written by an unknown prophet in the seventh century who "gathered together whatever there was of ancient law in manuscript and of ancient counsel in current traditions, and rewrote the laws of Moses, codifying both manuscript and tradition, modifying both and adding to them new regulations in the spirit of the old, and new applications of the old to the conditions and problems of his own time" (p. 119). Additions to this were made subsequently by other writers. In its completed form "the whole constitutes the book of Deuteronomy. How much of it is truly Mosaic, how much of it was contributed by the unknown author in the reign of Manasseh, how much is of even subsequent date, it is not possible now to determine with absolute accuracy, nor is it necessary" (p. 120). But such a procedure as this is declared by Dr. Abbott not to be a "pious fraud," for he declares that the ethical standards of the book are noble. It is difficult to reason with persons who use language in this loose manner. It would seem that the contradiction involved here was almost as clear as the one found in the preface. The same incoherent method of writing appears in what Dr. Abbott says about the difficulty of preserving the manuscript of Deuteronomy if it had been written in Moses' time. He says, that "we must either suppose that Moses wrote these orations, or that they were taken down verbatim by some contemporaneous reporter and then miraculously preserved through the intervening ages" (p. 121). What the author's definition of miraculous is it would be a curiosity to know. It certainly would be no miracle in the ordinary conception of the word to have a document like Deuteronomy preserved on clay tablets for two or three centuries as the Tell el-Amarna tablets were preserved for two or three thousand years. Besides, the assumption which Dr. Abbott makes concerning the utter general neglect of the law is over and above the historical evidence, and one which he has no right to make with great confidence from purely negative evidence. The history of the book of Judges professedly passes over three-fourths of the period and pretends to give but the briefest account of a few local crises. The "school" of interpreters that treats this as a complete account of the whole period stultifies itself at the outset.

THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By the REV. LEIGHTON PULLAN, Fellow of St. John's Baptist College, Oxford; Lecturer in Theology at St. John's, Oriel, and Queen's Colleges. 12mo. Pp. x, 300. London: Rivington's. 1901. \$1.25.

"This book is intended to meet the widely prevalent need of an introduction to the New Testament which is neither a mere hand-book nor an elaborate treatise for specialists. It is written in a conservative spirit, and at the same time an ample use has been made of recent critical investigation."

This promise of the preface is amply fulfilled. The discussions are carried on in light of the most recent knowledge, and in recognition of

all the well-established facts. There is a combination of fullness of knowledge, breadth of vision, and soundness of critical judgment rarely found in a single volume. The conservative conclusions at which the author arrives are seen to be the legitimate results of reasoning from the entire body of facts. As a hand-book for constant reference, the student of the New Testament can find no better volume. Almost the only point at which we should dissent from him is in dating the book of the Acts subsequent to 70 A. D. His reasoning in endeavoring to account for the absence of any reference to Paul's death in the book of Acts is ingenious, but not convincing. He says:—

" . . . As Acts i. 1 shows that Acts was written later than the Gospel, and as there is just enough difference in style between the two books to encourage the idea that Acts was not written immediately after the Gospel, we may reasonably place Acts between A. D. 75 and 80.

"One obvious objection to placing the date of Acts so late is the fact that the writer does not record the death of St. Paul. This is certainly startling, for the martyrdom of the great apostle would have formed an impressive conclusion to the book. But there are several reasons which may be appropriately suggested to account for the omission. Possibly the author intended to write a third 'treatise,' in which the story of the martyrdom of his two great heroes, St. Peter and St. Paul, would be recounted; possibly Acts, which ends very abruptly, was never completed by the author. It is also possible that, after showing that the Roman civil power had generally been tolerant towards Christianity, he did not wish to endanger the circulation of his book by giving an account of Nero's brutal persecution of the Christians. If the book had contained any such history, the possession of it would have been regarded as no small offence by the civil authorities. Several years later, when the church was probably much stronger, St. John, in writing the Revelation, disguised his description of Nero in symbolical language. In any case, St. Luke may have wished both to show Theophilus that Christianity was compatible with loyalty to the government, and that the government had for a long time been tolerant towards Christianity" (p. 108).

A PROBLEM IN NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM. (The Stone Lectures for 1897-1898.) By MELANCHTHON WILLIAMS JACOBUS, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the Hartford Theological Seminary. 12mo. Pp. vii, 285. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.50.

The problem discussed in this volume is that of the relations of the teachings of Jesus to the teachings of Paul. It is thus a timely discussion of the topic which is uppermost in the religious thought of the day, and is a satisfactory reply to those who exaggerate the apparent divergences of doctrine between the Gospels and the Epistles. The most important point to keep in mind through all the discussions of this subject is, that prior to Christ's resurrection and ascension the main object of his work and the full method by which it was to be accomplished could not

be comprehended by his disciples. When they were children he had to speak to them as children; while they were still babes he had to feed them on milk; after his resurrection and ascension and the day of Pentecost, they had new facts at their command from which they could unfold the profounder thoughts of the Christian religion. This subject is admirably developed in these brief lectures, and the positions taken are abundantly supported by references to the literature of the subject.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. By STEWART D. F. SALMOND, M.A., D.D., F.E.I.S., Principal and Professor of Theology, United Free Church College, Aberdeen. Fourth Edition (revised throughout, and reset). Pp. xix, 565. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1901. \$3.00 net.

Since the publication of the first edition of this volume, which was reviewed in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for October, 1896, there has been a vast amount of discussion of the subject; so that the author has thought it worth while to have the entire work reset, though none of his conclusions have been essentially modified. In its fitness to meet all modern doubts concerning immortality, and to shed light upon the dark questions pertaining to the punishment of the wicked, the work has taken on a new lease of life, and become indispensable to serious students of this most important topic.

To those who are oppressed by the representations of future judgment in the New Testament, we commend the author's concluding wise remarks:—

"The principle of *degrees* in reward and punishment must be taken in all its breadth as an essential and qualifying element in the doctrine in question. The idea of reward proportioned to the measure of service and penalty proportioned to the measure of failure, occupies a much larger place in Christ's teaching and in the New Testament generally than is usually recognised. If anything deserves to be described as a lost theological principle which it concerns us to recover, it is this. It is often alleged against the doctrine of Eternal Judgment, that while sins differ through all possible grades of difference, it seems in the end at least to represent them as all punished alike. But it is the very burden of a large part of Christ's teaching and that of the Apostles, that this final retribution will not be the same to all; that each shall receive according to what he has done; that it shall be more tolerable for some than for others in the day of judgment; that the servants shall be beaten with many stripes or with few, according to the measure of unfaithfulness; that the issue to each will be in equitable accordance with possession, talent, opportunity, knowledge.

"It is of the nature of things that there are vast differences in the guilt of sins. The fact that in this world we see all varieties of character and all possible gradations of good and evil in men's lives has been made a reason for denying that in the other world there can be any absolute

line of demarcation or any final division of souls into two classes of saved and lost. But conscience itself is a witness that beneath all these varieties and gradations there is something deeper, a drift of disposition which parts men into righteous and unrighteous, into lovers of God and the opposite. Yet this essential and final distinction in kind is not inconsistent with infinite differences in the measure of good and evil, and consequently in the reward and the penalty. The New Testament recognises this and makes provision for it. The judgment of which it speaks is a judgment which shall be with perfect knowledge, perfect equity, perfect sympathy, the judgment of a Father who knows our frame and remembers that we are dust, the judgment of a Son who by experience understands man and man's life. The doctrine of degrees is the relief given us by Christ Himself in thinking of the maladjustments of the present existence, the mystery of unequal circumstance, and the lot of the lost. It provides for all possible gradations in the punitive awards of the future. It does more to lighten the problem than is done by the Roman Catholic theories of *poena damni* and a variety of localities in the other world, or by the idea of a Protestant purgatory, and it does it more simply and reasonably. It is the proper corrective to the dogmas of a second probation and a universal restoration. It gives all the alleviation which other views of the future profess to give, and it gives it without doing violence either to the power of man's will or to the sufficiency of grace here" (pp. 532-533).

CHRISTIANITY IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE. (The Historical Series for Bible Students.) By GEORGE T. PURVES, D.D., LL.D., recently Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis in Princeton Theological Seminary. With Maps. 12mo. Pp. ix, 343. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900. \$1.25.

It is fortunate that the *a priori* mode of treatment of apostolic history by Dr. McGiffert was soon followed by a volume of such sound scholarship as characterizes this work by Dr. Purves. His familiarity with the literature of the subject is equal to Dr. McGiffert's, but his judgment is clearer, while his conclusions in the main coincides with what is called the traditional view. It is a mistake, as the volume amply shows, to suppose that the scholarship is all on one side of the questions at issue. We know of no more satisfactory treatise upon the subject than that contained in this book of modest dimensions.

THE FACT OF CHRIST: A Series of Lectures. By P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON, M.A., Minister of Renfield Church, Glasgow. 12mo. Pp. 208. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1901. \$1.25.

This is a valuable contribution to the evidences of Christianity, especially in view of the emphasis which it throws upon its central fact. The answer to the question "What think ye of Christ?" will in the end determine the answer given to all the other vexed questions of biblical criticism. Prominence is given by the author to the spiritual experience which is wrought by Christ in the regenerate heart.

THE FIRST INTERPRETERS OF JESUS. By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature and Interpretation in Chicago Theological Seminary, author of "The Student's Life of Jesus," "The Student's Life of Paul," and "The Revelation of Jesus." Pp. xiii, 429. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1901.

This volume, which continues the author's studies of the Gospels, is characterized both by the excellences and the faults of the preceding volume. Wide familiarity with the most recent German literature is evinced on every page, but there is little evidence of a corresponding familiarity with the earlier discussions of the subjects involved which had resulted in the formulation of the great orthodox creeds of the world. The author does not find in the Epistles convincing evidence of the pre-existence of Christ or of his true divinity; but he can attain this agnostic position only by neglecting the light thrown upon the more obscure passages of Scripture by the plainer passages. It sounds scientific to say that we must approach every passage of Scripture without presumption, but the attitude of mind thus indicated is far from being scientific. The literature of the apostolic age must be considered in a body. The prologue to the Gospel of John, as an outcome of a half-century's discussion of the fundamental facts of Christianity, sheds its backward light upon the earlier periods. The evidence for the divinity of Christ is cumulative, and is so related to the experience of the church in all ages that it cannot be eliminated by microscopic criticism.

WORD STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By MARVIN R. VINCENT, D.D., Baldwin Professor of Sacred Literature in Union Theological Seminary, New York. Vol. IV.—THE THESSALONIAN EPISTLES, THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS, THE PASTORAL EPISTLES, THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. 8vo. Pp. 624. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$4.00.

As in the preceding volumes, the author gives a connected commentary, word by word, of the portion of the New Testament which comes under survey. Each of the Epistles is provided with a concise and carefully written introduction. In his opinions the author leans strongly to the liberal side. For example, not content with holding that the only thing of which we are sure concerning the authorship of the book of Hebrews is that it is not Paul's, he goes farther and unwarrantably magnifies the difference in doctrine between Paul and the writer of the Epistle. Concerning the Pastoral Epistles, he holds in very positive form that no place can be found for them in the recorded ministry of Paul, and unqualifiedly rejects the theory of Paul's release from imprisonment and his second arrest, affirming that "of this there is no sound historical evidence whatever" (p. 187). The volume is provided with ample indexes of the English and Greek words commented upon, and is printed in an attractive form.

THE TREND OF THE CENTURIES; or, *The Historical Unfolding of the Divine Purpose.* By the Rev. ANDREW W. ARCHIBALD, D.D., author of "The Bible Verified." 12mo. Pp. 419, Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1901. \$1.25.

"By their fruits ye shall know them." Among the most effective arguments for Christianity is the work which it has accomplished in the diverse epochs of the world's history. Dr. Archibald has, in fresh, able, and judicious manner, presented a portion of this evidence, producing a book which in many respects will compare favorably with Dr. Storrs' "Divine Origin of Christianity." Among the twenty chapters of the book may be found those treating of "The Downfall of Judah," "The Fullness of Time," "Christianity Victorious in Rome," "The Crescent and the Cross," "The Crusaders," "John Wycliffe," "The Reformation," "The Spanish Armada," "The Discovery of America," "The Coming of the Mayflower," "John Wesley the Founder of Methodism," and "The Triumphant Nineteenth Century." Throughout this discussion one is made to feel the throb of the divine love and power which is making all things work together for good to the church of Christ. Among the most interesting of the chapters is the one entitled "The Gulf Stream of Messianic Prophecy," which, by its general marshaling of the individual facts, produces a conviction from the cumulative evidence that is usually frittered away by an unscientific microscopic attention to the details. Singly the force of each prophecy of the Old Testament may be largely explained away, but altogether they resemble the movement of the Gulf Stream as it bears the heated waters of the tropics into the forbidding latitudes of the far north.

A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY. By GEORGE NYE BOARDMAN, Professor Emeritus of Systematic Theology in Chicago Theological Seminary. Pp. 314. New York: A. D. F. Randolph Co.

No better remedy for the present unsatisfactory condition of theological thought can be suggested than a thorough study of New England theology by our younger ministers, and no better guide to that study can be found than this comprehensive and compact treatise of Dr. Boardman. All the great missionary movements which originated in New England a century ago are attributable to the theological system formulated by Jonathan Edwards and his successors. Their views, obtained by profound study of the Bible in connection with their own deep religious experiences, have been the motive power giving life to the home and foreign missionary societies, and to nearly all the other great movements which have been carried on by the Congregational churches. Without a renewal of the original forces our activities are not likely to continue. The momentum will, ere long, exhaust itself. At any rate, every one interested in the progress of Christianity in the United States and in the regions affected by its influence should look to the rock out of which he has been hewn. Dr. Boardman's volume, however, is not a rhapsody,

but a straightforward, plain history by one of the few remaining elderly scholars who have made a thorough study of the system. The book is in every way to be highly commended.

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRIST IN MODERN LIFE: Being a Study of the New Problems of the Church in American Society. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS, Pastor of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn. Pp. xiv, 416. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1900. \$1.50.

This charming volume disarms criticism. The language is so beautiful, the figures are so forcible and appropriate, and the thoughts really so profound, that each chapter must be regarded as a prose poem, and be judged by the impression made as a whole. The merits of the volume are so great that it must take permanent place among the homiletical standards of the twentieth century. The simple title of the chapters is an education in itself: "The New Problems of the Pulpit and its Place in American Life and Thought"; "Social Progress and the Influence of Jesus Christ in Civilization"; "Jesus Christ the Supreme Example of Genius in the Realm of Intellect"; "The Supremacy of Christ in the Realm of Ideal Character"; "The Simplicity and Breadth of Christ as a Religious Teacher"; "God's Silence and His Voices also: a Study of Nature's Concealments and Disclosures"; "The Higher Nature of Man as a Revelation of God"; "The Old and the New Conceptions of God"; "Evolution and Christianity: Every theory of Development asks for an Infinite God to make the Theory Workable"; "Evolution and the New View of the Bible"; "The Swing of the Pendulum from Scepticism to Faith: an Outlook for those who are seeking to solve their Doubts and reconstruct a Working Faith"; "Christ's Relation to the Poet, the Philosopher, the Scientist, and the Seer"; "Fear, Law, and Love as Motives of Life"; "The Automatic Judgment Seat in Man: an Outlook upon the Problem whether Theistic Evolution throws Any Light upon Christ's View of Future Punishment"; "The Church: its Problems and Claims upon American Society."

THE RELIGIOUS USE OF IMAGINATION. By E. H. JOHNSON, Professor in Crozer Theological Seminary. 12mo. Pp. ix, 227. New York, Boston, Chicago: Silver, Burdett & Co. 1901. \$1.00.

Treating of imagination as *image*-ination, or the ability to bring out into clear outline the implicit beliefs of the mind, Dr. Johnson shows, in this charming and very readable volume, that the religious imagination should serve the same purpose that Tyndall affirmed was the prerogative of the scientific imagination. There is no easier way of detecting a fallacy than by spreading out the statement so that everything involved can be clearly seen. The author's plea for the use of the imagination is only another form of the plea for clearness of thought. It is a very healthy book to read.

TWO THOUSAND YEARS OF MISSIONS BEFORE CAREY, based upon and embodying many of the Earliest Extant Accounts. By LEMUEL CALL BARNES, Minister, Fourth Avenue Church, Pittsburg. With Map and Illustrations. 12mo. Pp. xvii, 504. Chicago: The Christian Culture Press. \$1.50.

It is a curious misnomer to speak of the nineteenth as the "missionary" century, for the whole spread of Christianity has been accomplished through missionary agencies. The present volume contains a carefully prepared summary of the missionary work during all the centuries beginning with the Christian era, and so supplies a want that has long been felt. The apostles and early disciples were the missionaries whose efforts secured the conversion of the Roman Empire during the first three centuries. During this period Christianity spread not only in Syria, but into Persia, from which center missionaries carried the truth into the Caucasus and into Mongolia, China, and India, where in the form of Nestorianism, it had remarkable success for a long period. Through the efforts of these missions, according to the report of the Nestorian Patriarch at Babylon, "a vast army of clergy, with uncounted multitudes of believers, scattered all the way from Odessa to Peking, and from Lake Balkash to the southern point of India," had come into existence. There are abundant indications still remaining of the success of these missionaries in China during the first seven centuries of our era. The famous Nestorian tablet discovered in Shenshi, in Northwestern China, in 1625, gives a sketch of Nestorian Missions in that empire from 635 to 781. As translated by Professor Legge, it contains 3,500 English words, and bears indubitable witness to the great extent and influence of the missionary work which had been conducted in that region. In the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries all Central and Northern Europe was brought under the influence of Christianity by a series of missionary efforts that in every respect compare favorably with those of the last century. It was in the ninth and tenth centuries that Russia became permanently Christian. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there was renewed interest in the missionary work in China and Tartary and in an effort to regain the ground lost through the terrible persecutions of the preceding centuries. But all these efforts were embarrassed by the difficulties of traveling across the great spaces of Central Asia, and by the imperfection of the representations of Christianity made in consequence of the corruptions of the ecclesiastical systems by whom the missionaries were sent out. Still the seed has not been entirely lost. To this day there is a large number of Catholic Christians in Southern Japan who are the lineal descendants of those converted during this period; while the million Catholic Christians in China bear witness to the success of the efforts put forth two or three centuries ago.

The discovery of America and the circumnavigation of the globe gave such an impulse to missions that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may be as truly called missionary centuries as can the nineteenth.

It is important to familiarize ourselves with these facts, in order that we may get a just comprehension of the great price with which our present privileges have been purchased, and in order that we may become duly sensible of the profound mystery which surrounds the ways of Providence. Superficially the recent events in China have much resemblance to those which have proved so disastrous at two previous periods. It is important to discover in what lies the ground of larger hope which we now cherish that the issue of the present persecution will not be like those of the past. To assist in forming opinions concerning this and numerous points, the present volume is an indispensable help. Its survey is complete, its selection of facts judicious, and its statements are drawn from most trustworthy sources.

JESUS CHRIST AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION: An Examination of the Teaching of Jesus in its Relation to Some of the Problems of Modern Social Life. By FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY, Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University. Pp. 374. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1900. \$1.50.

In this carefully-thought-out and clearly-written volume we have something quite different from the ordinary treatises upon the subject. The author's position has enabled him to obtain a just appreciation of the difficulties as well as the responsibilities of the educated and wealthy classes, and of the general complications of our civilization. This especially appears in his chapter upon the Family, which he justly considers to be the great bulwark of safety in the present age of special temptation. It is remarkable that Jesus exalted the family to such a high degree, and recognized all its main elements of value. His appreciation of the family was entirely ahead of his age. Only the researches of the present generation enable us fully to appreciate its wisdom and sublimity. "Modern learning, using the language of research, says, 'The family is the unit of civilization.' Jesus, using the language of Hebrew scripture, says, 'The twain shall become one flesh. . . . What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.'" The author's chapter upon the Rich is peculiarly comprehensive and helpful. Its summary is worth quoting:—

"Who, then, is the Christian rich man? It is he who recognizes that in the management of his wealth he is in the presence of a constant and subtle temptation; that, as Jesus said, there is in the nature of increasing wealth a peculiar quality of 'deceitfulness,' so that the money which is at first one's servant is at any moment likely to become one's master. The Christian rich man knows well enough that it is hard for him to enter the kingdom of God. He observes the characters of many men shrivel in the flame of prosperity. He sees that conditions of luxury, ease, and lack of the friction of life contribute to a slackening of moral fiber. He holds before himself, therefore, the solemn alternatives of Jesus,—the mastery of wealth, or the abandonment of it. Thus the wealth of the Christian rich man becomes to him a trust, for the use of which he

is to be scrupulously judged. He administers his affairs with watchfulness over himself and with hands clean of malice, oppression, or deceit. He does not hope to atone for evil ways of making money by ostentatious benevolence in spending it. He is to be judged according to his ways of accumulating wealth as rigidly as for his ways of distributing wealth. He is not hard in business and soft in charity, but of one fiber throughout. His business is a part of his religion, and his philanthropy is a part of his business. He leads his life, he is not led by it. His five talents produce other five" (pp. 223-224).

THE HISTORY OF THE LATIN MONETARY UNION. By HENRY PARKER WILLIS. Royal 8vo. Pp. 343. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1901. \$2.00.

In the recent discussions over the currency question in the United States, the possibility of international bimetallism was one of the disputed points, and the history of the Latin Union was appealed to by both sides as proving their respective positions. The question of the success or failure of the experiment in the Latin countries of Europe must be admitted now to have been finally settled by the publication of Professor Willis' book. Gold monometallists will derive great satisfaction from the unqualified answer in the negative. It must not, however, be supposed from this that the book is a partisan plea for that side. On the contrary, it is a most careful, accurate, and scholarly investigation of the internal history of the Union, the superficial facts in whose history are perhaps familiar to most readers. The author, who is professor of economics at Washington and Lee University, has made an exhaustive study of the original documents in France, Belgium, and Italy, many of which are still unfamiliar to students in those countries.

The Latin Union dates from 1865, when France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland agreed to a monetary treaty which insured uniformity of coinage and international circulation within these countries, and reduced all fractional coins to a common basis. Greece later joined the union, but was a "mere useless appendage"; while Spain and Roumania made attempts to introduce the Latin coinage system without, however, uniting with the league. France, not unnaturally, exercised the dominant influence within the Union, and within that country Professor Willis believes, in common with Dr. Soetbeer, that the Bank of France actually shaped the policy adopted by the Latin Union. His conclusion is interesting: "It seems, in short, probable that the creation of the Latin Union was largely a political measure rendered opportune by the monetary difficulties arising from the new gold [supply of California and Australia], and by the popular desire for international monetary action."

Without going into the detailed history of the experiment in bimetalism, it is sufficient to say that the States of the Union were compelled first to limit, and finally to suspend, the coinage of silver. This action,

following the demonetization of silver in Germany, the United States, and other countries, is usually thought to have had an important influence in lowering the price of silver, but Professor Willis shows that the present stock of silver in France is about the same as it was in 1848, and far in excess of that in 1859, and concludes that the "demonetization" of silver did not lower the price of silver by decreasing demand. To the argument that the price of silver would have been kept up had the Union maintained free coinage, Professor Willis replies, that this was impossible, as the countries could not maintain a great deal more silver than is now actually in circulation.

As to the present status of the Latin Union, Professor Willis denies that it is now on a bimetallic basis. "Business is as actually on a gold basis as if there were not a piece of legal-tender silver in existence." For the future the Union is doomed to existence in its present condition for an indefinite period, since none of the allied countries, except perhaps France, is in a position to redeem the outstanding silver. The conclusions as to the success of the league should be carefully weighed by those who demand independent monetary action by the United States, or an international agreement with other nations. "The Latin Union as an experiment in international monetary action has proved a failure. Its history serves merely to throw some light upon the difficulties which are likely to be encountered in any international attempt to regulate monetary systems in common. From whatever point of view the Latin Union is studied, it will be seen that it has resulted only in loss to the countries involved."

R. L. BOGART.

THE AMERICAN WORKMAN. By H. LEVASSEUR. 8vo. Pp. 509. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1900. \$3.00.

It is a curious fact that foreigners have often written better books on the political, social, and industrial institutions of countries they have visited than the native authors. Such have been the books of De Tocqueville and James Bryce, and to these we must now add Professor Levasseur's voluminous work on "The American Laborer," which is certainly the most exhaustive treatise on the subject yet published. Professor Levasseur, a member of the Institute, and Professor of Economics in the College of France, has visited the United States twice,—the first time in 1876, and the second in 1893 on the occasion of the World's Fair, when he spent several months here. As a result of these visits and a diligent study of governmental statistical reports, he compiled a two-volume work, entitled *L'Ouvrier Américain*, which has been somewhat abridged by the translator in the single volume of the American edition. The translation has been admirably done by Dr. Thomas S. Adams, of Johns Hopkins University, who has managed to retain the vivacity of the original. What Professor Levasseur says about the United States is interesting, not because of its originality, for we have heard most of the facts before, but because it comes

from a foreigner, and shows what impression has been made on an eminent economist by the material prosperity of this country.

The most striking feature about the book is its optimism in the treatment of American industry, and admiration for the American laborer. The wonderful development of our industry for the past century excites his admiration, and even in the tendency to concentration he sees nothing to fear. However, the condition of the laborer is the real theme of the book, and in this connection he discusses the productivity of labor, labor laws, strikes, wages, and workmen's budgets. A few of his conclusions may be briefly stated. The productivity of labor is high in this country, as are also the wages; the average daily wage of men in industrial pursuits is about two dollars, as against five francs in France and five shillings in England. While men earn more than in Europe, they spend much more. But the extra outlay represents a higher standard of living, for the American probably gets more for his money than the European laborer; food, lighting, heat, and perhaps clothing are cheaper in this country, and while rent is higher the houses are more comfortable. An American laborer spends more on clothing than his French *confrère*; the girls more than the men; a shop girl more than a factory girl. Professor Levasseur is struck, as was Mr. Bryce, with the well-dressed appearance of the working population, particularly the women. He sums up the comparison of wages as follows: "The average American workman enjoys a real as well as a nominal income which is probably more than twice as great as that of the French workman."

Labor legislation Professor Levasseur thinks has hardly gone far enough yet in the protection of the employe; labor unions are rather too inclined to make use of the strike, but the spirit of arbitration seems to be growing. Socialism has not been able to obtain a foothold, owing to "an inherent antagonism to the sophistries of communistic production." There has been during the past century a continual improvement in the condition of the American laborer. This has been due to the progress of agriculture and manufactures, to the productivity of the workingmen, the abundance of capital, the demand for labor, the development of education, and the corporate organization of the laborers. Professor Levasseur concludes with the following words: "Despite the agitations which may arise, I do not doubt that the twentieth century will witness a further increase in the prosperity of the United States."

The book is such an arsenal of facts, fairly bristling with statistics, that it is impossible to do it justice in a brief review. The only theoretical subject discussed is the law of wages; two chapters are devoted to the influences affecting wages, and the interaction of the rate of wages and the standard of comfort of the laboring class. Professor Levasseur frankly gives up the search for a single cause as the regulator of wages, and finds them to be fixed rather by a complex of causes, among which are: custom and institutions, productivity, competition, cost and standard of

living, industrial capital, activity of production, and amount of consumption. In the main, however, the author confines himself to the presentation of facts. One criticism may be made in this connection, which perhaps explains in part Professor Levasseur's optimism: he accepts without question the statistics of labor bureaus and census, some of which are notoriously defective and even misleading. This, however, does not detract from the value of the conclusions. The book will prove a mine of information for all who are interested in the economic and social progress of the American people, and must be warmly recommended. R. L. B.

OUR LAND AND LAND POLICY. By HENRY GEORGE. 12mo. Pp. 345. New York: Doubleday & McClure Co. 1901. \$2.50.

This last-published volume from the writings of Henry George is made up of various selections not otherwise appearing in book form, of which the most important is the title essay, constituting, as it does, more than one-third of the whole. The other selections comprise speeches, lectures, and essays on such varied topics as *The Study of Political Economy*, *The American Republic*, *The Crime of Poverty*, *Land and Taxation*, *Causes of the Business Depression*, *Peace by Standing Army*. While apparently disconnected, they are nevertheless bound into a unified whole by the fundamental thought that runs through them all—the injustice of private ownership in land and the necessity of the single tax.

All admirers of that marvelous book "*Progress and Poverty*" will be interested to read the initial essay, which was originally published as a pamphlet in 1871, and which formed the basis from which the larger work was developed some eight years later. It is interesting to note in this earlier essay the essentials of Mr. George's later philosophy, which further study served only to fortify and deepen. We find the same ideas, only cruder, of the labor theory of value, of the exploitation theory of rent, of the causes of poverty, and of the single tax, as appear in his later works. For almost thirty years Henry George preached the same doctrine, which no one who reads this book can doubt that he held with as much sincerity at the time of his death as when he wrote "*Our Land and Land Policy*." It is wonderful to see the faith with which he fitted his key to every lock, and the ease with which he solved—to his own satisfaction—every economic problem. "I hold," he exclaims, "and I think no one who looks at the facts can fail to see, that poverty is utterly unnecessary." "The key to the labor question is the land question. In the single tax alone can labor find relief." And again, "There is but one cure for existing business depression. That is the single tax."

One is so impressed with the earnestness and sincerity of the man, that it becomes a little difficult to criticise the book, but that is perhaps unnecessary. Certainly Mr. George's peculiar economic theories no longer need refutation. But whether one believes in the single tax or not, the volume may be recommended for its virile style and its earnest purpose.

R. L. B.

MONOPOLIES PAST AND PRESENT. By JAMES E. LE ROSSIGNOL. 12mo. Pp. 253. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1901. \$1.25.

In spite of the multiplication of books upon the subject of monopolies and trusts, Dr. Le Rossignol, who is professor of economics at the University of Denver, has struck out a new line in the present volume. He has written a very readable and trustworthy history of monopoly, which serves excellently as an historical introduction to the study of modern trusts. While there is nothing strictly original in the book, the author has brought together a mass of hitherto scattered information, some curious, much valuable, and all interesting.

Monopoly is defined as ability to control price, but the author stumbles more than once in the theoretical exposition of the nature of monopoly. The primary and fundamental cause of monopolies he finds deep-seated in the human heart—it is the desire for gain. Patents, railway discriminations, and the tariff are only secondary causes, or rather instruments. In successive chapters are described monopolies in ancient and mediæval times, guilds, exclusive trading companies, patents and copyrights, railways, municipal monopolies, and the modern trust. After showing how the monopolistic spirit of the Middle Ages was replaced by the system of industrial liberty, which is now in turn giving way to a period of combination, Dr. Le Rossignol asks: "May it not be that we are returning to a system of public control like and yet unlike that of ancient and mediæval times?" His positive suggestions in the way of legislation are for publicity of accounts and prevention of stock watering, as well as adequate taxation and the establishment of a federal commission. While conservative, the book is interesting and well-written, and the author's fairness and good temper are manifest on every page. E. L. B.

APHORISMS, DEFINITIONS, REFLECTIONS, AND PARADOXES, Medical, Surgical, and Dietetic. By A. RABAGLIATI, M.A., D.D., F.R.C.S.E. Ed., etc. London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox. 1901.

The author of this very peculiar, but certainly brilliant, interesting, and most instructive work is racially a mongrel—half Italian, half Scotch and of Scotch upbringing and training—an unusual but fine blend, as the Tea and Whiskey people would say, which accounts for some of the special characteristics of the man and of the book in which they are reflected. It is written, primarily, of course, for his medical *confrères*, but it will do many "laymen" good to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest many of its sage though paradoxical remarks.

The book embraces a preface of eight pages, five hundred and fifty two aphorisms, etc., and a pretty complete index. It is a pity that a table of the *sections* was not prefixed. Such headings as "Aphorisms on Food," "Too much Surgery," "Heredity of Disease, etc.," "Disease Salutary," "Unity of Disease," and so on, would have quickened curiosity.

Here is a remark which is worth noting: "As to Alcohol, while its ef-

fects in excess have been notoriously evil and are so yet, it is more than likely that a good many of the evils attributed to alcoholism have really been due to improper feeding." Dr. Rabagliati has much to say on the evil results of *kako-siteism* (bad feeding), *poly-siteism* (much feeding), *pollaki-siteism* (frequent feeding), and some of his statements about these habits are paradoxical enough, though experimentally shown to be true. Take, for example, No. 83, "The commonest cause of a persistently low temperature is *poly-siteism* and *pollaki-siteism*. But by reaction both also induce a high temperature. From which it follows that we elevate a low or subnormal temperature by the same means by which we depress a high or supernormal one, viz., by restricting the diet." No. 86, "We quicken a slow pulse by the same means by which we slow a quick pulse, viz., by restricting the diet." If space were at my disposal, I could quote without end aphorisms, paradoxical and otherwise, pawky and otherwise, which are as full of sense as they are startling.

In the preface, the author says, and, so far as a mere layman can judge, says correctly, "What we [medicals] want is a philosophy rather than a science. In many ways we have scientific facts enough—far more than we know how to use. Take such a question as the alleged increase of cancer. . . . In the quinquennium 1892-1896 109,376 persons died of cancer in England and Wales alone. Suppose that these cases lasted on the average two years each, and that they were seen by the medical attendants twice a week each, . . . we should then have 21,875,200 careful and accurate observations on cancer. What has come out of them? If I said 'Nothing!' I should not be far wrong, for there is no agreement either (1) as to whether there is a real increase of cancer or not; (2) as to what causes are inducing it; or (3) as to what steps we must take to prevent a disease which we cannot cure." "In every direction the same conclusion must be drawn."

These words are a specimen of the author's unflinching candor. I agree with him in saying that "philosophy is needed." A great deal of so-called science is purblind, or worse, for lack of it. And when one remembers that almost the entire mental culture and discipline of a majority of medicals is acquired by means of their professional studies, which are largely a matter of memory, can one wonder at it? Nothing can be as a rule more fatal to the effective study of nature or man than that the student should have had little or no preliminary thorough training in logic, psychology, ethics, and philosophy proper, which are the true propædæutics. Dr. Rabagliati is an arts as well as medical graduate of the University of Edinburgh.

Theologians and social reformers with their eyes open and *en rapport* with the deeper drift of the time may get many a fine, helpful, and far-reaching suggestion from this book. Medicals may expect troubled dreams as the result of studying it; but it will do them good.

D. W. S.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS AND THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN HIGHER CRITICISM.

BY MR. I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY, M. A.

I.

AFTER baffling three or four generations of critics, the Letters of Junius have been allowed to take rank among English classics under a pseudonym. Like the autobiography of a certain famous statesman, "the author has not yet been announced"; and this in spite of a continuous stream of conjectural literature coming down from the last century concerning the "Great Unknown." "Junius Rumours," "Another Glance at Junius," "Junius Unmasked," "The Identity of Junius with a Living Character Established"—these and similar titles serve to mark the ebb and flow of the tide of speculation. Such pamphlets, essays, and even elaborate works may be considered mere literary driftwood; they yet testify to the force of an unsatisfied critical curiosity. The question still remains: Who wrote that series of Letters on political affairs which appeared in a London newspaper a decade before the American Revolution? They may be at present

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of little intrinsic interest, except for their treatment of the Freedom of the Press, and the Discontents in the Colonies, but at the time they created no small stir in the literary and political world. They were eulogized by Dr. Johnson, and quoted with admiration by Edmund Burke. Of the "invisible state satirist," the latter said: "Kings, Lords, and Commons are but the sport of his fury. Were he a member of this House, what might not be expected from his knowledge, his firmness and integrity? He would easily be known by his contempt of all danger, by his pointed penetration and activity."

The attention paid to these philippics and the celebrity they acquired were not due so much to their bold and pungent style, as to the air of mystery thrown over them by the author himself. Threescore of the Letters, collected in book form, were prefaced by this tantalizing statement: "I am the sole depository of my own secret, and it shall perish with me." On the other hand, the interest arising from concealment was increased by a certain self-disclosure enveloped in the cloud of a fictitious name. Junius was no dim figure. In his forceful vindication of public rights against an obstinate king and a distracted Parliament, he appeared to High Whigs "the very genius of English liberty," and his book became "almost a sort of Bible or inspired exposition of popular principles." Moreover, to the Tories, Junius was no indefinite personality; he was too dangerous to be a shadow. Somehow the "Terrible Unknown" obtained a great quantity of secret intelligence, which he boldly applied in exposing political wrongs. Thus Junius' sources of information became an added cause of interest to his contemporaries. Who was this man so intimate with the inner circle of the court, so familiar with the public offices of government, that he could even anticipate ministerial manœuvres?

Given then a confession which was only a concealment,

a character of public champion, and a surprising acquaintance with state secrets, it was no wonder that there at once arose a host of claimants to the name of "Junius." When but twenty-two out of the sixty-nine Letters were published, one of the Opposition wrote: "Various have been the conjectures formed on the question 'Who is Junius'? I have heard at least twenty persons named, whom suspicion points the finger at. Nay, I have been assured, at different times, that each of them was the author in question." Another contemporary, Wilkes, called this "the most important secret of our times." It was not surprising that a writer's own age exaggerated his importance: it was surprising that the next generation kept up an interest in Junius. It was a literary example of the Man with the Iron Mask. Up to 1832, at least fifteen complete volumes were written on the Junius enigma. And even in a third generation speculation did not cease. In the standard edition of 1855 no less than thirty-seven persons are enumerated, to whom the authorship has been attributed; while at present there are over fifty different claimants.

No less striking than the growth in numbers is the variety of individuals included in this list. There are to be found orators and private secretaries, bishops and army officers, dukes and treasury clerks. Even the joint authorship of a man and woman, Lord and Lady Temple, has been suggested, and as a last absurdity General Charles Lee gravely put himself forward as "Junius Americanus." Lee was reported to have asserted that Lord Chatham was not the author, but the secret remained solely with himself, and would forever remain with him. When questioned as to this avowal, he answered: "I have unguardedly committed myself, and it would be but folly to deny to you that I am the author."

This case of the American pretender may be dwelt upon, for it gives a first clue out of the wilderness of candidates.

Along with the reason for the immense quantity of claims, it exhibits the fallacy of judgment, which has allowed their accumulation. The reason was that love of notoriety led to numberless so-called confessions of authorship, and the fallacy that these confessions, whether direct, tacit, or implied, were accepted as true by blind partisans in their attempts to establish the claims of this or that favorite to the anonymous publication. Now to reverse such procedure is to gain a principle of rejection. Thus among the candidates to be excluded are the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Grenville, who both declared they knew the author, but never gave any definite information on the subject.

In our first glance at the mass of external evidence, we may discard in a lump contemporary statements unless of a negative cast. Suspicion is thus thrown on the modern favorite for the place, Sir Philip Francis, because he replied in a manner variously interpreted, at any rate ambiguous. On the other hand, the contemporary favorite, Edmund Burke, was the only person who gave a prompt and decided answer. Charged with being Junius, he denied it to Dr. Johnson, and to Dean Morley he said, "I could not write like Junius; and if I could, I would not."

Another common test of Junian authorship is the quality of style. In applying this, caution must be observed. To pick out pages of similar words between Junius and this or that Whig writer is to make a list of party mottoes, and nothing more. But to examine the writings, not as if they were corresponding pages of two dictionaries, but for the sustained quality of diction, the result is different. Another effective means is given, of reducing the sum total of aspirants. From their surviving writings at least thirty candidates are proven incapable of the "grand style" of the Letters. It is hard to match the rhythmical periods, the stately and polished eloquence, of the "Great Unknown," in

the literary remains of even the men of distinction of his day. Out of the whole list it is held that Sir Philip Francis, Lords Sackville and Chatham, Wilkes, Tooke, and Burke are the only persons that can be credited with sufficient mental power to have produced the Letters, and out of this limited number the last is the most likely candidate. As Dr. Johnson told Boswell: "I should have believed Burke to be Junius, because I know no man but Burke who is capable of writing these Letters."¹ This judgment was based on Burke's power of assuming or disguising style, as shown in his "Vindication of Natural Society," but it ran counter to Burke's own emphatic denial of Junian authorship.

We are now thrown forward to another means of lessening the number of claimants. It is not because of their literary style or their personal confessions, but from a certain coincidence in career, that five most plausible candidates have been set up. It was because they were clerks in some ministerial department, or secretaries to some eminent statesman, and so had facilities for gaining Junius' prompt and minute information on important state affairs. Yet this criterion has its corresponding fallacy. Because this or that man was familiar with the same events, knew the same persons, in general lived the same life,—all this is not to make him a Junius, but simply a member of the same party. So this argument from similarity of situation, instead of narrowing the field of inquiry, leads back to that original wilderness of candidates, for there is scarcely a Whig of prominence who may not be proved by this sort of reasoning to be Junius.

In examining the three captions,—personal confessions, similarity of style, and coincidence in career,—we have gained three means of judging the final claims to the authorship of the Letters. Now to apply them to the given

¹ Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, iv. 344.

half-dozen favorites is at once to discover that only one of these fulfills all three conditions. Running through the list: Lord George Sackville was early accused of being Junius, and does not appear to have directly denied the charge. Also through his official position he had unique sources of political knowledge such as Junius possessed; yet in one thing is he lacking,—in respect to his style there is nothing to go by. As with Lord Sackville, so with Lord Chatham, there is the same want in each and for the same general reason, the fact that there was scarcely one man in the noble houses of that day who has left any record of his literary workmanship. And even Burke meets but two out of three qualifications. He had the opportunities of the peer and the ability of the commoner; for he was acquainted with all the great characters of the day, and in his speeches employed every brilliant metaphor and striking figure used by Junius. Burke's case would be positive, except for one thing: his confession was an emphatic denial.

We have thus far sought to clear the ground in the search for the real Junius, by the principle of exclusion, rejecting doubtful claimants and narrowing the inquiry to the most probable. But after negation comes affirmation. By applying the three marks of authorship to men who but partially fulfill the conditions, it is shown that the proof, if there is a proof, must be circumstantial and composite. The successful candidate for Junian honors must have had a career which ran parallel with that of Junius; his literary style must show, not only verbal coincidences, but sustained superiority of diction, and he himself must have uttered such a confession that suspicion is pointed to him as the author. In our limited list one candidate remains. It is Sir Philip Francis who is said to fulfill all these requirements, and this is the evidence, in order:—

As to confession, Francis makes none directly; he him-

self writes like one of the general public about Junius: "Junius is not known, and that circumstance is perhaps as curious as any of his writings. I have always suspected Burke, but whoever he is, it is impossible he can ever discover himself." While this is hardly more satisfactory than the original statement of secrecy, prefacing the first edition of the Letters, yet De Quincey, perhaps the most decided of the Franciscans, sees an assertion in the very ambiguity of the denial. He points out that it was "most jesuitically adapted to convey an impression at variance with the strict construction, which lurks in the literary wording."

The argument for style likewise holds good for Francis. It is contended, and rightly, that a man cannot feign a style except by a very brief effort, least of all a weaker the style of a stronger; but here is a writer with brains enough for a sustained effort. The matter has thus been presented by an admirer of Sir Philip: "Note the extraordinary coincidences between the Letters of Junius and the general ability and eloquence of Francis' speeches; the boldness and even fierceness of tone, the studied force and energy of the diction, the pointed and epigrammatic cast of style, the concise and frequent metaphors and the mixture of the language of business and affairs with a certain scholastic elegance and elaborate sarcasm."

Again, coincidence in career points to Francis. Of course this has been carried to extremes. Attempts have been made to show minute correspondence of dates and incidents in the life of Francis, with the date and incidents in the publication of the Letters. It is alleged that the papers of Francis show that his absences from London corresponded with the silence of Junius. Obviously such reasoning is precarious: a single missing link destroys the chain of evidence. The opponents of the Franciscan theory have but to prove an alibi,—that on only one occasion

Francis was too far from London for the publication of a certain particular letter,—and the case, from this side, falls to the ground. For all that, there remain many surprising coincidences in career and situation between the anonymous writer and the eminent statesman. Here are the basal arguments in favor of the title of Sir Philip Francis: “Junius shows an acquaintance with the forms of the Secretary of State’s office, and with the business of the War Office; Francis began life as a clerk in the Secretary of State’s office, and was a clerk in the War Office at the time of the appearance of the Letters. Junius shows a minute acquaintance with the private life of statesmen and with secret political manœuvres; Francis had means of access to such knowledge through his father, as well as through other channels.”

At this point it is possible to summarize the case thus: There are three requisites which must be found in the real Junius; other personages fail in some important particular, but in Francis there is a culmination of the different requisites in one man. And now to these three marks of authorship we may add a fourth, viz. psychological resemblance, or resemblance in both temperament and opinions. The former has been put as follows by an impartial critic: “Francis, whether Junius or not, was a man of great ability and unflagging industry, arrogant and vindictive in the extreme; unscrupulous in gratifying his enmities by covert insinuations and false assertions, yet courageous in attacking great men; rigid and even pedantic in his adherence to a set of principles which had their generous side,—really scornful of meanness and corruption in others, and certainly doing much to vindicate the power of public opinion.”¹ This is the moral resemblance: the mental is no less close. Take as a crucial test their political opinions. On questions of either Colonial or Home government the two men might

¹ Leslie Stephen, *Dictionary of National Biography*, xx. 179.

have radically differed. Yet there is positive agreement between Junius and Francis on the subject of Parliamentary Reform; and as to the right of Great Britain to tax America, both were opposed to it. Junius said, "The right of taxing the colonies is a speculative right merely"; Francis said, "I rejoice that America resisted."

The evidence for Francis is now in. It is, therefore, time to retrace the steps made, and to put over against this positive testimony certain qualifications—to take the salient points in reverse order. As regards mental resemblance the proof stands; it cannot be offset by the fact of the same general agreement and sympathy between Junius and all other opposition men. Sackville and Chatham, Wilkes and Tooke, may have thought largely as did Junius on affairs of state. The point here is that Francis alone meets this, in addition to the other three qualifications. As for moral resemblance, the same holds true. Junius was vehement and combative in temperament; so was Francis—his unpopularity when appointed to office in India bears this out. In truth, life and Letters correspond. Moreover, the proof is strong from its very subtlety. It is claimed by experts that the handwriting of Junius is the handwriting of Francis, disguised by flourishes and embellishments. It is otherwise with the sentiments and opinions of this writer; he does not attempt to conceal his faults nor palliate his defects. Junius, whoever he may be, stands out a zealous, opinionated, hot-tempered partisan. In repeating the principle of combination, we find that psychological resemblance makes a decided count for Francis, provided only the other points hold true; e.g., a trustworthy confession, from the other side, might destroy this entire argument. Thus in a recent work entitled "Junius Revealed, by his Surviving Grandson, H. R. Francis" (1894), proof is sought by narrating various idiosyncrasies and anecdotes preserved in family tradition. But a reviewer of this vol-

ume has correctly objected, "The value of such opinion is only corroborative. It might be nullified at any moment by an authentic disclosure of the real identity of Junius." Moreover in the latest edition of "The Francis Letters" (1901), there is presented, among the evidences against the identification of Francis with Junius, "the discrepancy which exists between Francis's private relations with certain individuals, and the treatment of these persons by Junius."

In fine, any hypothesis of Junian composition is of necessity composite; it stands only as its different parts stand. In particular, the Franciscan theory is strong only as it is fourfold strong. We may take up, then, the other three points in favor of Francis, testing their strength by whatever can be set against them. In general it is internal evidence that first impels to skepticism; the Letters themselves—their statements, their date, their style—arouse certain questions of dissent. As to coincidence in career: In one place Junius says: "I am no lawyer by profession, nor do I pretend to be more deeply read than every English gentleman should be in the laws of his country." It will be said that this is a piece of rhetorical modesty; but strictly, can it be reconciled with the fact that but two years after this Francis was made a member of the Supreme Council in Bengal, an office of great legal importance? Next, as to quality of style and requisite literary ability, here is an apparent contradiction: When Francis was scarce thirty years old, Junius was famous. In other words, was he not too young to have composed the Letters which excited such intense public curiosity? Still the matter is not without parallel. Alexander Hamilton, as a mere undergraduate in Columbia College, wrote an anonymous pamphlet of such sterling merit as to be attributed to the president of the institution. This argument might be settled by analogy, unless there were a further consideration. Again does

the book itself furnish a cause for doubt. The style is the style of youth, the contents is not. The diction of Junius has pungency, vehemence, intrepidity, and power of invective; but his sentiments are apparently those of mature age. In 1771 Junius uses the phrase "after long experience of the world." Now at that time Francis was thirty-one years old. Granted that his experience, like his handwriting, was assumed for a purpose, the general suspicion remains that so young a man could not have held out for a generation as the Oracle of the British Constitution. Lastly, as regards personal confession: The ambiguity of Francis' statement has already been considered. It might be urged that in this Francis was consistent; as his handwriting was disguised and his knowledge of the world fictitious, so his denial of authorship was meant for something else. But the question of date again creates misgiving. Why was Francis' name not mentioned in connection with that of Junius until the next century? De Quincey has ingeniously pointed out that Francis was debarred from making the avowal by fear. The clerk in the War Office, having divulged state secrets, was restrained by a motive of perpetual secrecy. True, but from 1773 to 1813 (the time of the Letters and the time of Francis' disavowal) was long enough for such a condition to pass off. The faults of Junius were forgotten, his fame remained. The authorship of the Letters, instead of being a disgrace, was an honor. Witness the number of candidates and the fact that Francis' claims were pushed by his own relatives.

In attempting a final review, as we go backward we perceive that the positive arguments grow weaker, the negative stronger. Let us sum up the four points in favor of Francis: (1) Psychological resemblance is close. As the man writeth, so is he. The Letters of Junius, like the Diary of Samuel Pepys, is not a disguise, but a disclosure. (2) Coincidence in career is strong. The rank, situation,

and sources of knowledge to be deduced from the Letters of Junius are found in the life of Francis. Such statements as "I am no lawyer by profession, nor do I pretend to be more deeply read," etc., may be discounted as attempts at illusion to be expected from a pseudonymous writer. Here the character of the evidence changes, and significantly half way comes the balancing point in the case. (3) Style, as related to mental power, appears too mature for Francis. Dr. Johnson attributed the Letters to Burke—but Burke was twelve years older than Francis. (4) Confession of authorship is ambiguous and strangely delayed. What we may say in conclusion is this: Either the authorship remains an impenetrable mystery, or it belongs to one whose name was not mentioned in connection with it for many years subsequently.

II.

If we could imagine the Junius question pushed forward some eighteen hundred years, we should probably find that the pretensions of Francis had settled into a fixed belief, an orthodox literary tenet. Yet the discerning critic of that later age—provided such an interest survived—would suspect that the problem was originally not so simple, but that in all likelihood, in the first stages of the controversy, there were several candidates in the field. To reverse this supposition, to apply it to the past and not the future, is to give the general rule that in the early ages there is great diversity of opinion as to the authorship of an anonymous work. Turning to sacred literature, on its face the Epistle to the Hebrews bears the marks of anonymity. Its superscription does not inform us of the writer,¹ nor does his name appear in the body of the book; while its position in the New Testament, after all the other Epistles, signifies the long hesitation of the ancient church as to its right to

¹Cf. Revised Version, American Committee.

a place in the canon of Scripture. Now, although a great part of Christendom has assumed the Epistle to be Paul's, there was no such uniformity until the lapse of considerable time. The unqualified statements of mediæval writers as to apostolic authorship simply reproduce the testimony of their predecessors, just as present-day Franciscan theories are but vain repetitions of the dogmatic Macaulay.

Nevertheless, at a time long before the Middle Ages, the church father did not throw the weight of his authority solely on one side. Augustine (†430) in particular, did much to perpetuate the Pauline composition of the letter; he specifies Hebrews as if it were a fourteenth Pauline Epistle, and quotes it as the Apostle's in his sermons; but he also uses such indefinite phrases as "the Epistle which is written to the Hebrews," and "the Epistle which the majority say is Paul's, but some deny."

And Augustine's master is no less hesitant and doubtful. Jerome (†420) at times quotes from Hebrews, calling it Paul's, or the Apostle's, but frequently he speaks otherwise: "If any one is willing to receive the Epistle which has been written to the Hebrews under Paul's name," and "Paul the Apostle speaks, if any one admits the Epistle to the Hebrews."

From the beginning of the fifth century, Paul's claim was generally acknowledged in the West; before that time it was as generally disowned. As Jerome stands midway between the two periods, his mediating view may well stand for the transition of belief. He refers to current doubts, but he concludes thus as to the Epistle: "It makes no difference whose it is, since it belongs to an ecclesiastical man, and is read daily in the churches." It is unfortunate that those who went before were not so discerning, but confused canonicity with apostolicity, disregarded literary and doctrinal value because of the lack of an apostle's signature. It is not surprising that there is a lack of

early testimony in the Latin Church, and that the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, are silent. A primitive age has other interests than critical questions. Still the second and third Christian centuries might be expected to contribute more to the problem than negation or meagre supposition. Nevertheless, it is a fact that there was no tradition in Italy, Gaul, or Proconsular Africa in favor of Paul until after the fourth century. Cyprian (†258) does not mention Hebrews, nor make any use of it. Tertullian (†240), denying the Pauline authorship, ascribed the letter to Barnabas. Irenæus (†202) did not attribute the Epistle to Paul, although he could have made effective use of any authentic apostolic writing in his work "Against Heretics." More significant is the testimony of the Muratorian Fragment (*c.* 170), which, like a table of contents in a first folio of Shakespeare, is the earliest extant attempt to give a formal list of those works to be considered valid. Yet the Fragment not only fails to mention this Epistle, but appears to censure it. After specifying the accepted letters, it adds: "There are many other letters (fabricated under the name of Paul) which cannot be received into the Catholic Church; for gall should not be mixed with honey."

The general rule that the earlier the age, the greater the uncertainty as to an anonymous work would appear to hold. But the question of the authorship of Hebrews is not so simple; ancient opinion fluctuates with time,—it likewise varies with place. Until Augustine, who was mainly instrumental in the change of Latin opinion, there was uncertainty in the West. It was not so everywhere. Greek Christian literature discloses a general acceptance of this Epistle in the Eastern Church. From the first generation of readers, the letter is there taken as apostolic. As might be expected from the seat of the most famous library of antiquity, the testimony of Alexandria is earliest and most

explicit. Pantænus (*c.* 175), founder of the Alexandrian catechetical school, believed Paul to be the author. Clement (†220) quotes the Epistle as Paul's, and at the same time attempts to account for the absence of the Apostle's name from the beginning on the ground of modesty. Thus the letter is taken as apostolic from the first generation of readers; in the next, Alexandrian belief appears on the surface to be uniform. Seven times does Origen (†254) cite the Epistle as Pauline, and it is also quoted by Dionysius (†270) without a sign of doubt; while still later Athanasius (†325) counts fourteen Epistles as Paul's. Subsequent to Eusebius, "Father of Church History," who records the foregoing records, this view became fixed. Cyril of Jerusalem (†389) and Chrysostom (†407) were both Paulinists.

So much may be said for Oriental tradition to the beginning of the fifth century. Now remembering that Hilary of Poitiers (†368) was the first writer in the West who unequivocally received the Epistle as Paul's, it might appear that patristic evidence was divided, that the traditions of the two branches of the church conflicted,—unless there were found a note of uncertainty even in the voice of the East. Jerome, foremost scholar of the West, used such phrases as: "The Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews, or whomsoever's you suppose it to be"; "The Apostle Paul, or whatsoever other person wrote the Epistle." Equal incertitude appears in the words of the leading scholar of Alexandria. Origen in his notes on Hebrews concludes: "Who wrote the Epistle, God only knows certainly." At present we are not concerned with the number and variety of claimants to this writing, but with the conclusion that the external evidence, with its earlier doubts and scruples, points back to an anonymous author. In short, from the testimony of those nearest in time, the author of the Epistle is no certain, well-known writer like Paul.

Turning to the internal evidence, a first glance discloses

not merely the want of title to the letter, but at the same time the absence of the writer's name, which Paul never omits. And to these two marks of anonymity we may add a third: The author himself confesses he is not an apostle, but only one of those who received his gospel "from those who heard" (ii. 3). Contrast this acknowledgment of second-hand information with the repeated declarations of Paul of his personal experience as a direct witness of the truth. Let the book again speak for itself, and we come to the second test. The difference in style between this and the thirteen acknowledged Epistles of Paul was a commonplace of antiquity. Origen has thus expressed the matter: "The style of the Epistle has not that rudeness of speech which belongs to the Apostle, who confesses himself rude in speech. But the Epistle is purer Greek in the texture of its style, as every one will allow who is able to discern differences of diction."¹ At the very beginning of real biblical criticism, dissimilarity of style aroused the suspicions of the ecclesiastical scholar. Yet, to repeat a former distinction, neither verbal coincidences nor sustained quality of diction bring exact results, without certain additional tests. The writer is confessedly not a first hearer of the gospel, and may have been using merely the stock phrases of Christianity, for such would appear to be many of the so-called Pauline expressions. Linguistic parallels tend in either direction, for or against apostolic authorship; so does the sustained quality of style. Some would make Luke the compiler, because only the second half of the book of Acts can vie with our Epistle in purity of style. On the other hand, "periods regular and rounded, rhythm oratorical and smooth, full-toned expressions and poetic figures," can all be matched in the great Apostle's discourses on Charity and on the Resurrection (1 Cor. xiii. and xv.). Literary style, taken by itself, has long furnished a weapon

¹ Eusebius, H. E. vi. 25.

which cuts both ways: but there are supplementary tests which tend only one way. To state and illustrate certain more anti-Pauline suggestions: If the Apostle were writing to Hebrews, why should he "adopt a purer Greek and higher style of writing in an Epistle addressed to readers who were the worst judges of good Greek"?¹ Were an analogy here permitted, this would be as if Junius had addressed the most carefully penned of his letters, not to Englishmen, but to the French refugees to be found, in his day, in London. Again, if the Apostle were himself an Hebrew, why should his Old Testament quotations be taken from the Greek version of the LXX, and not from the original? This would be like finding that all the Homeric allusions in the Letters of Junius were taken from Pope's translation of the Iliad, and then asserting that Junius was some famous classical scholar like Dr. Johnson.

Thus far only two tests would appear to exclude Pauline authorship. The quality of style is adverse; so are the "confessions," whether of self or others. In brief, internal evidence, combined with early Western skepticism, outweighs the traditions of the Eastern Church. For these reasons there was a compromise in the earliest times, a theory that the thoughts of the Epistle are Paul's, the language and composition another's. It was from a place naturally fertile in such suggestions that this suggestion came: Clement of Alexandria asserts that Paul wrote the Epistle in the Hebrew tongue, and Luke translated it into Greek. Moreover, Origen of Alexandria gave fuller expression to the idea that Paul was not directly, but only mediately, the author: "I should give as my judgment that the sentiments are the Apostle's, but the language and composition belong to some one who repeated from memory the Apostle's teaching, and, as it were, expounded the things spoken by his master." Such a guess, in itself, is

¹ Davidson, *Old Test. Intro.*, 212.

not improbable. In the eighteenth century certain "Discourses on Art" came forth under the name of Sir Joshua Reynolds; the ideas were his, but the literary form was due to Edmund Burke. However, the ancient theory of an amanuensis fits only one of Origen's suppositions. The so-called Epistle of Clement of Rome resembles our Epistle least of any New Testament book. It is a venerable document, and perhaps for that reason, its literary complexion is as rude as the state of culture in the church of Rome at the end of the first century.

In the next place, to scrutinize Origen's alternate candidate: since purity of language and structure speak against Paul, then Luke, who was several years his companion and by descent more familiar with the Greek idiom, was well qualified to put his Jewish master's thoughts into their final shape. The third Evangelist as a follower of Paul and mediate author of Hebrews, would account for a letter with Grecian choice of expression and Hebrew elements of thought. But again the test of career, or birth and position in life, must be met. Turning to our Epistle, we find three qualifications of necessity to be found in the author. He must have been personally acquainted with his readers,—“I exhort you the more diligently to do this, that I may be restored to you the sooner” (xiii. 19). He likewise must have been a disciple of the twelve apostles,—the gospel “which having at the first been spoken by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard” (ii. 3). Finally, the author must have been a Jew, and thus address his hearers as of the same race,—“God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers” (i. 1). Now how are these prerequisites fulfilled by Luke? If the Epistle is addressed to the Jewish Christians in Palestine, he had personal acquaintance with them, since he had accompanied Paul in his last journey to Jerusalem. For the same reason he could have enjoyed inter-

course with the Twelve. However, in the third requirement he is found wanting. The opening words of the book betray composition by a native Israelite; whereas Luke was of Grecian descent, and not of Jewish birth.

We are now thrown forward to another candidate of old, and one who was a favorite in the North African Church. A passage from Tertullian reads: "There is extant an Epistle of Barnabas addressed to the Hebrews, written by a man of such authority that Paul has ranked him with himself."¹ It needs only be suggested how Barnabas meets the demands of career which Luke only partially fulfilled. A single scriptural passage will show his qualifications: "And Joseph, who by the Apostles was surnamed Barnabas, a Levite, a man of Cyprus by race, having a field, sold it and brought the money, and laid it at the Apostles' feet" (Acts iv. 36). We have here in brief form the triple condition of career,—personal acquaintance with his audience, intimate connection with the Twelve, and lastly Jewish descent. We are now ready to examine another essential to be possessed by the author of Hebrews. The opinions set forth in the book form a further and more searching criterion. It is noticeable that the writing, which was so long on the borderland of canonicity, is one of decided peculiarity. Speaking generally, its teaching is throughout typical, symbolical, transcendental. It begins with a pæan on the sublimity of the heavenly Mediator; it continues with an exposition of the perfectness and eternity of his high priesthood; it ends with an admonition to that faith which is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." It is this last definition which gives the characteristic view-point of the author,—the contrast between the visible and the invisible world, the conception of the things of this earth as but faint copies of the things of heaven. Now, applied to ritual law and sacrificial wor-

¹ De Pudicitia, 20.

ship, this makes the Old Testament institutions to be symbols and prophecies of Christianity. The Holy Law itself is but "the example and shadow of heavenly things to come" (viii. 5). The Tabernacle is but a type of the "true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, not man" (viii. 2). And over this "greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands" (ix. 11), there is to be another and higher priest,—“the priest forever after the order of Melchizedek” (vi. 6). Without further reference to “the better covenant,” “better promises,” the New Jerusalem “whose builder and maker is God,”—it is clear that our author takes the carnal and transitory elements of the old dispensation, and sublimates and etherealizes them into types of the new.

Judging from these single selections as characteristic of the whole, what is the source of this peculiar speculative strain which runs through Hebrews? Paul occasionally typologizes the Old Testament, and once refers to the ancient ordinances as “a shadow of things to come” (Col. ii. 17), but in general he makes no such detailed application of the method of analogy. After all, there is only one other writer of the first century who carries this principle to such extreme. It was Philo of Alexandria, who was to that literary center what Emerson was to Boston. And to read the New England transcendentalist with his insistence on the Over-Soul, the Archetypal third, and the like, is to be reminded of this old idea of the things of earth as “sensual copies of supersensual realities.” Now in the ancient Epistle such “Philonic Echoes” are to be found.¹ Of course we may not assert direct dependence of the sacred upon the secular author. While to Philo the Old Testament was transmuted into Platonism, to the author of Hebrews Judaism was the shadow of which Christianity was the substance. Yet despite their difference in conclusion, their

¹ Beyschlag, *New Test. Theology*, footnote, p. 284.

initial view-point was the same: they both looked upon the biblical material with Alexandrian eyes.

We return to our last candidate and see if he meets this subtle qualification of opinion. Whence could he have derived this unique outfit of ideas? The answer is indirect, yet suggestive. Barnabas was "a man of Cyprus by race," and Cyprus was connected with Alexandria in many ways. Being commercially a half-way station between Egypt and the Levant, it was one of the islands where the Alexandrian philosophy came to be taught; along with the trade-winds came a unique intellectual atmosphere. Barnabas, born and bred a Cyprian, would account for the foreign tone in Hebrews. Nevertheless, certain additional facts of his birth and breeding apparently run counter to the internal evidence. Being a Hellenistic Jew like Stephen, Barnabas might have used the Septuagint version in his scriptural citations, but as a Levite, and therefore familiar with Levitical ritual, he should not so speak as if he derived his knowledge of the temple at second-hand (chap. ix.). Much less could he make such an error, as does the author of our Epistle, viz. that the high priest offered sacrifices daily (x. 11). Another discrepancy in the career of Barnabas is found in the fact of his being set apart as an Apostle to the Gentiles. As such he could scarcely use that tone of authority and command towards Hebrews prevalent in the Epistle.

It is so far evident that no one of the candidates mentioned in ancient tradition fulfills all the requirements of authorship. A short summation will disclose how, even in single separate tests, one after another of the claimants must be disallowed. There is first the confession of the writer, that he was not a direct hearer of the gospel. This excludes Paul. There is next the style of the Epistles—ornate and polished. This excludes Clement of Rome with his Epistle plain and unrhetorical. There is again

the career, or condition of life, which necessitates the writer addressing his readers as fellow-countrymen, the seed of Abraham. This excludes Luke the Greek. Finally, there is required a set of opinions or teaching symbolic and transcendental, and, coupled with this, such a temperament of natural ability and forcefulness as to round out the psychological resemblance.

There is only one man in whom these widely different qualifications are brought together. It is proof of the difficulty of fixing upon an anonymous writer, that his name was not suggested until the Reformation, and yet it speaks for the sagacity of Luther that his conjecture of Apollos is borne out so fully by the ancient description. In Acts we read that Apollos was "a Jew, an Alexandrian by race, an eloquent man, mighty in the Scriptures, fervent in spirit, who powerfully confuted the Jews, and that publicly" (Acts xviii. 24-28). Now see how this tallies with the main requirements and even the sub-conditions of the case. Apollos, as a Jew of the Dispersion, was not an original apostle, but only one of those "confirmed" in his salvation "by those that heard." Next, living in a second Athens of Hellenistic culture, he would naturally write a purer Greek than a Hebrew of the Hebrews. Moreover, as an eloquent man and one noted in the Corinthian church for his "persuasive words of wisdom," Apollos' writings would possess a more stately and polished style than Paul's Epistles. But general superiority of diction is not so decisive a test as the writer's specific quotations from the Old Testament. Apollos was a Jew, but he used a Greek Bible, the Septuagint being a distinctively Egyptian production. And Apollos meets the conditions of career in all their intricacy. He was a Jew, and could therefore address his hearers as descendants of the fathers. Moreover, he held intercourse with the Twelve, not originally, for when first brought to our notice he "knew only the baptism of John." Yet lat-

terly he was confirmed by those that heard—for at Ephesus dwelt St. John, and in Corinth St. Paul. An acquaintance with his readers is more difficult to prove. If the Epistle was an encyclical addressed to "Hebrews" scattered in the Christian Dispersion, Apollos would have known many such communities. He came from Egypt, which had a larger Jewish population than Palestine itself; he held public discussion with Jews in Ephesus; he had a following of Jews—like Aquila and Priscilla—in Corinth. On the other hand, if the Epistle is directed to the Hebrews in Jerusalem, we have only probability that Apollos personally knew his hearers. We know that he went from Alexandria to Ephesus, and from Ephesus to Corinth, and also that he was urged by Paul to "journey diligently" from Crete to Necropolis (Tit. i. 5 and iii. 13). Apollos' travels were extended. It is, therefore, probable that he went to Jerusalem, whether on a devout pilgrimage to the Holy City, or to visit the headquarters of the church.

There remains, as a last and most intricate test of Apollos' candidacy, his psychological resemblance to the author of Hebrews. The little that can be said as to moral identity may be left to the end; the mental identity, as disclosed by internal evidence, needs a more thorough elucidation. As we have seen, the opinions set forth in the book were throughout typical and symbolic. In brief, the priestly arrangements of the past were considered to be obscure reflections of new truths. Now the man most skilled in this kind of interpretation was Philo, who was teaching in Alexandria in Apollos' own lifetime. But for all this congeniality with the Neo-Platonic philosopher in ideal concepts and even single expressions, the writer of our Epistle had a different end and purpose. What is said of Apollos in Ephesus describes this, "He taught carefully the things of Jesus." Thus both the agreements and disagreements of the two Alexandrians will explain two marks

of our Epistle,—its strain of speculative loftiness and its Christocentric aim.

From the doctrinal contents of the Epistle arises another distinction; our author does not entirely depend on Philo, no more does he on Paul. One example will suffice. The Pauline view of the law was realistic,—it was a dead weight which hung about the sinner's neck. The view here set forth was idealistic, the Law was a "shadow of good things to come." In other words, our Epistle was one of decided originality. It had Philonic tendencies, yet it borrowed the Hellenist's figurative method alone. It had Pauline affinities—it taught Christ's humiliation and exaltation—yet it was not an adaptation, but a new presentation. "The main doctrine which runs through the Epistle, the priesthood of Christ, puts Pauline authorship away."¹ We have noted the attitude of authority used toward those whom our writer addresses (xiii. 19, 22). Along with this goes an attitude of mental confidence. In spite of its peculiar and often forced analogies, the doctrinal system of Hebrews is set out with all the assurance of a positive belief. Now Apollos would appear to fulfill this attitude of authority and of mental confidence; he was "fervent in spirit," and he "powerfully confuted the Jews."

We have pretty well exhausted the case for an Alexandrian author of Hebrews. One more point is left. What Apollos accomplished in the propagation of the gospel is the best proof that he had a forcefulness of character such as that manifest in the Epistle. The convert from Alexandria, along with Apostle Peter, became the head of a party in the Corinthian church, and Paul himself acknowledged his share in the work,—“I planted, Apollos watered” (1 Cor. iii. 6). It is needless to sum up the case for Apollos; on every count but one something can be said in his favor. The requisites of style, career, and opinion are all com-

¹ Davidson, *Introduction to the New Test.*

bined in his personality, and what is to be gathered from the book itself is in close harmony with the description in Acts. But unless this portrayal is considered valid testimony, early external evidence is totally lacking for Apollos as the author of the Epistle. It was not for fourteen centuries that Apollos' name was conjoined with this book, for it was an acute conjecture of Luther that first attributed the Epistle of Alexandrian tone with the learned Alexandrian.

In formulating the final results of our investigations we can do no better than to repeat a former statement: "Either the authorship remains an impenetrable mystery, or it belongs to one whose name was not mentioned in connection with it for many years subsequently." In fine, the answer to the problem of Hebrews may be expressed in terms of that of the problem of Junius; while a general conclusion applying to both these works is this: In view of the difficulty of fixing upon a name when it is not originally given, a book once anonymous is always anonymous.

ARTICLE II.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT
"NEW THEOLOGY."

BY THE REV. EDWARD HARTLEY DEWART, D.D.

WE hear from time to time references to the "new theology." Certain preachers and authors are spoken of as being in sympathy with modern theological views. There is a good deal of pleading in behalf of keeping up with the results of modern scientific thought, in a way that indicates a desire to make room for some new views which it is implied deserve a favorable reception, though we are generally left in doubt as to what these new ideas really are. It is natural that these things should prompt one to ask: What historic doctrines are assumed to have become effete and obsolete? Is there a new theology? If so, what are its distinguishing characteristics and tendencies? It is somewhat difficult to give definite and satisfactory answers to these questions. It is quite certain that there is no such thing as a new system of doctrines with any claim to supersede the historic teachings of Christianity. None of the great truths of our holy religion have lost their vital interest and adaptation to our human need. Humanity has not outgrown those sacred verities which have inspired the saintly and heroic souls of the ages in their work of faith and labor of love. The Scripture truths concerning God's character, man's condition by nature—his duty and destiny, the divine character and redemptive work of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the claims of God's revealed will to our acceptance and obedience, are still "the power of God unto salvation" to every one who receives them with a living

faith. These doctrines are the unwaning guiding stars of the spiritual life of the children of God, for which no earth-born philosophy can supply a substitute.

But, though "the foundation of God standeth sure," every one whose ear is open to the echoes of the day, must hear things which indicate something like a "new departure" in certain lines of theological thought, though the ideas suggested are too negative, indefinite, and discordant to constitute a system of theology. It is freely admitted that there has been in the past a development of doctrine. A restatement of doctrines is justifiable, when the meaning of Scripture is thereby more correctly given. Our methods of teaching and work should be adapted to the times in which we live. We should be ready to receive every truth that is duly attested, whether it agrees with our creeds or not. But those things are not what is meant by a "new theology."

EFFECTS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS.

There is reason to believe that, in some cases, the idea that there is a new theology in the churches results from the placing of greater emphasis on some truth or doctrine not at all new, but which has been neglected in the past. A clearer and truer apprehension of the import of some neglected truth may seem like the discovery of something unknown before. The teaching of the early Methodists was chiefly distinguished by the special emphasis of doctrines that existed in the creeds of the church, but had been largely ignored and neglected.

There is, however, such a thing as placing an undue emphasis on some one thing, that may be true enough within proper limits, but which may be so exaggerated as not to be true in the sense and degree in which it is applied. In such a case a truth may be so stated as to be untrue. When a doctrine, a method, or a duty is made a fad, which

excludes other truths from the place or consideration which they should receive, some people call this a new theology, though the truth exaggerated may not be by any means new. It also sometimes happens that when a religious teacher obtains new light upon a question, or clearer grasp of some truth, he makes the mistake of fancying that because this truth is new to him, it must be new to other people. Sometimes such a one makes the still greater mistake of regarding his personal opinions as the tide-mark of human progress. He lives so much within the circle of his own thoughts, that he imagines his beliefs must be held by the whole community around him.

It may be safely affirmed of nearly everything that claims to be new theology, that "what is true is not new, and what is new is not true." There must be an element of truth in any teaching that receives the approval of rational men. It is this element that secures adherents. It is a notable fact that the teachers of all new beliefs begin their mission in every new place, with statements that are not likely to provoke opposition, or call forth objections from those whom they seek to influence. A very cursory study of the current theories, that have any claim to be regarded as features of a new theology, will justify what we say of their origin, and show that when they are examined and punctured, there is nothing found to warrant the claim that they are newly-discovered truths; but in nearly every case they will be seen to be exaggerations of familiar ideas.

THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD.

Some things are said about the Fatherhood of God which will not bear examination. It is alleged that all men, saved and unsaved, are children of God; that this truth of the divine fatherhood was not known, or at least was but dimly apprehended, till it was revealed by Christ; and that this revelation by him has been overlooked by the churches

until made prominent in recent times. The facts do not justify these allegations. Though we fully recognize the fullness of "grace and truth" which came by Jesus Christ, we maintain that the Hebrew saints were not ignorant of the fatherhood of God. In the Old Testament we find such statements as these: "Doubtless thou art our Father, though Abraham be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not; thou, O Lord, art our Father," etc. (Isa. lxiii. 16); "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him" (Ps. ciii. 13); "O Lord, thou art our Father" (Isa. lxiv. 8); "Ye are the children of the Lord your God" (Deut. xiv. 1).

A prominent divine in a recent magazine article says that he remembers, that, when certain preachers began to preach this doctrine of the fatherhood of God, "there was great anxiety lest the foundations of theology were about to be destroyed." This singular statement implies that this doctrine has not been preached till recent times, and has been regarded by some as questionable. The present writer has heard the fatherhood of God preached for over half a century, without ever hearing any objection as to its having any dangerous tendency. It is true, there are ways of representing the divine fatherhood which are justly objectionable. Such views as that this doctrine is at variance with future punishment, or that all men are by nature children of God, only they do not know it, till it is made known to them by baptism or in some other way, may be placed in this class. But objecting to some unscriptural caricature of this kind is not denying the fatherhood of God as set forth in the New Testament.

To assert that the fatherhood of God, in the sense that the wicked and the righteous are alike his children, "is the substance of the truth to which Jesus bore witness" while on earth, is a statement that is not justified by the Gospel records of Christ's teaching; and not in harmony

with the words of the evangelist: "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." In the sense of being Creator of all, God is the Father of all; but in the New Testament the divine fatherhood implies a gracious filial relationship, on the part of those who call him Father; "for," says the apostle, "as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." To the unbelieving Jews who said: "We have one Father, even God," Jesus replied: "If God were your Father, ye would love me. . . . Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do." When, therefore, a conception of the fatherhood of God, which is declared to be inconsistent with the doctrine of future punishment, is represented as having become universally accepted as the faith of the Christian churches, one is forced to conclude, that those who make such a statement have accepted the creed of Universalists, and take the liberty of assuming that their belief is the universal faith. It is not necessary formally to disprove an assumption so contrary to the actual facts.

DISPARAGING INDIVIDUALISM.

All Christians believe in the application of Christian principles to the affairs of communities, as well as to personal conduct and character. Some social reformers, however, disparage individualism, and speak as if in some way society as a whole may be uplifted by the church or the state. But society is made up of individuals, and is just what the character of the individuals who compose it make it. If the members of a church are thoughtful, converted, consecrated men and women, that church will be a powerful agency in the promotion of moral and social reforms. If the people of a nation are intelligent and virtuous, that nation will be distinguished by stability and progress. We have societies enough and to spare. There is no way

of elevating communities, but by uplifting the individuals of which they are composed. The churches should fully recognize and enforce the doctrine of human brotherhood. The ethics of the New Testament should govern communities as well as individuals. But masses of people cannot be raised to a higher plane of life merely by being shown what is right and told to do it. There must be the motive-power of right beliefs, and the gracious ability of godly character, before there can be truly right conduct in the life. It is only the good tree that brings forth good fruit. The greatest need of the church and of the world to-day is, more men and women who will be "living epistles," illustrating the truth and power of Christ's religion in all the relations of human life.

COMING BACK TO CHRIST.

A good deal is written and said about "coming back to Christ." It is generally by no means clear what is meant by this phrase. Some times those who use it seem to mean the acceptance of certain socialist theories, which they ascribe to Christ. The most natural import of these now familiar words is, that the Christian churches have neglected or corrupted the teaching of Christ, and substituted some other authority for "the mind of the Master." Hence it is the duty of Christians to study his teaching, and to make it their standard of faith and conduct in a way that they have not done in the past. Sometimes this going "back to Christ" is put in contrasted opposition to beliefs and dogmas. But beyond question, the belief of what the New Testament teaches, respecting the character, work, and doctrines of Christ, does not tend to render Christians less likely to trust and love him, and to follow his teaching.

We should indeed frankly and fully recognize whatever truth there may be in these allegations. If any Christian teachers have gone away from Christ, and accepted some

other standard of truth and duty, they should by all means come back to him. But there is ground to question the justice of what this phrase commonly implies. It is freely admitted that Christians have not manifested the spirit of Christ's teaching in their lives as faithfully as they ought to have done. No doubt a fuller experience of sanctifying grace would give a truer insight into the mind of Christ, and a more faithful conformity to his will. But if the spotless Example, the unerring Teaching, the atoning Death and Mediatorial work of Christ have been faithfully presented in the preaching in our churches, it is not justifiable to speak of these churches as if they had gone away from Christ and neglected his teaching, until he was "re-discovered" by modern critical study. It is indeed the privilege of all Christians to "grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ"; but, those who have trusted in Christ for salvation, and are living by faith in him, cannot justly be spoken of as if they were deserters who had lost the knowledge of Christ. The common Christian conception of Christ may have been comparatively imperfect; but it did not consist of erroneous ideas that should be renounced for new views of his character and teaching. With some theologians "coming back to Christ" seems to imply a questioning of the authority and trustworthiness of prophets and apostles, under the pretext of exalting the Master, who said, "He that despiseth you despiseth me."

DISPARAGING AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

There is probably nothing so characteristic of the theological trend of the times as the rejection of authority in religion, including that of the Holy Scriptures. We do not mean merely the rejection of the inerrancy of Scripture or any particular theory of inspiration, but the denial of the trustworthiness and authority of the Bible. This drift of

current speculative thought towards the rejection of authority as a ground of belief is fruitful in practical results. There is a widespread restiveness under definite statements of doctrine and duty, and a strong desire for greater latitude in the rejection of old beliefs and rules of conduct. There is an undue exaltation of the human element in the Scriptures, and a corresponding ignoring of the divine, till the latter is largely left out of sight. Nay more, in some cases it has come to this, that prominent teachers within the Christian churches hold that whether the Scripture records, including what the Gospels tell us about the Lord Jesus Christ, are facts or fictions is a matter of minor importance, that need not affect Christian faith or piety. This is as much as to say that those who reject the historic Jesus Christ of the Gospels may still claim to be his disciples. The poet Coleridge counted nothing in the Bible inspired, except what "found him." Some modern teachers appear to hold that nothing in the Bible has any authority for them, but what they choose to indorse. They regard the Scriptures merely as the thoughts and lessons which good men of former times addressed to the people of their day. Many claim that divine inspiration was not peculiar to the sacred writers; but that it is possessed by all devout Christians, in proportion to their piety. Individual opinions are exalted to the level of the teaching of the prophets and apostles, in a way that would make every Christian an oracle of himself.

But it should not be forgotten that, as Christianity is an historic religion, its foundation facts must be received on the evidence of testimony. The rejection of the testimony by which these truths are attested is perilous to Christian faith. As the mariner who discards chart and compass and guiding stars is sure to be swept by adverse winds and waves out of the true course, so Christian preachers and teachers who disparage the truth and authority of the Bible,

and speak not according to the words of "the law and the testimony," are sure to be found "teaching for doctrines the commandments of men." The theology, whether old or "new," which undermines the authority of the Holy Scriptures, or divests our Lord Jesus Christ of those divine attributes which make him an all-sufficient Saviour, is misleading and dangerous, no matter what its claims to superior liberality may be.

ARTICLE III.

THE MOTIVE AND METHOD OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.¹

BY THE REV. H. FRANCIS PERRY, PH.D.

It would not be difficult to prove that pre-Christian times had certain forms of charitable help for the destitute and the unfortunate. The religious motive, however perverted its accompanying worship may have been, manifested itself in almsgiving long before the supreme Christian motive of unselfish love was declared and illustrated by Jesus Christ. The Egyptians, the Hindus, the Persians, the Chinese, the Greeks, and the Romans,—all had some form of charity in connection with their religious systems. The motive was usually far from altruistic, and was largely a desire for personal advantage to be gained through benevolence. It was the same motive which was dominant in the mediæval church—reward for the giver, rather than blessing for the needy.¹

Christian charity in the ancient church received its dynamic from the personal teachings of Him who founded the new brotherhood of man on the new conception of the fatherhood of God, and who thus gave to benevolence a correspondingly new impulse. Divine favor was not to be secured by almsgiving, but was already vouchsafed to man in the love of God, which only waited for repentance of personal sin to enter into the life of the disciple as a regnant force. Men were to do the works of God because they possessed the love of God—a reversal of the ancient

¹ See, for a concise treatment of ancient benevolences, Crooker's *Problems in American Society*, chapter on "Scientific Charity."

idea of merit. Love to God and to man was the normal condition of renewed life. A guide of unusual intelligence and experience stands ready to conduct us through the mazes of the Roman Empire in its days of decadence, when the Old World was approaching its death-throes, and to show us the church which was unable to arrest the dissolution of the perishing world, "but sat at its death-bed with help and comfort, and lighted up its last hours with such an evening glory as the Old World had never known in the times of its greatest prosperity." Uhlhorn is the guide in his "Christian Charity in the Ancient Church." It was into a world without love that Christianity came with its message of love in Christ. The *liberalitas* of the heathen world was not the *caritas* of the Christian church. While almsgiving was certainly a custom among the Israelites in the time of Christ, its *caritas* was largely lost in its ostentatious display. Love in benevolence does not boast at street corners. It expects no reward of men. It thinks of the need of the unfortunate, and forgets itself.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

The Apostolic Age was a period of purest Christian charity, for it lived in personal fellowship with the ascended Christ. It is customary to say that primitive charity had, as its motive, love for man, rather than any desire for personal benefit to be derived from almsgiving. This is true, but there is a still deeper love than love for men working in the first days of the church. It was love for Christ that became the principle of charity, and the love for man resulted from the love for Christ. He made over to his poor brethren on earth the results of the love which his disciples had for him. At the very beginning of this period the so-called community of goods obtained in the Jerusalem church. Love was so great that this primitive church voluntarily expressed itself in a unique brotherliness. It was

repeated nowhere else among the apostolic churches in the same form of social oneness, but shone forth conspicuously as a sequel to Pentecost, a magnificent demonstration of special grace meeting conditions of special need. Membership in the Jerusalem church at this time meant ostracism, and persecution, and sometimes death. This common suffering led to a lessening of the grasp upon individual possessions, and the formation of the new brotherhood of social oneness. That spirit of love which exposed itself in Jerusalem in the community of goods declared itself elsewhere in other ways. It was the spirit of Christ finding fitting expression in conformity with the special requirements of the local community. In the Christian church none suffered want. Gentile churches sent aid to the mother church at Jerusalem.

The heathen also experienced the results of the new spirit, as well as the brotherhood of believers. Where there was distress, abounding love suggested the giving of aid. It was a simple love for the needy which was ready joyously to sacrifice much in an enthusiasm to be Christlike in service. Paul instituted in apostolic times an international and interracial charity which did much to break down the middle wall of partition between Jewish and Gentile sons of the Heavenly Father. The method of primitive charity was the direct care of the needy by the church through its own representative officers. The diaconate appointed to care for this matter were men "of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom." There could have been no benevolent establishments in the martyr church, for the inmates of such refuges would have been persecuted and slain. There was a personal administration of help. The amount of gifts was not small. While there is but little data to show exactly how much was collected, we know that Cyprian gathered a special collection in his church of \$4,250 for Numidian prisoners. Eusebius writes

that 1,500 widows and indigent persons were supported in Rome by the church. At first the sole purpose of the money collected by the church was the relieving of the poor. The first period of Christian charity extends from the ascension of Christ to the nominal triumph of the church under Constantine. Its chief principle was love, its method the congregational care of the poor rather than the institutional care. The congregation at its public worship and at the celebration of the Lord's Memorial made an offering for the poor, in singleness of purpose, controlled by love. The followers of Christ were taught that it was treason to their Lord to live in superfluous luxury when the poor were hungry. The primitive Christians lived as members of the Family of the Redeemed. The family was still relatively small and knew each other. The individual church through its appointed channels cared directly for the poor. In this first period the whole church assembled for worship, and all gave, and gave generously. If liberality consists in the spirit rather than the amount of the gift, the first period of the Christian church gave more liberally than did any succeeding time. The genuine strength of primitive charity could not be more strongly declared than by stating that Julian the Apostate sought to produce under the law of paganism a similar system of charity.

THE SECOND PERIOD OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

The line of demarcation between the charity of the primitive church and the church of the Empire of necessity is not clear-cut and distinct. "Obscurations," to use Uhlhorn's expressive word, "of charity" were seen in the præ-Constantinian era. There was a tendency in the church, during the latter part of the first period, to accept in certain quarters the pernicious perversion that almsgiving is sin-atonement. In proportion as this doctrine became the

general belief, the earlier motive of simple, loving service for the needy was eclipsed, and a dangerous departure from the faith was accompanied by a declining delight in self-forgetfulness in God's service. Four changes in the post-Constantinian Age must be observed:—

1. The condition of the world.
2. The condition of the church.
3. The new motive.
4. The new method.

1. The Old World was perishing. The death-rattle was already heard in its shriveled throat. Morality was lowered, misery was increasing, taxes were oppressive, barbarity was but veneered by law, distress grew apace, the Northern barbarians became more insolent and powerful. Men grew weary of life, and poverty and want and desolation were universal. There was a horde of beggars, an army of wretched men and women, hungry, naked, sick, who besieged the only power which was willing to offer help. The state never attempted to alleviate in any generous, systematic way the needs of its despoiled citizens. It did, however, make over to the church donations and privileges, which aided the church in its great work of alleviating distress.

2. The condition of the church must also be observed before we can wisely estimate the new motive and the new method of benevolence. The cross has conquered the crown, and nominally the empire is Christian; but this unfortunate alliance of Christianity and paganism paganized Christianity as much as it Christianized paganism. Now spacious and beautiful churches were built, men of strength became leaders of the church; but religion was growing to be a more formal matter, and vital piety was waning. Only a part of the church was present at the public worship, and offerings were now obtained from worshipers by exhortation and command. Over against the decreasing

congregational gifts was the fact that the church treasury never was more abundantly supplied. Donations and legacies were made by emperors and the rich, so that the church rapidly increased in wealth. "In the fifth century the church was the greatest land-owner in the empire." Funds were safely invested, and the church derived a large income, which was used for the help of countless multitudes.

3. But a new motive is clearly discernible in this period. That which was already seen in the beginning in the first period has now become the ruling motive. Men were now giving not with the abounding love of the primitive church, but because of the benefits accruing to the giver through the gift. The larger the gift to the church, the safer their own souls would be in the time of judgment. A sure method of causing God to be propitious to them was to relieve the distress of others. Alms were given soon after the death of a friend, with the expectation that some merit might thereby accrue to the advantage of the deceased. Legacies and endowments were often given in remembrance of the departed. The earlier period gave a foreboding of the doctrine of merit through almsgiving, this period suggests the dangers of the doctrine of purgatory. A very strong motive for almsgiving is present in the belief that it delivers one from the torments of purgatory.

4. The new method of helping the poor in this epoch differs widely from the earlier, congregational method. When all the people gave and the church had no other income, it was administered by the officers—the deacons—of the church in the homes of the poor; but now it was chiefly administered by the bishops who had charge of the undivided church, and who kept a head manager of the church property—a steward. Wholesale alms from the church revenues were given to the deserving and the undeserving by the bishops, and the multitudes who had pre-

viously been cared for in their own homes were now transferred to the *xenodochias*, the poorhouses, the hospitals, and the monasteries, which were sustained by the church. The *xenodochium* was instituted for the eminent Christian virtue of hospitality. It was a house for strangers. The first hospitals received all who needed an asylum,—strangers, the poor, the needy, the sick, widows, orphans,—and not until later were they reserved for the sick and infirm. Great misery led to their formation. It was the age for institutional help. The monastery, the home of the ascetic believer who did not attempt to penetrate the life of the world with the spirit of Christ but fled from the dying old world, was another refuge for the wretched. The monastic was obliged to work for his own support, and to be able to give extensive benevolent aid. The poor and the stranger were received at the monastery, and were fed and cared for. The cloister sheltered the sick, and restored them to health again.

The second period of Christian charity extends from the time of Constantine to the dissolution of the old Roman Empire. Its chief principle was almsgiving for merit; and its methods, wholesale giving from church revenues through the bishop's steward, or the presidents and stewards of benevolent institutions. The fathers of the church kept themselves poor, in order that the needy might be helped. It was indeed a noble sight to see Basil waiting upon the sick, Chrysostom living modestly and daily feeding 7,000 poor, Augustine desiring no other garment than such as he could give to any poor brother, Gregory mourning for days upon hearing that a man had died of starvation in Rome and accusing himself of being his murderer. The church fathers declare that the relief of the poor was one of the main reasons for the payment of tithes, and say, "A man who does not pay his tithes will appear before the tribunal of the Eternal Judge, charged with the murder of all the

poor who have died of hunger in the place in which he lives; since he has kept back for his own uses the substance which God has assigned to the poor."

In these tumultuous times, when the Old World was breaking up and the New World was but yet in its swaddling-clothes, the church became the great center of blessing and help. In spite of the lesser motive, and by the use of the different method, the church did a marvelous amount of blessed work in the sunset days of the old empire and the sunrise hours of the new German world. Well does Guizot say: "From the fifth century we discover a powerful guarantee for the safety of society in the authority of the Christian priests. The municipal functions were performed by the bishops and clergy. In reality all that remained of the jurisprudence of the Roman Empire were some civil ordinances, which the magistrates and the heads of towns, discouraged by imperial restrictions and the ruin of cities, neglected to enforce. On the other hand, the bishops and priests, zealous and energetic, looked keenly to the interest of their people and directed their affairs. It would be unjust to charge them with usurpation. The natural course of events placed them in their new position. They were the only class possessed of intelligence and moral courage, and they alone were deserving of authority. Such is the law of the world. The church of that epoch earned unquestioned glory, the glory of powerfully contributing to the formation and development of modern civilization."

THE THIRD PERIOD OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

The Germanic races had taken possession of the Roman land and government through successive waves of destruction, and now the fair-haired, blue-eyed men of the North were in turn to be conquered by the Roman religion, and customs, and languages. This double conquest had already

shown itself. In outward things the Germans were conquering the Romans; but in inner life the Romans were conquering the Germans, and teaching them to live in cities, to read and write, to become civilized in their form of life and in their tastes, and also that which is more important for our study, to accept their religion. It was these rude barbarians, brave in battle, faithful in family purity, whose blood was to infuse fresh vigor into the body politic, and whose labor should be the continuation of the world-life through the birth-pangs of the national spirit into modern civilization. Mediæval Europe in the dark ages appears at first sight to be an epoch of disaster and distortion and death, but in reality it is a time of beginnings, of preparation for the greater civilization that was yet to come.¹

The church of the Middle Ages was the Roman Catholic Church, with its iridescent dream of a world-church to which the state should be loyally subject. Was the Roman Empire established on a German basis only to be overcome in a great struggle by the Imperial Church under Gregory the Great, who saw a vision of Rome as the final arbiter of all earthly power? Such a vision was an impossibility even for those church-intoxicated days, and the Concordat of Worms, in 1122 A. D., was a compromise for both the church and the state.

The charitable motive of the mediæval church was a self-receiving rather than a self-sacrificing desire. The expiatory power of almsgiving, which had superseded the simple giving of help through love for Christ and the sufferer in the second period, has now reached its maturity and climax in the elaborately planned, meritorious results of benevolence, touching all forms of life.

The method of charity was in conformity with the general movement of the period, which was to sink individu-

¹See Emerson's Introduction to the Middle Ages, and his Mediæval Europe.

ality in corporate life. Everything which would tend to emphasize personal power or differentiation had the age tendency against it. Institutional life was everywhere regnant, and the strongest man was bidden to submerge himself in the interests of his class. All charity became in this period institutional, and was given to the church as a means of the giver's salvation, and was distributed by the church, and not by the individual. The important element of personal love was lost, and the indiscriminate giving by the church or the monastery fostered poverty and educated beggary. The indiscriminate almsgiving of the Middle Ages was not inculcated by the church. The fathers declare the necessity of investigating the cases of those who apply for help, and a celebrated mediæval theologian of Paris affirmed that to give to one who has no need is not only not a merit, but even a demerit. Thus in *theory* the church was not favorable to indiscriminate giving, but the preaching of discrimination in giving was overwhelmed in the insistence on giving as a meritorious deed. Historically considered, the theory was lost, and almsgiving was practically indiscriminate, all cases receiving help.¹ The man who gave to the poor in the first period of charity, with Christlike love for the needy in his heart, and who made sacrifices to give his gift without a thought of himself, is of a totally different type from the man in the Middle Ages who gives merely to obtain for himself or his deceased friends the clemency of the Great Accountant in the skies. Well does Uhlhorn say, "The transformation was complete." Benevolence became a source of corruption both for the giver and the receiver. The beggar felt that in giving one an opportunity to relieve his wants he was doing him a favor. Beggars looked upon begging as a profession through which they were ministering to the Christian growth of those whom they

¹ See Ashley's *English Economic History*, pp. 316, 339.

asked for aid. Men did not longer give to alleviate suffering or honor God.

The defects in the method of relief were many. No attempt was made by the state as a whole or by secular public authority to relieve distress. It could hardly have been expected that the help which came through endowments and personal almsgiving should have been wisely distributed to meet the highest needs of all the unfortunates. Whatever the theory may have been about the investigation of the cases of those who asked for help, the practical outcome was indiscriminate charity, which, instead of wisely relieving and checking poverty, created a pauper class, which found it unnecessary to work for a living. The charity of the time was not coördinated or distributed wisely. Often those who most needed help were left to suffer, while the professional beggar had an easy time. Certain districts of a given country might be flooded with charitable help through richly endowed foundations, while other parts of the same country would be starving. Thus relatively a small part of the population received much aid from charitable endowments, while other people received next to nothing. It even happened that some healthier districts of the country had many hospitals, while those parts constantly troubled with malaria had scarcely none. The severe indictment against the charity of this period, then, is that the deserving and the needy were often left to suffer, while the undeserving and professional beggars were thriving in their laziness.¹

One would, however, leave a wrong impression of this period if he said nothing about the beneficent results which followed even this imperfect motive and method of charity. While one regrets the loss of apostolic fervor and of congregational distribution, yet the compassion of the church counted for much in the dark ages which followed the

¹ See Ashley's *English Economic History*, Vol. ii. chap. v.

breaking-up of the empire. It was the light center of help for despoiled centuries. It would doubtless be going too far to say that there was no love in this period, but it was only an institutional love, which is cold and unsatisfying when compared with the love in the days before Constantine.

The third period of Christian charity extends from the overthrow of the Roman Empire to the time of the Reformation. During the mediæval period no attempt was made by the state as a whole, or by secular public authority, to relieve distress. The help all came from various forms of almsgiving. All the tendencies in the second period which were contrary to the simple, unselfish devotion of the first period, came to their full maturity. Almsgiving became a mere financial bargain, the benefits of giving to accrue to the giver. The doctrinal aspect of almsgiving was largely to blame for the shiftless methods of charity. If reward and merit were to be earned through almsgiving, the giver would not be likely to be overcareful in the distribution of his alms: for the whole proceeding was largely subjective, and the needy only an opportunity for the exercise of this grace. It would have been surprising, indeed, if there had been discrimination under such a doctrine of giving. The period was retrogressive in its relation to development, for the motive of almsgiving carried the mediæval church back to the old pagan idea of giving, which was essentially selfish. The Oriental giver under the sway of ethnic faiths, long before the Sun of Righteousness shone upon the earth, was somewhat charitable, but it was a charity essentially selfish. The same principle was powerful in the church of the Middle Ages. It was only self-seeking covered with a thin veneer of brotherliness which was seen in the apostate church. The Reformation period was to be a summons to sincere souls, kindled with the fire of a new love, to a new form of charity which was really the old form of primitive Christianity. Any kind of char-

ity was new to the fierce Germans, and doubtless counted for much in binding the new people to the charitable church. All the time this selfish charity was accomplishing one purpose, it was educating the community to believe that a large amount of work should be done, and that the needy should somehow be helped. This impulse when directed by scientific methods of modern charity is valuable indeed.

THE FOURTH PERIOD OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

The Reformation period of Christian history gave the principles which would finally divorce the organic union between the church and the state, and in this separation an inevitable change was involved for the motive and method of charity. The Reformers taught that the government of the church was in the hands of the church itself, and was not the prerogative of a priestly class. They also declared that the church should not control the state, nor the state dominate the church. Let church and state co-operate in moral order. Another cardinal principle of the Reformation was that the individual had a right to judge for himself in religious matters, and that liberty of conscience and worship was his inherent right. The exaltation of the Scriptures and the dethronement of tradition brought men back to the old principles of love to God and love to one's brother. The doctrine of merit by works was sharply indicted, and thus forced upon the attention of the Reformers the current conception of almsgiving, and brought the condemnation of the new freedom upon the old method. The motive for giving by the Christian in the Protestant communions swung partly back to the primitive motive of love. Given an open Bible, an emerging individuality, an independent church and state, and the conditions for unselfish charity are again before the church. In this period the study of the method is

very important because it is the beginning of a radical change.

When the changes already noted took place, it was next to certain that there would come, sooner or later, a great change in the method of administering charity. Secular instead of ecclesiastical agencies might be expected to care for the needy, the defectives, and the delinquents. In proportion as civil affairs were separated from the church, charity would tend to become a secular duty. Since the Reformation, Protestant countries have seen that the care of the needy belongs primarily to the state. Different forces coöperate to bring about this radical change in the method of charity. It is first seen in Western Europe in the end of the fifteenth century. It had become very evident that the church had largely failed in the method of administering help; that pauperism was increasing through indiscriminate charity, and that only a stringent prohibition of begging would relieve the situation. The action of monasteries had been utterly ineffectual in the diminishing of pauperism, and their indiscriminate alms made a class of professional beggars. That this spirit pervaded all classes of public and private givers is seen in the words of Crowley in 1550, who described the tricks of beggars, and then says: "Yet cease not to give to all without any regard. Though the beggar be wicked, thou shalt have thy reward." Lecky is within the facts when he says, that Catholic charity has "created more misery than it has cured." When he sums up the work of monasteries he is not too radical in saying, "The poverty they have relieved has been insignificant compared with the poverty they have caused." Why not turn to the state for help? Three forces were coöperating to aid in this wise transition. Before scholasticism became effete, John Major, the Nominalist, sought to magnify the functions of the state. In 1515 he wrote: "If the Prince or Community should decree that

there should be no beggars in the country, and should provide for the impotent, the action would be praiseworthy and lawful." This became in later times an argument used by cities for the right to suppress public begging by law.

The Reformers were led, as we have just suggested, by a theological reason, to see that the doctrine of meritorious works in relation to charity was pernicious, and were constrained to seek some other method as well as motive for philanthropy. In 1520 Luther declared that one of the greatest needs of the time was the total abolition of mendicancy, by which he probably meant to include the mendicant orders. At the time of the Reformation the country swarmed with beggars. Luther says, "This caused no wonder, as the monks made a religious service out of begging." Luther sought to diminish the evil when the doctrine of justification by faith had taken away the doctrinal excuse for begging. Collections were taken, and people appointed, as in the early church, to attend to their distribution, and to see that only the worthy poor received aid. Luther was very generous in his gifts to the poor. The associates of Luther were untiring in their sacrifices for the needy. The sixteenth-century church went back to the personal method of the martyr church. Each town, Luther said, should discover those who were truly poor, and maintain its own poor. The church and the state should work together to destroy pauperism. In 1523 Luther drew up "The Regulation of a Common Chest," which became the basis of reform in Protestant Germany. This common chest was to give wise aid to the worthy poor, and was to be administered by elected citizens. The abolition of the monasteries and the confiscation of the property of the Romish Church came about in a most indefensible way, but the ultimate result was a blessing to the poor of England.

Its immediate result was the swelling of the full ranks of vagrants and mendicants, but out of the increased evil

came the ultimate result of the overthrow of many centers of pauperism, the stopping of the accustomed doles of the paupers, and the seeking for a relief for destitution which found form in the enactments of Elizabeth's reign. In England under Elizabeth the principle of a compulsory assessment for the relief of the poor was established in 1601. It was seen that earlier statutes which inflicted severe punishment were not enough to put down pauperism; that man must be kept from the kind of want that would make him break the law. The eminent statesmen of Elizabeth's reign decided to attack the problem squarely, and were forced to see that the relief of destitution must be undertaken by the state, and that taxation must prove the means for two things—for seeking to set to work those who could work, and to provide if necessary the material; and for relieving such poor people as could not work. The administrative work was to be done by overseers of the poor, "who were to be composed of four, three, or two substantial householders in every parish, who shall, under the hand and seal of one or more justices of the peace, be yearly nominated in Easter week, and that these, with the church wardens, shall be overseers of the poor." The chief part of this enactment was the compulsory assessment for the relief of the poor by the state, even though a part of the administrative force was from the church. This great event in English poor-law legislation is really the foundation of the English Poor Law.¹ And yet, against the scientific method of charity, the Roman Church, tenacious of the principles of the dark ages, in the person of William Cobb, says: "The Reformation is the cause of the misery, mendicancy, nakedness, famine, and the endless list of woes, which we see and which stun our eyes. England celebrated, when it was Catholic, as the land of hospitality, generosity, comfort, opulence, and serenity, has become,

¹ See Sir G. Nichols's *History of the English Poor Law*, Vol. i. chap. iv.

under the Protestant yoke, the theater of cold egotism, of the labor of beasts of burden, of extreme misery and rapacity."¹

In this modern period the state has not been guiltless in creating pauperism. Near the end of the eighteenth century in England, poor laws were so lax, and relief was so easy to secure, that it became more desirable for a shiftless man to become a pauper than an honest laborer. The poor rate became so oppressive that farmers offered to give up their lands, rather than pay such exorbitant taxes for maintaining able-bodied men in idleness. These same paupers refused to take such land, because they enjoyed the system of relief much better. This reminds one of the taxes levied about A. D. 400, in the decadent days of the Old World, when a large tract of land in the Campagna was allowed to become a desert, because its owners could not meet the enormous taxes levied upon it.² In some parishes in England the cultivation of the soil ceased, since the land could not produce enough to pay the taxes for pauperism. The evils of pauperism had become unendurable. Men felt no repugnance in taking the pauper's portion. Hard-working men were nearly killed with the burden of taxation. Their hard-earned money was given to the beer-shops, which were largely supported by the paupers. In 1834 an effort was made, by the abolition of outdoor relief for the able-bodied, to do away with this system. Excellent results followed, but even now only about one-ninth of the paupers enter almshouses.

The great cities were beginning to feel the sense of corporate life, and this led them to grapple with the burning question of poor relief. The evils of the old church system were felt in the cities, for the deserving and undeserving poor were alike attracted there by the lavish gifts from

¹ Letters of the Reformation.

² Mackenzie's *Nineteenth Century*, pp. 11, 81, and 180 *seq.*

the rich endowments for the poor. These cities were forced in self-defense to create a civic organization to deal with relief and to forbid begging. These different movements led to the principle of the civil control of relief measures. The state soon found that it could not stop pauperism by mere repressive measures while the church controlled the aid, but that it must itself take charge of relief work. It was not transferred in Germany as quickly as it otherwise would have been, on account of the religious wars which followed the Reformation. It was done in England at the time of the English Reformation, in France at the time of the Revolution, but not in Italy till the last few years; for where the Romish Church holds power it strenuously objects to the relinquishing of the relief system for the poor. Legal charity is called by Romish writers a Protestant innovation, a poor substitute for the generous almsgiving and for the innumerable asylums created by the Papal church for the relief of every form of misery. True charity, according to this biased view, was extinguished by Luther and Calvin and the other leaders of the Reformation, because they denied the necessity of good works for attaining salvation. Cardinal Baluffi¹ laments that Protestant influence has closed the hand of charity in many instances, and brought disrepute upon the sovereign means of meriting a reward for the giver by almsgiving; but boasts that the divine virtue which secures to those who give most freely the largest measure of merit, still lives on the earth among the faithful. Baluffi holds that the declension of charity as a religious institution "is traceable in a large degree to the deadly exhalations of Protestantism, to the domination of an infidel and cruel philosophy, and to the baneful agency of secret societies." "The only true charity is Catholic charity."

The history already related answers without any com-

¹ The Charity of the Church a Proof of her Divinity.

ment the partisan attacks of writers like the Italian Cardinal.

It certainly was right that the state should accept its burden in the relief of the poor, but it also does well to allow that the impelling motive to charity in general exists because the church had taught the centuries the invaluable lesson of help for the needy and dependent.

The fourth period of Christian Charity, therefore, extends from the time of the Reformation to the beginning, say, of the eighteenth century. Its noteworthy characteristic was the transference of the administration of charity from the church to the state.

THE FIFTH PERIOD OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

We have now reached our own period, which we will call the epoch of scientific charity. The transition which was being made in the fourth period from ecclesiastical to secular charity, in the fifth period has reached its culmination, and all students agree that the administration of general charity belongs to the state. Middle-Ages charity, with its motive of personal advantage, and its method of indiscriminate giving to relieve temporal wants, has given way to a truer benevolence in motive and a wiser method of administration.

Crooker in "Problems in American Society," in his chapter on Scientific Charity, gives three causes for the transition from ancient to modern charity, namely :—

1. The administration of charity was transferred from ecclesiastical to secular agencies. This point we do not need to consider further.

2. The rise of the humanitarian sentiment, which gave to the world a more exalted idea of man and society. The dignity and worth of man were emphasized.

3. The growth of the scientific spirit. Men began to inquire why there were so many in want? What could be

done to relieve this want, and to remove the sources of misery?

Such questions led to the beginnings of wise methods of amelioration. A scientific study of charity and its application to active conditions began in 1788 in Hamburg. In fact, as early as 1711 steps were taken in this Free City for some personal supervision of the poor which should attempt to cure the evils of pauperism. Proper organization of this purpose for such a great task developed from the principles of 1711 was made in 1788, and personal supervision, employment, medical help, and day nurseries were established, while coöperation between the various charitable agencies of the city was insisted upon. The funds came (1) from public taxes, (2) from one-half of what was collected in the poor-boxes of the churches, (3) from a subscription taken up annually by prominent citizens, (4) from weekly collections taken by the district visitors as they went from house to house, given by those who made no annual subscriptions, and (5) from three thousand poor-boxes kept in as many families. But, in the one hundred years and more which have been added to the world's life since 1788, few additions have been made to the Hamburg system. This institution of poor relief was initiated in twenty cities of Germany, while it also aroused great interest in foreign countries. It is very evident that the real origin of our own modern scientific method of charity did not originate in Elberfeld, but in Hamburg. Elberfeld borrowed from Hamburg, and in 1801 began work which remained unchanged until 1853, when this system of charity, which had not worked very well, was made more efficacious by a reorganization, without change of the fundamental principles. More enthusiasm and more overseers made the system successful. The plan of Thomas Chalmers to assign a small number of families to a Friendly Visitor was a contribution which he gave to the Elberfeld method, and it is

now a constituent part of the famous system. In 1869 the London Charity Organization Society was formed on the Elberfeld system. In 1877 the Charity Organization Society was formed at Buffalo on the basis of the societies in Elberfeld and London. Now there are about seventy American cities whose charitable work is modeled on the Elberfeld plan, but with this difference, that they are private institutions rather than a part of the municipal government like Hamburg and Elberfeld. Another difference is that the German form of government seems to be better fitted for honor officers, while the American system thus far has needed salaried officers. The principle, however, remains unchanged—personal supervision of the destitute, with the purpose of preventing pauperism and the coördinating of all charitable agencies.

Some of the principles of modern scientific charity may be stated thus: "Give no man a cent that he can earn"; "Have a personal supervision of the poor"; "Give immediate attention at the critical moment, and be sure that your care is both wise and friendly"; "Study the cause of pauperism"; "Investigate thoroughly all cases of need"; "Have coördination among the various charitable agencies"; "Well-meant charity may be a curse to the poor if it is unwisely given"; "Seek to prevent rather than to alleviate poverty"; "Part of the time of the wise friends of the poor is occupied with the undoing of the work of the unwise friends of the poor"; "There must be a heart back of the system, which yearns with true sympathy to assist the unfortunate"; "Purify the home, and thus help children to live up to their best instead of their worst heredity"; "You can do but little for the poor; you must work *with* the poor"; "Above all, do not wear patronizing airs in trying to aid the poor." All of these may be summed up in the present Elberfeld fundamental principles: "Poor relief must be individualized, so that the aid given to each

person must correspond in its character and its amount to the peculiar needs of the individual"; "Let there be a thorough examination of each individual dependent, continued careful guardianship during the period of dependence, and constant effort to help him to regain economic independence."

While we talk of the secular management as the administrative method of modern charity, it must be emphasized that the separation of work into sacred and secular does not mean that in voluntary charity the workers in the secular department are irreligious men. The real fact probably is that in American cities the voluntary charitable work of coördination, as well as the money for the immediate alleviation of distress, comes very largely from those who are the pledged followers of Christ. The time and attention and money necessary for this work of friendly visiting and helpful aid is often given by those who also give these same gifts to the poor and needy of their own churches. While, therefore, the important separation of the church from the state has made wise the care of the poor at large by men in the capacity of citizens rather than as churchmen, yet really the same men are largely instrumental in this work. The form of work which is done in the modern period by the state as an institution in the care given in almshouses, orphan asylums, hospitals, asylums for the insane, and in outdoor relief at home, is more consistently called the secular charitable work. That this work for men in general, and especially for the defective classes, belongs to the state we do not question. The ecclesiastical administration would doubtless be less satisfactory, but it is a testimony of no small value given to the church by Warner in "American Charties," "It was right that the state should undertake relief work, but that relief work and the great access of sympathy for our fellow-men which compelled it, would never have existed except for the in-

fluence of the church." This relief work by the state is under strictly secular officers, and should be kept so, with no influence attempted by the church, except the repeated affirmation that it should be honestly administered.

The seeming glory and triumph of the church in the days of Constantine, when a state church was created, was in reality a disaster of large proportions, the culmination of which was the selfish, corrupt papal system. In the present period the relation of the church and state in European countries is vastly different from that of the United States. The state supports the national church, but is tolerant of other forms of religious belief. The state church in Germany and England is constantly brought into comparison with the growing power of dissenting worship. France supports several church organizations on an equal footing, and permits a toleration under certain conditions, but in reality the Romish Church is still strongly enough entrenched to claim the allegiance of the country which was called the Eldest Daughter of the Church. While United Italy tells of the uprising of political freedom, yet Italy is also virtually a Roman Catholic state church. Other forms of worship are tolerated. In the United States there is no palsying alliance between the church and the state with its grudging toleration; but we have found a better way for the conduct of both church and state—freedom for both. Not toleration, but freedom of worship; not submission or patronage, but freedom of citizenship. This separation of church and state, and consequent freedom of worship, was not the matter of a day, even in our own land. The early history of our own colonies was virtually a union of church and state. Colonial history declares that the church and the state were at first intimately joined, and that the religious meeting corresponded with the town-meeting. Religion was supported by taxes. Ministers were generally chosen in open town-meeting. Attendance on worship was

compulsory. Marriage must be performed by a civil magistrate, and not by the minister. The rude altar was the center of all life,—religious, social, and political. The first town-meetings were held in the meeting-houses. We know too well the few pages of that early history, when the men who had themselves fled from intolerance, became intolerant, and persecuted and banished and imprisoned, by order of the Court, those who differed from the colonial church in matters of conscience. But that is long past; and in the United States to-day the church is free, and the state is free. The state now exists as the organized body for the performing of civic functions; the church exists as the organized body of Christian believers, under various forms of belief, each man through freedom of conscience voluntarily accepting the form of belief which appeals to his life.

In the days when birth into the state also gave one birth into the church without any required new birth from above or voluntary acceptance of any faith, it was very easy to see, that, if the church was to care for her own, she must care for all the people. We of the evangelical faith are more scriptural in our conception of the church as a body of voluntary believers who have confessed Christ. But the question remains to be answered, What is the obligation of the church to-day in wise charitable relief? What duty has the church, as a church, to the poor? There appears to be no dissenting voice to the statement that the church in the United States should care for its own members who may be in distress and suffering. With the exception of possible hypocrites who may be parasites upon the church life, these are the poor who through unavoidable circumstances have been brought to want. In a quiet, unostentatious way, having regard to the Lord's injunction that the left hand should not know what the right hand doeth, these people are helped usually in a genuinely sci-

entific manner. Investigation by competent persons is usually made in the spirit of brotherly love, and those assisted where real need actually exists. In my own church of 1,150 members, for instance, our charitable work is conducted on a thoroughly scientific method. The poor fund is under the judicious care of one of our deacons, who personally visits reported cases of distress, extends sympathy and aid, and is held responsible by the board of deacons for the administration of the fund. In special cases he asks for council and direction from the full board of deacons. But little money is paid directly into the hands of the needy. Every effort is made to prevent the loss of self-respect on the part of the recipient, and to see to it that no one is led toward pauperism. All of the other agencies for help in our church are coördinated with the central department, and move on in harmony, so that the same person is not being helped by various societies within the church. We also have those who assist with personal visits and counsel the needy families, and express to them the true love which is the only genuine motive of Christian helpfulness.

There may be a difference of opinion on the question whether it is the duty of the church as a church to undertake the care of a specific number of families outside its own membership.

Whatever may be the answer to the second question, it is perfectly evident that the church is called upon to undertake some work of relief for those outside its membership. The measures of relief must be largely that form of help known as outdoor relief, and all the benefits of this mooted system of relief can be seen at its best in private relief when this charity is scientific as well as religious and sympathetic. In addition to the financial help which is to be given, the church should undertake the more taxing and more productive work of friendly visiting, and by well-

planned friendliness open the door of a broader life to the people who have lived in the shadow of comparatively unnecessary degradation.

During this period in which the state has developed its interest in the care of the poor, either by state support or by voluntary secular societies, there has occurred a remarkable movement in Germany along the regenerated members of the State Church in behalf of the needy. No survey of the fifth period would be at all complete without showing something of the work of the Inner Mission of the German people. This is distinctively a religious movement, having its incentive in an evangelical love for the lost and the unfortunate. Its motive is love. In Protestant Germany the condition of church and state is not unlike that which was found in New England in early colonial days. Membership in the state presupposed baptism into church relationships and finally confirmation, whether one is regenerated or not. The community, therefore, is at one on civic and religious interests. The Lutheran churches are closely allied to the state, and must render their final reports to officers whom the state appoints. There are about twice as many Protestants as Romanists in Germany. The Emperor is at the same time head of the nation and of the church. Every minister is an officer of the government. The state builds churches. The local church is maintained by taxation. There are earnest regenerated men in the national church, and these men have combined in what is known as the Inner Mission for the needy at home. The primary work is to win nominal Christians to a spiritual life, the "saving of the heathen at home," the regeneration of lost men, and the helping of the poor to temporal and eternal salvation. It is to secure a regeneration in the Inner Life of the state, the church, and society. Its entire basis is spiritual love for men leading to a crusade against the devastation which sin and want

had wrought in the professed members of the church. Less than six per cent of the children of Protestant parents remain unbaptized, and most of those who are christened are later confirmed; so that to work for the people of Germany is largely to work for the members of the church.

The Inner Mission is a comprehensive work of voluntary associations. Its purpose is "to stretch a holy net of love, whose separate threads are already spun, but which waits upon this union for a well-ordered, closely connected whole." The central committee has an office in Berlin. Its functions are instruction, inspection, counsel, assistance, but not legislation. The term Inner Mission was used to designate all the works of rescue which grew out of Christian faith and love in response to social need. Many voluntary fraternities had been formed in different countries and in different branches of the church to respond to the call of suffering. There was one common foundation here—faith that Christ is the Redeemer of the perishing. "The Inner Mission does not mean this or that peculiar work, but the sum of labor which arises from loving faith in Christ, and which seeks to renew within and without the condition of those multitudes in Christendom upon whom has fallen the power of manifold external and internal evil which spring directly or indirectly from sin, so far as they are not reached by the usual Christian offices with the means necessary for their renewal. No form of evil or misery is to be neglected. No class is to be ignored." The City Mission does in a city that which the Inner Mission does in an empire. It is a local Inner Mission for the helping and saving of the people. The spiritual leaders of the church saw that through faith Jesus would free the souls of men from sin and death; through the works of kindness, on the part of regenerated men, he would free society from the evils of sin, from poverty, wretchedness, and ruin.¹

¹ See Williams' *Christian Life in Germany*.

The motive of the Inner Mission is evangelical love expressing itself in all forms of helpfulness. Active Christian love has been found to be the best agency for reaching men materially and spiritually. Most of its work appears to be work for the physical betterment of society; but, beneath its work of alleviating suffering, of changing social conditions, of rescuing the lost, of preventing woe, it soon becomes evident that the principle at work is love, and that the purpose of the work is to win those who are helped back to the church and to personal allegiance to Christ. This very work has led the state to be more careful and helpful in its care of the unfortunate.

THE AGENCIES OR METHODS OF THE INNER MISSION.

The orders of deacons and deaconesses have been revived. Nine thousand deaconesses are at work for the people of Germany in 730 hospitals, 168 homes for the poor and feeble, 125 orphan houses, 48 nurseries, 50 establishments for the training of servant girls, 451 schools for little children, and as pastors' assistants in 1,017 parishes, as well as in other ways. This force of deaconesses preach regeneration as the only permanent way of betterment to the classes of people with whom they come in contact.

The deacons, or brothers, were to care for the poor, to rescue the lost, to visit prisons, and to manage the inns where assistance is given to the poor. These deaconesses and deacons are carefully trained for their work. Evangelistic efforts go on in connection with nursing the sick and giving charity.

The fields of activity in which the Inner Mission works are varied and they have been summarized as seven:—

1. The education and instruction of children.
2. The education and preservation of youth.
3. The rescue of the lost.
4. The preservation of those who are in danger.
5. The distribution of Christian literature.

6. The care of cripples and the sick.

7. The removal of social wrongs.

These seven fields include nearly all forms of preventive and alleviative work which is done anywhere for the poor.

THE RELATION OF THE INNER MISSION TO THE STATE.¹

"In Germany, for many classes of sufferers, the state assumes the entire expense and looks to the church only to supply that personal sympathy which belongs to her very atmosphere."

The interest which the church has taken in charity has led the state to improve its methods of help, and the scientific Elberfeld system has become the basis of our wise state help. The state, individuals, societies, disburse financial help to the needy, the church supplements this work with that which other agencies fail to meet. "Often it is enough that she give personal attendance, always in a Christian spirit, to the sick, or that she encourages, with hopeful and instructive words, the dependent and disheartened. It is this kind of work that the church seeks to do in cities by means of the city mission, in the country at large by means of the Inner Mission."

In conclusion, when state charity cares for all those outside the church who need help, there will still be a work for the church to do. It will be to furnish that mysterious, sympathetic, loving touch which cannot be given by mechanical organization, but must come from the heart. The church when in fellowship with its Founder is an institution of the heart. Within the church itself we are largely back to the apostolic motive and method in the care of our own poor. The problem which now presses upon us for solution, is how to apply in conjunction with a scientific method this same motive and method to the care of the poor outside the church.

¹ See Williams, p. 216 sq.

ARTICLE IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE.¹

BY THE REV. JOSEPH LEONARD DANIELS, D.D.

THE American college is one of the richest fruits of American civilization; for it must rank among the five notable contributions which this country has made to the permanent progress of the world. These are the Christian college, the public school, the self-supporting church, the formal separation of church and state, and the most complex and yet harmonious system of representative government. It properly heads this list both historically and logically; for, while the compact in the Mayflower was the germ of the American Constitution, while the legislatures of Plymouth and Massachusetts colonies antedated the founding of Harvard, while the college has gradually been transformed in the two hundred and fifty years of its history, it has, none the less, been a vital factor in this nation's life. For it has from the first trained the men who have formed public opinion and have been the leaders in church and state. This was the one reason affirmed for the founding of a college—to train the preachers and teachers for the coming generations. "Without a nursery for such men," said Cotton Mather, "the churches of New England would have been less than the business of one age, and soon have come to nothing." Pilgrim and Puritan alike believed in Christian education. As early as October, 1636, Massachusetts voted four hundred pounds for a college. Almost simultaneously with this was founded the public

¹ An address before the Alumni of Olivet College, Michigan, June 19, 1901.

school: in Boston in 1635, at Hartford in 1637, at New Haven in 1642.

In 1646 Massachusetts required every community of fifty families to maintain such a school; and a community of one hundred families, a grammar school. Connecticut adopted this law in 1650. Thus Harvard and these grammar schools as feeders, were the educational system of New England for more than half a century. Then arose Yale, and Dartmouth, and Williams, and that galaxy of Christian colleges that to-day numbers almost five hundred.

That these institutions originated in America is not claimed. They were at first but the reproduction of Cambridge and Oxford. They bear the distinctive marks of their English parentage. In their later development they have incorporated many features of the German universities. And yet they have not copied either England or Germany. As a rule, they have not been dependent on the government, except for their charters. They have not recognized titles and classes and social distinctions. They have been independent in their government, democratic in spirit, progressive in method, religious in aim, and patriotic in every national crisis. They have been both the reflex of a free public opinion, and no less the makers of such an opinion. They are creatures of circumstances, and yet creators of their own environment. For they have excited the thirst for knowledge by opening its perennial fountains. They have attracted and incited thousands of youth to seek an education by lifting up the torch of truth in every part of our land. They have brought knowledge to the homes of the people. The distinctions of race, class, and color have ceased to be a barrier to their privileges. Their doors are open wide to women as well as men, and the possibility of a liberal education has come to be universal. Admitting, as I do, the excellences of other systems of education, is it not true that America has made her own?

Has she not stamped it with her own personality, and made it as unique as her national history? Has she not developed a college purely American, truly Christian, at once the most conservative and the most progressive in the world? And were not these seeds planted in Cambridge in 1636, and in New Haven in 1701? Have not these little democracies in the intellectual world made the great democracy in the political world of to-day?

These are questions England is asking herself most seriously. Her wisest men are seeing that her future supremacy depends on bringing the higher education within the reach of the middle classes of society. They see that the Scotch universities in 1900 had 6,061 undergraduates, while Oxford and Cambridge had but 6,421, although the population of England is seven times as large as that of Scotland. They see the United States enrolling 84,955 college students—five times as many *pro rata* as in England—new recruits for the great army of thinkers, the home guard of the republic and the vanguard of civilization. They see more than this, that the skill in the manufactures, commerce, and business of to-day is the product of trained minds; that thought rather than force is to be the arbiter of the future; and that intelligence and moral leadership are to rule the world. They are re-reading the history of the last hundred years, somewhat as Professor Andrew Fleming West interprets it for the Paris Exposition of 1900, when he says:—

“The [American] college lies very close to the people. Distinctions of caste may manifest themselves occasionally, and yet the college is stoutly, and we believe permanently, democratic. Its relation to the better side of our national life has been profoundly intimate from the beginning. The graduates of Harvard and Yale in New England, of Princeton and Columbia in the Middle States, and of the College of William and Mary in Virginia, contributed powerfully to the formation of our republic. Edmund Burke attributed the ‘intractable spirit’ of the Americans to ‘their education,’ and by this he meant the college education. ‘The colleges,’ wrote President Stiles of Yale, shortly after the Revolution,

'have been of signal advantage in the present day.' When Britain withdrew all her wisdom from America, this revolution found above two thousand in New England only, who had been educated in the colonies, intermingling with the people, and communicating knowledge among them."

And what was true then has been true in our subsequent history. Though not one in a hundred of our white male youth has been college-bred, yet the colleges have furnished "one-half of all the Presidents of the United States, most of the Justices of the 'Supreme Court, not far from one-half of the Cabinet and the National Senate, and almost a third of the House of Representatives."

That the colleges have had even greater influence on the educational, moral, and religious life of the American people there is hardly room for doubt. For from these centers have come the great teachers and preachers and leaders both of the schools and of the church. The young men have been the enthusiastic pioneers in college and church building all over our land. The great missionary projects that have belted the world, like the "haystack meeting" at Williams, and the more recent Student-Volunteer movement, have begun in American colleges. These have been more manifest, yet not more potent, than that silent, all-pervasive educational and religious spirit which has penetrated every hamlet in our republic.

Such, in a word, has been the history and influence of the American college. And yet to-day, after this unparalleled record, its very existence is imperiled. The recent words of President Hadley, of Yale, most vividly depict the situation:—

"The American college at the beginning of the twentieth century is confronted with a set of conditions which may threaten its very existence. The growing tendency toward specialization in American life creates a necessity for a lengthened period of professional study. This makes it harder for students to spare the time for a course of study which is non-professional. Yet it seems of vital importance for the welfare of the country that this period of non-professional study—collegiate study in

the old sense—should have its place in our education. The American college in the past has been a school of public sentiment, a place for forming conceptions of duty, based on considerations of self-interest and standards of intellectual attainment unaffected by considerations of commercial value. . . . If the American of the twentieth century is to become a part of a vast machine, there will be no place for the American college. If he is to remain a free citizen of a free commonwealth, the overwhelmingly important work of the American college lies in fitting him for such freedom."¹

Has, then, the American college fulfilled its mission? Is its work already accomplished? Is the old *régime* to give place to a new and a better? Or is it, with its independent and flexible organization, to meet the new conditions, and accomplish a larger work than ever? It shall be my effort to show that

1. The college has still a *place* in American life.
2. It still has a *work* for the church and the republic.
3. Its *limitations*, so-called, are in no small degree its *excellences*.

I. Has the college still a place in our system of education? The changing conditions of American life naturally raise this question. The beginnings of our educational system were very simple; now they are very complex. In the seventeenth century there was the local grammar school and the college. The many received only the education of the former, the few entered the college. The candidates for the freshman class came from one of two sources,—either the graduates of the grammar school, or from pupils privately taught by the minister of the parish. In the latter part of the eighteenth century arose the endowed academy, of which Phillips of Andover and Phillips of Exeter are a type. While these institutions are still doing their special work in fitting students for college, the modern high school has become the great rival of the endowed academy and the private training-school. This began in Boston in 1824, and to-day is found in every city and village of our

¹ Education, Vol. xx. p. 588.

land. It is a municipal organization, and democratic in its spirit and policy. It is therefore as variable and flexible in its character and requirements as the diverse constituencies that support it. There are three somewhat well-defined theories in regard to it:—

(1) One is that its course of study should be brief, practical, and designed to furnish a good business education.

(2) A second is that it should aim to fit students for college, in accordance with the contention of President Eliot of Harvard, that "no course of study can so well fit for 'life' as that which fits for college, and that it is unfair to maintain short and disconnected courses which must throw a scholar off the line or bring him to a pause, if he afterwards wishes to take a college course."

(3) A third view combines the two theories already named, and offers a short course for "life" and a longer course for college.

Under the old *régime*, the college set the standard for admission, and the academy or private training-school simply met the requirements. These were clearly defined, uniform, and adapted to a fixed and prescribed college course. But to-day the high school furnishes a large percentage of the students for college. This institution, being municipal and democratic, fixes its own courses of study and standard of scholarship according to the citizenship of the community. It is the reflex of the city itself. This great variety and diversity in preparation has led to the flexibility of the modern college course; to the establishment of new and special courses of study; to the introduction of the elective principle; and, finally, to the recognition of equivalence in determining the standard of admission to college, and also the standard of graduation, henceforth to be represented by one degree, viz., the bachelor of arts.

Thus the high school has been instrumental in broadening and enriching the college course. It has done more.

It has brought the possibility of the higher education to many a bright lad in many a city, who, without the opportunity and incentive of the high-school training, would never have found his way to college. Thus genius born of humble parentage has found its place and work, and been saved to society and the state.

But with all these merits of the high school, there are also some disadvantages. These arise from its ambition to do college or even university work. It is certainly questionable whether it is wise for candidates for college to undertake elementary scientific work in the high school, when it can be so much better done in the college or the university. Far worse than this is the tendency to-day to transfer the high-school graduates at once to the professional school without any intermediate training. In both these ways the high school is encroaching upon the college. No argument is offered for this, except the false economy of time and money, at the expense of positive detriment to the professional man and inferior service to the public. If you add to this, political influence in the election of school boards, and in consequence the frequent changes of superintendents, teachers, and policy of school management, you have a very unstable type of training-school compared with the old-time academy, whose trustees and teachers and policy were as stable as the college itself. Now, whatever the causes, the facts are, that secondary education has encroached upon the higher education a full year since 1856. Then the freshman at Harvard was seventeen years and seven months old. In 1866 he was eighteen years and two months. In 1875 he was eighteen years and six months. To-day most writers agree that the average freshman in American colleges is nineteen, and the average graduate twenty-three.

On the other hand, if we turn to the graduate side of the college, these conditions have changed even more. Both

professional and technical schools have arisen. At the time of the Declaration of Independence there were but two professional schools in this country,—the medical college of Philadelphia, founded in 1765, and the Medical Department of King's College (now Columbia College), founded in 1768. There are now 532 professional schools, 55,669 students, with \$50,000,000 of invested property. The number of students in these schools increases faster than the population. The note of alarm in some quarters has already been sounded. Restrictive legislation, both for admission and graduation, will apparently soon be necessary for the protection of the people. They will demand intelligence, character, and thorough training for those positions that involve the property, life, and the moral and spiritual welfare of the whole community.

The present chaos in regard to entrance requirements of professional schools is seen in the recent report of the Bureau of Education. In four theological schools there are no entrance requirements. In twenty-four they are indefinite. Nineteen demand a grammar-school education. Three require high-school work. Others vary, requiring one, three, or four years of college work. In sixteen law schools there are apparently no entrance requirements whatever. In eight they are practically worthless. Twenty-six demand a grammar-school education. Four require some high-school work. Harvard demands an education equivalent to admission to senior class in college. Columbia will be maintained as a graduate department after 1903. In two medical schools the requirements are indefinite. Twenty-nine demand a grammar-school education. A few, high-school work. Johns Hopkins requires a college course. Harvard will also after 1901.

The reports of the United States Commissioner of Education showing the percentage of professional students who hold a college degree are too incomplete to be of much ser-

vice. Not much more than half of the professional schools in 1898 show any college graduates. So far as returns are made, the schools in theology show fifty-three per cent of college graduates; in law twenty-nine per cent; and in medicine twenty-one per cent.

These facts are significant and speak for themselves. What is the remedy? If these professional schools exist for themselves, and the supreme motive is to increase the numbers of imperfectly trained men, then their past policy has certainly been successful. If, on the other hand, these schools are for public service, to supply strong, symmetrical, well-equipped men for the responsible work of physicians, lawyers, and ministers, then they ought to improve the quality instead of increasing the quantity; they ought to raise the standard of admission; they ought not to reach down to the grammar school and the high school, but rather to draw their new recruits from well-trained college men. They ought to get the best, and the best are none too good for these sacred trusts. What are they doing? They are extending their own courses, but still taking in the crude material from the grammar and high school. During the last twenty-five years, the law and medical schools have lengthened their time between one and two years.

Such is the situation. The high school has lengthened its course a full year; the professional school from one to two years. This extends the whole time of preparation for the professional man, if he takes a college course, two full years, and in some cases more. As President Thwing puts it, "The college is in danger of being ground to pieces between the under millstone of the preparatory school and the upper millstone of the professional school." This, when translated, means that the college student of to-day is nineteen years old when he enters college; he is twenty-three at graduation; he is twenty-six or twenty-

seven when he enters his profession. This means that many will be tempted to omit the college course, and pass from the high school to the professional school, and enter life work at twenty-two or twenty-three.

Some minds will solve the problem by shortening the college course to three or even two years. Others will say, "Let the college electives be made in the line of one's chosen work, and thus anticipate and overlap the professional course for one or two years." A still more reasonable plan is the abridgment of the elementary and secondary school courses, so that the student shall enter college two years earlier. What the final solution will be no one knows. One thing, however, may be safely affirmed. The college ought to retain its place between the secondary education and the professional schools. For

2. The college has still a great work to do both for the church and the state, viz., the training of men and leaders. This has been its work in the past, this will be its work in the future. The elementary school will go on teaching the child facts. The secondary school will interweave these facts into groups and principles and laws. Manual training will become more and more a feature of both, in preparation for the useful and the practical in life. The professional and technical schools will become more and more postgraduate schools, to fit men for the callings, the professions, the specialties of life. But between these—between the secondary and the technical schools—lies the all-important, the supreme work of training the man. For the man must be a *man* before he is a specialist. The minister, the doctor, the lawyer is impotent in his profession if he lacks the poise, the symmetry, the character, that we call *manhood*.

No school has ever accomplished this so well as the American college. For it takes the student already familiar with principles and laws, and teaches him to view these

comparatively, to reduce them to rules of action. It appeals to his will, his judgment, his ethical nature, his moral sense. He is ever in the valley of decision. He settles a question to-day only to find a more important one to-morrow. He is ever in search of truth, and for the most part truth that touches upon his own life. His work is chiefly with the humanities. His subject is man, and in studying man he is studying himself. And this is the great work of the college, to reveal the man to himself.

There is no more marvelous transformation than the college boy into the college man; from the crude, untested, unpolished lad as he enters college, not knowing his own powers nor what to do with himself, to the young man of decision, poise, culture, and character as he stands at last to receive the benediction of his alma mater, and goes forth to find his place and work in the world. It is not the humanities alone that have wrought this change. To be sure, philosophy has unlocked the mysteries of human nature, history has mirrored man in the past, sociology has pictured his needs to-day, language and literature have revealed the life and thought of other peoples, the sciences have unfolded the divine plan in nature, and the Bible the personal revelation of God to man.

But, apart from his growth in knowledge, there has been a deepening and expansion and enrichment of his personality, which is the end and aim of the highest culture.

"For this is the final efficient and the final cause of all things. Things have no value, no meaning, are nothing, apart from consciousness. Mind gives value to these. Thought, feeling, will; these are the great realities. Things have value only as they afford the ground for actions and reactions of the mind. They are indeed a part of human environment, but only a part. In larger degree they are determined by the human will and human character. Indeed, the most important part of human environment is personality. Persons are the best educators of persons."

Xenophon tells us that nothing was more profitable

than association with Socrates, and the spending time with him anywhere and on any subject whatsoever. So thought Garfield of his revered teacher Mark Hopkins. Athens was an ideal city, unparalleled in its literature and art. Williamstown is an ideal college home. So Jerusalem shines like a star in the Orient. But even *there* was "One greater than the temple."

For, personality imparts itself to personality. It is not abstract ideals, but ideals incarnate in the life, that move the world; not books but living teachers; not even the perfect law of God, but God sending his own Son. For the divine personality in Jesus is the greatest educator. Now the great work of life is the expansion and enrichment of personality. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" What if he gain all knowledge, all professional success, all honor from men, and lose his own personality, his divine birthright, his heavenly heritage?

Now the Christian college is the rare and unique place for the development of personality. In this respect the Christian home stands first and best. It alone can do the work of the earlier years. There is no influence so sacred and so permanent as that of the Christian father and mother. But not all homes are Christian. And even Christian parents have their limitations and defects. So here the college comes in to supplement the work of the family. A score or more of devoted teachers, each enthusiastic in his own department, take the place of the parents. The scenes are new. The field of thought is new. The studies open up many new vistas and broaden the mental horizon. It is not the work of the specialist, it is not preparation for a certain kind of life, but for life in its fullness; life physical, intellectual, moral, and religious; life eternal, which changes not with professional success or earthly conditions. Such is the relation of the Christian college to the individ-

ual student; such its aptitude to the development of the truest *manhood*.

But the modern college has a larger and broader field, and never so large and broad as to-day, in its relations to the church, the state, and the civilization of which we are a part. The college is not only to train *men*, but to train men to be *leaders* of men.

Mr. William T. Harris, Commissioner of Education, shows by comparing the statistics of 1872 and 1898 that in twenty-five years our college students have more than doubled, our professional students have nearly trebled, the technical students have increased sixty-five per cent, and the graduate students have multiplied twenty-five fold. If this means that the professions are overcrowded, that we are graduating each year more than twice as many as can fill places of honorable service, and that therefore they are to be idlers and drones, living by their wits and preying upon the public, then the situation is not only serious but alarming. But this does not seem to be the case.

There is an ever-increasing number of college graduates who enter no profession. They take the college course as the best equipment for life. They aim to be broader men, better business men, better citizens. President Carter of Williams College estimates this number at present to be nearly fifty per cent of all our graduates. It will no doubt be larger as the twentieth century advances. Whatever this fifty per cent may be and may do, they are to be leaders in church, in state, and in the world. Now a leader must be himself a well-trained, a symmetrical man. He must know men. He must know something of everything that pertains to man. He must know the world of to-day both at home and abroad. He must be versed in history, philosophy, science, government, and religion. He may in some things have the intensity of the specialist, but he must have the breadth of general culture. This is the work of

the college and will remain its special field. In it must be the element of sufficient time, the maturity of the student, the study of the humanities, and the impress of religion under the inspiration of Christian teachers. This has been its work in the past, and its fruits have been magnificent. Its graduates have been leaders in every noble cause. This will be its work until such leaders are no longer needed. Nor will the public care whether the man is twenty-one or twenty-three or twenty-six when he enters upon his life-work, if he only enters upon it fully equipped. The nineteenth century has added several years to the average of human life.¹ The world will say to the modern student, Take some of that time for extra preparation. For when great interests are at stake, when property and person and life are in peril, the public will call for the fully prepared man. That man in the twentieth century will be the college man. Not the man who has jumped into his profession at twenty-one; not the expert who is so narrow that he can see only his little self and his own little work; but the man who is a *man* before he is a specialist, who has thoroughly fitted himself to be fit for his own special work, wise in his own affairs, and a wise leader in church and state.

3. One more consideration claims our attention, that the limitations of the typical American college are in no small degree its excellences. It is not claimed that limitations are always beneficial, yet often they bring great incidental advantages. This is seen in American college building.

A few of our institutions are creatures of the state. They

¹ William Roscoe Thayer, in *Forum*, February, 1900: "During the past one hundred years the length of life of the average man in the United States and in the more civilized parts of Europe has increased from a little over thirty years to about forty years." The average age of the most eminent men in Europe and America (330 names) is sixty-eight years and eight months.

spring into life at once, draw their supplies from the state treasury, are dependent in no small degree upon the good will of each new legislature, and are subject to evils and limitations belonging to a political organization, often more serious as affecting a true education than the limitations of the independent college. A few, also, are the offspring of millionaires, have come into life with the stroke of a pen, and are worthy monuments to their founders.

But the typical American college is born, and not made; it is a growth, and not a building. It is conceived in a few great souls, who pray over it, and plan for it, and at length rejoice that a new life is born into the world. It has no patrimony but poverty; for it is born to be poor, that it may make the world rich. It is fortunate if it find a godfather who will be sponsor for its future. Its baptismal gifts may be nothing more than a few old books from ministers' libraries. But it is a child, and not a thing. It has a soul, and not a purse. For the lives of its founders live within it, unselfish lives of service and consecration. It comes at length to rejoice in its great mission and to take on new strength with the years. "It increases in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man."

The college in time becomes the loving mother of a numerous family. She has her birthdays and her anniversaries, when the children come home to greet her. With songs and acclamations they swell her praises. With one heart and one accord they voice the loyal college spirit as they sing:—

"Many a mother has done excellently, but
Thou excellest them all."

Hundreds of such colleges have grown into the life of the American people, and they will not let them die. Their trials, struggles, and limitations have made them all the dearer. Their history is their power. We love them

not only for what they are, but for how they have become what they are.

Again, there are certain limitations in education which must be regarded as exceptions to the business maxims of the world. It may be true, and it may not, that combination and consolidation are universal laws. The oil trust, the sugar trust, and the steel trust may be best for the world, and they may not. The law of supply and demand may meet every emergency, and it may not. But one thing is certain, that political economy is not always mental economy, for the reason that man is not a machine. The present age surpasses all others in making machines, and is fast reducing man himself to a machine. Fain would it apply the same methods to education. The graded school, the normal, the university, become vast machines which measure their success by numbers. What becomes of the individual in such aggregations? What of the value of the touch of mind upon mind, of teacher upon scholar, when the professor does not even know his own scholars, but lectures to a sea of faces which he cannot recognize afterward upon the street? Undoubtedly in education the individual training is the best. For teacher and pupil to sit side by side, and each to awaken and enkindle the mind of the other to an enthusiasm that readily imparts and readily receives,—this is the ideal. The nearer we approach to it in the schools, the better. The limitation of numbers must be such that the vitality of the teacher shall vitalize the scholar. An eminent professor in Yale said to me, “I have thirteen in my class. I would not add another. It is as many as I can know and teach well.” I need not remind you that the Divine Teacher called but twelve disciples. And yet the term “small college” in many minds is a term of reproach. If it be small in other respects, it may be justly deserved. If it is small only in numbers, its limitations may be its special advantage. With good equip-

ment and good instructors the probability of good work on the part of the students is in favor of the small college; for in the large institution the pupil may do good work, in the small one he must.

The limited vicinage is another criticism of the American college. It is said there are too many, that fifty well-endowed colleges were better than five hundred. Viewed individually college by college they would be better; viewed practically in their influence, the five hundred may be better. For each is a luminous center that irradiates a dark circle. Each is an incentive to a higher education. Mark Hopkins, the ideal college president of a generation ago, bears testimony that he owed his education to the fact that his home was near to Williams College. Many such testimonies might be gathered. It is the glory of our republic that it has no radiant center that outshines all the rest, but that the light is so widely diffused. The presence of the American college everywhere is one of the radiant causes. It has reversed the law of demand and supply, and made the supply create the demand.

Still even more do the limitations of the small college promote the best social life. Viewed from the outside, this may seem improbable. By one seeking for the first time a genial college home, this may be doubted. But to one who knows by experience both the life of the large and that of the small institution, there is no mystery about it. To one who has sat again and again in alumni meetings and listened to the anxious fears of the graduates that the old-time social, democratic spirit, the most precious element in student life and memory, was passing away with the increase of numbers, the matter becomes one of serious import. There is an earnest effort in some of the overgrown colleges to preserve this democratic spirit of the early days. But wealth has made new distinctions. Cliques, clubs, fraternities, societies of all kinds, honeycomb the social

life of the college. Members often live in their own clubhouse, affiliate with each other and isolate themselves from the rest. There is a kind of social life under these conditions. To some it may be the ideal. But how different the good fellowship and the brotherhood that unites classes and societies and individuals in a common college spirit, that recognizes character and merit, and makes every man's life a blessing to every other! It is this good fellowship that greets the new-comer, and welcomes him to a place in the college home. It is neighborly, brotherly, democratic, Christian. There may be a better social life than this, but it has never yet been discovered.

The crowning limitation, and at the same time the crowning excellence, of the future American college will be the wise selection and limitation of its courses of study. It will not aim to teach everything, but to teach the best. It will be content to be a college, and not a university. It will be satisfied with the old motto, *Pro Christo et Humanitate*, and will not care which way you translate it, "For Christ and Consecrated Learning," as President Morrison intended it; or "For Christ and Humanity," as the world has always interpreted it. For he who knows Christ and the humanities has the essentials of a true education. He will be the ideal man and a brother to his fellow-men.

In its relations to the state, also, the college will remember and cherish the farewell words of Washington:—

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles."

These words are but a fair expression of the spirit of the founders of our government. These liberal-minded men,

whose fame grows brighter with the years, believed in religion. They opened Congress with prayer, they respected the oath in the courts of justice, they had their days of public fast and thanksgiving. They were truly tolerant in matters of religion. They separated church and state. No man was taxed to support a state religion. No man was debarred from office by his peculiar religious views. They were tolerant of all forms of religion. And yet they cherished religion in the schools. They had no other thought or desire. They never intended that their tolerance toward men should become intolerance of religion itself. It has been left to this age and to our own nation to give this new meaning to toleration. In the name of liberty we have placed this new limitation on education. In the name of toleration we have debarred the Bible and the teaching of religion from the schools. The fruits are already beginning to appear. A generation is growing up in ignorance of the Bible. The state must not teach it. The church does not. Of the nineteen million children of school age in our country, only nine and one-half millions are enrolled in our Sunday-schools. But figures are inadequate to paint that cloud of ignorance and indifference which is already brooding over the land. It will, however, appear in debased standards of literature, art, and morals; in empty churches and crowded jails. For to leave religion out of childhood is to leave man without hope and without God in the world. It is the earth without the sun, it is life without light.

In this, our sister Saxon nations, England and Germany, are wiser than we. They find it possible to be tolerant in the state, and yet to retain religion in the schools. The Bible is accorded a place in the course of study until the student reaches the university or the professional school. This was the policy of the Pilgrims and Puritans; the men of the Revolution and the framers of the Consti-

tution. That famous bill of rights has but two brief sentences on this vital subject: one forbids Congress' making any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; the other requires the oath of loyalty to the Constitution from every officer, and forbids any religious test as a qualification for any office or public trust under the United States. The wisdom of these provisions nobody questions.

The Constitution of Michigan also has two brief articles on the subject of religion. One reads:—

"The Legislature shall pass no law to prevent any person from worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience, or to compel any person to attend, erect, or support any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion."¹

I have no doubt that this section has reference wholly to freedom of worship, and that the last two phrases, "minister of the gospel" or "teacher of religion," are coördinate terms describing one and the same class of persons. And yet our judges have read between the lines a prohibition of religion in education, and, on the strength of this article, have swept the Bible from every public school in the State.

But that our constitution makers did not intend to banish religion absolutely from the State is apparent from another section, which reads:—

"The Legislature may authorize the employment of a chaplain for the state prison; but no money shall be appropriated for the payment of any religious services in either house of the Legislature."²

We then have three distinct groups of persons in Michigan who, as the Constitution is at present interpreted, are treated on different principles religiously. The first is a group of seven hundred and sixty-one men in Jackson, and five hundred and sixty-six at Ionia, who are supplied with chaplains at State expense; and in Ionia at least, "all the inmates are *required* to attend religious services on Sun-

¹ Art. iv. sect. 39.

² Art. iv. sect. 24.

day morning unless excused for cause.”¹ We find the second group at Lansing—one hundred and thirty-two men—the lawmakers of the State, who *may* have a chaplain, if it costs the State nothing. The third group is scattered all over the commonwealth in our public schools—a half million and more, our children and youth, soon to be the leaders of the State, who *must not* have religious services. In a word, It is constitutional in Michigan to tax ourselves for the support of a chaplain in our prisons to pray for the recovery of criminals. We may have a free gospel in the Legislature, without money and without price. But a teacher of religion in our schools is prohibited. It is constitutional to teach religion to criminals, and Chaplain Mendenhall, of Ionia, testifies that “it has a powerful influence for good.” But it is unconstitutional to teach religion to boys to prevent their becoming criminals! The State may teach religion in Jackson and Ionia, but not in Ann Arbor and Lansing!

Is it not apparent that there are not only perils, but even absurdities, in the state education of to-day? Is there not a place and a work for the college to train Christian leaders who shall create a better public sentiment, and show that not all the limitations and defects in modern education are to be found in the college; that our secular system is ignoring the eternal principles of true manhood and of Christian civilization? If we leave out of our training the Bible and Christian truth—our corner-stones in the past—then the individual must deteriorate, and the state must decline. There must be chaplains in the prisons, if there is no religion in the schools. If it is one of the limitations of the American college that it is Christian, then let us glory in our limitation. If it is our infirmity to hold fast to that which is good, then let us glory in our infirmity,

¹ Annual Report, 1901.

remembering that "God has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty."

The American college appeals to-day to its alumni and friends as never before. It points to its illustrious founders, its unique history, and its splendid service. It asks of us renewed loyalty to its principles and unwavering devotion to its interests. For the sake of the church, the state, and the world, it bids us consecrate ourselves to its noble work, and thus in giving it an immortal life we shall become immortal ourselves.

ARTICLE V.

THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF MAN.

BY THE REV. SAMUEL WHITTLESBY HOWLAND, D. D.

THE truth in reference to the nature of man is most important, because of its bearing on so many important doctrines. The doctrines of sin,—its nature, its origin, its transmission,—conversion, sanctification, the person of Christ, the atonement, the resurrection, the future life, and many others, are modified by the doctrine as to the nature of man. Unless the latter is both correctly and clearly stated, not only will erroneous views be held on these other points, but the practical activity of the church may be seriously affected, so close is the connection between truth and life.

The earlier Christian fathers, as Irenæus, Justin Martyr, Origen, and others, held a tripartite view as to man's nature, as the most natural interpretation of Scripture. But when Apollinaris based a dangerous heresy on this doctrine, and the Latin Church, which became dominant, definitely and with authority adopted the doctrine of the bipartite nature of man, the older view was neglected or rejected. In modern times it has been taken up again in a tentative sort of way, or with an attempt to harmonize it with the other theory. But I have nowhere seen an altogether satisfactory treatment of the subject, and therefore venture to attempt a brief statement of it.

It is now pretty generally conceded that man shares his lower nature with the animals, and therefore in our induction of facts we may make use of some facts of the animal

kingdom. The principal distinction between living things and those without life is, that the living are organized. An organized thing is one which is made up of organs, i. e. parts which have functions to perform for the good of the whole. It is difficult to conceive of an organism without an organizer, something which makes the unity of the whole by making the functions or actions of the several parts subservient to the good of the whole. Every plant has its plan, which it carries out, only slightly modified by varying circumstances. That which carries the plan is not the matter of which it is composed, but the organizer, an immaterial something which gives the plant individuality and plan, and unity and reciprocal activity of its parts.

Joseph Cook says: "As the plan of your eagle, your lion, your man, your oak, is steadily adhered to from the first to the last, we may say that plan belongs to something that is not in flux, that came in when the plan threw its first shuttle, and goes out unimpaired even after the shuttle ceases to move. That invisible somewhat, some scholar in Germany calls a spiritual body." This immaterial organizer, or user of matter, is found in the plant, animal, and man, varying in its capacities according to its position, but having always the same general characteristics. We cannot explain away the evidence for the existence of such an agent, by the illustration of corals and madrepores, where we have colonies of individuals working together and producing a beautiful form, such as Neptune's cup, for example. The coral mites do not form an organism. They work together because only by so doing can they do anything. They first form the stem of the madrepore, because only by mutual help can they rise above the slime of the bottom. When they get above that, they branch out, because they can thus better get their needed supplies from the surrounding salt water; and yet they are dependent for a foundation on those that have gone before them, and so

the cup is formed. But there is no more of organism here than in the case of a crystal.

It is evident that the organizer of a plant is divisible; because, when a plant is divided, the same plan and the same individuality is found in each part. The facts of grafting show that what is divisible is also unitable, and the same is illustrated in seed-bearing. Materialistic evolutionists are very unwilling to admit any evidence in favor of anything immaterial; but they find themselves in great perplexity, and often land themselves in absurdity, in their attempts to account for heredity.

To suppose, as Weismann does, that germs from every minute portion of the parent are found in every little seed or particle that is capable of reproducing, so that all the peculiarities of the parent are transmitted to the minutest details, would tax the credulity of any one not pre-determined to the opinion. But when we admit the transmission of a portion of the immaterial organizer, we have a sufficient explanation to account for the facts.

If we admit the existence of spirits separate from matter, such as angels, we need not be loath to admit the existence of other immaterial beings, when facts demand that we do so. This *organizer* in man is called the *body*, though in popular usage the material clothing of the organizer is often called the body. It may be considered to be the same in man as in animals and plants, though more highly organized; and, having become the servant of higher agencies, it may seem to have higher qualities.

Having admitted that the appearance of life in the progress of evolution was due to the introduction of an immaterial substance, we will the more easily admit the introduction of another substance in the process, i. e. the animal *soul*, or agent of sensation and consciousness. That this animal soul is not a mere result of the process of evolution is seen by the fact that the lowest forms of animal

soul do not appear as a result of high organization of plant life. The lowest animals are almost as low in the scale of organization as the lowest plants. The materialists fail to show any facts that imply a development of animal soul from organization. The animal soul shows all stages of progress and development, but is itself radically different from the organizer of the plant, although in some respects related to it, and capable of association with it.

Mr. Wallace, who has been regarded as one of the highest authorities on evolution, has maintained that "there are at least three stages in the development of the organic world, when some new cause or power must necessarily have come into action." "The change from inorganic to organic, when the earliest vegetable cell, or the living protoplasm out of which it arose, first appeared"; "next, the introduction of sensation or consciousness, constituting the fundamental distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms"; "third, the existence in man of a number of his most characteristic and noblest faculties, those which raise him furthest above the brutes, and open up possibilities of almost indefinite advancement." These three new introductions in the progress of evolution mark the first appearances respectively of the three parts of which, as the Bible teaches, man is constituted. They are the immaterial organizer, or *body*, shared with plants and animals; the animal *soul*, shared with animals only; and the rational *spirit*. In the story of Genesis the last two of these are marked by the use of the word "*create*."

The facts of heredity in animals and man show, that, like the body, the animal soul is divisible and unitable.

Mental characteristics are transmitted, and it sometimes seems as if spiritual qualities were also. But it can be shown that the latter are due to spiritual activity following lines of least resistance, and dependent on inheritance of mere mental qualities. If we may judge from the higher

animals, we conclude that this animal soul has memory, and intelligence, and can draw conclusions from premises, although it cannot form concepts. Its knowledge is derived through the senses, and is prudential, and its principle of action is care for self.

The difference between this animal soul and the spirit which is found in man is marked and radical. The spirit is a rational being, its knowledge is intuitional, it sees causes and things as they are: it knows God and self, and the relations between the two, therefore duty. It has self-consciousness and conscience. It alone can form concepts, and control thought by will. It alone perceives the true, the beautiful, and the good, and experiences love, joy, and peace. Materialists are naturally anxious to show the beginning of rationality in animals, but Mr. C. Lloyd Morgan, one of the best authorities on evolution, said, not long since, that "he does not find the perception of relations or the exercise of the faculty of reason in any animal except man." It is just this rational nature which distinguishes man from the animal. It is inconceivable that it should be developed out of anything in the animal, or that it should be produced by adding qualities to the animal soul. The spirit in man has not only individuality but personality, and is indivisible, it is the gift of God, and is the image of God, and by it man became the son of God.

We find thus in man three substances, all immaterial, all working together as the man, and yet differing from each other radically, showing that they could not be developed the one from the other. The first two, the body and the soul, are evidently transmitted by inheritance, while the third, the spirit, is the gift of God. We might confirm this statement by yet other facts of experience, but it may be well to compare it with Scripture. The passage 1 Thess. v. 23 speaks as if the three—body, soul, and spirit—were in some sense coördinate, or at least as if they were the es-

stantial constituents of the person, each being of importance; so that the person would not be perfect if either one were lacking, and all are to be kept until the judgment-day. Therefore "body" cannot mean the mere physical frame, which turns to dust. Paul is fond of speaking of man as composed of spirit and flesh, which are in conflict with each other. By the term "flesh" he evidently designates the inherited part of man, the body and soul, that which seeks to rule according to self-interest, and comes into conflict with the conscience. He contrasts the law of the mind (*nous*, or rational nature) with the law in the members (Rom. vii. 23).

In speaking of death and the resurrection, he says, "It is sown a soul-body (*psuchikos*), and raised a spirit-body (*pneumatikos*)," of which the explanation seems to be that the body as laid in the grave is called a "soul-body," because it is still joined with the soul, although separated from the spirit; but in the resurrection the spirit has come and rejoined it, and, dominating it, makes it a "spirit-body." The use of the two terms leads Paul off into a little digression, contrasting the spiritual with the unspiritual, which he before described in chap. ii. 14. The "soul-man," he says, cannot understand spiritual things. This same peculiar word is used by Jude in speaking of a class of wicked persons who do not have the Spirit, and also by James (iii. 15) in giving a gradation of evils. "Earthly" is evidently one who is controlled by the bodily appetites, *psuchikos* must be one controlled by the animal soul as against the higher nature and conscience, and might therefore be called "selfish"; "devilish" carries its own meaning. When the spirit in man becomes evil, so that evil is its good, and secures control, then the man is devilish. The appetites might be attributed to the animal soul, inasmuch as they do not appear in plants which have body. But, although they do not appear in the plants, which have

no consciousness and therefore cannot manifest them, they belong to the organizer, and are often restrained in the animal by the dictates of prudence or selfishness.

The same threefold gradation is found in the description of temptation, e.g. "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life" (1 John ii. 16). These three correspond to the temptation in the body, soul, and spirit respectively, and were illustrated in the temptation of Eve, when she saw that the fruit was good for food, pleasant to the eyes, and to be desired to make one wise. The temptation that comes to the spirit is pride, such as overtook Satan and his angels, a desire to be as God. The same three temptations came to Jesus Christ.

The distinction that is referred to in Heb. iv. 12 between soul and spirit must be between the spiritual man and the soul-man before described. In many passages in the New Testament the word "soul" is translated *life*. This seems due to a Hebraic use of the word. We read that the soul is in the blood (Lev. xvii. 11). The close association of the soul with the life, the soul being the source of the life, led to the use of the one word for the other. The same connection led to the use of the word "soul" for the self, sometimes the whole inner man, and sometimes the deepest self, without any idea of selfishness. These usages passed over into the Greek of the New Testament, and in many cases add expressiveness, as "he laid down his soul for us" (1 John iii. 16). The same can hardly be said of Acts ii. 27, 31; neither the word "life" nor the word "self" will answer in this place. Therefore it must be taken literally, which accords with what we said before, that at death the soul and body go into the grave, awaiting the return of the spirit, which goes to God (Ecc. xii. 7). This was true of both David and Jesus Christ.

Although this was the ordinary usage of the Old Testament, there are several passages which mark the distinc-

tion we have noted. In Job xii. 10 we read that "in the hand of the Lord is the soul of every living thing, and the spirit of all mankind." The expression "dead soul," which is quite frequent, although translated "dead body," very likely carries a literal meaning as well; certainly the literal meaning is correct. The Hebrew word *ruach*, meaning breath as well as spirit, is not strictly limited to man. In the passage Ecc. iii. 19-21, it is translated with both meanings. We might paraphrase it as follows: "Man and beast have all one way of breathing, and one way of dying, and what evidence is there that in man's breath there is a spirit which goes to heaven, while the animal has nothing of the kind, and its life simply returns to the earth?" The writer does not assert that there is no difference, but simply calls attention to the resemblance.

Another (*n'shamah*) is also used in the Old Testament to describe the spirit of man, especially with reference to its being a gift of God. In Prov. xx. 27 it plainly refers to the rational nature, and is called "candle of the Lord"; and its searching "all the innermost part of the belly" corresponds to Paul's statement, that the spirit of man alone knows the things of man (1 Cor. ii. 11). In Isa. xlii. 5 and lvii. 16, it is used as parallel to "spirit" (*ruach*), and also in Job xxxii. 8. In Deut. xx. 16; Josh. x. 40; xi. 11, 14; 1 Kings xv. 29; Ps. cl. 6, this word is used of man as distinct from animals. Only in Gen. vii. 22 could it be made applicable to animals also; but even here it does not necessarily include them, and therefore, it being the only instance, it is better not to include them. This usage of this word bears on the account of man's creation (Gen. ii. 7), where it is said that God breathed into man's nostrils the "breath" (*n'shamah*) of life. This is equivalent to saying that he put into him a rational spirit, as is asserted of every man (Ecc. xii. 7). In this account the words "formed of the dust of the ground" well describe the process of

development of the lower nature under divine control. The animals are spoken of as formed out of the ground (Gen. ii. 19). The word in both these passages expresses forming by a process like a potter, and is very appropriate to the process of development.

In Gen. i. 26, 27 the words "make" and "create" are both used: the former applied to animals (ver. 25, etc.), and describing a formation from what was already in existence; and the latter only used when something new was brought into existence, e.g. ver. 21, where a summary of animal creation is given. The two words are used together again in the third account of man's creation (v. 1, 2).

Thus the Bible account of man's origin exactly harmonizes with what science teaches. As the animal nature transmitted from persons in whom it has been strong is relatively abnormally strong in the offspring, yielding to it, which is sin, becomes practically certain. This is how "the many were made sinners" (Rom. v. 19). But the character is not fixed in infants, except by a series of such yieldings up to five or ten years of age. For this reason, if they die in infancy or early childhood, the spirit, not having completed a fixed choice of evil, naturally goes to and remains with God; and there, under the influence of God's love,—not only as manifest to the angels, or even as revealed to the inhabitants of other worlds so as to be successful in keeping them from sin (Eph. iii. 10; Col. i. 20), but with still greater power, because they belong to the redeemed race,—their responsive love is made sure, and their spirits in the last day reunite with their awakened souls and bodies without any liability to sin or even temptation.

The salvation of adults is not by any magic power, but the Holy Spirit as a rational being acts upon our spirits like other rational beings, only more effectively and wisely, and in many cases coöperating with other rational beings,

as perhaps angels, certainly with human friends: and because the choice for evil has been made in partial ignorance and under undue pressure, He is able to enable our spirits to rise above the effects of the controlling choice and to make a new choice. This enabling of the Holy Spirit may continue for some time before a final choice is made; and we must believe that every adult human being experiences it, although the pressure or degree of persuasion must vary with the circumstances of each individual. When the spirit has been reinstated as the ruling power, it is not at first all-controlling. But the companionship of the Holy Spirit and the other good beings strengthens it, and this carries forward the work of sanctification, until the renewed spirit attains to a more perfect or comparatively complete supremacy. This is apparently never quite perfect in this life (1 John i. 8). The statement in 1 John iii. 6, 9 is, that he who abideth in God, or has been begotten of him, cannot be a sinner. It is not speaking of particular transgressions. If the spirit has once been reinstated, there will never again be a reversal of character, nor can there be again a choice against God. A loyal man cannot be a traitor, and one born of God cannot be a sinner as to his controlling purpose.

For a full discussion of the person of Christ we need to first consider the Trinity of spirit and of Deity; but the positions taken above require us to hold that, because he was in all things like us, he must have received a body and soul from his mother, and the Divine Logos in him must have been equivalent to a human spirit, in self-consciousness, experience, etc. Some hold that there was a Divine spirit in him, and also a human spirit; but this would destroy his likeness to us. The reason of this supposition is in order to account for the possibility of his suffering. But if the Divine spirit did not suffer, then there was neither a sufficient atonement nor a revelation of God's character.

Others say that the union of the two was such that both suffered. But in that case there is no gain in supposing two spirits, to say nothing of its being contrary to Scripture. The case is fully met by holding that the Divine Logos, uniting with the inherited soul and body, and taking them as its agents of activity in that connection, was so limited in its activity in that individual as to be equivalent to a human spirit.

We suppose that a human spirit is able to exist and act freely and perfectly like the angels, when freed from the soul and body by death; but while united with them, its activity seems to be limited by them, so that injury even to the physical frame, which is fashioned by them, hinders or prevents its activity causing abnormal or partial action, or even total unconsciousness. Similarly the Divine spirit united to a human body and soul could act only under those limitations, at least in that connection, and all its activities would, as a consequence, partake of human limitations, and be equivalent to any human spirit. This is not the Apollinarian error, for the reality of the humanity is secured by the kenosis (Phil. ii. 7) brought about in this way, while the essential Divine nature is not denied, but rather revealed in the eternal character, holy and loving. This also agrees with the Scripture which says (Rom. i. 3, 4), that by "the spirit of holiness" in him he was the Son of God, but by the flesh, i. e. his soul and body (see above), he was "the seed of David."

By his death, the spirit, leaving the soul and body in the grave (Acts ii. 27), was freed from its self-imposed limitations, which fact Jesus offers as a proof of his divinity (John x. 18); and then at the resurrection he again assumed the limitations, and continues with them, on the right hand of the Father, still real man although glorified, until the judgment, when he lays them aside as no more needed for the mediatorial work (1 Cor. xv. 28).

When he ascended, the material covering of his body was apparently dissipated, forming the cloud which received him out of sight. Although Jesus was then freed from the limitations of the "flesh and bones" (Luke xxiv. 39), which cannot ascend to heaven (1 Cor. xv. 50), he still retains the inherited immaterial soul and body, and is by them limited, so as to be really separate from the Father as when on earth, and is therefore spoken of as on his right hand. But when his mediatorial work is done, he lays aside these limitations; and the discarded soul and body, not of themselves constituting a person, have no reason for continued existence, but "perish" like the soul and the body of the beasts (Ps. xlix. 12), which probably means, reunite with the common soul and body from which they were derived, or individualized by the act of beginning a new individual existence.

The mere fact of death, or separation from spirit, does not cause this loss of individual existence, because there is reason for their continuance, in order that in the resurrection the man may be complete, and they are kept for this purpose (1 Thess. v. 23; 1 Peter iv. 19). Although this lower part of man does not have personality, yet it has individuality; and a considerable part of the activity of the man in life being dependent on this, it may be spoken of as the man, even when separated by death from the spirit which has the personality (John v. 28).

The spirits of the good are in heaven (Heb. xii. 23), becoming strengthened in holiness by communion with Christ and all holy spirits, until, in the resurrection, they are reunited with the body and the soul through which most of the temptations of the present life come, but then completely subservient, so as no longer to be agents of temptation. The "souls" seen under the altar (Rev. vi. 9) are not the spirits which are in heaven and would not call for vengeance (Acts vii. 60), but are the literal souls, uncon-

scious, but figuratively calling for vengeance, like Caesar's wounds. It is these souls of martyrs that are raised to life at a special resurrection at the beginning of the millennium (Rev. xx. 4, 6). In them the lower nature has been so subdued as to warrant an earlier reunion without risk of sin, even as in Enoch and Elijah a separation was not needed.

We see from the above considerations, which might be confirmed by a multitude of scriptural allusions, that there is scarcely a more important subject in theology than the Tripartite nature of man.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SECOND-ADVENT THEORY REVIEWED. ✓

BY THE REV. EDMUND B. FAIRFIELD.

By the "Second-advent Theory" I mean the theory that teaches a future personal coming of Christ to the earth; or, in other words, a future incarnation. With some, this advent is to be premillennial; with others, it is to be post-millennial. With many, it is an event to be looked for soon.

That when Christ speaks of his "coming," he does not always refer to any reincarnation, or to any visible advent, will scarcely be denied, I presume, by any; for example, when he says, in the fourteenth of John: "If I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also"; "I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you"; "If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him"; and in numberless other similar examples. It is not to be assumed, therefore, that his "coming," so-called, necessarily implies a second incarnation, either before the millennium or after it.

In discussing the theory, as I have defined it, it has not been entirely easy for me to decide as to the order of presenting the subject; but my final conclusion was, that I could perhaps not do better than to take up the different points in the same order as that in which I studied them.

In doing this I come first to the principle of interpretation that is generally, if not universally, assumed by Adventists of every type, that, in interpreting the prophecies,

the rule is, that in giving the time of any event predicted a day stands for a year. And so the passage in the eighth chapter of Daniel, speaking of two thousand and three hundred days, and also those in the twelfth chapter (verses 7, 11, and 12), "It shall be for a time, times, and a half" (meaning three and one-half years, or one thousand two hundred and sixty days), "From the time that the daily sacrifice shall be taken away, and the abomination that maketh desolate set up, there shall be a thousand two hundred and ninety days," and "Blessed is he that waiteth and cometh to the thousand three hundred and five and thirty days," mean respectively 2,300, 1,260, 1,290, and 1,335 years.

Now that a day stands for a year is not said in these chapters in connection with the mention of these numbers, and of course there must be some show of proof outside. This proof is submitted by a reference to Dan. ix. 24-27; also to Ezek. iv. 4-6.

We take up this last passage first. It reads thus: "Lie thou upon thy left side, and lay the iniquity of the house of Israel upon it: according to the number of days that thou shalt lie upon it, thou shalt bear their iniquity. For I have appointed the years of their iniquity to be unto thee a number of days, even three hundred and ninety days: so shalt thou bear the iniquity of the house of Israel. And again, when thou shalt have accomplished these, thou shalt lie upon thy right side, and shalt bear the iniquity of the house of Judah forty days: *I have appointed thee each day for a year*" (Ezek. iv. 4-6). This last clause is supposed by our Adventist brethren to be a general statement directing us how to interpret prophetic numbers. The pertinency of the argument does not appear. It seems, upon the face of it, to be simply an object-lesson, impressing upon the mind of the prophet the number of the years by representing them in this way. How many scores of

times I have heard this clause—"I have appointed thee each day for a year"—quoted as the law for all prophetic numbers, I cannot pretend to say. Enough surely to have made it true if the oft repetition of an idle fancy could transform it into solid fact. But I think we may waive this aside without further ceremony.

The passage from Daniel is a much more plausible and effective one, as it is addressed to a popular audience, composed of those to whom the original Hebrew is not familiar. This passage I quote in full: "Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy. Know, therefore, and understand, that from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem, unto Messiah the Prince, shall be seven weeks, and threescore and two weeks: the street shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times. And after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself: and the people of the prince that shall come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary; and the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the war desolations shall be determined. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week: and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and upon the wing of abominations shall come one that maketh desolate; and even unto the consummation, and that determined, shall wrath be poured out upon the desolator" (Dan. ix. 24-27).

Now it being admitted on all hands that a week means here seven years, it is not unnaturally inferred that a day stands for a year. The whole difficulty has grown out of an unfortunate translation. The word translated "week" does not mean week at all in our ordinary sense. It means

simply "a seven." In this passage it is plural as well as singular; and whether it is seven days, or seven weeks, or seven months, or seven years, *depends entirely upon the context.* Here the context is very plain, and there is no dispute as to its meaning seven years—not because a day stands for a year, but because *years are the thing spoken about.* The prophet had been studying the prophecies relating to the captivity from which he was suffering with others who had been carried away to Babylon. The seventy years were coming to a close. He fell to praying and making confession. The angel Gabriel appeared to communicate to him marvelous things which were to come to pass in the future; as though he said to him, "Your seventy years of captivity are drawing to an end, but seventy sevens [of years, of course] are determined upon thy people." And then he goes on to tell him how these seventy sevens of years were to be filled up. Simply translate correctly, and it is plain. The Hebrew words, even to one who does not understand them, indicate the relationship between the "seventy" and the "sevens"—*shaw-boo-eem shib-by-eem—shibbyeem* meaning "seventy," and *shawboo-eem* meaning "sevens" (in the plural).

Opening any Hebrew lexicon, one finds the definition of *shaw-boo-ah* (the singular) given as meaning "a seven." *Shaw-boo-eem* (or *shib-by-oth*) *yaw-meem* (a "seven of days") is the full form of the word "week" in our ordinary sense. If one has no acquaintance with the Hebrew characters, he may look into Young's Analytical Concordance, which gives no other meaning as the primary one, but "a seven." No theory of a day standing for a year receives any support from these chapters in Daniel.

That this theory in the general interpretation of prophecy is a mere dream, will sufficiently appear when we begin to apply it to the prophecies of the Old Testament, in all other cases. The first prophecy involving time is

found in Gen. vi. 3, given to Noah: "Man's days shall be a hundred and twenty years still upon the earth." Certainly no one will claim that this meant 43,200 years, which would be required if a day stood for a year. The next is to Abraham, in Gen. xv. 13, telling him that his posterity should be strangers in a strange land, where they should suffer affliction for four hundred years, which would sum up 114,000 years, on this theory. In Num. xiv. 33 it is predicted that the children of Israel should wander in the wilderness forty years; certainly not 11,400 years. The captivity of the Jews in Babylon was foretold to be seventy years, by Isaiah, and also by Jeremiah. A day for a year would make this captivity to last 25,200 years, instead of seventy. In short, there is not a single case of prophecy from first to last (unless this in Daniel be an exception) in which a year means any more than a year, or a day more than a day. Now, as all the attempts to fix the time of the second coming of Christ as near at hand have been based upon this assumption, that a day in these prophecies in the eighth and twelfth chapters of Daniel stands for a year, and as nothing of that sort is said in connection with them, and as in every other case of prophecy it is universally conceded that no such principle applies, I think we must agree that that theory evanishes into the thin air.

There are many other difficulties connected with this interpretation, that a day stands for a year, of which I may mention a few as examples. At the end of 2,300 days, the sanctuary was to be cleansed. This is made to mean the burning-up of the world, or its purification, so as to be fit for Christ to reign in; an interpretation in face of the one uniform meaning of "sanctuary," and strikingly absurd when we see what the connection requires. I quote the whole passage: "He [the little horn] magnified himself even to the prince of the host, and by him the daily sacrifice was

taken away, and the place of his sanctuary was cast down. And a host was given him against the daily sacrifice by reason of transgression, and it cast down the truth to the ground; and it practiced, and prospered. Then I heard one saint speaking, and another saint said unto that certain saint which spake, How long shall be the vision concerning the daily sacrifice, and the transgression of desolation, to give both the sanctuary and the host to be trodden under foot? And he said, Unto 2,300 days; then shall the sanctuary be cleansed" (Dan. viii. 11-14). The simple reading of the whole passage is a sufficient refutation of the interpretation which makes this cleansing to mean the purification of the earth by fire, or by any other means.

So also, after the 1,335 days are mentioned, the angel said to Daniel, "Go thy way: thou shalt stand in thy lot at the end of the days"; certainly not at the end of 1,335 years. And yet even this has been insisted on—that Daniel must have been brought into the world somehow at the end of these years!

The thousand fancies that have played their part in finding what events can possibly fit into the 1,260, 1,290, 1,335, and 2,300 years are in striking contrast with the rational interpretation which finds the events in the compass of the time as days, not years. So far as I know, the exact scholarship of the world is all on one side—rejecting entirely the theory of a day for a year, in the interpretation of these numbers.

Next I came to the study of the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew and the corresponding chapters in Mark and Luke. And here I made some interesting discoveries. (To me they were discoveries: to the reader they may not be: but I give them in order, as they come up.) First, I noticed the question which the disciples asked, in reply to which Christ spoke the wonderful words recorded in these chapters. Jesus had just been at the temple, and the dis-

ciples had taken pains to show him the wonders of its architecture, and he had said to them, "See ye all these things? Verily I say unto you, There shall not be left here one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down." Then came the question, "When shall these things be, and what shall be the signs of thy coming, and of the end of the world?" Here I discovered that the word translated "world" did not mean "world" at all in our sense of the term, but "a long period of time." Very unfortunately there are two entirely different words which are both translated in our Authorized Version by the same word—"world."¹ They are *kosmos* and *aion*. *Kosmos* means the material, visible world, and *aion* means something entirely different. Both words have been transferred into our own tongue, and it will be convenient for me sometimes to use them in this form—"cosmos" and "eon." "Eon" is a word of time, and never of place or physical form. "Cosmos" is a word of place (or form), and never of time. And when I had traced the thing through I found that the end of the "cosmos" was never spoken of—*never*. If this material world ever comes to an end, it will not be in fulfillment of any word of prophecy. Absolutely the only sentence in the Bible that alludes to the end of this globe is found in Ecc. i. 4: "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh, but *the earth*

¹The fact that the word "world" was used in these different senses in our "authorized translation" is not at all chargeable to any incompetency on the part of the translators in 1611. If the reader will turn to the word in the Century Dictionary, he will discover that "world" originally meant "an age of man; a generation." A lengthy quotation from a work published in 1577 is given to illustrate that usage. Its meaning, soon after that, began to change: so that in 1611 it was used also in another sense, very similar to that which it now has: at the same time retaining its first meaning: so that the translators might consider themselves as fully authorized to use it in both senses. At present it has entirely lost its original meaning, and so is misleading to the ordinary English reader. It is this fact which makes it unfortunate.

abideth forever." But the reader will want more than the writer's say-so upon so important a point as this. Let him open, then, any Greek lexicon, and he will find that only one thing is taught by them all—and that is, that *αἰὼν* means an age, a period of time,—ordinarily a very long period. (Etymologically it means, "always existing.") The writer has examined eight or ten of the most reputable lexicons in this country and in Europe, and never has found a suggestion of any other meaning. Occasionally we may find an apparently close resemblance between *cosmos* and *eon*, which may lead us astray, without careful discrimination—such as we have in our own language. For example, one may say, "The greatest statesman in the history of the *world* is Moses, the lawgiver of Israel," and another may respond, "Yes: I agree in the belief that *all the ages* have produced no one who was his equal." The two have expressed the same general sentiment, but in a different way. The history of the "world" is the history of the globe, and of those who have lived upon it. The ages are periods of time: and their history would cover the same ground. The men of this world and the men of this age are terms used in a loose way as synonymous. But no one is misled; for we understand our own language, and know that "world" means the physical globe, and "age" means something else. The *place* in which I live and the *time* at which I live are very distinct. *A period of time comes to an end, but the place does not.*

We are all aware that the Septuagint was the translation used by the Apostles much more than the Hebrew Bible itself. The Hebrew had well-nigh become a dead language at the time of Christ's being on the earth. Hence the importance of referring to the use of Greek terms in the Septuagint as helping us to the meaning of the Greek of the New Testament. So after examining all the lexicons in several countries to which the writer could get access, and

finding no variation in the meaning of *aiōn*, he sought most carefully and laboriously to ascertain whether there was any variation from the classic Greek in the use of this word in the Septuagint, which might have led the writers of the New Testament to employ it in a different sense from that which it uniformly has in the classic literature of Greece. Accordingly he examined every passage in the Septuagint in which this word is found. There are more than 420—(his count made exactly 433). And it was found that everywhere it is a word of time—never of place. Almost always it means a very long period of time. “From everlasting to everlasting” is literally “from eon to eon.” “The Lord reigneth for ever and ever” is “for an eon and an eon.”

In the New Testament the word is used 122 times; and generally where it is translated “world” or “worlds,” there is no very obvious change in the general sense. But in one or two cases it is so translated where the true idea is entirely lost. Take, for example, the third verse of the eleventh of Hebrews: “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God: so that which is seen was not made of things which do appear.” This verse is manifestly invested with a fog, which entirely disappears when the true version is given. The argument against our translation may be thus briefly stated: (1) As already remarked, there is no authority whatever, either in the classic Greek or the Jewish Greek, for ever expressing any other idea than that of a period of time by this word *aiōn*, whether singular or plural. (2) The Revisers have themselves disclaimed in a quiet but most effective way their own translation, by inserting in the margin, “Gr. ages.” Now if “ages” is the proper equivalent for the Greek, and as the Greek, and that only, is inspired, why should not the English equivalent be introduced into the body of the text? (3) The doctrine of a plurality of worlds

is not brought out in the Bible. It is probably true; but the Bible was not intended to teach us modern astronomy. *The word cosmos* (meaning "the world") *is never used in the plural.* There is but one *cosmos*. The only apparent variation from that is the way in which the Bible speaks of this world, and of the world to come: but it is *aion*, and not *cosmos*, in that case. *Cosmos* is used 184 times in the New Testament, and 28 times in the Septuagint, but it is always singular. *Aion* is often used in the plural, as it is here. It should be translated "ages," or by some equivalent form of speech. (4) The true translation of this verse would be something like this: "By faith we understand that the ages were fitted together by God's word: so that the thing which is seen to-day did not come to pass in accordance with the appearance of things." When men, for example, looked upon old Tyre, or Babylon, or Nineveh, or Thebes, or Jerusalem, it was no human foresight that predicted the future desolation of those cities. Only the omniscience of God could have indited the prophecies respecting future events which have so impressively contradicted all the expectations or hopes that men would have built and did build, upon the evident look of things as they once appeared. There are at least two other inaccuracies in our translation of this verse besides the main one involving the use of *aion*.

These inaccuracies have been suggested in the rendering which has been given. Where our translation says, "the worlds *were framed*," the writer has rendered, "the ages were fitted together"; the verb being *katarizō*—the same used in 1 Cor. i. 10, where the translation is, "that ye be perfectly joined together." The ages were fitted to each other, not by the foresight of man, but by God's foresight. So when our translation says, "that which is seen *was not made* of things which do appear," the word is *ginomai*, which is translated properly, "come to pass." "That

which is seen has not come to pass according to the appearance of things," is a much more exact rendering. To change the meaning of "ages" so as to make it mean "worlds" required the perversion of both the other words—*katartizo* and *ginomai*—from their ordinary meaning. The Revisers, I think, would have corrected the entire verse, but for their limitations.

The question, then, to which our Lord addressed himself was, "What shall be the sign of thy coming, and of the end of the *eon*?" They were approaching the end of an *eon*—the end of that long period, which was just closing, when most of the New Testament was written. John the Baptist had come preaching "the kingdom of heaven *is at hand*." When Christ sent forth the twelve he had said to them, "As ye go, preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven *is at hand*." A year before the time of that conversation of which we have a record in the twenty-fourth of Matthew, he had told them that the Son of man was to come in the glory of the Father with the holy angels, adding, in the *same sentence*, "Verily I say unto you, There be some standing here who shall not taste of death, *till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom*" (Matt. xvi. 27, 28). Mark and Luke also record this conversation of the previous year. (That conversation was in Cæsarea Philippi.) So the questions, "When shall these things be? and what shall be the sign of thy coming, and of the end of the *eon*?" were most natural on this second occasion.

Another thing was noticed in this talk on the Mount of Olives, namely, that he said to them, after going through with the signs,—such as wars and rumors of wars; famines, pestilences, and earthquakes in divers places; great tribulation, such as had never been before, nor should ever be again; the coming of false Christs, and false prophets; the sun should be darkened, the moon

should not give her light, the stars should fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens should be shaken, —“When ye shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the doors,” adding immediately, “Verily I say unto you, *This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.*” The remarkable fact was noticed without a parallel, that each of the three Synoptists had given these same most solemn and emphatic words.

Now let the reader observe that the very first question which the disciples asked, was, “*When shall these things be?*” Hence the significance of the declaration, “This generation shall not pass away till all these things shall be fulfilled,” cannot be overestimated. It was the prominent inquiry in their minds. Christ did not give them a false answer, nor an ambiguous one.

For years I tried faithfully to find that this did not mean what it says. I tried to make it mean that the fulfillment was to *begin* in that generation; but I could not. There was not a single sentence in the Greek Testament, nor in the Greek Septuagint, nor in any Greek lexicon, upon which could be based such an interpretation. Then I tried to find that the word “generation” might mean the church, or the Jewish nation. But no: there was no help in that direction. The word *genea*, here translated “generation,” means generation *just as we use it*. It is used forty-one times in the New Testament, and ninety-one times in the Septuagint, and always in the same sense. No word in the Greek Testament is any more uniform in its meaning. And then the fact was recalled that the other form of expression, “There be some standing here that shall not taste of death till they shall see the Son of man coming in his kingdom,” was entirely unambiguous, and yet expressed the same fact.

But may be the reader will ask, “Does not Peter speak

of the church as "a chosen *generation*, and a royal priesthood?" Most assuredly, according to our translation he does. But the translation ought to say "a chosen *race*," or "a chosen sort of people." It is a different word, with a different usage. A kind of second cousin to *genea*,—namely, *genos*,—but by no means identical with the other.

When we adopt any principle of interpretation that can allow us to change the plain, uniform meaning of any word in that saying of Christ,—a saying repeated by every one of the Synoptists,—Matthew, Mark, and Luke,—we are all at sea; and without pilot, rudder, or compass. And yet every system of Second-adventism that I ever heard of, is obliged to eliminate that passage, or give it some meaning which the plainest laws of interpretation utterly forbid. It would seem as if our Lord, not only, but the inspired Evangelists, intended that whatever else might be misunderstood, this should not be. Christ did not use that form of emphasis very often,—"*verily*,"—*and never in any other instance did he add that most impressive sentence*, "Heaven and earth may pass away, but my words shall not pass away." But Matthew, Mark, and Luke all alike give that also.

"Are we to understand, then, that in that first century, at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, the sun was darkened, and the moon; that the stars fell from heaven; that the Son of man came in the clouds of heaven, with the voice of the archangel, and the trump of God?" I answer:—

1. Yes: we most assuredly are to believe, that *in the sense* in which these expressions were meant to be understood, just exactly that took place, because Christ, in uttering these predictions, expressly declared in the most emphatic way possible, that that generation should not pass till they were all accomplished.

2. These highly wrought figures of speech are so often

found in the Old Testament that they were perfectly well understood by Christ, and the Apostles, and all the people, to be only the oriental drapery, the rhetorical costume, in which the great and stirring events which were soon to take place, were set forth. We must bear in mind that the Old Testament constituted a large and important part of the literature with which the hearers of Christ were familiar. These Old Testament Scriptures were read in their synagogues every Sabbath. And so this furnishes the best help in interpreting the New. Especially do the prophecies of the Old Testament aid us in interpreting the prophecies of the New.

Turn, for example, to the thirteenth chapter of Isaiah, which is entitled "The Burden of Babylon," and see in what forms of speech the destruction of that city is foretold: "Behold, the day of the Lord cometh, cruel, with wrath and fierce anger; to make the land a desolation, and to destroy the sinners thereof out of it. For the stars of heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light: the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine. . . . I will make the heavens to tremble, and the earth shall be shaken out of her place" (ver. 9, 10, 13). Did any of those things happen literally in the destruction of Babylon?

Take, as another example, this same prophet's prediction of the capture of Jerusalem, and the laying waste of Palestine by Sennacherib: "Behold, the Lord maketh the earth empty, and maketh it waste, and turneth it upside down. . . . The earth is utterly broken, is clean dissolved. The earth shall stagger like a drunken man. . . . The moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed" (xxiv. 1, 19, 20, 23).

Another, in which the judgments of God are denounced against Edom, is especially interesting, because no imagery found in the words of Christ as he foretells his second

coming, and the so-called "end of the world," is so highly colored as that used by Isaiah in this prophecy: "All the host of heaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled together as a scroll, and all their host shall fade away. . . . The sword of the Lord has drunk its fill in heaven: it shall come down upon Edom to judgment. . . . The streams thereof shall be turned into pitch, and the dust thereof into brimstone, and the land thereof shall become burning pitch. It shall not be quenched night nor day; the smoke thereof shall go up forever" (xxxiv. 4, 5, 9, 10).

And not alone does Isaiah indulge in such gorgeous drapery. When Ezekiel predicts the overthrow of the king of Egypt, these are his words: "When I shall extinguish thee, I will cover the heaven, and make the stars thereof dark: I will cover the sun with a cloud, and the moon shall not give her light. All the bright lights of heaven will I make dark over thee" (xxxii. 7, 8).

When Joel foretells the desolations produced by the locusts, he does it in such forms of speech as these: "The day of the Lord cometh, for it is nigh at hand: . . . a great people and a strong. . . . The earth quaketh before them: the heavens tremble, the sun and the moon are darkened, and the stars withdraw their shining" (ii. 1, 2, 10).

You will see that there is not one form of speech employed by Christ and the apostles in foretelling the desolations of Palestine and the destruction of Jerusalem—from Matthew to Revelation—that they might not have drawn from the old prophets in their predictions of the calamities that were denounced against Babylon, Edom, Jerusalem in the olden time, and Egypt. And the reader of Josephus must conclude that more terrible things never could have befallen those ancient cities and countries than fell to the lot of the Jews in the lifetime of the Apostle John. The highly wrought figurative speech of Isaiah and Ezekiel and

Joel did not mean the end of the cosmos in the days of Pharaoh and Sennacherib, and the son of Amoz: neither did the same figures of speech mean the end of the cosmos when used by Christ and Peter and John. The Bible is its own best interpreter. Those who were familiar with the Old Testament were not misled by these strong Orientalisms.

I must call attention to one more illustration. It is found in the Eighteenth Psalm, in which David describes his merely personal deliverance from the hand of his enemies, especially of Saul. He prayed for victory: and here is his account of God's coming to help him: "The earth shook and trembled. The foundations also of the mountains were moved, and were shaken, because he was wroth. . . . He bowed the heavens and came down. A smoke came out of his nostrils and fire out of his mouth. Thick darkness was under his feet. He rode upon a cherub and did fly. He flew upon the wings of the wind. . . . He thundered in the heavens: he uttered his voice: hail stones and coals of fire were the arrows which he shot. . . . The channels of the waters appeared: the foundations of the world were laid bare."

Does anybody imagine that there were literally earthquakes and volcanic eruptions and tidal waves and terrific thunder-storms sent to David's help? Those who heard the prophecies of Christ on the Mount of Olives, and of John from the Isle of Patmos (for, as John published his Apocalypse before either of the Gospels was issued, he had given his version of the terrible things that were to come to pass about the year 70 in the first part of that marvelous book: so he had no occasion to repeat in his Gospel what the other Evangelists have given in their narratives; and Peter also, in his second Epistle, had set it forth to the churches), were all accustomed to such modes of speech. From the beginning they had heard the reading of such

words every Sabbath in their synagogues. They knew that the sun and moon and stars had never literally been disturbed at Babylon, or Jerusalem, or Egypt, or Edom. They knew that all this was the rhetorical costume of the thought. Those who survived with John the events of the year 70 knew that every word uttered on the Mount of Olives had been fulfilled—just as it was intended to be understood—in the momentous events which had taken place in their day.

“But do you really believe and teach that the third chapter of Second Peter referred to the times of the overthrow of Jerusalem; or do you reject from the canon this Epistle?” So it was asked of the writer a while ago.

He answers most decidedly, that he does accept of Second Peter as belonging properly to the canon, and as decidedly does he believe with fullest conviction that every word of it was fulfilled at that time. In setting this matter forth, three things may be said:—

I. This Epistle indicates most plainly that the events of which the Apostle speaks, especially in this third chapter, were to occur in the *near* future; so that those to whom he was writing were personally interested and concerned in them. There is a feeling of the *intense* in the whole style of the chapter. The air which the writer breathes is full of oxygen. No one can read the passage in the original, or in any translation that is at all accurate, without being impressed with the urgency of it. Something should be done, and done now, and done by the very persons to whom he was writing, to get ready for events which were just at hand. It has the atmosphere of a military encampment, amid the blare of trumpets, calling to battle-array, with the enemy in sight, and coming on at double-quick. He “stirs up” (ver. i.) their minds vigorously. His appeal is all on fire: “Seeing that all these things are about to be dissolved, what manner of persons

ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness, looking for and *hastening* unto the coming of the day of God?" Now, bearing in mind that the date of this writing is the year 66; that, more than thirty years before, the Master had said, "There be some of you standing here who shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom"; remembering that Peter had heard him say this, and had also heard him say those other words of terrible import: "The sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken: . . . and then shall all the tribes of the land mourn," adding in the same breath, "Verily I say unto you, *This generation shall not pass away, till all these things be fulfilled,*"—it is not strange that the soul of the Apostle should be charged with the electric fire. The fulfillment was already beginning: The mourning of the tribes was even now swelling in a deep undertone, and was ready to break out into a wail such as had not been heard since the world began: no, nor ever should be heard again.

With this understanding of it, the writing of Peter is entirely intelligible. But on the theory that the Apostle was writing of things yet two thousand years in the future, it is quite impossible to understand it. Just imagine, for a moment, that Peter is saying to his readers (or better, to his hearers; for no doubt all these Epistles were written to be read to the people in their assemblies), "Beloved, this world is one day to be burned up. Not in your day or mine; not in a thousand years. Not in eighteen hundred years. But some day in the remote future it is to be burned up. Seeing then, that all these things shall, two thousand years hence, or later, be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye who are now living to be in all holy conversation and godliness, looking for and hastening unto the coming of the day of God, wherein the heavens,

being on fire, shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat—two thousand years hence!"

Such a juxtaposition of ideas, such basing of a fervid appeal to present Christian life and action *upon a remote event in the history of the physical globe*, would be so absurd that it seems well-nigh irreverent even to hypothecate it. The Apostle Peter was never guilty of such preposterous preaching as that. No man outside of a madhouse would be expected to put things together in such a fashion as that. Yet just that was what Peter did; or—

2. If he appealed to them in view of events which *he supposed to be near at hand*, but which were yet many centuries distant,—what, in that case, becomes of his being an inspired teacher? If he were *mistaken*, by more than eighteen hundred years, as to the *time* of the events which he foretells, what ground of confidence have we left that he might not have been mistaken in the occurrence of the events at all?

How is it that some of my Second-advent brethren hold to the destruction of this world, except that Peter and others of the New Testament writers (as they understand them) so declare? Yet if Peter's prophetic gift was not adequate to save him from an error of more than eighteen centuries as to the *time* when this catastrophe should take place, what ground of faith is left us, either in his prophetic gift or in any divine inspiration whatever?

The preachers of fifty-eight to sixty-three years ago who went everywhere declaring that the end of the world was to be in 1843, lost their hold upon the people when the year 1844 smiled upon a world not yet in ashes. They ought to have lost it. Those other preachers, thirty-five to forty years ago, who placed the date of this catastrophe in 1866, had no more any power with their hearers when the year passed, and their predictions had failed. This was inevitable. And the good brethren and learned doc-

tors who tell us that the Apostles were all mistaken about the *time* of the coming of Christ and the end of the world, may not know it (they certainly do not intend it), but just as certainly they are in fact destroying the very foundations of all faith in apostolic teaching, and indeed in the prophetic teachings of Christ himself. And yet, if those predictions *have not already been fulfilled*, there is no other possible conclusion. For I do not know of a passage of Scripture quoted to prove the yet future personal coming of Christ, that was not spoken at the time of an event *then near at hand*—within the lifetime of the generation then upon the earth. I read a little while ago a long discourse, preached in Chicago, upon this subject, in which the eloquent preacher quoted from the words of Christ and the Apostles sixteen passages to prove Christ's second coming as still in the future and near at hand: and I found in the immediate context of every one of them most clear and unequivocal proof that they were spoken of an event or of events *just about to take place then*.

The quotation of "proof-texts" upon this subject has more than once reminded the writer of a little bit of personal experience which the reader will pardon him for introducing here. Coming home one evening with a letter in hand, I said to my family, consisting of children and boarders, all of whom were in a healthful mood for a harmless practical joke (the younger members of the household had retired): "I have a letter from my sister J. Would you like to hear a sentence or two?" "Yes, yes: hear, hear." I read, "I am expecting to come to you next week." "Good, good: I'll meet her at the train," cried one. "I'll give her up my room," said another. "I'll stay at home from college to see her," shouted a third. One of the company at this point quietly asked: "What is the date of your letter?" Just as quietly I said: "It is only twenty-two years since it was written!" Of course it was well for

me to make a speedy escape from that room. And yet who has not heard, time without number, such passages as "Lo, I come quickly," quoted to prove that the second coming of Christ was now to be expected very soon? words uttered more than eighteen hundred years ago—and if ever they were worthy of belief, must have been fulfilled more than that long ago—quoted as if they were just now spoken from heaven? But for the good intentions of those who are guilty of this "fallacy of quotation," what else could it be called but consummate trifling with the word of God? I knew that I was, for the moment, trifling with my sister's old letter; but I did it for a moral purpose, and to illustrate and enforce a principle of interpretation that it was important to learn, namely, that a disconnected sentence, taken from any document, without reference to its date, may make a very false impression. This is, perhaps, the most common and the most hurtful of all fallacies in the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures.

Just here I may say a word or two in allusion to some things which I have often heard repeated. One is this, that Christ had himself said, that of the day and hour of his coming, even he himself did not know—only the Father. But the reader will find that this was said directly after the saying, "Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all these things be fulfilled"; adding "but of the *day* and *hour* knoweth no man, not even the Son, but only the Father." It was to be in that generation: it was to take place before some who were then present should taste of death. That general statement was enough for all practical purposes. The precise day and hour had not been revealed.

And another thing often said is, that as with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, so any time will be "quickly." But we surely must not forget that when God speaks to men it is in their own language, and when he

says to the children of men, "*To-day* if ye will hear his voice: behold, *now* is the day of salvation," it will be a little dangerous to say that "with God it is always to-day," and that it is "one eternal now" in his reckoning. I do not know of anything else in which men are so constantly guilty of that sort of fallacious interpretation except in this matter of the second advent.

3. The third thing which I wish to say is this, that, upon the hypothesis that this Epistle of Peter referred to events then close at hand, the record of which is authentic history, there is not a form of speech in it which is not justified by the laws of language to which Peter and all his readers and hearers were thoroughly accustomed. Suppose Peter had written thus: "Beloved, the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night, in the which all the host of heaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled together as a scroll. The streams of the earth shall be turned into pitch, and its dust into brimstone. The earth shall become burning pitch. It shall not be quenched day or night: the smoke thereof shall go up forever"; suppose he had written that—how eloquent men would have become in showing that such language was too plain to be misunderstood! They would have said, "Such words *must* refer to the end of all things. The host of heaven is to be *dissolved*. No form of words could be more emphatic in setting forth the absolute closing-up of the material universe. And then how plainly the language in reference to the earth must imply its utter destruction, and nothing short of it! So graphic! So explicit! So detailed! The streams turned into pitch! The dust into brimstone! The earth itself becoming burning pitch! And the smoke of the destroying fires to go up forever!"

Those who should question the literal interpretation of such "unmistakable forms of speech" would be chided for

their unbelief, and warned against the doom of those who take away from the words of the book.

Every one of you will admit that the substitution of the words which I have thus put into the mouth of the Apostle instead of the tenth verse of this third chapter would increase, and not diminish, its intensity—would make the destruction of the earth more absolutely certain, and not less so. And yet I have but copied, word for word, the prophecy of Isaiah respecting Edom, instead of that of Peter which is understood to mean the end of all things. Assuming that Peter's prophecy was of the calamities which came to Palestine about the year 70 (which I most fully believe it was), it is even then not by any means so highly colored as Isaiah's, that is known to refer to Idumea. We can understand why. For although all the prophecies of the New Testament, like those of the Old, deal in strong imagery, yet each writer, endowed with the gift of prophecy, has still his own personal characteristics. Had Isaiah, instead of Peter, been the seer of Palestine's desolation, the picture had been still more highly colored than Peter's hand has made it. The calamities that befell the land of Israel in the seventh decade of the first century undoubtedly far surpassed those of Idumea, as predicted by the son of Amoz.

There is not a word in this third chapter of Second Peter that ever suggested to those who read it or heard it read, in Peter's lifetime, or John's, any thought of the literal destruction of the heavens and the earth. All their lives they had read from Isaiah about the sun and the moon and the stars being darkened, when it was merely the desolation of Babylon that was meant by it. They had heard, times without number, that all the host of heaven should be dissolved, and the heavens should be rolled together as a scroll, and all their host should fade away: and that the streams of the earth were to be turned into pitch,

and the dust thereof into brimstone, and the earth was to become burning pitch, to be quenched neither day nor night, but the smoke was to go up forever, when they knew that this was only the rhetoric in which the desolation of Idumea was clothed. They had listened to Ezekiel in similar strains when it was the king of Egypt that was to be overthrown; and when Peter had employed similar forms of speech—though on a lower key, for he was a fisherman, and not a poet—in prophesying of the terrible times that filled up the years from the very date of this Epistle to the final overthrow of Jerusalem, those who passed through the agonies of that unparalleled epoch never thought of charging Peter with overdrawing the picture, but only said, “Oh, if Isaiah had done it, with what flashes of lightning would he have set all the heavens ablaze!”

Much stress is laid upon such expressions as “the last day,” “the last days,” and “the last times,” as proving that this world is to come to an end; and that, at the time of the destruction of this material globe, the final judgment is to take place. But it goes without saying, that, as there was an end of the Jewish dispensation, and as there is to be an end to every human life, these expressions alone do not settle the question. It is a fit subject for examination as to whether these modes of speech should be referred to the end of the world, or to some other end, which may fittingly be spoken of as the last day.

Proceeding with such an investigation, we shall find that in Acts ii. 17 Peter quotes from the Prophet Joel these words: “It shall come to pass *in the last days*, saith God, I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh: . . . and I will show wonders in heaven above, and signs in the earth beneath: blood, and fire, and vapor of smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before that great and notable day of the Lord come”—telling his

hearers distinctly *that they were then realizing* the fulfillment of that prophecy. (By the way, that shows how Peter understood those emphatic expressions which are so often quoted as yet to be fulfilled.) *Those were the last days.* We have this direct testimony of the Apostle.

In 2 Tim. iii. 1, Paul speaks of the perilous times coming "in the last days," and proceeds to exhort Timothy to be ready for them in such a way as manifestly to indicate that he was to encounter them; and that, too, before long.

Heb. i. 2 says, "God hath *in these last days* spoken unto us by his Son." This is the accepted version from an old Greek text. The Revised Version translates from a revised Greek text, "In the last of these days," but with no substantial change of meaning.

James v. 3 reads, "Ye have heaped treasure together for the last days"—R. V. reads "*in the last days.*" Both forms of expression imply that those days were the last days.

1 Peter i. 20 speaks of Christ as manifested "*in these last times.*"

2 Peter iii. 3 alludes to scoffers that should come "in the last days," as though they were then living, and the people to whom he was writing needed to be on their guard against them.

1 John ii. 18 says, "It is the last time: and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now are there many Antichrists: whereby we know that it *is* the last time."

All these words were written before the year 70, and so explain the understood meaning of these expressions as referring to the end of the old dispensation, which was then passing away.

Besides these seven examples of the use of these words, there are six others in which the expressions "the last day" and "the last time" are used, and I think that a critical study of them will show that they are used with refer-

ence to the end of human life; and not at all as referring to the end of this material globe. Indeed, I do not find any form of speech in the Bible which properly interpreted refers to the end of this material earth. That *may* sometimes occur; but the Bible has nothing to say about it. There is certainly nothing in science to suggest that this planet is anywhere near the end of its career. The Creator, since in the beginning he created the heavens and the earth, has spent, according to the unanimous agreement of scientists, many millions of years in fitting it up for human habitation—millions of ages before there was a human being upon it. Were any man to spend ten years in building a house, it would be assumed that it was his expectation that it should be occupied by some one *at least as long as it took to build it*. Of course I do not pretend to know that this planet is yet to be inhabited for millions of years, but I most assuredly believe it—*on general principles*. I am sure that the Bible has not a word to say to the contrary. The earth is but in its earliest infancy. Every year it is becoming better and better fitted to live in. If I did not know that heaven was a still better place for our permanent home, I should be glad to live another threescore and ten here.

But some man will ask, "Did not the angel tell the disciples at the time of Christ's ascension: 'This same Jesus, who is taken from you into heaven, shall so come *in like manner* as ye have seen him go into heaven,'—and does not your understanding of his coming imply a very different manner?"

This is a very proper and pertinent question. Let me address myself to the answer. And first let me say, that the words *hon tropon*, which are here translated "in like manner," are used four times in the New Testament, and in every other instance are translated simply "as." They do not necessarily imply "identity of mode or manner,"

but simply the same absolute assurance of the fact. Here they are:—

Matt. xxiii. 37: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even *as* a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings." Here certainly there is no intention of expressing identity of manner, but the fact that he would *as certainly* have given them loving protection.

Acts vii. 28: "Wilt thou kill me, *as* thou didst the Egyptian yesterday?" Does this imply similar manner of killing, or the simple fact of the killing, without reference to details of mode?

2 Tim. iii. 8: "Now *as* Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also resist the truth." Certainly no identity of manner of resistance is here intended. For Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses by magical enchantments. Paul in the immediate connection describes those who resisted him, and in the use of eighteen distinct epithets sets forth their modes of resistance, but not one of them is that of being magicians (see 2 Tim. iii. 2-4).

The New Testament usage, then, gives little countenance to the theory that this form of speech must imply identity of mode or manner. And the Septuagint usage does not sustain this theory any better. I give you but a single example from Isa. xxxiii. 4: "Your spoil shall be like the gathering of the caterpillar: *as* the running to and fro of locusts." Were the men in gathering spoil to imitate the movements of locusts—going in the same way? Or does it simply mean that the spoiling was to be as thorough and as obvious?

But I may still further say that the interpretation of *hon tropon* as meaning "identity of mode or manner" proves too much altogether for those who understand literally what is said of Christ's second coming. His going away was most unlike what was said of his coming again.

His ascension was very quiet. It was in the presence of very few. There was absolutely nothing spectacular about it. But his second coming was to be "with clouds, and the voice of a trumpet, and every eye should see him." There is *no resemblance of manner*. I think, therefore, that we must all agree that all that was meant to be expressed was, that the reality of his second coming was to be as obvious and as unquestionable as his ascension had been. As a matter of fact it was far more impressive, as the figures of speech used in describing it would naturally lead us to expect that it would be. The Jewish system fell with a crash that resounded to the end of the earth. The kingdom of God came with power and great glory.

"Was Christ's second coming, then, at the destruction of Jerusalem, and are we not to look for his personal coming again?"

I so understand it. I cannot get away from that saying of his in Cæsarea Philippi, "There be some standing here who shall not taste of death till *they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom*." It was so impressed upon the minds of those who heard it, and it was so brought by the Spirit of God to the minds of the Synoptists, that they all give it substantially in the same way. And that still more impressive talk on the Mount of Olives, when the subject was amplified, and that "Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled"; this with the supplementary words confirming the statement in a most unexampled way, "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away." There the words stand—in almost precisely the same form in each of the three records. I cannot possibly get away from these words. Every known manuscript and every old version contains them.

Nor do I see why we should still hunger and thirst for Christ's coming in person to reign in this world—either

premillennially, or post-millennially,—when *he has told us distinctly that his spiritual presence is better for the world than his bodily presence.* “It is well for you that I go away: for if I go away, I will send the Comforter, who shall take everything and show it unto you.” As though he had said, “If I were to remain here in bodily presence, you would sometimes be in Judæa when I was in Galilee. You would be in Rome when I should be in Damascus. It is well *for you* that I should be with you in spirit rather than in body. You are going to preach the gospel to all the nations—lo, *I shall be with you always.*”

I traveled for weeks in Palestine. It was with such a realization of the personal presence of Christ as I followed his footsteps from place to place everywhere, that when, by and by, we came to the limits of his journeyings, and pushed our way on through Phœnicia, I had for hours such a feeling of parting from *Him*, that, never as before nor since, there came to me such floods of tears that in my agony I cried out, “O thou blessed Christ, help me!” Then the words seem to drop down upon me from heaven, “*Lo, I am with you always, even forever and ever.*” If the *word* should require me to accept of it, that He was to come in person and reign in Jerusalem, I would do it. But there would be no comfort in it. His spiritual abiding presence is far better. Suppose he were in Jerusalem to-day, how few of all his saints could go there to see him! *Now* he is just as much where the reader at present is, as in any other place on earth. We could not all live in Palestine if he were there. (Read John xvi. 7–15.)

I noticed another thing in this study of the twenty-fourth of Matthew,—the very last, I think, that I did notice,—and that is, that the whole atmosphere of this discourse on the Mount of Olives is *local*. For example, as Matthew repeats the talk of our Lord, he says: “When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Dan-

iel the prophet, standing in the holy place, then let them that be in Judæa, flee into the mountains." Mark uses the same language. Luke employs a different form of words, but to the same import, thus, "When ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that the desolation thereof is nigh."

And another form of words which in our translation is somewhat disguised, "Then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn." The more accurate translation would be, "Then shall all the tribes of the *land* mourn." That the word *gee* does not always mean the earth no Greek scholar will claim. For example, it is said of the darkness at the crucifixion of Christ, "There was darkness over all the *land*" (common version). So Matthew, and Mark. The translators have translated the same word "earth" in Luke. The Revisers have translated the word "land" in Luke, as well as in Matthew and Mark. And that it should be translated "land" in this case, in the twenty-fourth of Matthew, is obvious from the fact, that it is "tribes" that are spoken of as mourning, not "nations." And the earth is never spoken of as being divided among "tribes." A "tribe" is properly used only in speaking of a limited portion of the earth. The word *phulee* (singular) is used thirty-one times in the New Testament, and is in the common version translated "tribe" (or "tribes") in all but six of the cases: it is in the Revised Version translated "tribe" (or "tribes") in *every case*, without exception. A few of the instances in which the word is used will illustrate the meaning: "Judging the twelve tribes of Israel," "The lion of the tribe of Judah," "Of the tribe of Judah were sealed twelve thousand," and so of all the twelve tribes mentioned in the seventh chapter of Revelation. When the whole earth is spoken of, it is as being made up of "*nations, and tribes, and peoples, and tongues.*" When tribes alone are spoken of, it is always as being limited to a portion of the earth,

and in the New Testament it is confined to the land of Palestine.

The whole atmosphere—I repeat it—of the words of Christ, as given by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, is local. The same thing is true of what John has said in that part of the Revelation which refers to the same period.

But it will be objected to the general view which I have set forth in this article, that Christ said: “This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in *all the world*, for a witness unto all nations, and then shall the end come.” And you may very naturally object, that that had not happened previous to the year 70 of the Christian era. My answer to this objection is:—

1. “All the world” did not mean as much with the people then as with us now. In Luke (ii. 1) it is said, “A decree went forth, that *all the world* should be taxed.” We know that this refers only to the Roman Empire, and yet the Greek is precisely the same as in the passage in hand. And in the account of the temptation of Christ, we are told that Christ was taken into an exceeding high mountain, and Satan showed him all the kingdoms *of the world*,—the same words again as here. And in Acts we are told, “These men who have turned *the world* upside down have come hither also,”—again the same words. It would seem, then, that the word had been preached in all the world, or else it could scarcely be said that the preachers had turned it upside down. It would seem to imply, not only that the gospel had thus been preached, but that it had taken hold of the people. Whatever the expression “all the world” may mean, then, it is plain that in the New Testament usage it did not cover any more ground in the one case than it did in the other. But

2. It is proper to say that the facts show that the gospel had been preached farther than we have generally supposed before the year 70. Paul had been brought to Rome

and put to death before that time. Mark, according to an undisputed tradition, went to Alexandria, in Egypt, and became pastor, and died a martyr there. Previous to that, certainly, he is spoken of as being in the vicinity of *Babylon*. And Peter, in sending Mark's salutations from Babylon (see 1 Peter v. 7), implies that he himself was there when he wrote that Epistle. Paul went everywhere, even to Arabia. The fact seems to be that the gospel was preached everywhere in the known world before the destruction of Jerusalem. Only think of the congregation gathered in Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost—representing Parthia, and Media, and Mesopotamia, and Cappadocia, Pontus, Phrygia, Pamphylia, Egypt, Lybia, Rome, Crete, Arabia, Elam. But in any case, the meaning of the words "all the world," admitting that they are in themselves ambiguous, cannot override the unambiguous words of Christ, when he said, "Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all these things [including this preaching in all the world, which is mentioned just before this utterance] be fulfilled." We cannot set aside this declaration without subverting our faith in any divine inspiration in the Evangelists or in Christ himself. *There is not in the Bible anywhere a plainer statement than that.*

Christ's second coming was eighteen hundred years ago. The Jewish dispensation then came to a perpetual end. According to the prophecy of Daniel, his kingdom was *then set up*. And it is to last forever. Have we not had enough of the folly of "Second-adventism" in our time, without keeping it up any longer? Some of us remember the wide-spread excitement over the coming of Christ in 1843. We remember how large a number of the victims of that delusion went into the insane asylums, and how much larger a number went into infidelity. The harvest gathered from the similar delusion of 1866 was of the same sort. Eight years ago one of the most brilliant of the

French preachers went into the madhouse on account of the excitement of the theory of 1892. All of these speculations have been as baseless as the shadow of a dream. They are the offspring of a totally erroneous interpretation of the Scriptures. Adventism, from first to last, has been delusive, divisive, perverse, subversive. *This world is not made to be destroyed, but to be redeemed.* It is yet to become the kingdom of our Lord and his anointed. But how slow we are to learn that what Christ said was true, and will be true to the end—that the *Spirit of God in the world is of far more worth than Christ's bodily presence.* What the world needs for its regeneration is spiritual power—not physical omnipotence.

This world is to grow better and better. More and more, from age to age, it is to be dominated by the living Christ through the Eternal Spirit. Generation after generation of the believing are to be gathered into the heavenly garner. For uncounted ages this earth is to be the nursery from which will be translated day by day unnumbered thousands into the eternal glory. The spiritual conquest of the nations is to go on, until from all lands shall come up the shout, "Alleluiah, the Lord God omnipotent reigneth: the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord and his Christ, and he shall reign forever."

Would it not be better for us to be expending all our energy in the work of saving men, and training them for this eternal life, instead of spending our time in cherishing the delusion and dream of the bodily presence of Christ as reigning king in Jerusalem?—or even in Chicago? No better instrumentalities or agencies for this world's redemption would be possible under such a *régime* than are possible now: Christ himself being witness. Think of the achievements of the last hundred years! Think of what our ancestors were three hundred years ago, and what the mighty empire of Great Britain has become; and of what

this nation of ours has attained to; of what a few centuries have accomplished; and above all of the assurance that *He*—"who is called Wonderful, Counselor, the Mighty God, the Prince of Peace"—will "*not fail or be discouraged* till he hath set righteousness in the earth." Then why should *we*? He himself, through the Spirit, is with us and will be forever and ever.

"Always with us, always with us—
Words of cheer and words of love;
Thus the risen Saviour whispers
From his dwelling-place above.

"With us when we toil in sadness,
Sowing much and reaping none;
Telling us that in the future
Golden harvests shall be won.

"With us when the storm is sweeping
O'er our pathway dark and drear;
Waking hope within our bosoms,
Stilling every anxious fear.

"With us in the lonely valley,
When we cross the chilling stream;
Lighting up the steps to glory
With salvation's radiant beam."

A hymn beginning with Christ's spiritual presence with us on earth and ending with his personal presence in heaven.

Finally: *Christ's personal presence is there, not here!* All the testimony is to that point. And to his faithful ones he says, "I go to prepare a place for you, that where I am there ye may be also." "*So shall we be forever with the Lord.*" He is never to leave that eternal home of the blest. "Surely goodness and mercy shall follow us all the days of our life, and we shall dwell in the house of the Lord forever." Brethren who talk about *his personal reign on earth* forget how full the Bible testimony is against them. The glorified saints are not to be defrauded of the

inheritance promised them—an inheritance “*eternal in the heavens.*” And what would heaven be without Christ’s personal presence there? Why, what are we dreaming of? Are we forgetting that we are all of us going home in just a little while? We shall never see him personally on this earth, though we should live here ten thousand times ten thousand years: but we shall soon be “over there,” and see him as he is.

ARTICLE VII.

THE POSSIBLE POPULATION OF PALESTINE.

BY G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

THE intelligent modern traveler in Palestine cannot fail to be impressed with the passage in his Baedeker relating to the ancient population of the country,¹ which, while giving correctly the estimates, speaks of them as evidently exaggerated. According to Num. i. 46 and xxvi. 51, the males above twenty years of age capable of bearing arms numbered 603,550; while in the time of David (2 Sam. xxiv. 9) there were 1,300,000 men capable of bearing arms, the age-limit being presumably the same as that mentioned in Numbers. If, as is usually done, we reckon the total population to be four times the number of adult males, it would be, in round numbers, 2,500,000 at the time of Joshua's entrance into Palestine, and in the time of David, four hundred years later, 5,000,000. Reckoning the area of Palestine, including the land occupied by the tribes east of the Jordan, at 10,500 square miles, this would give a population of 240 to the square mile in the time of Joshua, and 480 to the square mile in the time of David; whereas the total population at the present time (650,000) is only about sixty-two to the square mile.

When the traveler rides over the treeless mountains from Dan to Beersheba, and witnesses the present neglected condition of the country and its consequent infertility, it is, indeed, difficult for him not to believe, with his guide-book, that the early estimates found in Numbers and Samuel are exaggerations. Especially is this the case if

¹ Baedeker's *Palestine and Syria*, p. 58.

he has come from the United States, where land is so plenty that high cultivation has not been a necessity, and where the average population to the square mile, excluding the Territories, is only twenty-six; that of Iowa, one of the richest agricultural States, being but forty-one. If, however, he has approached the country from some of the more densely populated regions of the world, where the conditions of life are still somewhat similar to those in the great centers of population three thousand years ago; and if, at the same time, he examines somewhat carefully the physical conditions of the country, he will be less likely to assume at once either exaggeration on the part of the sacred writer or error in the transmission of the figures.

If one has gone from Egypt to Palestine, density of population such as is involved in the census report of David's officials will not be at all staggering, when due account is taken of the natural resources of the country. The arable land of Egypt is estimated at 11,240 square miles, of which about 7,500 are included in the delta, where there is considerable waste land. Yet the population of Egypt is, at the present time, 11,000,000, or about 1,000 to the square mile; while it is expected that, by regulating the water-supply by means of the great dam nearly completed at Assuan, the productiveness of the soil may be so increased as to support a population of 14,000,000 or 15,000,000, and perhaps even more. The land of Goshen occupied the eastern portion of the delta, with a fertile strip bordering the ancient Sweet Water Canal leading to the Bitter Lakes. With the present density of population a border strip of the delta twenty-five miles wide and one hundred miles long (which seems to be about the limits which recent investigations would assign to it) would give ample support to the population of the Israelites at the time of the Exodus, when there is said to have been (Ex. xii. 37) "about 600,000 on foot that were men, besides children," which, at

the former mode of reckoning, would make a total of 2,400,000.

Nor is this anything exceptional. The Barbadoes, which are mainly agricultural islands, support a population of 192,000 on 166 square miles, which equals more than 1,156 to the square mile. But the most remarkable illustration of the capacity of land to support a population which lives in a very economical yet comfortable condition is found in Japan. Excluding Formosa, Japan has an area of 147,655 square miles, with a total population of 43,760,815, making a density of 296 to the square mile. But the islands are to such a large extent composed of mountains which are incapable of being tilled, that the population is practically limited to one-tenth of this area, that is to about 15,000 square miles. There are then really more than 3,133 inhabitants in Japan to every square mile of arable land.

If, with these figures in mind, we consider the natural resources of Palestine, we can easily believe, not only in the highest figures which are given for the population in the book of Samuel, but even in those of Josephus, who reckons 5,000,000 for Galilee alone, whose area could not have been more than 2,000 square miles. At any rate, however much we may exaggerate the proportion of waste land in Palestine which is incapable of cultivation, we can hardly reduce it so low that, with the density of the inhabitable portions of Japan, its population would not equal 5,000,000. For, as already said, the total area of Palestine is 10,500 square miles, and, leaving out the mountainous districts, the most of which are themselves capable of yielding rich agricultural returns, it is easy to find 2,000 square miles of the most fertile land in the world situated in the valleys, where they receive abundant supplies of water from perennial springs, together with the fertility that is brought with it in the wash from the mountain sides.

Nothing can be more impressive than the life-giving effect produced by the immense flow of sparkling water which pours forth from the underground channels at the base of Mount Hermon both at Banias and, three or four miles away, at the site of the ancient Dan. At various places, also, similar streams pour out along the eastern base of the mountains of Napthali into the plains about Lake Merom. Aside, also, from the river Jordan, which is capable of watering all its valley, such live-giving springs as those above Jericho and at Engedi burst forth in numerous places along the base of the mountains, at elevations which are convenient for purposes of irrigation.

The cause of these springs is so permanent that we can count upon their always having been in existence, and upon their never having failed, except in periods of extreme drought. The mountains of Palestine consist of limestone, which, in the southern part, is of such a porous nature (in many places being real chalk) as to absorb a vast amount of water, and hold it in a permanent reservoir at a considerable elevation, from which it is gradually imparted to lower levels; and, even where the rock itself is not porous, it is eroded so irregularly by atmospheric agencies that the soil is collected and retained in innumerable depressions, which open into underground watercourses, and keep them constantly supplied with a steady stream of water. These upper limestones, also, contain all the elements necessary for the support of plant life, and disintegrate under atmospheric agencies at a rate which keeps the soil constantly fertile.

It has often been assumed that the rainfall of Palestine was greater three thousand years ago than it is now. This, however, is not capable of proof, and seems to be contradicted by many well-established facts. The occurrence of droughts for example, especially the one in the time of Elijah, would indicate conditions very similar to those ex-

isting at the present time. But the clearest evidence is to be found in the size of the Dead Sea, which, so far as we can learn, occupies nearly the same dimensions now that it did in the time of Joshua, when the children of Israel crossed the Jordan near Jericho.

There is, indeed, abundant evidence that, at a comparatively recent geological date, the valley of the Jordan was filled with water to about 750 feet above the present level of the Dead Sea, or even to 1,200 feet, according to Professor Hull. Instead of the limited area of the Dead Sea, we then should have had a lake extending, from a considerable distance south of the present shores, northward to Lake Galilee, or, if Professor Hull's inferences are correct, beyond Lake Merom to the fountains of Dan. The evidence of the extension of this lake to the 750-foot level is too clear to admit of doubt. This is found in the fine sediment, showing signs of stratification by water up to this level, which extends all around the basin, and fills the valley of the Jordan to an unknown depth. It is through this sediment that the present river Jordan has cut its deep, tortuous, narrow channel, with its characteristic clayey banks, rendering its passage in general very difficult.

That these events are of recent date is evident enough from the small amount of erosion which has taken place since the water fell to its present level in the Dead Sea. Without doubt, also, they point to great climatic changes during recent geological time, but they evidently so far preceded the historical knowledge which we have of the region, that they are most likely connected with an earlier class of events belonging to the glacial period.

In order to appreciate the evidence, we must take into account the causes which secure the present water level of the Dead Sea. This is now dependent upon the equilibrium which is established between the precipitation over the basin and the evaporation. The evaporation now just

equals the precipitation. With these elements constant the water cannot change its level; for, if the Dead Sea should fall, that would diminish the evaporating surface, so that, if the precipitation is the same, it would speedily regain its level; while the surface cannot appreciably rise without increasing the evaporating surface. Hence, unless the rainfall were increased, the higher level could not be maintained. It is evident, therefore, that when the water level in the basin was high enough to distribute the silt which reaches the 750-foot level, either the precipitation must have been immensely greater than now or the evaporation proportionately less; for the expanse of water was then eight or ten times greater than at the present time.

One theory to account for this great increase of water in the Jordan basin connects it with the glacial period. Professor Hull and others had supposed, that during that epoch glaciers covered the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains, and, as a consequence, so clouded the sky and lowered the temperature that the evaporation was checked, and that this, combined with an increased precipitation of moisture over the region, produced the results observed. But, as I failed to find evidences of a glacial period in the Lebanon Mountains (except possibly far to the north over the limited elevated area containing the last remnant of the cedars of Lebanon), that theory commends itself less to me than it did at one time. If the facts are in any way connected with the glacial period, it must be indirectly through a general lowering of the temperature and an increased precipitation which characterized a belt of indefinite extent south of the glaciated regions, which is altogether theoretical.

At present I am more inclined to connect this increase of water with facts which I have published elsewhere (but which I will more fully set forth in a future number of the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*), going to show that since man

came into the world there has been an extensive but comparatively brief subsidence of all Northern, Central, and Western Asia, which may possibly be correlated with the Noachian deluge. If this subsidence were even less than we now know it to have been upon the shores of the Black Sea, it would have admitted the waters of the ocean into the Jordan Valley, and furnished the conditions which might readily explain the sediment there to which we have referred; while, upon the emergence of the land, evaporation would rapidly reduce the area of water exposed until an equilibrium was established. For a time this may well have been at the 750-foot line spoken of, when the precipitation was still greatly in excess of what it is now. While it is true, therefore, that the precipitation over Central Asia has been, within the last few thousand years, greatly in excess of what it is now, this must have preceded the occupation of Palestine by the children of Israel by a considerable lapse of time, and so will not help us in explaining the productiveness of the land during the early historic period.

But it is not needed. The rainfall in Palestine is still sufficient to meet all the requirements of a vastly increased productivity, if certain other conditions were supplied. The annual rainfall at Jerusalem is twenty-three inches, occurring on fifty-two different days, beginning with one and a half inches in October, and ending with one and a half in May; June, July, August, and September being rainless months. This rainfall is so distributed as to be ample for all purposes, and favors both winter and spring crops. There are, on the average, five and a half rainy days in November, nine in December, ten in January, ten and a half in February, eight and a half in March, and five and a half in April. The prevailing winds are from the west, bringing the moisture collected over the Mediterranean Sea. These winds occur, on the average, 210 days in the

year. The conditions, therefore, are so nearly uniform that nothing which man can do is likely to affect the actual amount of precipitation.

It is true that some have suggested that the greater extent of forests which covered the mountains in early times may have increased the rainfall. This, however, is not supported by facts. The mountains themselves are the great condensers of moisture, and they have been permanent factors for the last three thousand years.

But the forests would have a beneficial influence in many respects: First, the roots of the trees would prevent the soil from being washed away during the heavy storms; secondly, they would greatly enrich the soil by the decomposition of their foliage; thirdly, they would, by their shade, and by their effect in retaining the soil, hold in the moisture which would find its way to the lower levels during a longer portion of the season. When, therefore, agriculture was first introduced into Palestine, and the forests were gradually cleared away, the productiveness must have been far in excess of what it is now; and, under proper treatment, especially by terracing the hillsides to prevent the soil from being washed away, their productiveness might have been kept up for an indefinite period.

That forests were actually abundant all over this region in the early historic period is evident, among other things, from the extensive mining operations which were carried on in the Sinaitic Peninsula long before the Exodus. But the successful working of the mines was dependent upon obtaining an abundant supply of charcoal in the vicinity, which implies the existence of forests to a considerable extent; while even in the time of Christ ship-building was an important industry on Lake Galilee,—the town of Tarichæa being specially noted for this industry. Josephus tells of collecting, for one of his military expeditions on the shores of Galilee, "two hundred and thirty ships from

the vicinity of Tarichæa alone"; while the Romans, against whom he led his fleet, evidently possessed an equal number. In former times, also, as now, the vine and the olive grew luxuriantly wherever in Palestine their roots could get access to the limestone soil which characterizes the whole country. But the oil produced from the olive was then out of all proportion to what it is now; two hundred thousand gallons being sent annually by Solomon to Hiram, King of Tyre. It need not be said that these vineyards and olive orchards in protecting the mountain sides would go far to supply the place of the native forests after they were removed.

Altogether, therefore, when we closely examine the situation, there is not the least difficulty in believing that 10,500 square miles of Palestine supported in the time of David a population of 5,000,000, or about 500 to the square mile; this being a density considerably less than that of Belgium, which is 593 to the square mile, and only half that of Brabant and Holland, one-third that of Malta, and one-sixth that of the populated area of Japan.

There is more difficulty, however, in understanding how the population of 2,500,000 Israelites who crossed the Red Sea were able to maintain themselves during the forty years of wandering. It is true that for a portion of the time they were miraculously fed, but it would seem scarcely in the line of the ordinary economy of miracles as revealed in the Bible, to suppose that this great multitude were wholly or principally fed by miracles during that entire time, and we are led to inquire, What natural means of support might they have found in the "wilderness of wandering"? And here it is a fact worthy of notice, that the population at the end of the forty years was almost precisely the same as that at the beginning, there being at both periods about 600,000 adult males. This would seem to indicate that the conditions of life to which they had

been subjected were more than ordinarily severe, for the population would naturally have doubled in that length of time. We may well believe, therefore, that even the miraculous intervention did not lift them altogether above want, but left them to endure as best they could the hardships of untried conditions of life.

At the same time we can obtain some light upon the subject by considering, first, that the children of Israel, from being mere nomads upon their entrance into Egypt, had become familiarized with the agricultural methods of the most highly civilized nation of antiquity; while we know, from their later life in Palestine, that they to a great extent carried this art and many of the common-law practices of Egypt with them to the promised land. In particular they knew the value to agriculture of water, and presumably may have put their knowledge to practice over the wide territory through which they were probably scattered, storing it for irrigation. Nor, secondly, is this country by any means a barren waste. The land of Midian, including about 3,000 square miles, at a later period sent 135,000 swordsmen into the field at once. Thirdly, we must remember that the conditions of life in that semi-tropical region are very simple,—the cost of clothing and of houses being reduced to their lowest point.

It is, therefore, by no means improbable that 2,500,000 Israelites could, for the most part, have found natural means of support in the vast region to the south, south-east, and east of Palestine, which is even now in the line of the great caravan routes connecting Arabia with both the east and the west. In endeavoring to picture the condition of the Israelites during their wanderings in the Wilderness, it is well, also, to keep in mind that Moses was familiar with the country and could direct them to the best advantage.

Throughout this comprehensive survey, it appears that

the *prima facie* objections raised against the historical statements of the Old Testament often disappear upon a careful examination of the subject. It is evident that the present economical conditions of the Orient are no true measure of the past, and that the present physical conditions of any particular section cannot be understood without a full knowledge of the broader circle of facts both past and present with which they are connected. Here, therefore, as is so often the case, where a cursory glance leads to erroneous conclusions and unwarranted doubts, scientific scrutiny supplies that true understanding of the conditions which can effectually remove the doubts and reëstablish faith.

ARTICLE VIII.

RELIGION: ITS IMPULSES AND ITS ENDS.

BY PROFESSOR JAMES H. LEUBA, PH.D.

RELIGIOUS beliefs, rites, and ceremonials from the comparative and the genetic point of view, are now, and have been for years, common subjects of exposition and discussion. The thinking world has long been interested in religious ideas and in religious practices. Much less attention has been paid to the forces behind the religious manifestations, to the impulses they reveal, and to the ideals or the ends they tend to realize. Is this because whatever is worth knowing on these subjects is already known? In our opinion, the neglect of the dynamic side of religious life is to be explained chiefly by the fact that the attention of philosophers has been occupied for the most part during the past centuries with the *formal* elements of psychic life. Sensations, perceptions, representations, images, ideas, have been the chief objects of their concern. In religion, it is the beliefs and the doctrines, the outward performances and the ceremonials, which have attracted and kept their attention; while the efficient and the final causes of these performances, i.e., the impulses, the cravings, the desires, and the purpose or the end, have remained in the background.

That philosophic reflection should have begun upon the formal side of conscious life is quite natural. What, if not this habit of ignoring the springs of action, is to account for the opinions, now obviously untenable, of men of the learning and acumen of Max Müller and Herbert Spencer, and for the wide acceptance of their views? The former affirms that the "perception of the Infinite" is the essence

of religion; the latter finds it to consist in "the recognition of the ultimate mystery." A *perception*, a *recognition*, the essence of religion! They failed to observe, or at least to realize, the full meaning of the fact that not the perception of the Infinite or the recognition of the mystery, but *the universal and ceaseless desire to enter into relation with the one and to penetrate the other*, is what leads to the making of theologies and to religious practices.¹ But for the impulse and desire, perception and recognition would leave man absolutely unconcerned and unmoved.

A psychological study of religious life had better start, therefore, with the consideration of the instincts, the needs, the impulses, the desires; in short, with the dynamic factors of which the outward religious deeds are the manifestations.

The following pages are portions of an investigation into the impulses and the ends of religious life.² They deal exclusively with the religion of the North American Indians and with Buddhism. We have tried to keep close to the facts and, especially, to refrain from reading into them meanings derived from higher religions. Because the higher issues from the lower, or is continuous with it, it has been the custom of certain persons to insist upon discovering at least faint traces of the color and fragrance of the flower in the dingy and the ill-smelling root. When thus prepossessed, the interpretation of the religious consciousness of primitive people cannot but be fanciful. Against this tendency—seeing not what really is, but what is in our mind's eye—the student of religion is in special need of guarding himself.

¹Max Müller recognized subsequently that the mere perception was not sufficient, and completed his definition thus: "A perception of the Infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man."

²See also the author's papers in the *Monist*, for January and July, 1901, on the "Contents of Religious Consciousness in this Country."

We confess to some misgivings as we reflect that most of the facts we are going to recite are quite familiar. The reader may feel that ours is a case of bringing up a candle where the sun is shining. Yet we may well proceed, because, even though the facts themselves should be known, their bearings upon the psychology of religion have surely not been sufficiently appreciated. The philosophy of religion is, in this respect, in a condition similar to that in which architectural knowledge would be if, the existence of the columns of the Greek temples being known, their position in the structure was not.

THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN.

The religion of the North American Indian has been selected among those of the non-civilized peoples because no other has been submitted to an equally extended and minute scrutiny.¹

With the Indians, as with every other primitive people, every important event of daily life, and very many of its minor functions, are or may be associated with religious ceremonies. Birth, the attainment of manhood or womanhood, marriage, sickness, war, hunting, traveling, smoking, sowing, planting, etc., each is or may be the occasion for the manifestation of religiosity. It is only rarely that religious practices are found, as is more frequently the case with higher races, in remoter connection with, or perhaps disconnected from, the immediate concerns of practical life. But whether we consider the one or the other class, the same purpose—we shall presently inquire whether it is the only one—appears conspicuously: their religious deeds are undisguised attempts to secure benefits from a certain class of agents.

Here are some illustrations. Before going to war against

¹ See, in particular, the annual reports of the American Bureau of Ethnology—Smithsonian Institute.

the Pawnee, the pious Kansa addresses himself to the sun, thus: "I wish to kill a Pawnee! I desire to bring horses when I return. I long to pull down an enemy! I promise you a calico shirt and a robe. I will give you a blanket also, O Wakanda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a Pawnee."¹ "Every morning of the year," says the Zuñi Indian, Pedro Pino, "when the sky is clear, at the rising of Lucero [the morning star], at the crowing of the cock, we throw corn flour to the sun. I am never without my bag of kunque; here it is. Every Zuñi has one. We offer it to the sun for good rain and good crops."² In war, before action, the Pueblo rub it upon their heart to make it big and brave. One of the prayers offered during the elaborate rain ceremonial of the Sia is as follows: after having offered food to the animals of the four cardinal points, the Shaman says, "When you eat, then you will be contented and you will pass over the straight road [into the images of themselves in the sand-painting before the altar]. We pray you to bring us, and to all peoples food, good health, and prosperity, and to our animals bring good health and to our fields large crops; and we pray you to ask the cloud people to come to water the earth."³ The Omaha Indian will, on occasions of particular moment, pray to the stream he wants to ford, thus: "You are a person and a Wakanda. I too am a person. I desire to pass through you and reach the other side." When beginning to smoke, the Indians of many tribes point the stem of their pipe alternately towards the four cardinal points, the heaven, and the earth, and say, addressing the four winds: "Thou who causeth the four winds to reach a place, help ye me!"

¹ "A Study of Siouan Cults," J. Owen Dorsey, 11th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 376.

² "The Medicine-men of the Apache," John G. Bourke, 9th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1887-88, p. 508.

³ See the complicated rain-making ceremonies in "The Sia," Miss M. Coxe Stevenson, 11th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 105.

The great Navajo ceremony called "the Mountain Chant," is celebrated for the "ostensible reason" of curing disease. The patient for the benefit of whom the lengthy ceremonies are performed pays for all expenses, and is the central figure during most of the nine days. The prayers he repeats vary but little:—

"Reared within the mountains!
 Lord of the Mountains!
 Young man!
 Chieftain!
 I have made you sacrifice.
 I have prepared a smoke for you.
 My feet restore thou for me.
 My legs restore thou for me.
 My body restore thou for me.
 My voice restore thou for me.
 Restore all for me in beauty.
 Make beautiful all that is before me.
 Make beautiful all that is behind me.
 Make beautiful my words.
 It is done in beauty,
 It is done in beauty."

The last sentence is repeated four times.

Many of the songs used during the ceremonies of the Mountain Chant are divested of religious character; they are purely poetical expressions; as, for instance, the Twelfth Song of the Thunder:—

"The voice that beautifies the land!
 The voice above,
 The voice of the thunder
 Within the dark cloud
 Again and again it sounds,
 The voice that beautifies the land.
 "The voice that beautifies the land!
 The voice below;
 The voice of the grasshopper
 Among the plants
 Again and again it sounds,
 The voice that beautifies the land."¹

¹"A Mountain Chant," Dr. W. Matthews, 5th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1883-84, pp. 379-467.

Many of these songs hint at, or relate, mythical beliefs regarding the sun, the moon, the earth, or other things; the names of symbolic instruments and of the figures pictured in the sand-painting recur frequently in many of them. But the proceedings, leaving out the non-religious, social, and poetical accretions, betray no other preoccupations than those arising from the "animal" desires. Every step of the dances, every accent of the songs, in so far as they have a purpose other than the gratification of the social and æsthetic feelings, is a bid for bread, or for protection from enemies, or for power, which includes among its delights both bread and protection.

That the most conspicuous and substantial parts of the religious life of the non-civilized peoples are prompted by the love of life as it manifests itself in the fear of death, in the pain of hunger, in the lust of the flesh, and the love of power,—in a word, by the very impulses which actuate secular activities,—is a statement which no one would venture to contradict. But the affirmation that *each and every* religious manifestation of the savage proceeds from the natural instincts and impulses which make the struggle for life, that there is no religious impulse *per se*, that every impulse which leads to religious activity could also, and actually does, lead to non-religious deeds, might not meet with the same unanimous approbation. Some persons have always insisted upon finding in the religion of even the most inferior men something of the loftiest, fairest contents of their own religious consciousness.¹ They have spoken with bated breath of the thirst for the Infinite, for the Absolute, for the realization of a glorious Ideal, for communion with the Divine, revealed, as in a glass darkly, even in the

¹ Whether or not these loftiest contents of the religious consciousness are not also dependent upon the natural instincts and impulses which make the struggle for life—at a higher level, of course,—is a point we must leave aside for the present.

most rudimentary religions. The very thought of any one of the members of the human race being so low as not to possess in some degree those lofty characteristics in which they take so much pride, makes them uncomfortable. They resent a suggestion to that effect as an indirect reflection upon themselves. But the facts they adduce do not countenance their view, unless their own interpretation of them be accepted,—an interpretation which proceeds from the unconscious self-glorifying motive we have just alluded to. It is so easy to misinterpret. We are assured, for instance, that the mourning custom of the Winnebago of cutting open their flesh and drawing blood is not a sympathetic expression of deep sorrow, as it has been supposed, but only to “let it out,” just as one would take an emetic for an overloaded stomach.¹

We know of no Indian religious practice to which a higher motive could be ascribed than the one already mentioned. Rites of pure adoration, not accompanied by request for physical help and protection, or by offerings intended as compensation for expected returns, are not to be found among the North American Indians.

It is probably in some of the most elaborate religious “dances” that the gross egoistic utilitarianism is least obtrusive; this not because the purer spirit of worship, familiar to the Christian—adoration, the communion of spirits,—is part of them, but only because the means used to carry out the religious purpose have gradually become associated in them with other functions having non-religious ends, as the pursuit of æsthetic and social pleasures.² The “Mountain Chant,” for instance, is a festival in which the initial purpose (the curing of disease) has been in many parts sup-

¹ 10th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1888-89.

² See, for instance, the last night's entertainment described at length by Dr. Washington Matthews, 5th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1883-84, pp. 431 *et seq.*

plemented, and even supplanted, by performances having no connection with the disease. An admixture of similar æsthetic and social pleasures is found in all religions, even in the highest. The various festivals which have come to be connected with Christian celebrations, and much of the music in the Christian churches, are of the same character. In the same way the satisfaction of hunger is made the occasion for the social pleasures of the table; fast day is turned into a time for merriment; even death and its attendant mournful ceremonial is made the occasion, or the excuse, for letting loose some of the inferior cravings. These extra-religious motives which have found a place in religious ceremonies, must not be allowed to bring confusion in the study of religion. Considered as a whole, the "dances" have a known purpose—the one to which the name "religion" is applicable and is actually applied. That purpose is always of the kind already described: the Indian wants to propitiate the spirits before going on the war path, or before starting on a hunt; he wants to cure disease, to secure rain, etc. A Dakota Indian gave the following reason for the celebration of the Sun Dance: "During any winter when the people suffer from famine or epidemic, or when they wish to kill any enemy, or they desire horses or an abundance of fruits and vegetables during the coming season, different Indians pray mentally to the sun, and each one says, 'Well, I will pray to Wakantanka early in the summer.' Throughout the winter all those men who have made such vows take frequent baths in sweat lodges." When the spring has come these men take the necessary steps to bring the dance to pass.¹

Whatever sacrificial rites are found among the North American Indians bear plainly inscribed on their face a gross utilitarian intention. Thank-offerings are of rare oc-

¹ "A Study of Siouan Cults," J. Owen Dorsey, 11th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 451.

currence among them, and, when met with, the attendant circumstances make it impossible to see in them anything loftier than the natural joyful expression of satiated hunger and of exultant power associated with the hope of continued favor.

The manifestations of religious life with which we have so far been concerned show the Indian endeavoring to reach his end through a particular class of agents conceived of by him as conscious beings. There are, however, among the performances usually included under the term "religion," certain activities which separate themselves clearly from the former, in that, although they have the same purpose and are animated by the same desires, they are not called forth by belief in conscious beings. *They differ in regard to the means, or rather the conception of the means, used to secure the particular benefits.* Consider, for instance, the so-called "animal dances." The Nutkas, before going to the hunt, perform the "seal dance." They wade some distance into the sea, and then come out of it crawling on the sand on their elbows and belly, imitating as they creep the motion and the cry of the seal. Advancing in this fashion, they enter their huts, and the performance ends with a wild dance. Their actions, symbolic of the coming into their huts of the seals, is supposed by the Indians to be in some way efficacious in bringing about the realization of the scene they have enacted. A similar belief in, and expectation from, a non-anthropomorphic agent, is shown in the use made of the "Groaning Stick" by the Navajo and the Apache. It is a flat rectangular piece of wood tied to a string, also called "Bull Roarer." Of this little instrument Bourke says, "The medicine-men twirled it rapidly, and with a uniform motion, about the head and from front to rear, and succeeded in faithfully imitating the sound of a gust of rain-laden wind. As explained to me by one of the medicine-men, by making this sound

they compelled the wind and the rain to come to the aid of the crops."¹

It is the same association of like with like, or of a thing with its opposite, which makes the Indian believe that a decoction of yellow root will cure biliousness; that a decoction of a tough root will strengthen the warrior's muscles; that a decoction of burr, in virtue of its sticking quality, will improve memory's retentiveness. Among the Cherokees, snake-poisoning is cured by rubbing the bitten limb in a direction opposite to that in which the snake coils itself. The Zuñis say that the arrow-head was originally made by the lightning, as also the forked tongue of the snake, and that therefore the snake is a nearer relative of the lightning than of man.

We are not called upon in this article to account for the ascription of causal relations between like, as also between opposite, qualities; and, inasmuch as we deal with the motives and ends, and not with the channels, of religious action, it is immaterial to our immediate purpose whether or not the two kinds of activities just differentiated have each a right to the name "religion," since the motives and the ends are the same in both. We note only that *in the first a conscious being is the supposed agent of the religious end, while in the second the end is to be achieved through non-anthropomorphic agents.*² It is evident that the indicated distinction in the nature of the available agents will induce different emotional attitudes and different mental contents: the feelings and the ideas of the Indian praying to Wakanda

¹"The Medicine-men of the Apache," John G. Bourke, 9th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1887-88, pp. 476-477.

²The word "superstition" might advantageously be reserved for the beliefs characteristic of the second class. It would then have a clear, well-defined meaning. We intend to take up in another article the genesis and evolution of the dualism in the concepts of force and of causal relation which is the ground of the differentiation of human activities into religious and non-religious.

will not be the same as when he makes use of magical means, even though it be in order to secure the same end.

In this connection, we must take notice of the fact, well known though rarely fully appreciated, that the medicine-man is both the physician and the priest, as far as that term may be used with reference to the non-civilized peoples; i. e., he has charge of the body and of the soul. The point of value to us in this fact is, that in primitive civilization these two functions, which later on became separated from each other, are not distinguished from each other, *although several classes of means are used to reach the common ends. It is therefore the community of ends and of fundamental instincts and impulses which is the bond between the physician and the priest.* It is only when the distinctions existing between body and soul, and between the separate *classes of means* available for the cure of the body and for the salvation of the soul, have become clearer, that the physician parts company with the priest.

Among the Indians three classes of means can already be distinguished: (1) superhuman agents (religion); (2) the power of like upon like and similar supposed forces (magic, superstition); (3) the power of certain agents called later on "physical" and natural, such as the use of certain medicinal plants, of massage, etc. These three classes of means are often used together in the same ceremony: religion, magic, and medicine (science) are made to contribute together to the end in view. The procedure by which the Indian tries to induce, or to compel, the conscious agent to come and take his temporary residence in the *altar* erected for his abode belongs frequently to the second class of means. The sand-painting symbolism, which plays such a considerable rôle in the life of several Indian tribes, is also often of that character. The Shaman will, for instance, spread on the floor a band of maize flour of a particular shape, leading up to the image of the God in

order that it may serve as a compelling or inducing thread for the "Spirit," from whom, when once his presence has been secured, some particular favor is expected.

In *résumé*, the impulses which actuate the North American Indian in his religious activity are not "religious," if by that is meant *a particular kind of impulse not to be met with in the other walks of life. In that sense there are no "religious" impulses, no more are there "religious" ends.* What prompts the primitive man to religious actions are the general, universal instincts and impulses proper to all animate beings: self-preservation and self-increase, together with the preservation and increase of others as far as they have become part of himself. If the primitive man whirls his "Groaning Stick" to get rain for his parched fields, he is also moved by the same desire "secularly" to water them; if he performs the "seal dance," he also, and for the same purpose, gets his hunting instruments in effective condition; if he calls in the medicine-man to secure the assistance of superhuman powers, he also, acting from the same motive, makes use of "natural" means for the recovery of his patient; if he offers corn flour to the sun that it may cause his crops to ripen abundantly, he also plants and tills the ground. His general psychic attitude and the contents of his mind are surely different as he does the one or the other, but the impulses, the motives, and the ends to be reached are common to the whole range of his life's activities.

The point upon which we are desirous of placing emphasis here will become evident, if we consider that, even though religion, as existing among the Indians, should include impulses and ends exclusively its own, it could, nevertheless, not be denied, that, without them—with only the lowest of the universal human impulses and needs—the Indian would still be led to the performance of all the activities we have mentioned in the course of this article,

provided his conceptual powers remained the same. Since these activities are by common consent called "religious," the existence of religion is therefore independent of the supposed specific religious impulses and ends.

If we insist upon a matter which to many will appear self-evident, it is because of the mischievous influence of the tree-in-the-germ hypothesis to which we have alluded at the beginning; it is also, and chiefly, because it appears to us of primary importance for the student of religion to keep fast in mind the fact that its fundamental spring, at least in so far as the non-civilized races are concerned, is the love of life, *at any and every level, however low, of development, in the same sense as it is the spring of every other manifestation of life*, and that therefore nothing has a less mysterious and a more natural *efficient cause* than religion. Whatever sacredness attaches to it belongs to the "will to live"; it is not religion's particular property.

PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM: ITS MOTIVE AND END.

Buddhism, unlike more primitive religions, is the creation of one man, of the Buddha Gautama, in the same sense as Christianity is the work of Jesus. This fact simplifies considerably our task, inasmuch as we shall find in the experiences which launched the Founder upon his career, and in the doctrines he enunciated, a double revelation of the motive and purpose of original Buddhism.

With the manifold departures from Gautama's teachings, and with the metaphysical and poetical accretions with which the disciples overspread the Master's revelation, we are not concerned here.

It would be a sufficient reward of much labor to be allowed to penetrate into the inner life of the young man in whom the new religion was germinating. His disgusts and his yearnings, his disappointments and his hopes, his sorrows and his loves, would make a precious con-

tribution to the psychology of religion. Unfortunately, history offers only meager information on these points. Yet the little we know of that early period, taken together with his subsequent activity, and particularly his teaching, is quite sufficient to put his motives beyond question. At the age of about twenty-nine, Siddharta, the son of an Indian prince, abandoned his father's palace and his own family, to search for the peace of Nirvāna. He thought first of finding it in a life of isolation and rigid penance. There is complete unanimity as to the cause of this unusual and irregular conduct: Siddharta had tasted of all the gilded joys of this world, and found them all loathsome, delusive, or insufficient.

As we might rightly conjecture from the rapid growth of Buddhism, the moral nausea of this Indian prince was not at the time an isolated fact. The views of human life entertained by the more serious Indians at the rise of Buddhism were extremely gloomy. Kern writes: "What strikes us most is the emphatically pronounced dread of the miseries of life, of old age and death; a dread intensified by the belief in perpetual rebirth, and consequently of repeated misery. All sects—barring the Sadducees of the epoch—agree in the persuasion that life is a burden, and unmixed evil. All accordingly strive to get liberated from worldly existence, from rebirth, from Samsāra."¹ When the famous Brahman, Kassapa of Uruvelā, had left all to join the new Teacher, and the astonished people asked him:—

"What hast thou seen, O thou of Uruvelā,
That thou, for penances so far renowned,
Forsakest thus thy sacrificial fire?
I ask thee, Kassapa, the meaning of this thing:
How comes it that thine altar lies deserted?"

¹ H. Kern, "Manual of Indian Buddhism," in the *Grundriss der Indoarischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, edited by G. Buhler, III Band, 8 Heft, p. 11.

he answers:—

“’Tis of such things as sights, and sounds, and tastes,
Of women, and of lusts, the ritual speaks.
When these I saw to be the dregs of life,
I felt no charm in offerings small or great.”¹

But if a religion issued from this pessimism, it is because it was not all-embracing; room was left for an optimism just as absolute within its range and just as tenacious as was the pessimism. The conviction that life is not worth living, deadening as it is when filling the heart entire, becomes a seed of religion, an occasion of irresistible activity, when associated with the conviction that there is a way of escape leading to the peace that “passeth understanding,” a way not beyond the power of man to discover and to follow. This is precisely what was true of the seriously minded Indians of the time, and of Siddharta in particular. Kern writes of the general state of religion in India at the advent of Gautama, “All [sects] are convinced that there are means to escape rebirth, that there is a path of salvation, a path consisting in conquering innate ignorance and in obtaining the highest truth.”

The successive steps of Gautama in the search for the path of salvation need not be detailed here. His departure from home, his seclusion, his penances and fasting, and, finally, the attainment of the Buddhahood, have of late become almost as well known to the reading public as the passion of Christ. Unfortunately history provides only stingily for the understanding of the final condition of Gautama. What his inner state was after the Enlightenment, how he differed from the young man who a few years before had abandoned his home, what had taken place within him at the crucial moment, are questions which can be answered only in the light of better-known transformations of a similar charac-

¹ The first Khandhaka, chap. xxii. §5, quoted by Rhys Davids in his “*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*,” *Hibbert Lectures* for 1881, p. 159.

ter; as, for instance, certain experiences of the Christian mystics and the renovation called "Conversion." But this matters little to us, inasmuch as the limited purpose of this article may be completed by an examination into the meaning of the word Nirvāna. It will make clear the end proposed to the members of the Brotherhood.

Nirvāna is the word used to denote the state after which the Buddhist yearns; it is the goal of his religious activity. The complete connotation of "Nirvāna" is open to discussion, but it is now generally granted that its meaning is not purely negative, as some formerly held, it does not mean simply annihilation, suppression of life. We shall presently have something to add on this point. For the present, a quotation from the Buddhist Birth Stories will bring out its positive side: "When the fire of lust is gone out, then peace is gained; when the fire of hatred and delusion are gone out, then peace is gained; when the troubles of mind, arising from pride, credulity, and all the other sins, have ceased, then peace is gained! Sweet is the lesson the singer makes me hear, for the Nirvāna of Peace is that which I have been trying to find out. This very day I will break away from household cares! I will renounce the world! I will follow only after the Nirvāna itself."¹

Whatever may have been the exact conception entertained by the Buddhists concerning the end of their religious efforts, this at least can be affirmed without hesitation: Arahatsip, the *Immediate* Nirvāna, is a *bliss* to be enjoyed on this earth, free from the disappointments of the senses and of the fear of death itself; the *Absolute* Nirvāna, the ultimate end, which can only be reached after death, is a state void for all eternity of all the suffering to which flesh and mind are prone. Logically the Absolute Nirvāna implies a cessation of consciousness; the doctrine of the Skand-

¹See Rhys Davids' *Hibbert Lectures for 1881*, pp. 160 and 161; also p. 159.

has and that of Karma, both admitted by Gautama, lead unquestionably to annihilation of personality.¹ But the Master never expressed himself definitely concerning the fate of consciousness and of the Ego in the Absolute Nirvāna. He is reported to have said that it is one of the questions which must be set aside as useless. So much as this is admitted by Burnouf, Oldenberg, Barth, Kern, La Vallée Poussin, and other authorities, and may therefore be considered as established.

Practically Nirvāna means for the believer deliverance from suffering,—salvation, final and forever. We may well feel certain that few were those who worried themselves with an attempt at a clear representation of the condition of the salvation-enjoying individual. It was enough for life's purpose to define it as the highest happiness. Does the modern Christian entertain a more distinct idea of his future state? We meet here a truth which, however often perceived, is always escaping anew from the philosopher's mind: it is not perception, understanding, knowledge, which man wants, but that subjective state of feeling he calls happiness, satisfaction; give him that—whatever it may be—or convince him that he will get it a little later on, and he will be content to walk on blindfolded.

The importance placed by Gautama and the Buddhistic sacred literature upon knowledge is not in the least in contradiction with the preceding statement. If the disciple must learn, if he must know the real nature of man and the conditions of his existence, it is only in order to escape from the "fetter of delusion," and be prepared to follow the path of salvation. Knowledge is the *revealer* of the Path of Salvation; it is a *means*, not an end in itself.

How thoroughly pragmatic Buddhism is, cannot fail to be noticed. One cannot approach the religion of Gau-

¹ Kern, *l. c.*, pp. 46-54; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Buddhism, Études et Matériaux*, pp. 43-46, 83-84.

tama from the point of view of traditional Christianity without being struck with two characteristics,—the absence of every theological element, and a deeply grounded aversion to pure speculation. Barth says, "Buddha does not deny the existence of certain beings called Indra, Agni, Varuna; but he thinks that he owes nothing to them, and that his business does not lie with them. . . . He does not busy himself with the origin of things; he takes them just as they are, or as they appear to him to be; and the problem to which he incessantly returns in his conversations is not that of being itself but that of existence. Still more than in the Vedanta of the Upanishads, his doctrine is confined to the doctrine of salvation."¹ The exclusively and directly utilitarian purpose of primitive Buddhism is evident and uncontested: the way leading to the cessation of suffering was the quest upon which Siddharta set out, and it is the announcement of this way (the eightfold path to salvation), together with whatever knowledge might be useful to lead men to it (the four Satyas, or Axioms, stating the facts with which man must be concerned; and the twelve Nidānas, or Causes of the evil of the world), which makes the burden of Gautama's preaching and the substance of Buddhism.

A statement of Kern is very interesting in this connection. After having named the four axioms of Gautama,—suffering, cause, suppression, the path,—he says, "It is not difficult to see that these four Satyas are nothing else but the four Cardinal articles of Indian Medical Science applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine."

That Buddha refused to enter upon metaphysical discussions concerning the soul, and that he held it irrelevant to his purpose and needless to reason upon the origin, nature, and existence of spiritual beings, is now a fact recognized

¹ Barth, *The Religions of India* (tr. by the Rev. J. Wood), pp. 109-110.

by every authority. We transcribe a part of an interesting passage bearing upon this point, taken from the Suttas, as translated from the Pali by Rhys Davids.

"It is by his consideration of those things which ought not to be considered [the gods and future existence], and by his non-consideration of those things which ought to be considered, that wrong leanings of the mind arise within him [the disciple]."

"Unwisely doth he consider thus: 'Have I existed during the ages that are past, or have I not? What was I during the ages that are past? How was I during the ages that are past? Having been what, what did I become in the ages that are past? Shall I exist during the ages of the future, or shall I not? What shall I be during the ages of the future? How shall I be during the ages of the future?' . . . Or he debates within himself as to the present: 'Do I after all exist, or am I not? How am I?'"

"In him thus unwisely considering, there springs up one or other of the six absurd notions [all of which are about the soul]. This, brethren, is called the walking in delusion, the jungle, the wilderness, the puppet-show, the writhing, the fetter of delusion!"¹

On one other peculiar and pregnant fact we must dwell an instant. If original Buddhism is a non-speculative religion, if it has no theology, it is because its salvation is to be secured by the individual efforts of each person. As he expects no help from the celestial powers, they forthwith fall outside his field of attention. Let the Brahman discourse upon the origin, the nature, and the attributes of the gods, bow to them in adoration, offer them sacrifices in the hope of securing their merciful assistance; the disciple of Buddha is *to gain salvation for himself by himself* without any reference to God or gods. In one of his last conversations with Ānanda, his beloved disciple, the Buddha said, speaking of the future of the Brotherhood and of the desire just expressed by Ānanda that he would leave instructions touching the Order, "The Tathāgata [Gautama] thinks not that it is he who should lead the brotherhood. . . . Why then should he leave instructions in any matter

¹ Hibbert Lectures, p. 88. For another similar passage see *Buddhism in Translations*, H. C. Warren, pp. 117-128.

concerning the order?" He then adverts to his approaching passing away, and continues:—

"Therefore, O Ānanda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the truth. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves."

"And whosoever, Ānanda, either now or after I am dead, shall be a lamp unto themselves, and a refuge unto themselves, . . . and holding fast to the truth as their lamp . . . shall look not for refuge to any one besides themselves, it is they, Ānanda, among the Blikkhus (the members of my Society) who shall reach the very topmost height [Nirvāna Arahatsip]—but they must be willing to learn."¹

It follows evidently from this proud individualism with regard to the means of salvation, that there is no room for worship, for adoration, in *original* Buddhism. The Founder is merely the revealer of the Truth; he is the Enlightener; and thus, but only thus, is he the Saviour. That is, the orthodox belief authorizes only a *commemoration* of the saints and of the symbols of their mission. Nevertheless, we find in practice among Buddhists two methods by which the assistance of the gods is sought,—the Tantric method and Adoration.² That it should be so will not be a surprise to any one who has observed how irresistible and independent of reason is the health-seeking instinct.

These two facts—the conviction that life as we have it is not worth living, and the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of the individual to save himself from the misery of life—are the most important traits of primitive Buddhism. The second of them marks the point of greatest difference between the religion of Gautama and that of Jesus. In no other point is Buddhism, considered from the practical point of view, so inferior to Christianity as in its failure to provide a set of beliefs which could suggestively convey to the believer a power outside³ himself. Original

¹ Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 182, 183.

² See, for description of these methods, La Vallée Poussin, pp. 107, 108.

³ The word "outside" must not be understood here in a spatial sense.

Buddhism makes no use of the power of "personality," or, rather, does not officially recognize and make use of it. The individual's only recourse is the suggestive power of his own ideas and feelings, while in Christianity the life-rescuing power emanates, auto-suggestively of course, from persons other and greater than himself,—from God the Father, from Christ the Son, from Mary the Mother, and from the Saints. The Enlightened One had hardly closed his eyes when his followers brought forth the personal and external means of help which had been denied them, thus finding their departed Prophet guilty of having pointed out a path of salvation to them unpracticable.

Let us, in conclusion, compare, from the point of view of this article, the religion of the North American Indians with that of Buddha. In both the motive to religious activity is rooted in the instinct for self-preservation and increase; Salvation is the end of both. Of Buddhism also can be said what was affirmed a little while ago of the religion of the non-civilized peoples: *the fundamental spring of religion is the love of life, at any and every level of development, in the same sense as it is the spring of every other manifestation of life.* Therefore there are no exclusively religious impulses, and religion derives the right it may have to sacredness from whatever sacredness belongs to the Primordial Instinct. Within this fundamental general agreement there are between them important points of difference indicating the much higher intellectual and affective development of the Hindoo. The following are the most important points by which Buddhism differentiates itself from the religion of the North American Indian:—

1. What is desired is not so much a positive good (the satisfaction of certain needs), as a negative one (the cessa-

The power is, of course, developed within the individual and not transmitted from one being, or from one place, to another.

tion of evil). The Buddhist desires—let us not stop at the apparent contradiction in terms—"the cessation, giving-up, relinquishment, forsaking, and non-adoption of desire." Is it not *desire* which endeavors to destroy desire? The Buddhist is dominated by the consciousness of the painfulness of life, the Indian by an aggressive desire to enjoy its goods; the one prays that he may be spared, the other that he may triumphantly assert himself. In the one, life declares its unwillingness to suffer; in the other, it affirms its will to enjoy. The one bears a close analogy to the graspingness of vigorous youth; the other, to the relinquishment of age. We need not add that neither one of these attitudes is exclusive of the other: Nirvāna is, practically, both cessation of desire, and eternal blessedness.

2. The several, particular, ends of daily life have become generalized: beyond the satisfaction or the destruction of the isolated, momentary desires,—food, triumph over an enemy, water for his fields, etc.,—the Buddhist aims at a final state in which all the separate ends of life will find their realizations.

It might be advanced, as an objection to this second point of difference, that the North American Indian also believes in a final state of happiness; he hopes to pass from this life to the "Happy Hunting Grounds" beyond the far-away river. This also is the result of a unification of the separate ends of life, but this physical paradise is little more than an occasional dream. It does not direct his conduct; it is not the ever-present goal of his religious efforts.

3. The undesirable circumstances to be gotten rid of include not only the "physical" pains and discomfort against which the Indian struggles, but also, in addition, "moral" suffering.

The consciousness in Buddhism of moral suffering is, for the student of the evolution of human desires, the most important point of difference between the two peoples

we are comparing. The young Prince is painfully affected not only by disease, old age, death, and the other physical miseries. They are not alone responsible for his dread of life. There is at the bottom of his pessimism a "moral" evil: conflicting desires, antagonistic motives, which, dividing him against himself, rob him of all peace and make him yearn for rest and deliverance. It is, even though not so clearly realized and divested of the feeling of guilt, the evil of which Paul complains, "For the good which I would that I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I practice. . . . O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" It is the dark conflict of newly born functions not yet harmoniously incorporated in the enriched organism. At the birth of Buddhism, this unrest, brought about by the appearance of new and higher desires, is only vaguely apprehended; hence the impatient, radical, condemnation of desire as an instrument of misery.

With these brief remarks upon weighty matters this article must be brought to a close, and further developments left for subsequent publication.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTES.

PROFESSOR PAINE'S REJOINDER.

IN the course of an article in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for April of the present year, the undersigned reviewed Professor L. L. Paine's book upon the "Evolution of Trinitarianism." Professor Paine has made a reply in the *Boston Transcript* of July 11th, a portion of which was reprinted in the *Congregationalist* of July 20th. With the merely personal part of that reply the public will not wish to be troubled. But the following points seem to demand notice from me:—

1. I am rebuked for "imputing the worst of motives," because I said that Professor Paine's criticism of the Fourth Gospel was *a priori*, having its origin in "rooted dislike" of the doctrines of the Gospel. I made the statement because Professor Paine had *expressed* his dislike in the most pointed terms, *which expressions I quoted*. If Professor Paine will now say (as he does not say in the *Transcript*) that he does *not* dislike the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel, and will *explain his expressions* in a way to make it plain that I was wrong, I will gladly retract what I said.

2. Professor Paine objects to my quoting Harnack against him in the matter of Athanasius. He says that I "seek to give the impression that Harnack is at irreconcilable odds with" him; whereas Harnack agrees with him in his general view of Greek Trinitarianism, and in his view of the whole trend of the history.

Professor Paine makes a very great mistake when he supposes that I was trying to oppose the naked authority of a great name to him. I gave Harnack's reasons for the disagreement with Professor Paine, and it is Professor Harnack's *argumentation*, not his person, that has not left our professor "an historical leg to stand upon." I expressly said that Harnack was the leader of the school of historical criticism to which Professor Paine belongs, by which I meant to say that there is general agreement between the two. But Professor Paine, I am now compelled to add, is not a very accurate student of Harnack. He errs in reference to him in the following points:—

(1) He says that Harnack and others "agree with him in holding that John the Apostle did not write the fourth gospel." That is true in form; but the general implication of the paragraph is false. Professor Paine holds that the Gospel was written about the *middle of the second century*, and that the author is *entirely unknown*. Professor Harnack holds that

it was written *before 110*, and perhaps as early as 80, and by an elder who wrote in *close dependence* upon the Apostle John. In other words, Harnack is a conservative critic, tending towards greater conservatism in his successive writings; and Professor Paine is one of the extreme radicals. To imply general agreement here is an injustice to Harnack. The same injustice is done to Professor B. W. Bacon, of Yale.

(2) He claims Harnack's general support for one of the most objectionable features of his book,—the identification of Augustinianism and later Trinitarianism with Sabellianism. I will not say that there are no passages in Harnack justifying this claim. I will only say I have not found them. The definitions of Sabellianism which Harnack gives¹ are not in favor of this idea, for he says expressly that Sabellius taught that "to the same essence three names are attached," and that "God is *not Father and Son at the same time*"; and no historian would claim that Augustine taught thus. His Son was an *eternal* Son. Augustine began at the unity of God, and made this the first thing; but so, according to Harnack, had Athanasius, so that Augustine must be viewed by Harnack at this point as taking up the old tradition. I find no passage in the "History" like that quoted from the smaller "Outlines" by Professor Paine, which speaks of Augustinianism being "modalism veiled." I suspect that to be a mistranslation, for in the "History" the corresponding passage² reads in the German: *Im Abendlande tilgte Augustin, einer alten abendländischen Tendenz folgend, den letzten Rest des Subordinationismus, näherte sich aber eben deshalb dem Modalismus*; and is to be translated: "In the Occident Augustine, following an old occidental tendency, obliterated the last remainder of subordinationism, but *for that reason* APPROACHED modalism." We have here Harnack's *interpretation* of Augustine, not an impersonal historical statement of his doctrine. Later (p. 296) he says that Augustine's "*investigations* . . . do not extend beyond modalism." I think it may be confidently maintained that he never charges Augustine with teaching modalism of any sort purposely. Of Harnack's value as a commentator I shall add a few words later. What Professor Paine says about Harnack's interpretation of the Cappadocians is correct. But I do not think that Harnack would approve, for an instant, the general line of Professor Paine's historical reduction of late Trinitarianism to Sabellianism. To call Stuart a Sabellian, is, in spite of Professor Paine's indignant objections, a case of "ambiguous middle" as well as an injury to a great name; for Stuart declared that the "distinctions" in the Godhead were eternal and co-existent, which is precisely the point which Sabellius denied. To identify these teachers on the word "*mode*" when one made it "*temporary mode*" and the other "*eternal mode*," cannot be designated by any other name than that of the fallacy of ambiguous middle, if one is to use logical language at all. Perhaps I erred in choosing to employ such

¹ Dogmengesch. i. 678, 679, second edit. ²ii. 294, first edit.

terms. I still think them adapted to prick the bubble of bad reasoning.

3. Professor Paine also misrepresents Calvin's position upon Sabellianism. Where he gained his idea of Calvin I do not know; but Calvin himself defines Sabellianism quite in accord with Thomasius and Harnack. "Sabellius," he said, "considered the names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as little more than empty sounds; arguing that they were *not used on account of any real distinction*, but were different attributes of God, whose attributes of this kind are numerous."¹ And he defines the trinity in words which exactly express what Stuart contended for: "that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one God: and that nevertheless the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but that they are *distinguished from each other by some peculiar property*."² Stuart was no Sabellian. His trinity was not exactly the trinity of the Greeks or of Augustine, but it was a faithful attempt to explain the essential elements of the New Testament doctrine, and whether fully successful or not, was enough to preserve the general evangelical doctrine which Professor Paine has abandoned.

I shall notice no further particulars in Professor Paine's article. But I wish to add one or two remarks, apropos of the little controversy, which I deem of great importance. The first pertains to the historical situation of the day. I have taken what pains I have to straighten out the relations of Professor Paine and Harnack principally for the sake of asking and answering the question, What are evangelical men to think of the considerable prevalence of this school of criticism at the present time?

My own estimate of Harnack's great work, the "*Dogmengeschichte*," was elaborately and fully expressed in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* in two articles, January and July, 1888. I trust that that review was both thorough and generous. But it was certainly plain in the estimate which a great deal of use of his work for the intervening thirteen years has continually confirmed. The book is excellent in parts and very bad in parts; but as a whole it is a failure as a description of the true progress and inner meaning of the Christian history. It fails fundamentally because it is out of sympathy with Christian theology. Harnack calls Athanasius' attempts to formulate the doctrine of the trinity "nonsense." He sees in what he calls the *Umschwung* (change, almost revolution), whereby the emphasis was laid by the Cappadocians upon the plurality in the Godhead, an entire inconsistency with the Athanasian position, which emphasized the unity. He does this because he thinks all trinitarian reasoning fallacious. But Professor Park used to remark that one might either emphasize the unity of God and lay the mystery in the threeness, or emphasize the threeness and lay the mystery in the unity. Either was scriptural and either orthodox. Professor Park had his own view, and for himself laid the emphasis upon the unity. But his capacious mind could hospitably entertain both views, as both possible, and

¹ Institutes, i. 13. 4. ²*Ibid.*, i. 13. 5.

each one expressing something which the other failed fully to express. Harnack can occupy no such position, and the reason is that he has never sought to get the point of view of the church theologians and sympathetically to understand them. He is so engaged in tripping them up that he does not fairly interpret them. He is a thoroughgoing Ritschlian. Whatever falls in with this school is welcome to him. Whatever else there is comes off with curt treatment. The result is that, where facts are plain and our sources are abundant, Harnack can be relied upon for his results. A good example of this is his presentation of Athanasius. There can be no doubt to the objective student of that teacher what his doctrine was. But where the sources are meager,—that is, in the most of the early historical period, and in many a one later, where it depends upon a *combination* of hints and brief items of actual information,—there Harnack is almost sure to go wrong.

If Professor Paine and Harnack are correct in their great underlying premise, the rejection of the supernatural as a fact in the providence of God and an element of Christianity, then their interpretation of these slight indications of the course of things, and of the ambiguous statements of many early writers, and of the whole course of the history, may be accepted as correct. It is, at least, as correct as men can arrive at who set out to explain everything by the categories of causation, the material categories of material science. But if they are wrong at this point, their whole edifice collapses. We affirm, and the church yet affirms,—and Congregationalism yet affirms,—the reality of the supernatural element in Christianity. Jesus Christ was truly God. The incarnation was a miraculous event. Miracles were performed by Jesus and his apostles. The Holy Spirit was in the church, and guided it to an ever fuller knowledge of the truth. Christian theology is, therefore, a divinely guided, consistently constructed, edifice of truth. This is our view of things; and when we come to interpret the history, this is the conception which finds the fullest confirmation from an objective study of the records as we have them. The other method finds them so full of error as to leave them without worth. The criticism necessary to maintain it is so subjective and arbitrary as to possess no convincing power to one to whom the conclusion is not a foregone one.

My second remark joins directly on at this point. Neither Professor Harnack nor Professor Paine has done anything to establish their denial of the supernatural, nor did Ritschl, the great dogmatic leader. Nothing has been done by anybody to invalidate the possibility of miracles, or to render incredible the gospel account of them. Evolution itself has left us with a personal God, and his personality is his superiority to his laws, and this is the possibility of miracles. Professor Paine will recognize no age of miracles. "The old traditional distinction between 'sacred and profane' history has been wiped out completely by scientific and historical criticism," he says. Nothing is more false. The person of Christ

still stands unique in history. Christianity is a unique force. These two things demand explanation. The biblical explanation is still the simplest, most reasonable, and the best. It is, that, in the great crisis of human affairs, when man had fallen into sin and was about to be lost, God interfered for his salvation. He sent his own Son. The Son came to men, wrought works which were natural and inevitable for him, since he was what he was. They were also necessary for man, that the revelation of God in Christ might be clear and the power of God brought into evident direct exercise. And that power, begun in miracle, has been continued in the supernatural work of the Spirit, which work is the secret of the efficiency and progress of Christianity. The so-called historical and scientific criticism is absolutely powerless to explain these things, and has nothing to say that is valid against the biblical explanation.

I believe that Congregationalists generally recognize the issue which is here at stake. But if any do not, let me urge them to a careful reëxamination of the matter. They will find that we are meeting the old Rationalism of several successive centuries before the present one, with hardly a new argument in its favor. The true force in the new historical criticism is not history but dogmatics, and very bad dogmatics too. Does a man reject the miraculous element of Christianity? Then he should go with Harnack and Paine. But he ought to go further, and eventually he will, viz., to the rejection of the personality of God upon which the miraculous is founded. Pantheism, black pantheism, which Professor Paine says is the goal of trinitarianism, will then be reached, but it will not be by evangelical believers in the Trinity.

The signs are numerous, and have increased since the April number was published, that Congregationalists intend to keep afloat that banner upon which Athanasius wrote the eternal and essential deity of the Son as the watchword of the church. Thus they will help preserve the faith in the personality of God; but—what is of greater importance yet—they will thus maintain the necessary condition of spiritual life in the church.

BERKELEY, CAL.

FRANK HUGH POSTER.

ON THE VERDICT "GOOD."

"AND GOD SAW THAT IT WAS GOOD."¹

OF the many who have written on the Bible story of creation, none appear to have attached importance to the presence or absence of the verdict "good" after the divine acts. A very few have noticed its omission after the work of the second period. Some have said this was due to the fact that the devils were created on the second day; while others, like Professor Cheyne, think it was merely a copyist's error. But neither suppo-

¹ Condensed from *The Problem of the Ages*, a book in MS ready for the press, by Dr. Warring.

sition suffices to explain the remarkable circumstance, that, out of the eleven divine acts recorded, five, the most important ones of all, are not called good. If the reader will turn to his Bible, he will find four things done in the first period,—the creation, the “moving” of the Spirit, the production of light, and the division between light and darkness,—only one of which is pronounced good, viz. light. The second period has no such word. The third tells of two works, each separately pronounced good. The next two periods have each that verdict. The sixth relates the production of cattle, beasts, and creeping things, and pronounces them good; then comes the creation of man, but it is not said that he was good. Lastly, creation being now ended, and all handed over to Adam, God saw everything that he had made,—the five which had not been pronounced good, as well as the six which had been thus honored,—and “behold it was very good.”

What is the explanation of these remarkable peculiarities in the use of good? They cannot be accounted for by the requirements of Hebrew poetry, for they are so arranged as to do violence to the measured parallelism which is one of its chief characteristics. An error of a copyist might perhaps account for one omission, but not for five. Three such accidents in the first few verses would have been impossible without detection. Nor can we conceive it as a matter of mere caprice, certainly not if we regard the character and order of all else in the story.

Dropping then all that has been offered in the way of explanation, our only recourse is to the study of the account itself.

We find that good is there applied only to things without life and to animals; hence it has no reference to moral character, since they have none. Another common use of this word is in the sense of *advantageous*, or *beneficial*; as, when we say, meat is good for the laboring-man, oats are good for horses, exercise is good for one's health, and the like. This throws no light on the cause of the five omissions, since those creative acts were as necessary to the fitting-up of the world for its present inhabitants as the six which are pronounced good. The Septuagint translates the same word by *beautiful*, and undoubtedly it sometimes has that meaning, as, when it is said “the daughters of men were fair” (Gen. vi.2). But this cannot be the sense intended here; else, why was it not applied to the firmament, and above all to our first parents?

There is another meaning of this word which is as common in Hebrew as now in English: I mean, *fit for its purpose*, and therefore *finished*, *completed*, *done*. A good knife, a good watch, a good piece of cloth, and the like are instances in point. If, in looking over a number of articles, the manufacturer should pronounce only a part good, the inference would be that the others needed to have something more done to them. This is why some things here are pronounced good; and others passed over without remark. The writer goes in this way through all the acts to the end of the series. And then, the others having in the meantime been com-

pleted, the whole was fit for the home of man, and accordingly it was all pronounced very good. This seems reasonable as a matter of exegesis. Moreover, it is a fact that each thing pronounced good was ready for the use of man, before, or in one case simultaneously with, the next thing in the story, which is not true of any of the five others.

The first divine act was the creation of the heaven and the earth. Not till long after the next two acts was there sun, moon, and planets. It could not be, and was not, pronounced good. The Creator next imparted motion; but, as this was only the first step in his formative work after creation, it was not finished till that had all been done; therefore it, too, is not pronounced good. The third work was the production of light. Coming from nebulous matter it was at first, according to the spectroscopists, poor indeed,—not merely feeble, but lacking in many of the important elements it now has. As condensation of the gas-like matter went on, the light which it emitted improved in quantity and quality until, when the nebulous mass's density equaled that of the sun, it became good for all purposes. This condition was reached before the earth became opaque, and thus divided the light from the darkness, or, in other words, before the next act mentioned in the account.

At that early period the earth's axis was perpendicular to the ecliptic. This I assume, because a globe developed mechanically from homogeneous nebulous matter, as our earth is said to have been, would necessarily take that position; and then, too, all geologists agree that, till long after the dry land appeared, there were no zones of climate, and lastly, the uniformity of plants irrespective of latitude, indicates uniformity of actinic influence, which could only be if the earth's axis was close to a perpendicular. The days and nights, therefore, were then of equal length, and seasons impossible. Evidently something remained to be done, the work was not completed, and Genesis withholds the verdict.

We next read of the expanse, and notice that it, too, is not called good. It ought not, because it needed much more done to it, for the atmosphere which filled it, was so charged with poisonous gases that none of the higher animals could breathe it. It was not fit for their or our use.

The sixth work was the gathering of the waters into one place and the appearing of the dry land. This was completed essentially as now, in the Pliocene contemporaneously with the appearance of the final species of vegetation, our present "grasses, herbs, and fruit-trees." The land and the plants being finished, ready for present life, each was therefore entitled to the verdict of completion, and each has it.¹

¹ As the reader perceives, I assume that the second work of this period was the production of the present flora. That "grass, herbs, and fruit-trees" refer to the first plants on our planet, is a survival from the traditional Genesis, which insisted that, if the Bible is true, the earth is only six thousand years old. The names which Moses gives to his plants apply easily and accurately to those of to-day, the only ones with which he

The work of the fourth period had to do with the natural measures of time,—“signs, seasons, days, and years.” Whatever it was, one thing is certain, nothing has been done in that direction since. Therefore it should have the verdict “good,” indicating completion, and it has it.

The thing actually done in the fourth period was, I think, the increasing of the earth's axial inclination to twenty-three and a half degrees. That would cause such days as we now have, and seasons, make the year an obvious measure of time, and offer a ready index to the times of the Jewish festivals. As such increase would in nowise affect the lunar movements, months would of necessity be omitted from the list of effects. And they are omitted.¹

The ninth act was the production of “living, moving, water creatures, and great whales,” and fowl to fly in the expanse of heaven. These brought animal life in their respective elements to present kinds, fit for all present purposes, therefore “good” in the sense the word is here employed, and the story calls them so.

Next we read of cattle, beasts, and creeping things. In them was the last development of land animals. No new types have since appeared. These were fit for all present conditions and needs. Genesis therefore pronounces this work “good.”

Man at his creation had before him, unlike the animals, an existence in which he was to rise higher and higher. Instead of setting out with no power of growth and improvement, he was gifted with capacities and powers which have as yet reached no limit, and, so far as we can conceive, never will. In this sense, therefore, “good” could not be applied to man. Withholding it implies far more.

By this time all that in their nature admitted of completion, had attained to it. The primal nebulous matter had been wrought into sun, moon and planets and stars; the divine “moving” first imparted had done its work; the earth's axis had become inclined as now, bringing with it all present effects; the poisonous atmosphere of the expanse had changed to the air we now breathe. All this was finished, and when Man was placed over it, everything was ready for the drama of human history

¹ For a full discussion, exegetical and scientific, see my *Genesis I. and Modern Science* (Hunt & Eaton, New York).

and his people were acquainted, and not at all to the protophytes of the Eozoic, or the seaweeds of the Silurian.

For similar reasons, I take it that the air and water creatures of the fifth period, as well as the land animals of the sixth, refer to the species at this end of creation. They are removed as far as possible from the microscopic forms in which animal life began. To-day's organisms arranged in order of seniority stand thus: its plants; its air and water vertebrates; its land vertebrates.

Understood in this way, all difficulties as to the order of plant and animal life vanish. There is, however, dispute in regard to man's place. But till scientists arrive at a consensus, it is useless to discuss the matter.

to open. Then surveying it all, the Great Architect pronounced it very good.

In the use of this word "good," I find a test of the historicity of the Genesis story of creation. It bears it well.

I have in this note worked on only one of the veins of precious ore which run through this chapter, invisible to the traditionalist, but glowing in the light of modern science. If some are stirred to look for themselves into the truth of this account, my present purpose will be accomplished. A conspiracy of silence may be a safe, but not a creditable, retreat for those who fear most of all a new idea.

POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK.

C. B. WARRING.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

RECONSTRUCTION IN THEOLOGY. By HENRY CHURCHILL KING, Professor of Theology in Oberlin Theological Seminary. 12mo. Pp. xiii, 257. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1901. \$1.50.

We are in the midst of a veritable springtime in religious thought. Life is stirring everywhere. For many a generation there was a kind of theological winter. The streams of fresh thought were ice-locked. Ancient forms of expression were frozen into dogma by the prevalence of a false conception of inspiration, of supernaturalism, and of authority. But there has been for a long time a thawing of the ice. Now green shoots of life are showing themselves. The summer of reconstructed forms in their perfection has not yet come, but the life of the Christian world is full of buds.

And it is not too much to say, that the coming era bears to the former the relation of growing maturity to childhood. Many of our ancient and revered forms of thought were formulated from insufficient data; necessarily so, by no fault of the constructors. There were whole realms of knowledge then unconquered. The materials for a wide comparison of life and movement in the world of nature and spirit were not at hand. In the last century there has been a wholly unprecedented widening of the area of knowledge. Its results will affect theology in a thousand ways.

The book of Professor King partakes of the movement of the time, and is in strong sympathy with all that is best in it. It is full of "buds" of infinite suggestion, which, however, he is too wise to force into hothouse bloom. Some of his readers will be inclined to ask, "Where is the reconstructed theology in this book?" But that is not promised, in the title or elsewhere. Here and there we find an application of his principle to current doctrines, very briefly; as in the case of the "social Trinity," the sacramentarian idea, and the person of Christ. But what he aims at and suggestively develops is to set forth the causes of the growing demand for reconstruction, and to bring forth at last the fundamental principles by which it should be controlled. It is, therefore, a more timely book than a restatement of doctrine could be. The time for that is not ripe. The real reconstruction must be one of those slow growths in the intellectual and spiritual realm which come on gradually, as the spring comes, with no proclamations and no rank shooting of abnormal growths. The minds that help it forward may be as numerous as the

blades of grass whose combined growth makes the velvet lawn. This our author emphatically affirms, denies the possibility of finality in theological thought, recognizes heartily the value of every one's work, and declares the first necessity to be that every thrusting blade of thought and life shall have free growth and expansion, uncruised by the careless or the hostile heel. His own work he puts forward modestly, frankly, with no breath of controversial spirit, and, notwithstanding his readiness to see new points of view, in a thoroughly conservative temper. Spirituality is its dominant note.

The leading cause of the demand for reconstruction he finds in "the new intellectual, moral, and spiritual world," which has come into being by the activity, especially, of the last half of the nineteenth century, in science, philosophy, and historical criticism; and by the changed moral and spiritual ideas which have resulted, partly from this extension of knowledge, and partly from the experience of the new complexity of life. The special influence on theology of each of these new conditions, modifying the conception of the interaction of the natural and the supernatural, as they were once termed, bringing in the immense influence of the idea of evolution, leading to the historical and literary study of the Bible, and all that is involved in that advance, is so presented as to lead up to the announcement of what is really a single fundamental principle—the central and supreme value of the *Person*. That idea, he affirms, must dominate all subordinate elements in the coming science of theology, as well as in the religious life of men. Theology is "a thoughtful and unified expression of what religion means to us." Religion is essentially a personal relation; therefore the personal note should dominate theology.

Before theology can make its final systematic constructions, there is a preliminary work to be done in the preparation of its material. Much of this material consists of experience, history, and scripture; a realm of facts and phenomena. This material comes under the range, and has to be worked by the methods, of science. *A priori* judgments are to be set aside, and diligent search made for the actual facts. The whole cosmos is such material; and, for the main facts in this immense realm, theology must depend on pure science, and accept the facts and laws which are substantially demonstrated by the united effort of scientific experts. This involves a vast field of recently acquired knowledge which has to be reckoned with in any rational construction of theology. The theologian cannot work this out for himself. He must recognize the growing necessity of a division of labor, and rely upon the work of others.

Our author, true to this principle, accepts without reserve the great law of evolution as demonstrated; insisting only that it be taken in its widest sweep, to cover human life and history as well as the previous development; and that the law of lower ranges be not stretched to cover the higher, since the whole is an *ascent*, "by successive stages, bringing forth new phenomena and new laws." For the energy that produces

the ever-upward movement, he posits the immanent God; not breaking in here and there by intervention, but constantly and eternally active, "working hitherto." Evolution in this interpretation is a "blanket term," which covers all,—inorganic, organic, and spiritual. Professor Howison, of the University of California, in his recent book "*The Limits of Evolution*," insists, on the other hand, that the term evolution ought to be restricted to the process of development in the animal world, by generation, where the law of the survival of the fittest holds sway. There are great breaks in the larger process which evolution cannot pass. It is undoubtedly true that the word is an imperfect fit for the whole idea; the trouble is to get a better one. Until we do, there is likely to be some confusion, especially at the point of transition from the sense-world to the realm of mind and spirit. In the latter realm the process we term evolution becomes a rational effort towards the ideal, in which the individual spirit and the Supreme Spirit coöperate. The law of the higher realm is, as our author declares, a new law. And if the laws of lower realms cannot control higher ones, neither can the law of the higher realm be used to explain the phenomena of the lower.

There is something of this confusion apparent in the treatment in this work of the question of miracle. The author speaks of the dominant law of the spiritual, which includes a free relation of the Supreme Person to other persons, allowing for influences on their minds transcending those of common experience. Prophets, poets, and the Christ himself are illustrations of such intercourse. But while this explains inspiration it does not explain miracle in the strict sense, which always involves some appeal to sense. The difficulty which most thoughtful men feel in regard to miracle lies in the irruption into the world of natural law of what is alleged to be the Divine Personality, in order to produce effects not explainable by the laws which prevail in that sphere. To explain such occurrences by the law of the higher realm, that, e.g., it is rational for the Divine love to carry on its beneficent purpose by unusual influence on minds, is to explain nothing really miraculous. It is the apparent lawlessness of the nature-miracle in a realm where law uniformly prevails by the test of all our experience, that raises the thought of incredibility. To say that there may be laws of the physical realm which we do not know, which would show the miracle to be rational, is only to evade the real question; for in miracle, laws we *do* know and always rely on cease to operate: the greater specific gravity of a human body does not make it sink in the water; the processes of growth and culinary skill are omitted in the supplying of bread for five thousand from five loaves or seven. The real question is not answered by making it a matter of good-will. The other question will arise, Is this a "playing-fast-and-loose" with human reason?

As Professor King himself insists, the real answer must come from the scientific method of investigating alleged facts of a bygone time, and

studying the bearing of tradition, time, customary habits of thought, and many other things. By the verdict of this inquiry, competently conducted, we must stand. We know what John Fiske terms "God's way of working," in all ordinary relations with the physical universe. The question of miracle is, *Has* he sometimes acted in the same realm on other and unknown principles?

There is another sphere of phenomena besides that of natural science, which is not worked by the devotees of science, and for which theology must train its own experts,—the field best illustrated by the historical and literary criticism of the Bible. It is eminently satisfactory to read the author's lucid pages on this subject, written in the spirit of the scholar and of the Christian at the same time. It is a timely utterance; for the term "higher criticism" unfortunately became popularized before it was understood, and has become, in ignorant hands, like its predecessors, "Arminian" and "Unitarian," merely a convenient bugaboo with which to frighten the timid. His treatment of the subject should be of great value to the many who are not clear in their own minds as to the meaning of those recent movements in historical and biblical study which, more than any other influence, are making a reconstruction of theology necessary.

The last fifty pages only are devoted to the gathering-up of all the lines indicated into a single principle which may be the dominating principle of a reconstructed theology. After all the preliminary work is done, the scientific position accepted, the historical and critical material worked out, and the attempt at least made to unify by a higher synthesis the Cosmic and the Ideal philosophies, the question arises, Around what life-giving center shall all material and all theory arrange itself, in order to produce a legitimate working theology, which shall be a rational and unified statement of what religion means to us? Professor King finds this center of relations in the principle of the supremacy and sacredness of Person. This is the most distinctive and suggestive outcome of his study. God as the Supreme Person; Jesus as the Master-person of human history; man everywhere as a person; self-conscious, spontaneously self-active in the ethical and spiritual realm; a son of God in relations with the Father, which relations are perfectly realized in the Christ,—this makes Personality the governing idea of religion. It is Jesus' idea of love operating between God and man and between man and man, as the solvent of life and the single law of spiritual being and harmony. In the presentation of this ripe conclusion, we have a preliminary chapter on religion as a personal relation, which throbs all through with spiritual vitality. If such is the heart of religion, then theology must accept this idea as its vital center, and come down out of vague clouds of speculation to provide a rational basis of thought for the religious life.

There is no space for farther discussion of this suggestive book. But it is certain that the student of theology who is preparing to preach a vi-

tal Christianity, and, as well, the layman who is seeking for a higher and more satisfactory interpretation of the modern movement of life and thought, will find here wise guidance and wholesome inspiration. This contribution to the tide of movement which is a veritable "wind of the Spirit" in our time, has that in it which will be of value for more than one generation, most of all because it is a presentation of the essential idea of Jesus himself.

H. P. DE FOREST.

DETROIT, MICH.

FACT AND FABLE IN PSYCHOLOGY. By JOSEPH JASTROW, Professor of Psychology in the University of Wisconsin. 12mo. Pp. xvii, 375. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

The aim which the author has set before himself is distinct, and has been pursued consistently throughout the work. He has undertaken the task of clearing the popular mind of certain grave misconceptions, and of setting forth clearly the real method and spirit of scientific psychology. This task he has accomplished with a very large measure of success.

The fundamental error against whose varied forms Professor Jastrow directs his attack is the wide-spread belief in the Occult. This superstition, he finds to be a powerful agency in thwarting the progress of science and the development of rational beliefs. In whichever of its multitudinous forms the Occult may appear, it exhibits, in its believers, a temperament to which the spirit of science is diametrically opposed. From the very earliest times, the Occult has been the expression of an inordinate craving for the strange, the unusual, the erratic, the supernormal, and the supernatural. It scorns the permanent laws of Nature, and seeks the magic formula which, by a short and easy method, will lay bare the secret of things, and give to its devotees a power by which their desires may be fulfilled and their beliefs satisfied, in a manner most certainly individual and capricious. The Occult is the expression of a revolt against that impersonality and impartiality of Nature which refuses to give way to the imperiousness of individual desire; it is an endeavor to find in the peculiarities of individuals, rather than in their common characteristics, the truth concerning Life and Mind. Consequently the Occult has always subordinated law to desire, the regular to the irregular, and the hard-won gains of science to the inconsistencies and irrelevancies of erratic pursuit. It is no wonder, then, that this way of thinking has universally shunned the open, exact, and patient methods of the laboratory, and has betaken itself to the dimly lighted closet, or has given itself without reserve to the prophetic utterances of ignorant and inconsistent babblers.

Although the Occult has always been with us, whether in the Shaman, the Angkok, the Witch-doctor, Medicine-man, Necromancer, Astrologer, or other medium, the modern world and the past century has seen a strange outburst of superstitious beliefs. It is to combat such beliefs,

and to call attention to the need for more logical thinking, that Professor Jastrow has set himself. He points out very clearly that, while men generally possess the rationality which enables them to avail themselves of the direct and practical lessons of experience, there is, nevertheless, a decided lack, in the common mind, of that logicity and intelligence which enables the individual to acquaint himself with the best information which his day and generation afford, and to carry through to their precise and remote conclusions the consequences which such antecedents afford.

In the first chapter, entitled "The Modern Occult," Professor Jastrow traces the characteristics and inconsistencies of Theosophy, Spiritualism, Christian Science, as well as the influences of the Occult in early Chemistry, Astronomy, Physiology, and Medicine. In the second, attention is called to the composite character of the movement commonly known as Psychical Research. In the three succeeding chapters, entitled "The Logic of Mental Telegraphy," "The Psychology of Deception," "The Psychology of Spiritualism," Professor Jastrow does excellent work in showing the predominating influence which mental predisposition, diversion of attention, self-deception, expectation, coincidence, unconscious suggestion, have exercised in the formation of irrational beliefs. The chapter upon "Hypnotism and Its Antecedents," is thorough and complete. "The Natural History of Analogy" traces the presence in the individual and in the race of a primitive form of reasoning, which, although in well-ordered minds it has given way to exact methods, yet exhibits the working of a powerful agency which has had much to do in determining the main features of the Occult. The next two chapters, entitled "The Mind's Eye" and "Mental Prepossession and Inertia," trace in an experimental way the fundamental influences which pre-perception and preconception have upon our every-day appreciation of ourselves, the world about us and its tasks. Closely connected with these is the section upon "A Study of Involuntary Movements." After an experimental manner, Professor Jastrow shows how subtle and unconscious are the methods of expression by which we involuntarily give information to those about us. The chapter brings to a conclusion the investigation, which the author has so carefully carried out, and in it is to be found an additional clue to the explanation of many of the "mysteries" of Thought-transference and Telepathy. The last chapter in the book contains an interesting account of the dreams of the blind.

Taken as a whole, the book is well written, and presents a scholarly, although a conservative, view of the border-lands of the psychological domain. And perhaps nothing better could be desired, at the present time, than the universal cultivation of that logical frame of mind upon which Professor Jastrow so much insists and which he has expressed in the following words: "the ability to distinguish between the plausible and the true, the firmness to support principle in the face of paradox

and seeming non-conformity, to think clearly and consistently in the absence of the practical reproof of nature." S. F. MACLENNAN.

THE CHURCH (Ecclesia). By GEORGE DANA BOARDMAN, D.D., LL.D., author of "Studies in the Creative Week," "Studies in the Model Prayer," "Epiphanies of the Risen Lord," "The Divine Man," "University Lectures on the Ten Commandments," "The Problem of Jesus," "Coronation of Love," "The Kingdom," etc. 8vo. Pp. xii, 221. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1901. \$1.50.

The moral purpose of this book is to clear away certain misconceptions concerning the church; such misconceptions, for instance, as arise from heredity, from ecclesiasticism, and from traditional theology. The book is an attempt to realize the phrase "back to Christ," not in the sense of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, by way of the Christian consciousness, but exclusively by way of the Scriptures,—the historic and scientific sense of the phrase. The position of the author is that, when we agree as to what the Scriptures themselves teach, there will be no real obstacle to church union, but that such union will be impossible if the teaching of Scripture is to be diluted with human opinion. Loyalty to the Scriptures demands that when we depart from the Scriptures we shall be ready to acknowledge the fact. For instance, when Baptists practice restricted communion, and when Pedobaptists reject immersion, both should acknowledge that their teaching is founded on expediency, and not on Scripture. The whole trend of the argument is thus irenic, though at first reading it might seem to be polemic.

The argument of Part First, "The Church as a Primitive Society," is as follows: The book of Acts is not the story of the organization of the church. It cannot be supposed that Luke is writing a history of the church as a human organization, when he has a period of thirty years to describe, and yet mentions it but nineteen times. The book is just what it has come to be called,—it is the story of the acts of the Apostles. It does not furnish a model for the modern church. Living things are the realization of an ideal, not the copying of a model. The apostolic church had its natural environment, and, like all living things, it must be interpreted within its environment.

What is involved in this immediately appears in Part Second, "The Church as a Modern Problem." While the problems of the church to-day are stated in the terms of the problems of the apostolic church, yet they are different problems, and the book of Acts does not furnish their solution. For example, church-membership and the confession of Christ in that day for Jew and for heathen meant an utter break with his training and with his traditions; in Christian lands to-day church-membership and the confession of Christ mean the natural assent to the teaching and the traditions amid which we have grown.

Part Third, "The Church as a Divine Ideal," is an excellent illustration of interpretation as distinguished from exegesis, the disclosing of

the meaning of Scripture, as distinguished from the drawing out of the formal statements of Scripture. The argument is cumulative, the church being described as the Church of the King's Rock, the Temple of God, the Body of Christ, the King's Bride, and the City of God,—a city being the highest symbol of life, where mental and moral attributes culminate.

Dr. Boardman is not a dogmatist; he is a teacher. His method is not the propaganda of his own conclusions; it is the marshaling of evidence and the deducing of principles. And yet the reader is by no means left in the dark concerning the author's own conclusions in the matter of the present-day problems of the church.

As a piece of literature the book is characterized by exceeding clearness of conception and by exceeding directness of statement. While it is an excellent sample of the scientific method of research, it is an equally excellent sample of pure and elegant diction. Scientific accuracy and literary excellence are not a common combination.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

JOSEPH EVANS SAGEBEER.

A CENTURY OF BAPTIST ACHIEVEMENT. Edited by A. H. NEWMAN, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Church History in McMaster University. 12mo. Pp. 480. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1901. \$1.50 net.

The Baptists are only second to the Methodists in numbers in America. The beginning of the twentieth century is appropriately marked in this volume by a comprehensive and summary collection of the facts relating to the progress of the denomination throughout the whole world during the century which has just closed. Thirty chapters, written by as many well-qualified authorities, treat of the subject in almost every imaginable phase. In two chapters a picture is given of the Baptist forces existing at the beginning of the century. Attention is also paid to the English, Scotch, and Welsh Baptists; while nine chapters are given to the work of the denomination in America. The mission work, both home and foreign, the Sunday-school work, and that of their publication societies and of their religious press, together with that of their educational institutions, and other forms of organic effort, are all duly presented. The extent of the work accomplished, together with its high and beneficent character, forms altogether one of the most convincing arguments in favor of religious liberty. Baptist ideas have to a remarkable extent preserved in our country respect for the Bible, while they have emphasized duly the importance of civil and religious liberty, and shown that the best means of preserving respect for the Bible is not through strengthening ecclesiastical organization, but in free discussion and in the multiplication of evangelical efforts for the conversion of men. Not alone to the students of church history, but to those who are endeavoring to comprehend the social and political forces of the United States is this volume essential. In this country the Baptists have increased from 100,-

000 in 1801 to more than 4,000,000 in 1901, that is nearly three times as fast as the population. This fact alone renders it incumbent upon every student of history to study the means by which this development has been accomplished.

THE HIGHEST LIFE: A Story of Shortcomings and a Goal; including a Friendly Analysis of the Keswick Movement. By E. H. JOHNSON, author of "An Outline of Systematic Theology," etc. 12mo. Pp. ix, 183. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1901. \$1.25.

This little volume is not only a friendly, but an acute, analysis of those religious tendencies which some years ago were known as Perfectionism, and later as the Higher Life, but which are now most prominently represented in the Keswick Movement, of which Robert Pearsall Smith is perhaps the best-known leader. The central point of weakness in all these movements is well shown by the author to be its negative character. The chief aim of the movement is to subdue sin; whereas the highest form of righteousness consists in doing work for Christ, and thus in positive effort becoming forgetful of self. It was in this respect that Moody excelled all others. Forgetting the things that were behind, he was constantly pressing forward to those that are before.

THE NEW EPOCH FOR FAITH. By GEORGE A. GORDON, Minister of the Old South Church, Boston. 12mo. Pp. xvii, 412. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1901. \$1.50.

In line with his previous volumes, Dr. Gordon continues his attacks upon all clear-cut systems of theology, and delights the reader with a series of brilliant metaphors and glittering generalities which are well calculated to make one satisfied with the world. He calls himself an optimist, rather than a universalist, and maintains "that God's love and endeavor are for all his children, and for them all forever" (p. 278), that is, that there is no limit to man's probation. For the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked he has no place. All this he draws from his general views concerning the meaning of the Incarnation. He thinks he understands the infinitely intricate problems of the moral universe so perfectly that he can categorically deny that a limited probation can be a part of a benevolent scheme of the universe. We see no evidence in the writer's attainments that he is authorized to make such a revelation, and we draw back from his statement that "if there are texts against this truth, so much the worse for the texts" (p. 267). As the author grows old and reflects more deeply upon the dark things in the universe, he will doubtless become less confident in his assertions and more subdued in his tone of criticism upon those systems of theology which have been the mainsprings of missionary effort and of evangelistic success.

THE PROGRESS OF THE CENTURY. Pp. iv, 583. New York: Harper & Bros. 1901.

This is one of the most convenient of all the summaries which have

been made of the progress of the nineteenth century; while the reputation of the writers who have contributed to it makes it in every respect authoritative. No greater recommendation of the volume can be given than to state the subjects and authors of the various chapters:—

"Evolution," by Alfred Russel Wallace; "Chemistry," by Professor William Ramsay; "Archæology," by Professor William Matthew Flinders-Petrie; "Astronomy," by Sir Joseph Norman Lockyer; "Philosophy," by Professor Edward Caird; "Medicine," by Professor William Osler; "Surgery," by W. W. Keen, M. D.; "Electricity," by Professor Elihu Thomson; "Physics," by President Thomas Corwin Mendenhall; "War," by Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke; "Naval Ships," by Captain Alfred T. Mahan; "Literature," by Andrew Lang; "Engineering," by Thomas C. Clarke; "Religion: Catholicism," by Cardinal James Gibbons; "Protestantism," by Professor Alexander V. G. Allen; "The Jews and Judaism," by Professor Richard J. H. Gottheil; "Free-thought," by Professor Goldwin Smith.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A Review of Progress during the Past One Hundred Years in the Chief Departments of Human Activity. Reprinted, under arrangement, from the *New York Evening Post*, of January 12, 1901. Pp. ix, 494. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1901. \$2.00.

Another most convenient and valuable summary of the progress of the nineteenth century, whose whole story, as the editor truly says, if fully told would consume all the time of the twentieth, and the world could not contain the books which should be written. The comprehensiveness of the volume is seen in the general topics treated, which are: Law and Government, History, Sociology, Literature and the Fine Arts, Education and Science, Applied Science, Transportation, Science of War.

Each of these topics is subdivided and treated by a number of authorities of the highest eminence (thirty-seven in all), making a volume of great interest and value. Among the writers are Chief Justice Charles C. Nott, Arthur G. Sedgwick, Horace White, Andrew Carnegie, Charles A. Cutter, Julia Ward Howe, Edmund Gosse, Kenyon Cox, Alice Freeman Palmer, Simon Newcomb, Andrew Lang, Leslie Stephen, John Trowbridge, and Arthur T. Hadley.

RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS. By EDMUND NOBLE. 12mo. Pp. vii, 285. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1901. \$1.50.

The renewed interest in Russia's expanding domain in Asia renders this volume timely in a high degree. So brief as to be hardly more than an essay, it is comprehensive, treating of the land and the people, of the slow development during the Middle Ages, of the reformations of Peter the Great, and the rapid development of the country since his day, and its expansion into Siberia and Central Asia, together with a valuable chapter upon the language and the literature.

In the main, the treatment is sympathetic, taking into account the extreme difficulties attending the national growth. The autocratic form of the Russian government, it should be remembered, has been absolutely essential to the national life. For ages Russia was the buffer state upon which the Mongolians spent their force. Up to less than three hundred years ago, Russia was paying tribute to the Tartar hordes which hung about her southeastern border. Up to sixty years ago Russian slaves in large numbers were held by the Turcomans. A strong central government has been the only means by which freedom from this bondage has been secured. It is not strange, therefore, that the Russian peasants idolize their Czar; for, not only have the czars secured to them freedom from the incursions of the Tartars, but they have at the same time preserved to them their ancient liberty and their general welfare. Every peasant has the right to petition the Czar; while it is a notable fact that the nobles of Russia are foremost in all philanthropic movements. The nineteenth century witnessed no single national act more fully illustrating the power of Christianity in ameliorating the conditions of mankind than is to be seen in the abolition of serfdom. The United States freed seven million slaves at the cost of a half-million lives who fell in battle and of \$3,000,000,000 expended by one side alone in the waste of war; while the slaves who were freed received nothing but their freedom, and were left in the worst possible relation to their former masters. In Russia, on the other hand, the nobles united with the Czar to secure the freedom of their serfs, and consented to share with them in generous proportion an interest in the land upon which they lived.

There is more than is ordinarily conceded in the contention of the friends of Russia that her condition is peculiar, and that the application to her by wholesale of Western methods of political reform would be a great mistake. All this is briefly indicated in the essay under review, which at the same time is free and frank in its criticism of the present condition of things.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMANISM. By HENRY WOOD, author of "Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photography," "God's Image in Man," etc. 12mo. Pp. 319. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1901. \$1.25.

The author's thesis is that natural law prevails in the economic and social world as well as in the physical. Being a believer in the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, he considers natural law to consist in non-interference on the part of government in matters industrial. The conclusions, which are merely Mr. Wood's private opinions, are in general sane and dictated by a kindly spirit.

SUBSTITUTES FOR THE SALOON. By RAYMOND CALKINS. 12mo. Pp. xviii, 397. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

The Committee of Fifty began its careful investigation of the liquor problem eight years ago. We have already expressed high appreciation

of the two volumes the committee has published on the legislative and on the economic aspects of the problem.¹ This third volume deals with the entirely different question of means for drawing patronage away from the saloon. Its answer is in the form of a comprehensive, classified, and most interesting summary of what has been attempted in seventeen large cities of the United States from Boston to San Francisco, and from New Orleans to Minneapolis. There is also an important chapter on English temperance houses. It is a volume of facts from which each reader will draw his own theories, and each practical temperance worker select the suggestions best adapted to his own field. Let no one be repelled by the title of the first chapter, "The Saloon as a Social Center." The book recognizes repeatedly that the social element in the saloon is quite secondary, while its primary attraction is the alcoholic liquor dispensed there. It recognizes, also, that no "substitute" can satisfy the craving for alcohol. At the same time there is legitimate hope of checking the desire for alcohol by developing other and healthy desires, and large hope by these means of preventing in multitudes of the young the development of the alcoholic appetite. It is sometimes said that character is formed only by the free choice of individuals. But there can be no question that such choice can be in an important degree directed by influence, by restraints that form habits, by suggestion and opportunity of wise choices. Not one whit should be abated from the moral and religious zeal of the earlier temperance reformers. Experience has added many and efficient weapons to the armory of their successors that ought soon to bring important victories in the struggle for social betterment.

W. E. C. W.

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE HEBREWS. (The Semitic Series.) By the Rev. EDWARD DAY. 12mo. Pp. viii, 255. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1901. \$1.25 net.

The point of view from which the author writes is that of an extreme evolutionist. He conceives the religion of the Hebrews to have arisen out of a barbarous worship of Yahweh as a war-god delighting in human sacrifices and caring more about ritual than character. "As the people became more civilized, they outgrew" the use of high places, and they were given up rather than abolished (p. 46). The progress was so very slow that our author says that human sacrifices were common in the time of the monarchy, as in the earlier period, and finds abundant traces of them up to the time of the exile (p. 212). He quotes with mild approval Robert Ingersoll's epigram, "An honest god is the noblest work of man" (p. 205). He makes the stories of the heroes of faith more influential and important than their real lives (p. 166). While not absolutely relegating Abraham to the realm of fiction, he accounts for most of the particular narratives in regard to him, not by their truth, but by the wish of unknown but inventive reformers at different times to furnish precedents

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April, 1901.

for their reforms. In this way he leaves only shreds and patches of historicity in the Hebrew Scriptures, not enough, even with the aid of his vigorous subjective presuppositions, to furnish a lifelike picture of Hebrew social life. He shows a conscientious desire to affirm nothing beyond what he knows, by the repeated and incessant use of such words and phrases as "probably," "undoubtedly," "unquestionably," "must have been" (which three last mean usually the opposite of what they seem to mean), "we may safely assume," "if these were, as we have assumed." The frequency of such phrases illustrates how uncertain are the deductions yet reached by the extreme critics. Our author has let them lead him too far. He quotes them too often, and the Bible itself too seldom. If he will study more independently; if he will deal with the Bible on principles he himself recognizes, that the frequency of acts may sometimes be a reason for their infrequent mention in literature, and that two diverse accounts of a thing may neither be wholly wrong; and especially if he will grasp the true philosophy of human history, that faith determines life rather than life faith,—he will some day write a better book.

W. E. C. W.

GOVERNMENT OR HUMAN EVOLUTION: JUSTICE. By EDMOND KELLY, M.A., F.G.S., author of "Evolution and Effort." Pp. xv, 360. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1900. \$1.50.

One interested in the practical problem of municipal government would scarcely be attracted by the title of Mr. Kelly's book. Yet it is designed as a preliminary study to the intelligent understanding of that subject. Starting out with the subject of human government, the author was led irresistibly to a deeper study of the purpose of government, and the relation between it and evolution. The conditions under which the book was written, as recounted by the author himself, are interesting. Mr. Kelly took part, with a number of others, in the movement for good government and against Tammany Hall in New York City in 1891-94. To secure this end a number of so-called "Good Government Clubs" were started, which were continued after the defeat of Tammany. But when the bond of a common hostility was removed, the members of the reform clubs began to differ among themselves as to what constituted good government. Some judged measures according to their expediency, others according to their justice, but "not one out of a thousand was able to formulate a clear idea as to the principles upon which he stood." Under these circumstances it was deemed indispensable to study the more fundamental issues of principle, before attempting to solve the problems that involved them.

The application of the conclusions to practical life is reserved for a future volume; in the present one Mr. Kelly has set before himself the double task of determining what justice, or the goal of human government, is, and of ridding us of certain erroneous ideas. Among the latter are the misleading expressions "natural rights," "law of nature," and sim-

ilar loose terms; all of these are rejected as either false or misleading. In endeavoring to ascertain the true relation of nature to government, the author next takes up the subject of evolution. This section of the book, comprising between a third and a half of the whole, gives a very clear statement of the theory of evolution, and discusses at length human as distinguished from natural selection and environment. While there is nothing strictly original in this part of the book, it constitutes an admirably lucid exposition of the general subject of evolution.

In the third part of the book Mr. Kelly puts to himself the question as to what the end of government is, or should be. This he finds to be justice. But it is not the purpose of justice to secure so-called natural rights, nor the attainment of perfect happiness; the first is a false ideal, and the second is beyond the power of legislation, belonging rather to religion. The real purpose of justice, and therefore of government, is to diminish the inequalities injurious to happiness imposed by nature and still more those imposed by man. All political measures should be tested, therefore, by the standard of their benefit to the individual and the race. The author's conclusion as to the purpose of government is summed up in his definition of justice. This is described as "the effort to eliminate from our social conditions the effects of the inequalities of nature upon the happiness and advancement of man, and particularly to create an artificial environment which shall serve the individual as well as the race, and tend to perpetuate noble types rather than those that are base."

Mr. Kelly is known as an original and clever writer, and has given us in this instance a thoughtful and suggestive study. It is interesting to note that, starting as a disciple of Herbert Spencer, he has ended by favoring many forms of collective action. The book is extremely interesting, and cannot help but appeal to students as a sincere attempt to develop a true philosophy of government.

E. L. BOGART.

FACTORY PEOPLE AND THEIR EMPLOYERS. By EDWIN L. SHUEY, M.A., author of "Industrial Training Essential," etc. Pp. 224. New York: Lentibhon & Co. 1901. 75 cents net.

This little book is called by its author in the preface a "practical book," and yet it is as thoroughly a book of ideals and noble aspirations as any volume of poems or sermons ever penned. No one can read it without feeling optimistic as to the future relations between labor and capital, and believing that work along these lines will go far toward the solution of the labor problem. It is however a compilation of facts, not of theories; of accomplished realities, and not merely of impossible ideals. Mr. Shuey has given us a plain, straightforward account of practical methods actually used in improving factory conditions and the relations of employer and employe, or, as the sub-title of the book rather naively states, "how their relations are made pleasant and profitable."

There are three ways in which employers may share their gains with the workers: They may make large gifts for the establishment of schools,

libraries, parks, hospitals, and similar institutions, which are shared by the whole community; they may divide directly with their employes by means of profit-sharing or some like scheme; or they may share indirectly by making daily provision for better conditions and comforts and opportunities for the employes. The record of the first, while enduring, is not on paper; it consists in the institutions themselves. Of the second method Mr. Gilman has given us a complete history in his "Profit Sharing." The third method is as yet new in America, and Mr. Shuey's little book is one of the first accounts of the progress of the movement in this country.

Among the various ways in which the manufacturers' interest in the welfare of their employes has been manifested, are improvements in the factory itself, in cleaning, decorating, and beautifying it; in larger personal comforts for the workers, as baths, chairs, lunch-rooms, club-houses, and similar institutions; in mental and moral training, afforded by classes, reading-rooms, and factory publications; and in the outside interests of the employes, by building houses, organizing pension and relief funds, and caring in general for the higher and better development of the workers. The most striking feature about the whole movement is, that it is advocated, not on the ground of benevolence, but of sound business principles. "It pays to make these improvements" is the unanimous verdict of all those employers who have introduced them into their factories. Such a combination of "philanthropy and five per cent" should bring about a speedy improvement in the conditions of work in many of our industries, and Mr. Shuey's book may serve as a tract which should be placed in the hands of all our manufacturers.

The book is one of a series of "handbooks for practical workers in church and philanthropy," edited by Professor Samuel Macauley Jackson, of New York University.

R. L. B.

MESSIAH'S SECOND ADVENT: A Study in Eschatology. By CALVIN GOODSPEED, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in McMaster University, Toronto. 12mo. Pp. 288. Toronto: William Briggs. \$1.00 net.

A candid, judicious, able, and thorough defense of the post-millennial view of Christ's second advent,—an important subject upon which too little has been written on the right side.

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LABORATORY AND PULPIT: The Relation of Biology to the Preacher and his Message. (The Gay Lectures, 1900.) By WILLIAM L. POTRAT, M. A., Professor of Biology in Wake Forest College. 16mo. Pp. 103.

CONGREGATIONAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL AND PUBLISHING SOCIETY, Boston.

JOSEPH PARKER, D.D.: His Life and Ministry, Minister of the City Temple, London, author of "The People's Bible," etc. (New Century Leaders Series.) By ALBERT DAWSON, some time his Literary Assistant and Private Secretary. 12mo. Pp. 176. 1901. 75 cents net.

EATON & MAINS, New York.

COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT. Vol. VIII.—EZZKIEL AND DANIEL. By CAMDEN M. COBERN, D.D. 12mo. Pp. 415. \$2.00.

THE CONVERT AND HIS RELATIONS. By L. W. MUNHALL, M.A., D.D. (Evangelist), author of "Furnishing for Workers," "Anti-Higher Criticism," etc. With an Introduction. By Bishop WILLARD F. MALLALIEU, 12mo. Pp. 194. \$1.00.

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LONGMANS, GREEN & COMPANY, New York.

THE INCARNATION. (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.) By the Rev. H. V. S. ECK, M.A., St. Andrew's, Bethnal Green, some time Vice-Principal of Ely Theological College. 12mo. Pp. 288. 1901. \$1.50.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, New York.

THE ENGLISH CHURCH from the Norman Conquest to the Accession of Edward I. (1066-1272). (A History of the English Church.) By W. R. W. STEPHENS, B.D., F.S.A., Dean of Winchester. 12mo. Pp. xiii, 350. 1901. \$2.00 net.

THE EVOLUTION OF IMMORTALITY. By S. D. MCCONNELL, D.D., D.C.L. 12mo. Pp. 204. 1901. \$1.25.

A SEARCH FOR AN INFIDEL: Bits of Wayside Gospel. Second Series. By JENKIN LLOYD JONES. 12mo. Pp. x, 315. \$1.50.

PRESBYTERIAN BOARD OF PUBLICATION AND SABBATH-SCHOOL WORK,
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PRESBYTERIAN FOREIGN MISSIONS: An Account of the Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. By ROBERT E. SPREER, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. 16mo. Pp. 296. 1901.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, New York.

THE BODY OF CHRIST: An Inquiry into the Institution and Doctrine of Holy Communion. By CHARLES GORE, M.A., D.D., of the Community of the Resurrection, Canon of Westminster. 12mo. Pp. xv, 330. 1901. \$1.75.

IS CHRIST INFALLIBLE AND THE BIBLE TRUE? By the Reverend HUGH M'INTOSH, M.A., author of "The Philosophy of the Gospel," etc. Pp. xxviii, 680. \$3.00 net. Imported.

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